{"check":null,"uid":"73a403a001440520","title":"Wo Qi v. Wo Weidong, Exchange Union Company, Standard Coin Company & Nest Clearing and Custody Limited — [2026] ADGMCFI 0029","title_generated":false,"country":"ОАЭ","organ":"Суды ADGM","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-12","summary":"Суд отклонил заявления гражданки Китая и ее брата о наложении ареста на цифровые активы их отца и двух компаний, которыми он управляет, и отказе предоставить информацию об этих активах через оператора обмена криптовалют в Абу-Даби. Суд счел недостаточным риск того, что активы могут быть утрачены до рассмотрения основного дела в Китае. Он также выразил обеспокоенность поведением представителей истцов в китайском деле, отметив отсутствие своевременного раскрытия важной информации перед слушанием.","snippet":"","topics":["Криптоактивы и блокчейн"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":64610,"versions":1,"url":"https://assets.adgm.com/download/assets/ADGMCFI-2026-646+%26+647+-+Joint+Judgment+%28Freezing+and+Disclosure+Applications%29/949d20e8de8911f1a3b6be84f27955d6","first_seen":"2026-11-13","last_checked":"2026-11-16 07:55","relevance":"hit","score":16,"query":"","source_key":"adgm_ae","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":16,"topics":["Криптоактивы и блокчейн"],"need_body":4,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"virtual asset","weak":false,"pos":2795,"ctx":"financial services and markets regulations 2015  adgm fsra guidance on the regulation of virtual asset activities in adgm (10 june 2025)  interpretation of the supreme people’s court on the ap","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"crypto","weak":false,"pos":4986,"ctx":"ch the freezing injunctions are intended to attach  comprise, primarily, various forms of cryptocurrency. the applications were made on notice to the defendants, who are their father, mr wo weid","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"crypto","weak":false,"pos":7628,"ctx":"t. if granted, the freezing injunctions would prevent the wo defendants from dealing with cryptocurrency in the digital asset accounts. the wo defendants oppose the applications.  6. ms qi and m","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"virtual asset","weak":false,"pos":18149,"ctx":"ers, mdm sun, ms qi and mr quan. at issue in the singapore proceedings is whether certain virtual assets are held by (among others) mdm sun, ms qi and mr quan for the benefit of mr wo.14 b. in m","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"virtual asset","weak":false,"pos":18467,"ctx":"july 2025, mdm sun sought an injunction in hong kong to restrain mr wo from dealing with virtual assets pending resolution of the prc divorce proceedings (the “hong kong proceedings”).  d. on 1","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"virtual asset","weak":false,"pos":24077,"ctx":". no issue was joined on whether there was any impediment to the restraint of dealings in virtual assets, such as the digital asset accounts. i proceed on the basis that such jurisdiction does e","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-11-13","meta":{"full_text_url":"https://assets.adgm.com/download/assets/ADGMCFI-2026-646+%26+647+-+Joint+Judgment+%28Freezing+and+Disclosure+Applications%29/949d20e8de8911f1a3b6be84f27955d6"},"source_url":"https://assets.adgm.com/download/assets/ADGMCFI-2026-646+%26+647+-+Joint+Judgment+%28Freezing+and+Disclosure+Applications%29/949d20e8de8911f1a3b6be84f27955d6","text":"In the name of\n\n## His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan\n\nPresident of the United Arab Emirates/ Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi\n\n## COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE\n\n## COMMERCIAL AND CIVIL DIVISION\n\nBETWEEN\n\n## WO QI\n\nClaimant and\n\n## WO WEIDONG\n\nFirst Defendant\n\n## EXCHANGE UNION COMPANY\n\nSecond Defendant\n\n## STANDARD COIN COMPANY\n\nThird Defendant\n\n## NEST CLEARING AND CUSTODY LIMITED\n\nFourth Defendant\n\n## COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE\n\n## COMMERCIAL AND CIVIL DIVISION\n\nBETWEEN\n\n## QUAN (JAMES) WO\n\nClaimant and\n\n## WO WEIDONG\n\nFirst Defendant\n\n## EXCHANGE UNION COMPANY\n\nSecond Defendant\n\n## STANDARD COIN COMPANY\n\nThird Defendant\n\n## NEST CLEARING AND CUSTODY LIMITED\n\nFourth Defendant\n\n## JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE PAUL HEATH KC\n\n## Neutral Citation:\n\n[2026] ADGMCFI 0029\n\n## Before:\n\nJustice Paul Heath KC\n\n## Decision Date:\n\n12 November 2026\n\n## Decision:\n\nIn each proceeding (ADGMCFI-2026-646 and ADGMCFI- 2026-647):\n\n1. The Additional Evidence Application is granted and the following is admitted into evidence:\n\na. Xin Mou 4;\n\n## b. the Challenged Evidence; and c. the fourth witness statement of Lan Yan filed\n\non 2 November 2026.\n\n2. The Freezing and Disclosure Application is dismissed.1\n\n3. As between:\n\na. the Claimant and First to Third Defendants, costs are reserved including the basis of costs to be awarded (standard or indemnity) and quantum; and b. the Claimant and the Fourth Defendant, there be no order as to costs.\n\n4. If the Claimant and First to Third Defendants are unable to agree costs, the First to Third Defendants shall file and serve a statement of costs in accordance with Annexure 2 to Practice Direction 9 and seek directions from the Court as to the exchange of written submissions on costs.\n\n5. Liberty to apply.\n\n## Hearing Dates:\n\n25 September and 5 November 2026\n\n## Date of Orders:\n\n12 November 2026\n\n## Catchwords:\n\nFreezing injunctions. Foreign proceedings (PRC). Chabra jurisdiction. Digital assets. Good arguable case. Risk of dissipation. Adequacy of existing preservation orders. Information disclosure orders. Non-disclosure by PRC lawyer. Applications dismissed. Costs.\n\n1 For the avoidance of doubt, this provision does not affect the Court’s decision on the Alternative Service Application and the Case Management Application which were dealt with by Order dated 4 September 2026 (re-issued on 7 September 2026 with reasons).\n\n## Legislation Cited:\n\nAgreement Between the UAE and the PRC on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters\n\nADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016\n\nAbu Dhabi Law (No. 4) of 2013, as amended by Abu Dhabi Law (No. 12) of 2020\n\nADGM Courts, Civil Evidence, Judgments, Enforcement and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2015\n\nADGM Financial Services and Markets Regulations 2015\n\nADGM FSRA Guidance on the Regulation of Virtual Asset Activities in ADGM (10 June 2025)\n\nInterpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China\n\n## Cases Cited:\n\nWo Qi and Quan (James) Wo v Wo Weidong ADGMCFI- 2026-646 and ADGMCFI-2026-647, Order dated 4 September 2026 (reissued on 7 September 2026 with reasons)\n\nAbu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Shetty [2021]\n\n## ADGMCFI 0004\n\nSociété Générale v Sanayi [2017] EWHC 667 (Comm)\n\nA17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001\n\nAA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)\n\nConvoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24\n\nLakatamia Shipping v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203\n\nTTMI Ltd v ASM Shipping Ltd [2005] EWHC 2666 (Comm)\n\nHolyoake v Candy [2017] EWCA Civ 92\n\nTSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1\n\n## WLR 231\n\nFourie v Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 WLR 320\n\nCivil Ruling (2026) Hu 0104 Min Chu No. 18660\n\nExchange Union Company & ors v Wo Qi & ors (High Court, Singapore, HC/SUM 464/2024)\n\nWo Qi v Exchange Union Company (Appellate Division, High Court, Singapore, No. AD/OA No. 28 of 2024)\n\nPetroceltic Resources Ltd v Archer [2018] EWHC 671 (Comm)\n\nAlliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Mazzagatti [2026] EWCA Civ 1043\n\nFW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Ltd v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Co [2025] EWHC 1920 (Comm)\n\n## Case Number:\n\nADGMCFI-2026-646 and ADGMCFI-2026-647\n\n## Parties and representation:\n\nIn each proceeding (ADGMCFI-2026-646 and ADGMCFI- 2026-647): Jamie Riley KC and Clarissa Jones for Claimant (instructed by Hadef & Partners LLC) Rajesh Pillai KC and James McWilliams for First, Second and Third Defendants (instructed by AlAidarous Advocates & Legal Consultants LLC) No appearance by or on behalf of Fourth Defendant at the hearings\n\nJUDGMENT\n\n## Introduction\n\n1.\n\n## On 27 August 2026, Wo Qi (“Ms Qi”) and her brother, Mr Quan (James) Wo (“Mr Quan”)\n\nfiled discrete claims seeking freezing and information disclosure orders (the\n\n## “Applications”) in aid of foreign legal proceedings in the People’s Republic of China (the\n\n## “PRC Proceedings”). The property to which the freezing injunctions are intended to attach\n\ncomprise, primarily, various forms of cryptocurrency. The Applications were made on notice to the Defendants, who are their father, Mr Wo Weidong (“Mr Wo”), two companies associated with him and a third unrelated company.2 The PRC Proceedings have been brought against Mr Wo and their mother, Madam Sun Hongmin (“Mdm Sun”), in the\n\nShanghai Xuhui District People’s Court (the “Xuhui Court”).\n\n2. In the PRC Proceedings, Ms Qi and Mr Quan seek relief arising out of the distribution of proceeds of sale of two properties in Shanghai.3 The properties were sold in 2021. In general terms, each of the siblings alleges that their father caused the misapplication of proceeds of those sales to which they were respectively personally entitled as registered proprietors of 50% interests in the respective properties. Because their mother (as holder of the remaining 50% interest in the respective properties) received the proceeds in the first instance, she too has been joined as a defendant. Ms Qi and Mr Quan seek judgment in the sums of USD 14,224,421.74 and USD 63,212,836.26 respectively.\n\n3. Freezing and information disclosure orders are sought against Mr Wo and two companies that it is accepted he controls: Exchange Union Company (“Exchange Union”) and\n\n## Standard Coin Company (“Standard Coin”). Both Exchange Union and Standard Coin\n\nwere incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Unless the context otherwise requires, I shall refer to Mr Wo, Exchange Union and Standard Coin collectively as the “Wo Defendants”.\n\n2 See paragraphs 3 and 4 below. 3 See paragraph 14 below.\n\n4. In each proceeding, an order requiring disclosure ancillary to a freezing order is sought against the Wo Defendants and a third company, Nest Clearing and Custody Limited (“Nest Clearing”). Nest Clearing operates the Binance exchange in the Abu Dhabi Global Market (“ADGM”). Exchange Union and Standard Coin are alleged to have digital assets deposited with Nest Clearing (the “Digital Asset Accounts”). Ms Qi and Mr Quan allege that Exchange Union and Standard Coin hold those Digital Asset Accounts on behalf of Mr Wo. The information disclosure orders sought against all four Defendants are broadly expressed. The obvious intention is to gather information about all digital assets that the Wo Defendants may hold in accounts operated by Nest Clearing, and otherwise.\n\n5. All orders are sought to protect Ms Qi and Mr Quan’s positions pending determination of the PRC Proceedings. Two specific Digital Asset Accounts are targeted in the Applications, though more general relief of the same type is also sought. If granted, the freezing injunctions would prevent the Wo Defendants from dealing with cryptocurrency in the Digital Asset Accounts. The Wo Defendants oppose the Applications.\n\n6. Ms Qi and Mr Quan seek an order requiring Nest Clearing to disclose information and documents concerning any accounts held on behalf of the Wo Defendants within the Binance exchange that it operates. While Nest Clearing has appeared in these proceedings, it has taken no active steps but has confirmed to the Registry that it abides the decision of the Court and will comply with any order made.\n\n## Relevant procedural history\n\n7. Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s claims were each filed on 27 August 2026. At that time, Mr Wo disputed that he had been served, despite the fact that lawyers acting for him in proceedings in Singapore (Setia Law) had been provided with the documents and had acknowledged receipt of them. At a without notice hearing held on 4 September 2026, I was asked to make an order approving an alternative mode of service on Mr Wo.4 That order was required because of the prima facie application of a treaty into which the Governments of the PRC and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) had entered in 2006: Agreement Between the UAE and the PRC on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Treaty”). The Treaty came into force on 12 April 2006. For the purposes of the Treaty, ADGM is treated as part of the UAE.\n\n8.\n\n## I made an order for service by alternative means (the “Service Order”). I explained my\n\nreasons as follows:5 “21. In the context of this case, I was satisfied that there is “good reason” to order both service by email on Mr Wo in the PRC and by email on Setia Law, in Singapore because:\n\na. I am satisfied that it would take between 6 and 12 months to effect service under the terms of the Treaty. That length of time is not appropriate for a time sensitive application for a freezing order. While this factor will not be enough to meet the “good reason”\n\n4 Under rule 19 of the ADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016. 5 Wo Qi and Quan (James) Wo v Wo Weidong ADGMCFI-2026-646 and ADGMCFI-2026-647, Order dated 4 September 2026 (re-issued on 7 September 2026 with reasons) at paragraph 21 of the reasons. I also made an order that the two proceedings be case managed and heard together: see paragraphs 4–6 of the Order of 4 September 2026 (re-issued on 7 September 2026 with reasons). Original footnotes have been retained in the extract from my reasons.\n\nthreshold in most cases,6 the time-sensitive nature of the Claim and the freezing order applications elevate its importance.\n\nb. As indicated, it is clear from Setia’s letters of 31 August 2026 to the legal representatives for the Claimants and the ADGM Court that Mr Wo is well aware of the proceeding. Mr Wo is in possession of documents that were previously sent to him by email of 28 August 2026.\n\n## c. There is an element of gamesmanship involved.7 I have formed that\n\nview based on the two letters from Setia Law. The relevant Court documents have already been brought to Mr Wo’s attention and it is apparent that he is seeking advice from lawyers who practise in the Abu Dhabi Global Market.8 Mr Wo takes inconsistent positions: on the one hand, he asserts that he has not been validly served yet, on the other, he seeks to ensure that the solicitors are provided with any further documents filed in these proceedings. He cannot have it both ways. In essence, Mr Wo wishes to be treated as an active litigant whilst, at the same time, reserving his right to apply to set aside service of the proceedings. The relevance of this type of “gaming” of the system is apparent from what Popplewell J said in Société Générale v Sanayi.9 d. Mr Wo will suffer no prejudice from service being effected by alternative means. All that will happen is that the de facto position with regard to service will be given lawful status.”\n\n(Footnotes retained and amended as appropriate.)\n\n9. All four Defendants have now been served. The Service Order has not been challenged. The Wo Defendants have each filed Acknowledgements of Service and have participated actively to oppose the Applications.\n\n10. At the same time that the Service Order was made, the proceedings were given a return date of 25 September 2026. As the Applications were made on notice, a hearing was scheduled to determine whether the freezing and information disclosure orders sought by Ms Qi and Mr Quan should be made. Timetabling orders were made to facilitate a defended hearing of the Applications. Although the timetable was tight and required prompt steps to be taken by the Wo Defendants, they co-operated to ensure the hearing could proceed on 25 September 2026.\n\n11. An unexpected development occurred prior to the 25 September 2026 hearing, to which the Court was alerted through evidence filed on behalf of the Wo Defendants. From that evidence, it appeared that the PRC Proceedings had been “amended”, with the consequence that Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s claims of USD 14 million and USD 63 million\n\n6 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Shetty [2021] ADGMCFI 0004, at paragraph 15. 7 Société Générale v Sanayi [2017] EWHC 667 (Comm) at paragraph 49(c). 8 After the hearing, a document purporting to be an acknowledgement of service from Mr Wo was filed on the eCourts Platform. It too [suffered] from the same deficiency. It [did] not unequivocally accept service, yet [purported] to advocate Mr Wo’s position on service and case management issues. 9 Société Générale v Sanayi [2017] EWHC 667 (Comm) at paragraph 49(c).\n\nrespectively10 had been reduced to a sum of about USD 1,500, in each proceeding.11 As the value of the PRC Proceedings was relevant to the question whether a freezing order should be granted, the Applications were adjourned (at the request of Ms Qi and Mr Quan) until 5 November 2026 for hearing. It was apparent that counsel for Ms Qi and Mr Quan in the present proceedings had been unaware of “amendments” made in the PRC Proceedings. Additional directions were made for the filing and service of updating evidence and supplementary skeleton submissions.\n\n12. On 28 October 2026, Ms Qi and Mr Quan made applications to file and serve additional evidence (the “Additional Evidence Applications”) in response to a witness statement filed on 19 October 2026, by a PRC lawyer, Ms Lan Yan (“Ms Lan”), on behalf of the Wo Defendants.12 The additional evidence consisted of a fourth witness statement from a PRC lawyer, Mr Xin Mou (“Mr Xin”), engaged by them in the PRC Proceedings (“Xin Mou 4”). Reliance was also placed on extracts from a witness statement from an independent PRC lawyer, Mr Yun Zhi, giving evidence on behalf of Ms Qi and Mr Quan, which was asserted by the Wo Defendants to have been outside the scope of the Court’s permission to allow reply evidence. I refer to the latter as the “Challenged Evidence”.\n\n13. The Additional Evidence Applications were referred to me on filing. On 28 October 2026, I made orders allowing the additional evidence (and any evidence in response) to be filed on a de bene esse basis, without determining admissibility. After making some adjustments to the extant timetabling directions, I ordered that the Additional Evidence Applications would be dealt with at the commencement of the 5 November 2026 hearing. I address the Additional Evidence Applications later.13\n\nContext\n\n14. Ms Qi and Mr Quan allege that, on 21 October 2021, they and their mother, Mdm Sun, entered into two agreements for the sale and purchase of properties situated in Shanghai.\n\n## One, situated in the Huayuan Shiqiao Road (the “Huayuan Property”), was (on the face of\n\nthe register) jointly owned by Mdm Sun and Ms Qi. The other, in Huashan Road (the “Huashan Property”), was shown to be owned by Mdm Sun and Mr Quan.\n\n15. At the time the Huayuan and Huashan Properties were acquired, Ms Qi was two years of age and Mr Quan was six years old. They assert that their respective one-half interests had been gifted to them by their parents. The Huayuan Property was sold for CNY 191.2 million. The Huashan Property was sold for CNY 850 million. The proceeds of sale of the properties were substantially distributed for the benefit of companies controlled by Mr Wo, including Shanghai Huiyin Investment Co., Ltd (“Huiyin Investment”). This is alleged to have been done at the direction of Mr Wo, for his own benefit.\n\n16. In July 2026, Ms Qi and Mr Quan each brought claims in the Xuhui Court to recover the funds that they allege should be paid to them. There are disputes as to the proper characterisation of the claims made in the PRC Proceedings. While Ms Qi and Mr Quan assert that their claims in the PRC Proceedings are based on property rights that each had in respect of the Huayuan Property and the Huashan Property respectively, Mr Wo takes the view that the claim arose out of an oral agreement and is based in debt. Because the\n\n10 See paragraph 2 above. 11 See paragraph 43 below. 12 This witness statement was filed pursuant to the 25 September 2026 directions. 13 See paragraphs 25 and 26 below.\n\nclaims are expressed in similar terms, I use the English translation of Mr Quan’s Civil Complaint for the purpose of summarising the way in which they are put:\n\n“In summary [Mr Wo’s] repeated deception of [Mr Quan] has caused him substantial financial losses and emotional harm, and [Mr Quan] has consequently lost virtually all trust and respect for him. [The Huashan Property] at issue was gifted to [Mr Quan], and [Mr Quan] holds a 50% ownership interest in it, corresponding to CNY 425 million of the sale proceeds. Although [Mdm Sun] agreed, after receiving the sale proceeds, to return [Mr Quan’s] share to him, she transferred nearly all of the proceeds, at [Mr Wo’s] direction, to companies and individuals under his control and is now effectively unable to make repayment. [Mr Wo] should therefore also bear liability for the repayment of the sale proceeds. [Mr Quan] has made repeated demands for repayment, but to no avail. To protect his lawful rights and interests, [Mr Quan] hereby brings this action before this Court and respectfully requests that judgment be entered as prayed for above.”\n\n17. Mr Wo and Mdm Sun no longer live together. Since February 2024, they have engaged in acrimonious litigation in no less than four jurisdictions:\n\na. In February 2024, Mr Wo commenced proceedings in the High Court of Singapore\n\n## (the “Singapore Proceedings”) by which he sought injunctive relief against, among\n\nothers, Mdm Sun, Ms Qi and Mr Quan. At issue in the Singapore Proceedings is whether certain virtual assets are held by (among others) Mdm Sun, Ms Qi and Mr Quan for the benefit of Mr Wo.14 b. In May 2025, Mdm Sun brought proceedings in the PRC to dissolve her marriage to Mr Wo (the “PRC Divorce Proceedings”).\n\nc. On 15 July 2025, Mdm Sun sought an injunction in Hong Kong to restrain Mr Wo from dealing with virtual assets pending resolution of the PRC Divorce Proceedings (the “Hong Kong Proceedings”).\n\nd. On 12 August 2025 and 30 April 2026, Mdm Sun filed separate injunction proceedings against Exchange Union and Standard Coin, respectively, in the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Proceedings”). The Cayman Proceedings were never served on Exchange Union or Standard Coin.15\n\n18. Mr Wo defended the PRC Divorce Proceedings on the grounds that the marriage had not irretrievably broken down. The Court accepted that contention. On 31 October 2025, the Court dismissed Mdm Sun’s application. Mdm Sun’s appeal against that decision was dismissed on 2 March 2026. As a result, Mdm Sun withdrew the Hong Kong Proceedings. While Ms Qi and Mr Quan now assert that Mr Wo is acting in a manner contrary to the position that he took in the PRC Divorce Proceedings, I do not need to make any findings in relation to that point.\n\n19. On 13 August 2025, Mdm Sun wrote to Nest Clearing to inform it about the 12 August 2025 Cayman Proceeding16 requesting that a freeze be placed over the Exchange Union and\n\n14 See paragraph 57 below. 15 See paragraph 19 below. 16 See paragraph 17.d above.\n\nStandard Coin Digital Asset Accounts. Those accounts were frozen voluntarily on 19 August 2025. However, the freeze was lifted on or about 8 May 2026 following filing of the 30 April 2026 Cayman Proceeding.17 Nest Clearing declined to continue that freeze. Subsequently, Mr Wo has refused to give any undertaking not to deal with the Digital Asset Accounts pending determination of these proceedings or the PRC Proceedings.\n\n20. The PRC Proceedings were not commenced until July 2026. Shortly after each proceeding had been filed, the Xuhui Court issued preservation orders (the “Preservation Orders”) in favour of Ms Qi and Mr Quan.18 The Preservation Orders were directed to both Mr Wo and Mdm Sun. In the proceeding brought by Ms Qi, the Preservation Order froze assets to the value of CNY 95.6 million. The Preservation Order made in favour of Mr Quan restrained his parents from disposing of assets to a value of CNY 425 million. The Preservation Orders attach shares in three companies controlled by Mr Wo: namely, Huiyin Investment, Shanghai Huiyin Group Co Ltd and Shanghai Ruitan Network Technology Co Ltd.\n\n21. The aggregate registered value of the shares in those three companies is approximately CNY 626 million, or USD 93.2 million. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the registered value of the shares does not (or no longer) equate to their market value. If the shares are presently worth USD 93.2 million, that amount exceeds the combined claims of Ms Qi and Mr Quan, which are approximately USD 77 million.19\n\nStructure of judgment\n\n22. Because the evidence advanced was so voluminous and unmanageable (the hearing bundle alone runs to some 9,210 pages) even fulsome reasons, given after a significant period to study the documentation in detail, would necessarily be incomplete and selective in nature. In the time available, I have done the best I can to distil the issues to their essence, avoiding rehearsal of the parties’ argument and focussing on the material points for decision.\n\n23. I analyse the issues in the following sequence:\n\na. First, I determine the Additional Evidence Applications.\n\nb. Second, I summarise the legal principles applicable to the grant of freezing and information disclosure orders.\n\nc. Third, I consider whether freezing injunctions should be made against the Wo Defendants.\n\nd. Fourth, I consider whether information disclosure orders should be made against the Wo Defendants and/or Nest Clearing.\n\n24. I record my appreciation of the arguments advanced at the 5 November 2026 hearing by Mr Jamie Riley KC and Ms Clarissa Jones (for Ms Qi and Mr Quan) and Mr Rajesh Pillai KC and Mr James McWilliams (for the Wo Defendants). It is only because of their focussed submissions that I have been able to produce a judgment that is sufficiently time-sensitive and directed to the points in issue.\n\n17 Ibid. 18 See also paragraph 43 below. 19 See paragraph 2 above.\n\n## Analysis\n\n(a) The Additional Evidence Applications\n\n25. At the commencement of the 5 November 2026 hearing, I heard from counsel on the Additional Evidence Applications.20 Mr Pillai confirmed that no objection was pursued in relation to the admissibility of Xin Mou 4 but that the Challenged Evidence remained in dispute. I make an order admitting Xin Mou 4.\n\n26. Mr Pillai was unable to point to any prejudice that had been suffered by the Wo Defendants as a result of the Challenged Evidence. He also acknowledged that I would not be making substantive decisions on applicability of Chinese law (for example, whether the PRC Proceedings are statute barred) in the context of a hearing of freezing order applications in ADGM. In those circumstances, I took the view that the Challenged Evidence should be admitted. I have taken Mr Pillai’s points of objection into account in determining what weight should be given to the Challenged Evidence. The Challenged Evidence is ruled admissible.\n\n(b) Legal principles (i) Freezing injunctions\n\n27. The parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction to make a freezing injunction in aid of foreign proceedings.21 That jurisdiction was confirmed by this Court in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Shetty,22 in which it was held that a freezing order could be made in support of foreign proceedings, even where a respondent might be a foreign national residing outside of the ADGM. No issue was joined on whether there was any impediment to the restraint of dealings in virtual assets, such as the Digital Asset Accounts. I proceed on the basis that such jurisdiction does exist.23\n\n28. The parties also agree on the test for determining whether a freezing order should be made. The controlling authority is the decision of the Privy Council in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd24 (“Broad Idea”). Delivering the Privy Council’s advice on behalf of Lord Briggs, Lord Sales, Lord Hamblen and himself, Lord Leggatt said:25 “101. In summary, a court with equitable and/or statutory jurisdiction to grant injunctions where it is just and convenient to do so has power - and it accords with principle and good practice - to grant a freezing injunction against a party (the respondent) over whom the court has personal jurisdiction provided that:\n\n20 See paragraphs 12 and 13 above. 21 A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraphs [42]-[57]. See also article 13(7) of Abu Dhabi Law (No. 4) of 2013, as amended by Abu Dhabi Law (No. 12) of 2020 (the Founding Law), sections 16(2)(b)-(d) and 41(1)-(3) of the ADGM Courts, Civil Evidence, Judgments, Enforcement and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2015 and rules 71 and 72 of the ADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016. 22 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Shetty [2021] ADGMCFI 0004, at paragraph 20. This proposition was confirmed in A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraphs [50]-[58]. 23 See section 258(1) of the ADGM Financial Services and Markets Regulations 2015 and paragraph 47(a) of the ADGM FSRA Guidance on the Regulation of Virtual Asset Activities in ADGM (10 June 2025). See also AA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) at paragraphs 55-61. 24 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraphs 101 and 102, applied in A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraphs 52, 67 and 78. 25 Ibid, at paragraphs 101 and 102. Although a separate judgment was given by Sir Geoffrey Vos, on behalf of Lord Reed, Lord Hodge and himself, that plurality did not dispute the points articulated by Lord Leggatt at paragraphs 101 and 102.\n\n(i) the applicant has already been granted or has a good arguable case for being granted a judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money that is or will be enforceable through the process of the court;\n\n(ii) the respondent holds assets (or, as discussed below, is liable to take steps other than in the ordinary course of business which will reduce the value of assets) against which such a judgment could be enforced; and (iii) there is a real risk that, unless the injunction is granted, the respondent will deal with such assets (or take steps which make them less valuable) other than in the ordinary course of business with the result that the availability or value of the assets is impaired and the judgment is left unsatisfied.\n\n102. Although other factors are potentially relevant to the exercise of the discretion whether to grant a freezing injunction, there are no other relevant restrictions on the availability in principle of the remedy. In particular:\n\n“(i) There is no requirement that the judgment should be a judgment of the domestic court - the principle applies equally to a foreign judgment or other award capable of enforcement in the same way as a judgment of the domestic court using the court’s enforcement powers.\n\n(ii) Although it is the usual situation, there is no requirement that the judgment should be a judgment against the respondent.\n\n(iii) There is no requirement that proceedings in which the judgment is sought should yet have been commenced nor that a right to bring such proceedings should yet have arisen: it is enough that the court can be satisfied with a sufficient degree of certainty that a right to bring proceedings will arise and that proceedings will be brought (whether in the domestic court or before another court or tribunal).”\n\n29. For ADGM purposes, I bear in mind the breadth of both the general jurisdiction to issue interim injunctions26 and the specific freezing order jurisdiction.27 Under the former, an order should only issue if it were “just and convenient” to do so, while the latter is based on an “interests of justice” test. The term “just and convenient” is used in the English authorities. While I use that expression for present purposes, in my view the two expressions should be treated as synonymous in the context in which they are used. The purpose of each is to provide a residual discretion to enable the Court to stand back and consider whether an order is justified notwithstanding findings that it may have made on the “good arguable case” and “risk of dissipation” points.\n\n26 ADGM Courts Civil Evidence, Judgments, Enforcement and Judicial Appointments Regulations, section 41(1). 27 ADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016, rule 71(1)(f), set out at paragraph 48 below.\n\n30. In order to establish a “good arguable case” it is generally accepted that a “plausible evidential basis” is sufficient. It is unnecessary to demonstrate that a claim is more likely than not to succeed.28 As Lord Leggatt observed in Broad Idea, there is no need for a foreign proceeding to be on foot at the time that a freezing order is sought: “it is enough that the court can be satisfied with a sufficient degree of certainty that a right to bring proceedings will arise and that proceedings will be brought (whether in the domestic court or before another court or tribunal)”.29\n\n31. Generally speaking, in assessing whether a “good arguable case” and a risk of an unjustified dissipation of assets exists, the Court must be satisfied that there is “solid evidence” to support its conclusions. As to the latter, the Court must assess whether the evidence adduced demonstrates a likelihood that assets will be put out of the reach of a judgment creditor, by disposal, or concealment, otherwise than in the normal course of business.30 I regard the expressions “plausible evidential basis” and “solid evidence” as synonymous in this context. That view was adopted in Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto.31\n\n32. It must not be forgotten that the onus of establishing the risk of an unjustified dissipation of assets rests throughout on a claimant. That said, there are circumstances in which it may be appropriate to draw inferences to support such a conclusion from the absence of evidence from a respondent within whose exclusive knowledge such evidence would reside. I adopt the approach articulated by Gloster LJ in Holyoake v Candy:32 “51. Second, it follows that, unless an applicant has raised a prima facie case to support a freezing order, the respondent is not obliged to provide any explanation or answer any questions posed—and nor can a purported failure to do so be held against the respondent. It is only if the applicant has raised material from which a real risk of dissipation can be inferred, that the respondent will be expected to provide an explanation. Then, in appropriate circumstances, the lack of a satisfactory explanation may give rise to an adverse inference.”\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\n33. It is accepted that there is no direct cause of action against Exchange Union or Standard Coin (non-cause of action defendants). The Court’s jurisdiction to order an injunction against those parties derives from (what has become known as) the Chabra33 jurisdiction. This jurisdiction was summarised by Justice Sir Andrew Smith in A17 v B17,34 as follows:\n\n“71. In my Ruling, I said that an applicant for a Chabra injunction must establish: (i) that there are grounds for belief or good reason to suppose that the respondent has assets that that would be covered by the order; (ii) that there is good reason to suppose that the respondent has assets that would be amenable to some process, ultimately enforceable by the courts, by which the assets would be available to satisfy a judgment\n\n28 Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203, at paragraph 38; see also paragraphs 33-37, applied in A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraph 68. 29 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 102(iii) set out at paragraph 28 above. 30 TTMI Ltd v ASM Shipping Ltd [2005] EWHC 2666 (Comm) at paragraph 25. 31 Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203, at paragraphs 33-38. 32 Holyoake v Candy [2017] EWCA Civ 92, at paragraph 51. 33 TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231. 34 A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraphs 71–73.\n\nagainst the respondent to the applicant’s substantive case (but the applicant does not have to identify specific assets in the hands of the respondent that would be available); and (iii) that there is a real risk that a judgment in the applicant’s favour would go unsatisfied by reason of the respondent disposing of assets, unless restrained by the Court from doing so.\n\n72. It is not in dispute that this formulation is in accordance with the principles of English law established before the judgments in the Broad Idea case: see, for example, PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Sergey Maksimov and ors [2013] EWHC 422 (Comm) at para 7. However, Mr Dillon-Malone submitted that I misdirected myself because Lord Leggatt “reformulated” the applicable test in his judgment (esp at para 101, cit sup), and that English law, and so ADGM law, requires that A17 must establish that it has “a good arguable case for enforcing a money judgment against [D17’s] assets using some process of the Court … While [C17] may have a shareholding in respect of [D17], any enforcement action against those shares could never amount to an enforcement action against [D17]”.\n\n73. I reject that argument: there is no indication in Lord Leggatt’s judgment that he intended to make the test for making a Chabra injunction more demanding: on the contrary, Mr Dillon-Malone’s interpretation of the judgment seems to me inconsistent with Lord Leggatt’s “enforcement principle”, which is key to his reasoning (loc cit at paras 84ff). I cannot accept that paragraph 101 of his judgment bears the interpretation that Mr Dillon-Malone sought to put on it. My view is, I think, confirmed by the judgment of Lords Reed, Briggs and Kitchen in Wolverhampton City Council and ors v London Gypsies and Travellers and ors [2023] UKSC 47, in that, when explaining the Chabra jurisdiction (at para 43), they cite the TSB Private Bank International SA case itself and other cases, without reference to the Broad Idea case. I add, however, even if I had accepted Mr Dillon-Malone’s argument on this point, it would not have affected any of the decisions that I have reached.”\n\n(Original emphasis)\n\n34. Under the Chabra jurisdiction, an applicant must establish that there are grounds for belief (or good reason to suppose) that the non-cause of action defendant has assets that would be covered by a freezing order and that a person against whom a money judgment might be granted may take steps to dissipate those assets unless restrained by the Court from doing so. The rationale for the Chabra jurisdiction is that assets held in the name of a noncause of action defendant but controlled by a cause of action defendant will be treated as assets held by a non-cause of action defendant as nominee or trustee for a cause of action defendant.\n\n(ii) Information disclosure orders\n\n35. This Court has jurisdiction, ancillary to its powers to grant a freezing injunction, to require a party to disclose information about a cause of action defendant’s assets. The jurisdiction is broad. Rule 71(1)(g) of the ADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016 (the “Court Procedure\n\n## Rules”) provides:\n\n“71.\n\n## Orders for interim remedies\n\n(1) The Court may grant such interim remedies as are necessary in the interests of justice (whether in the particular case or more generally) including –\n\n… (g) an order directing a party to provide information about the location of relevant property or assets or to provide information about relevant property or assets which are or may be the subject of an application for a freezing injunction;\n\n…”\n\n36. The breadth of this Court’s discretion to make disclosure orders is in dispute. While Mr Riley submitted that the jurisdiction is broadly based and designed to assist in policing a freezing injunction prospectively, Mr McWilliams (who argued this aspect of the case on behalf of the Wo Defendants) contended that a more narrow approach was required. Mr McWilliams characterised the orders sought as no more than improper “fishing” for the existence of assets of which Ms Qi and Mr Quan are presently unaware.\n\n37. In view of the conclusion I have reached,35 it is unnecessary for me to determine which of the two approaches should be taken.\n\n(c) Should freezing injunctions be issued?\n\n38. The Wo Defendants joined issue on all three elements of the test for determining whether freezing injunctions should be issued.36 I consider whether to issue freezing injunctions by reference to the arguments advanced in relation to each of those elements.\n\n39. For reasons that will become apparent, I deal with the Wo Defendants’ positions collectively.\n\n## “Good arguable case”\n\n40. As the Privy Council made clear in Broad Idea, the first question is whether an applicant for a freezing injunction “has already been granted or has a good arguable case for being granted a judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money that is or will be enforceable through the process of the court”.37 In the context of an application for a freezing order in aid of a foreign proceeding, the focus is on whether an applicant has “a good arguable case” to obtain a money judgment in the court of the foreign jurisdiction in issue.\n\n41. Mr Riley submitted that the present proceedings before the Xuhui Court were sufficient to pass the “good arguable case” threshold. Mr Pillai’s argument was more refined,\n\n35 See paragraph 63 below. 36 The tests are summarised, by reference to the Privy Council’s decision in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraphs 101 and 102, set out at paragraph 28 above. See also paragraph 29 above. 37Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 101(i).\n\nemphasising a number of procedural steps that had been taken in the Xuhui Court immediately prior to and after the initial hearing in this Court that had been scheduled for 25 September 2026. Mr Pillai submitted that those steps foreclosed the possibility of a finding that Ms Qi and Mr Quan had established a “good arguable case”.\n\n42. I start by identifying material steps taken in the Xuhui Court both before and after 25 September 2026. Most of these were identified in witness statements filed after the 25 September 2026 hearing.\n\n43. Having commenced the PRC Proceedings against Mr Wo and Mdm Sun in July 2026, Ms Qi and Mr Quan brought their Applications before this Court on 27 August 2026. As to subsequent steps, the evidence establishes that:\n\na. Mr Wo challenged the jurisdiction of the Xuhui Court to determine the PRC Proceedings based on Mdm Sun’s place of residence in Shanghai. Mr Wo’s position was that, having regard to Mdm Sun’s then residential address, the proceedings should have been filed in the Shanghai Jing’an People’s Court (the “Jing’an Court”).\n\nb. On 15 September 2026, after the jurisdiction challenge had been filed, Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s PRC legal representative, Mr Xin, filed applications in the Xuhui Court seeking permission to reduce the value of each of the claims in the PRC Proceedings to approximately CNY 10,000, about USD 1,500 (the “PRC Amendment Applications”). The PRC Amendment Applications were not served on Mr Wo or his legal representative, Ms Lan.\n\nc. Although the PRC Amendment Applications had been filed on 15 September 2026, Mr Xin failed to disclose the PRC Amendment Applications in a witness statement prepared and filed in advance of the 25 September 2026 hearing in this Court. Ms Lan discovered the existence of the PRC Amendment Applications on 22 September 2026, during the course of the hearing of Mr Wo’s jurisdiction challenge. Evidence about the PRC Amendment Applications was put before this Court by Mr Wo shortly prior to the scheduled 25 September 2026 hearing. On receipt of that evidence, Ms Qi and Mr Quan applied to adjourn the Applications, notwithstanding the urgency with which they had previously contended they should be determined.\n\nd. Between the intended hearing date of 25 September 2026 and the date to which the Applications had been adjourned, 5 November 2026, Ms Qi and Mr Quan applied to withdraw the PRC Proceedings (the “Withdrawal Applications”). That was done by Mr Xin, apparently without instructions from Ms Qi and Mr Quan. Mr Xin’s intention was to take advantage (by a procedure that does not appear to be uncommon in the PRC) of a change in Mdm Sun’s registered address which had occurred on 18 September 2026. His purpose was to use the Withdrawal Applications as a means of resisting Mr Wo’s jurisdiction challenge.\n\ne. Before the Withdrawal Applications were determined, the Xuhui Court ruled in favour of Mr Wo on his jurisdiction challenge. The Xuhui Court held that jurisdiction lay in the Court of the District in which Mr Wo and Mdm Sun had resided: the Jing’an Court. Consequently, the PRC Proceedings were transferred to the Jing’an Court. No appeal has been brought against the jurisdiction decision, and the time for appealing that decision has expired.\n\nf. On 10 October 2026, Ms Qi and Mr Quan sought to refile fresh proceedings before the Xuhui Court containing the same substantive allegations as had been made in the PRC Proceedings, albeit restoring the claims to their original values of approximately USD 14 million and USD 63 million respectively.38\n\n44. Mr Pillai submits that the PRC Proceedings in aid of which the freezing injunctions are sought are those originally filed in the Xuhui Court, which, on Ms Qi and Mr Quan’s case, have been reduced in value to approximately USD 1,500, and are the subject of the Withdrawal Applications which have not yet been determined. As matters currently stand, Mr Pillai contends that the PRC Proceedings are now before the Jing’an Court following the successful jurisdiction challenge. Further, Mr Pillai submits (on the basis of expert evidence of PRC law from Ms Lan) that the Xuhui Court is likely to dismiss the new proceedings as an impermissible duplicate action,39 on the basis that the parties and the subject matter are the same.\n\n45. In addition, Mr Pillai submits that the PRC Proceedings rest on an assertion of an alleged oral agreement for which there is no corroboration; whether by way of contemporary documentation or other witness testimony.40 Issues of limitation potentially arise in relation to that allegation. However, as I made clear at the start of the hearing, I do not propose to attempt to determine any question of procedural or substantive PRC law in deciding the Applications. For present purposes, I assume, in favour of Ms Qi and Mr Quan, that the PRC Proceedings would not be struck out either on the basis of being an impermissible duplicate action or on limitation grounds.41\n\n46. Mr Riley points to the terms on which the freezing injunctions have been sought. Each of Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s Claims filed on 27 August 2026 stated that they were “brought in support of proceedings commenced by [the respective Claimant] in the PRC against [Mr Wo] and [Mdm Sun]”. Mr Riley added that the PRC Proceedings had, in fact, been brought on the basis of Ms Qi and Mr Quan’s alleged property interests, as registered proprietors as to 50% in the Huayuan Property and the Huashan Property respectively.42\n\n47. I accept Mr Riley’s submission that the approach taken by the Wo Defendants as to the status of the PRC claims is overly technical and does not accord with the principles underlying the freezing order jurisdiction. The nature of the “good arguable case” criterion was explained by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Fourie v Le Roux.43 Lord Leggatt summarised the position in Broad Idea:44 “37. When the House of Lords next considered the power to grant freezing injunctions in Fourie v Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 WLR 320, Lord Nicholls’ analysis in Mercedes Benz was not expressly mentioned. But it finds support in the statement of Lord Bingham of Cornhill that the “important but limited purpose” for\n\n38 See paragraph 2 above. 39 Under article 247 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China. 40 Compare with the summary of Mr Quan’s Civil Complaint (with which Ms Qi’s claim is materially the same), set out at paragraph 16 above. 41 See also paragraph 45 above. 42 See paragraphs 14 and 15 above. 43 Fourie v Le Roux [2007] UKHL 1; [2007] 1 WLR 320, cited with approval in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 37. 44 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 37. This statement of principle is also supported by observations at paragraph 102(iii) of Broad Idea, set out at paragraph 28 above.\n\nwhich freezing injunctions are granted is “to prevent a defendant dissipating his assets with the intention or effect of frustrating enforcement of a prospective judgment” (para 2). Lord Bingham went on to underscore as an “important safeguard” the need for the claimant to identify the prospective judgment whose enforcement the defendant is not to be permitted, by dissipating its assets, to frustrate. He said, at para 3:\n\n“The claimant cannot of course guarantee that he will recover judgment, nor what the terms of the judgment will be. But he must at least point to proceedings already brought, or proceedings about to be brought, so as to show where and on what basis he expects to recover judgment against the defendant.”\n\nThere is no suggestion in this account that a freezing injunction is dependent on or ancillary to a pre-existing cause of action: the focus is entirely on the prospect of recovering a judgment and the need to identify proceedings (actual or anticipated) is treated as a practical requirement designed to protect the defendant against having his assets frozen unnecessarily and not as a limitation on the court’s power.”\n\n48. The breadth of the jurisdiction is also apparent from the terms of rule 71(1)(f) of the Court Procedure Rules. It states:\n\n“71.\n\n## Orders for interim remedies\n\n(1) The Court may grant such interim remedies as are necessary in the interests of justice (whether in the particular case or more generally) including –\n\n… (f) an order (referred to as a “freezing injunction”) restraining a party from removing from a particular jurisdiction assets located within that jurisdiction or from dealing with or removing from ADGM or any other jurisdiction any assets which are located there;\n\n….”\n\n49. Applying the “interests of justice” test from rule 71(1)(f) and the flexibility inherent in the cases which have dealt with the “good arguable case” element, I consider that Mr Pillai’s argument expresses relevant principles too narrowly. Adopting the approach approved in Broad Idea,45 it is enough if the applicants for a freezing order can point to a factual foundation on which a cause of action can be based and pursued in the foreign jurisdiction.46 As with comparable summary applications (such as strike out or summary judgment applications), the Court will approach the question whether a “good arguable\n\n45 See paragraph 47 above. 46 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 102(iii), set out at paragraph 28 above.\n\ncase” exists on the assumption that the claimant’s factual allegations will be proved at trial.\n\n50. In this case, whatever approach may be taken by the PRC Courts, there is, in my view, a good arguable case that Ms Qi and Mr Quan can seek recovery of an amount equating to their prima facie one-half interest in the Huayuan Property and the Huashan Property on the basis of a claim based on property rights rather than an oral agreement of the type to which Mr Pillai referred. In my view, the summary of the PRC claims to which I have already referred47 supports that conclusion. On the assumption that their factual allegations will be proved at trial, I hold that Ms Qi and Mr Quan have a good arguable case for the full amounts claimed in the PRC Proceedings, notwithstanding any decisions that either the Xuhui or Jing’an Courts may take in relation to the extant applications to withdraw proceedings in the Xuhui Court or to decline to progress the refiled claims.48 Should one or other of the PRC Courts make a decision of the type suggested by Mr Pillai, it would be open for the Wo Defendants to apply immediately to this Court to discharge any freezing order that might be made against them.\n\n## Risk of dissipation\n\n51. In almost all freezing injunction applications, the question whether an applicant has established a sufficient risk of dissipation so as to put enforcement of any judgment given in a foreign jurisdiction in peril is often determinative. As previously indicated, the onus of proof of risk of dissipation lies on the applicant for a freezing order though an evidential burden may pass to a defendant in respect of information within its exclusive knowledge: see Holyoake v Candy.49\n\n52. As set out in Broad Idea, the focus of such orders is a situation in which there is a risk that the person against whom the order is sought will deal with assets, or take steps which make them less valuable, outside the ordinary course of business, with the result that the availability or value of the assets is impaired and the judgment left unsatisfied.50\n\n53. There is no doubt, on the evidence, that Mr Wo uses a complex web of corporate vehicles to undertake his commercial ventures and broadly maintains liquid assets (such as cryptocurrency) to do so. There is evidence that assets are regularly moved among Mr Wo’s corporate interests in order to meet their immediate commercial needs. Those factors are circumstances of the type that the PRC Courts took into account in making the Preservation Orders.51\n\n54. The “Civil Ruling” given by the Xuhui Court on 23 July 2026 recorded that in circumstances “where, due to the act of one party or other reasons, a judgment or arbitral award may become difficult to enforce or may cause other damage to the parties, a people’s court may, upon the application of the opposing party, rule to adopt property preservation measures”. The Xuhui Court made such orders on the basis of “litigation property preservation liability insurance” taken out by Ms Qi and Mr Quan, and a letter of guarantee from the Shanghai Branch of Dajia Property Insurance Co Ltd.52 While, as Mr Pillai submitted, limited weight should be given to findings made at a hearing at which Mr Wo\n\n47 See paragraph 16 above. 48 See paragraph 43.d and f above. 49 Holyoake v Candy [2017] EWCA Civ 92, at paragraph 51, set out at paragraph 32 above. 50 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 101(ii) and (iii), set out at paragraph 28 above. 51 See paragraph 20 above as to the nature of the orders made. 52 Civil Ruling (2026) Hu 0104 Min Chu No. 18660.\n\nwas not represented, the fact remains that he had the opportunity to apply to discharge the orders but has made no application to do so.\n\n55. Mr Pillai pointed to the lack of “solid evidence” of risk of dissipation. That expression represents the way in which the test for onus of proof is typically expressed, though I prefer the phrase “plausible evidential basis”. That view is consistent with what was said by Haddon-Cave LJ in Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto.53 In my view, the terms “solid evidence” and “plausible evidential basis” are synonymous.\n\n56. Mr Pillai pointed to four specific circumstances that he contended militated against a finding of risk of dissipation:\n\na. The fact that Mr Wo has undertaken commercial activities through nominees or some form of interlocking corporate enterprise does not prove anything. So long as it is done legally, a person such as Mr Wo is entitled to use whatever corporate or trust structures that may best suit the enterprises that he is undertaking.\n\nb. The fact that Mdm Sun has made applications for relief in the nature of freezing orders in Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands does not add anything to the present Applications. Those orders, while initially made, have not stood.54 c. The existence of Preservation Orders in the PRC which protect Ms Qi and Mr Quan sufficiently.\n\nd. The absence of evidence that Mr Wo (despite having had ample opportunity to do so) has moved assets outside the ordinary course of business while the on notice Applications were awaiting a defended hearing tells against the making of the freezing injunctions.\n\n57. During the course of the hearing, I asked Mr Pillai to refer me to the best available evidence about the way in which Mr Wo and associated entities acquired their wealth. Mr Pillai referred me to a decision given by Kristy Tan JC, on an application for a proprietary injunction made in the Singapore Proceedings, in which Mr Wo asserted he was the “sole ultimate beneficial owner” of various virtual assets. Kristy Tan JC’s decision also throws some light on the complicated relationships among the four family members; in particular, it demonstrates that resolution of credibility and reliability of evidence in the PRC Proceedings may not be straightforward. In explaining why she granted a proprietary injunction in favour of Mr Wo, the Judicial Commissioner said:55 “5. … In 1997 and 2001 respectively, he established Shanghai Huiyin Investment Co, Ltd and [Shanghai Huiyin Group Co Ltd] in the PRC (together with all companies founded by and beneficially owned by [Mr Wo], the “Huiyin Group”). He started to invest in cryptocurrencies with his personal resources in or around 2014, and formed a team of employees from his various companies to help him with the day-to-day operation and\n\n53 Lakatamia Shipping v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203, at paragraph 38; see also paragraphs 33-37, applied in A17 v B17 [2025] ADGMCFI 0001, at paragraph 68. 54 See paragraphs 17.b and 18 above. 55 Exchange Union Company & ors v Wo Qi & ors (High Court, Singapore, HC/SUM 464/2024), at paragraph 5. Ms Qi’s application for permission to appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Division of the High Court: Wo Qi v Exchange Union Company (Appellate Division No. AD/OA No. 28 of 2024, Kannan Ramesh JAD and See Kee On JAD). The Appellate Division Judges held that the Judicial Commissioner had not made any error in granting the proprietary injunctions in relation to digital assets said to be owned or controlled by Ms Qi, Mr Quan and other Defendants to the Singapore Proceedings.\n\nadministration of his digital Assets in or around 2016. In around August 2016, [Mr Wo] began to move his businesses into active investments in cryptocurrency markets. The Huiyin Group formally established a US$20m blockchain venture capital fund known as the “Huiyin Blockchain venture” in December 2016 to manage [Mr Wo’s] investments into the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry. From August 2018 to 2020, a “DFG Platform”, involving several of the Huiyin Group’s overseas companies, including [Digital Finance Group Co], [Smart River Investments Ltd], [Create Fortune Pte Ltd] and [Jumbo Access Investments Ltd], was created to replace the “Huiyin Blockchain Venture”. [Exchange Union] to [Shanghai Shengyi Information Network Co. Ltd] [Digital Finance Group Co], [Mr Wo] and [W3 Cap Holding Co Ltd] to [Jumbo Access Investments Ltd] were beneficially owned and controlled by [Mr Wo] to assist him to hold, administer and/or operate his vast amounts of digital assets. [Mr Wo] allowed [Mr Quan] (his son) to take the credit and receive public recognition for being the “founder” of the DFG Platform but remained in full control of the strategic direction taken by all companies within the DFG Platform; [Mr Quan] was [Mr Wo’s] agent and nominee in respect of the DFG Platform. [Mr Wo] appointed [Ms Qi] (his daughter) as his agent and trustee to administer and operate his digital assets by way of an oral agreement made in or around November 2021. In or around November to December 2021, [Mr Wo] arranged for [Ms Qi] to receive from Zhang and Peng ([Mr Wo’s] trustee employees) all necessary means and credentials (including all usernames, passwords, codes, security keys, etc) to access and operate his digital wallets at that time. On 6 December 2023, a falling-out occurred between [Mr Wo] and [Ms Qi]– [Ms Qi] cut off Lu’s ([Mr Wo’s] employee) access to [Exchange Union’s] accounts with Binance and OKX and, according to [Mr Wo], made unauthorised transfers of digital assets from his digital wallets. [Mr Wo] seeks, among other reliefs, a declaration that [Ms Qi] to [Smart River Investments Ltd], [Persons Unknown] and [Mr Quan] hold digital assets, whether owned by [Mr Wo] directly or through [Exchange Union] to [Shanghai Shengyi Information Network Co. Ltd] and [Sun Hongmin] to [Smart River Investments Ltd], on trust for [Mr Wo]; and an order for the return of the digital assets to [Mr Wo].”\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\n58. Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to determine whether a person against whom a freezing injunction is sought has moved assets for good commercial reasons or for some nefarious purpose. Context is everything. In this case, it is clear from Kristy Tan JC’s decision that the practice of moving assets has existed for many years and could properly be regarded as part of the ordinary way in which Mr Wo and his interests do business. The countervailing point is that Mr Wo has a conviction for dishonesty (bribery) from which Ms Qi and Mr Quan ask me to infer that any movement of assets is likely to be for dishonest or inappropriate purposes. Mr Wo has also been engaged in acrimonious litigation with both Mdm Sun and his children which could point to a desire to put assets out of their reach should they succeed in the PRC Proceedings. Notwithstanding those considerations, I do not consider that it is appropriate, in a case such as this, to assess the legitimacy or otherwise of the moving of assets. When assessing risk of dissipation, the Court’s purpose is not necessarily to ascertain whether assets will be moved with the intention of defeating a claimant’s interests but, rather, to protect a claimant against movement of assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, in circumstances where their availability (or reduction in value) for enforcement purposes may leave a future judgment unsatisfied.56\n\n59. In my view, the most significant question in this case is whether Ms Qi and Mr Quan are adequately protected against the risk that any judgment they obtain in the PRC Proceedings could not be enforced as a result of asset dissipation outside the normal course of business. In assessing that, I remind myself that the question whether freezing injunctions should be issued is made in the context of the law’s acknowledgement that such a remedy is a “… drastic interference with a person’s right to do as they please with their own property …”. The purpose of a freezing order is not to provide a claimant with “comfort or to provide a route to extra disclosure but to ensure that if there is a real risk that the judgment … may go unsatisfied, something is done to prevent this”.57 For that reason, the Court must “remain vigilant” to ensure freezing orders are not granted inappropriately.58\n\n60. In assessing whether there is a real risk that any judgment may go unsatisfied without preservation of the Digital Asset Accounts by way of a freezing order, the extent of any protection must be taken into account. The Preservation Orders form the basis of existing protection. In the absence of evidence to the contrary from Ms Qi or Mr Quan to put in doubt the value of the protection afforded by the Preservation Orders, I cannot be satisfied that there is a real risk that any acts on the part of the Wo Defendants in relation to the Digital Asset Accounts would result in an inability for Ms Qi and Mr Quan to enforce judgments obtained in the PRC Proceedings. As previously indicated, the prima facie value of the shares to which the Preservation Orders attach exceeds the combined claims made by Ms Qi and Mr Quan.59 The absence of any evidence that the Wo Defendants have sought to move assets illegitimately while the Applications were pending adds to a conclusion that dissipation of the Digital Asset Accounts is unlikely.60 In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is a plausible evidential basis to infer a risk of dissipation.\n\n61. I add one further important comment. Although I would not have dismissed the Applications on this basis alone, Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s legal representatives’ conduct in the PRC Proceedings, in relation to the PRC Amendment and Withdrawal Applications and (more importantly) the failure of Mr Xin to disclose what was done to this Court in advance of the 25 September 2026 hearing, is of the utmost concern. While I do not go so far as to accuse Mr Xin of deliberately withholding that information, his failure to disclose on behalf of Ms Qi and Mr Quan is serious. This Court could have made freezing injunctions on or shortly after 25 September 2026 without knowledge that there had been a reduction of the claim values to approximately USD 1,500 or any explanation as to why the alleged tactical measures in PRC were appropriate.\n\n62. Assuming (without deciding) that Exchange Union and Standard Coin are non-cause of action defendants holding property on behalf (or at the direction) of Mr Wo, my reasoning for holding that there is no established risk of dissipation is sufficient to dispose of the\n\n56 Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24, at paragraph 101(iii). 57 Petroceltic Resources Ltd v Archer [2018] EWHC 671 (Comm), at paragraph 55. These propositions were approved by the Court of Appeal in Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Mazzagatti [2026] EWCA Civ 1043, at paragraph 64, adopting the observations of the first instance Judge at [2026] EWCH 2178 (Comm), at paragraphs 63-65. 58 FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Ltd v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Co [2025] EWHC 1920 (Comm), at paragraph 14. 59 See paragraphs 20 and 21 above. 60 See paragraph 56.d above.\n\nApplications against them. Accordingly, the Applications are dismissed against the Wo Defendants.\n\n## Information disclosure orders\n\n63. In the absence of the grant of a freezing order against assets of the Wo Defendants, there is no basis on which an information disclosure order can be made against any of them. Nor, in my view, would it be appropriate to permit Ms Qi and Mr Quan to obtain an information disclosure order against Nest Clearing. I do not express any final view on whether a narrow or broad approach should be taken to the circumstances in which information disclosure orders should be made.61 In circumstances where no freezing order is granted, to make a disclosure order against Nest Clearing would amount to improper “fishing” for the existence of assets of which Ms Qi and Mr Quan are presently unaware.\n\n## Result\n\n64. For those reasons:\n\na. The Additional Evidence Applications are granted.\n\nb. The Applications are dismissed.\n\n65. The Wo Defendants would ordinarily be entitled to costs of the proceedings as against Ms Qi and Mr Quan. However, I reserve costs to give the parties an opportunity to attempt to agree costs as between themselves. Because, at least in part, Mr Pillai has signalled that indemnity costs may be sought, I reserve questions both of the type of costs to be ordered (standard or indemnity) and quantum. If the parties are unable to agree, the Wo Defendants shall file and serve a statement of costs in accordance with Annexure 2 to Practice Direction 9 and seek directions from the Court as to the exchange of written submissions on costs. Any statement of costs and subsequent costs submissions are to deal with how the costs sought are to be apportioned between the two proceedings. Any contested application will be determined on the papers.\n\n66. As Nest Clearing took no active steps in the proceedings, no order for costs is made in respect of Ms Qi’s and Mr Quan’s application against it.\n\nIssued by:\n\n## Linda Fitz-Alan\n\n## Registrar, ADGM Courts\n\n## 12 November 2026\n\n61 See paragraph 36 above.","changes":[]}