{"check":null,"uid":"5f9c3ddb0b987cfa","title":"Clive David Carter v London Borough of Haringey","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-01","summary":"Суд рассмотрел дело гражданина Клайва Дэвида Картера против Лондонского боро Харингей, касающееся нарушения публичным органом условий судебного предписания о раскрытии информации. Суд установил, что хотя ответчик своевременно исполнил предписание после подачи заявления о нарушении, задержка составила более двух недель, что было признано серьезным нарушением. Тем не менее, учитывая обстоятельства задержки, включая длительную болезнь сотрудника органа власти и отсутствие своевременного обращения за юридической помощью, суд счел справедливым не передавать дело в апелляционный суд и отказал в сертификации правонарушения.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":27042,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1239","first_seen":"2026-09-11","last_checked":"2026-09-17 01:36","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"data protection","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":422,"ctx":"t was the public authority in the appeal proceedings brought by the Appellant against the Information Commissioner under case no EA/2023/0217. The Tribunal’s decision was issued on 8 th January 2025 and d","zone":"орган","weight":3}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":6020,"ctx":"rises following, and in relation to, an order of the tribunal under section 166(2) of the data protection act 2018 (orders to progress complaints), a copy of the order;  (v)  the grounds relied o","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":9542,"ctx":"s considered the position before the amendments to section 61 foia were brought in by the data protection act 2018 , when the exercise of the first-tier tribunal’s certification power led to tran","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-09-11","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01239 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1239","text":"Background to the application\n\n1.\n\nThis is an application, dated 23\nrd\nApril 2025, under Rule 7A of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 to certify a contempt against the London Borough of Haringey (“the Respondent”).\n\n2.\n\nThe Respondent was the public authority in the appeal proceedings brought by the Appellant against the Information Commissioner under case no EA/2023/0217. The Tribunal’s decision was issued on 8\nth\nJanuary 2025 and disposed of the proceedings under\nsections 57\nand 58 of the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\n. The Substituted Decision Notice required the council to disclose information to the Appellant within 35 days of the decision being issued by the Tribunal, namely by 12\nth\nFebruary 2025. The terms of that Substituted Decision Notice were as follows:\n\n“\n1\nst\nrequest\n\nIn its response to the Appellant’s request for information of the 22 March 2022 the London Borough of Haringey (“the Council”) was not entitled to withhold commercial information in the Carter Jonas LLP Report by section 43(2) FOIA because its disclosure would not be likely to prejudice the Council’s commercial interests. An appropriately unredacted version of the Carter Jonas LLP report shall be disclosed within 35 days of this Decision being sent to the Council.\n\n2\nnd\nrequest\n\nAs regards the Appellant’s 2\nnd\nrequest of the 19 April 2021 the qualified person’s opinion of the 27 May 2021 was not reasonable. Accordingly an appropriately unredacted version of the relevant information shall be disclosed within 35 days of this Decision being sent to the Council.\n\n3\nrd\nrequest\n\nAs regards the Appellant’s 3\nrd\nrequest of the 11 May 2021 the Appeal is dismissed.\n\n4\nth\nrequest\n\nAs regards the Appellant’s 4\nth\nrequest of 12 August 2021 while the exemptions at sections 43(2) and 36(2) FOIA were in part engaged (and the QPO was reasonable) the public interest balancing test favoured disclosure. Accordingly, an appropriately unredacted version of the relevant information shall be disclosed within 35 days of this decision being sent to the Council.”\n\n3.\n\nThe London Borough of Haringey was not a party to those proceedings, however, and it subsequently applied for permission to appeal by way of form GRC7 on 5\nth\nFebruary 2025. As part of that application, the Respondent additionally applied to be joined as a party to the proceedings.\n\n4.\n\nOn 11\nth\nFebruary 2025, the Tribunal granted the Respondent’s application to be joined as the Second Respondent to the appeal proceedings and suspended the Substituted Decision Notice until the application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal had been determined. The Respondent was therefore not required to comply with the requirement to disclose the relevant information until such a time as that application had been determined.\n\n5.\n\nOn 7\nth\nMarch 2025, the Tribunal refused permission for the Respondent to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, citing its reasons for doing so in a 10-page decision. The time for the Respondent to comply with the Substituted Decision Notice was extended to 4pm on 7\nth\nApril 2025, and the Respondent was notified by the Tribunal in an email of 11\nth\nMarch 2025 (the date when the decision was sent to the Respondent) that any direct application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal must be received by the Upper Tribunal within one month of that date (i.e. by 11\nth\nApril 2025). It does not appear that any such application was forthcoming.\n\n6.\n\nOn 17\nth\nApril 2025, which was of course ten days after the date by which the Respondent was required to have provided the ordered disclosure, the Applicant notified the Tribunal by email that the Respondent had failed to comply with the terms of the Substituted Decision Notice. In that email, the Applicant expressed a desire for the Respondent to be made to comply with the Tribunal’s order and he was subsequently provided with form GRC4 for making an application to certify a contempt to the Upper Tribunal.\n\n7.\n\nThe Applicant subsequently submitted his application to certify a contempt to the Upper Tribunal on 23\nrd\nApril 2025, averring that the Respondent had failed to comply with the Substituted Decision Notice as ordered by this Tribunal.\n\n8.\n\nThe Respondent eventually complied with the terms of the Substituted Decision Notice on 24\nth\nApril 2025, being 17 days after the date for compliance.\n\nThe Law\n\n9.\n\nSection 61(3) and 61(4) FOIA provide that the First-tier Tribunal may certify an offence to the Upper Tribunal where –\n\n(a)\n\na person does something, or fails to do something, in relation to proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal on an appeal under those provisions, and\n\n(b)\n\nif those proceedings were proceedings before a court having power to commit for contempt, the act or omission would constitute contempt of court.\n\n10.\n\nSection 61(5) FOIA provides that where an offence is certified under subsection (4), the Upper Tribunal may (a) inquire into the matter, and (b) deal with the person charged with the offence in any manner in which it could deal with the person if the offence had been committed in relation to the Upper Tribunal.\n\n11.\n\nUnder Rule 7A(2) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, an application to certify an offence to the Upper Tribunal\n“must be made in writing and must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received no later than 28 days after the relevant act or omissions (as the case may be) first occurs.”.\nRule 7A(3) provides that an application must include –\n\n(i)\n\ndetails of the proceedings giving rise to the application;\n\n(ii)\n\ndetails of the act or omissions (as the case may be) relied on;\n\n(iii)\n\nif the act or omission (as the case may be) arises following, and in relation to, a decision of the Tribunal, a copy of any written record of that decision;\n\n(iv)\n\nif the act or omission (as the case may be) arises following, and in relation to, an order of the Tribunal under\nsection 166(2)\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n(orders to progress complaints), a copy of the order;\n\n(v)\n\nthe grounds relied on in contending that if the proceedings in question were proceedings before a court having power to commit for contempt, the act or omission (as the case may be) would constitute a contempt;\n\n(vi)\n\na statement as to whether the applicant would be content for the case to be dealt with without a hearing if the Tribunal considers it appropriate and\n\n(vii)\n\nany further information or documents required by a practice direction.\n\n12.\n\nThe standard of proof to be applied is the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the Tribunal must be satisfied so that it is sure of any fact before finding it proved. This reflects the serious nature and potential consequences of allegations of contempt of court.\n\n13.\n\nIn\nMoss v Royal Borough of Kingston-upon-Thames and the Information Commissioner\n\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1438\n, the Court of Appeal considered the test to be applied by the First-tier Tribunal when deciding whether to certify an offence to the High Court (now the Upper Tribunal), and determined that there was a two-stage test [32-52], which is as follows:\n\n(1)\n\nThe First-tier Tribunal must determine firstly whether a person is guilty of an act or omission which is capable by its nature of constituting a contempt; and\n\n(2)\n\nSecondly, if it determines that a person is guilty of an act or omission which by its nature is capable of constituting a contempt, it will then decide whether to exercise its discretion to certify and send the matter to the Upper Tribunal.\n\n14.\n\nThe Court of Appeal gave further guidance at [44] as to how the First-tier Tribunal should approach this exercise, which was as follows:\n\n“In deciding whether an act or omission is something which would be capable by its nature of constituting a contempt, the FTT is not intended to undertake a detailed analysis of the law relating to contempt, nor the application of the law of contempt to the facts. Rather the FTT is considering simply whether the act or omission would be capable of constituting a contempt. In this context, the acts or omissions are ones involving breach of rules, directions or orders of the FTT governing the conduct of an appeal. It should be relatively straightforward in most cases to determine whether the act or omission (i.e. a breach of a rule, direction or order) is by its nature such as would be capable of constituting contempt. In the present case, for example, the omission (admitted by Kingston) was the failure to comply with an order of the FTT. Such an omission, by its nature, would be capable of constituting a contempt. The FTT was not required to deal with the questions of whether service of the order on Kingston as a party was required for the omission to be capable of constituting a contempt or whether notice of the order was sufficient for those purposes. Nor was it necessary for the FTT to determine whether or not individuals within Kingston had the mens rea necessary for the omission to amount to a contempt by Kingston. Those factual matters, and in particular, the final determination of those matters were for the High Court (now the Upper Tribunal).”\n\n15.\n\nIn\nPenny Bence v Cornwall Council\n\n[2025] UKUT 420 (AAC)\n, Mrs Justice Williams DBE, Chamber President of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber)) at [94] confirmed that although the decision in Moss considered the position before the amendments to\nsection 61\nFOIA were brought in by the\nData Protection Act 2018\n, when the exercise of the First-tier Tribunal’s certification power led to transfer of the case to the High Court (rather than the Upper Tribunal),\n“There is no doubt that Lewis LJ’s careful and detailed analysis (a paragraphs 35-52) applies equally to the current power to certify the contempt for transfer to the Upper tribunal. As I have noted the legislative powers are materially the same and during his discussion of this issue, Lewis LJ made multiple references to the same position applying under the new\nsection 61\nFOIA.”.\n\n16.\n\nIn\nNavigator Equities Limited v Deripaska\n\n[2021] EWCA Civ 1799\nthe Court of Appeal set out a helpful summary of general propositions of law in relation to civil contempts at [81], which it considered to be “well-established”:\n\ni.\n\nThe bringing of a committal application is an appropriate and legitimate means, not only of seeking enforcement of an order or undertaking, but also (or alternatively) of drawing to the court’s attention a serious (rather than purely technical) contempt. Thus, a committal application can properly be brought in respect of past (and irremediable) breaches;\n\nii.\n\nA committal application must be proportionate (by reference to the gravity of the conduct alleged) and brought for legitimate ends. It must not be pursued for improper collateral purpose;\n\n…\n\nv.\n\nIt is generally no defence that the order disobeyed (or the undertaking breached) should not have been made or accepted;\n\nvi.\n\nOrders and undertakings must be complied with even if compliance is burdensome, inconvenient and expensive. If there is any obstacle to compliance, the proper course is to apply to have the order or undertaking set aside or varied;\n\nvii.\n\nIn order to establish contempt, it need not be demonstrated that the contemnor intended to breach an order or undertaking and/or believed that the conduct in question constituted a breach. Rather it must be shown that the contemnor deliberately intended to commit the act or omission in question. Motive is irrelevant;\n\nviii.\n\nContempt proceedings are not intended as a means of securing civil compensation;\n\nix.\n\nFor a breach of order or undertaking to be established, it must be shown that the terms of the order or undertaking are clear and unambiguous; that the respondent had proper notice; and that the breach is clear (by reference to the terms of the order or undertaking)\n\nIssues and Evidence\n\n17.\n\nI have been provided with a 176-page Hearing Bundle, the contents of which have been agreed between the parties. Additionally, the Applicant has provided an additional document entitled ‘External property Review’ and dated 18\nth\nApril 2023, which he seeks permission to rely upon for the purposes of this application. This was provided significantly after the time for doing so had passed, being provided by email on 11\nth\nJune 2026. However, the Respondent has confirmed that it has no objection to this document being relied upon by the Applicant for the purposes of this application. I therefore grant permission for the Applicant to rely upon this document, insofar as he considers it may assist him.\n\n18.\n\nThe parties were agreeable to the determination of this application on the papers, that is to say, without an oral hearing. I am satisfied, pursuant to rule 32(1)(b) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, that I can properly determine the issues without a hearing.\n\n19.\n\nThe issues for the Tribunal to determine in this application are firstly, whether the Respondent is guilty of an act or omission which is capable, by its nature, of constituting a contempt, and secondly, if the answer to that question is in the affirmative, the Tribunal will go on to consider whether to exercise its discretion to certify and send the matter to the Upper Tribunal to determine. Only then would the Tribunal go on to consider the terms of any Order to be made.\n\nSubmissions\n\nApplicant’s submissions\n\n20.\n\nThe application was submitted by email on 23\nrd\nApril 2025, and in addition to the completed GRC4 form, the Applicant has provided a witness statement of the same date. A summary of the Applicant’s submissions is as follows:\n\n(i)\n\nThat the Respondent has, as at the date of the Applicant’s application of 23\nrd\nApril 2025 failed to comply with the terms of the Substituted Decision Notice within the required 35 days of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision being sent to it (i.e. by 4pm on 7\nth\nApril 2025).\n\n(ii)\n\nThat following permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal being refused by the First-tier tribunal, the Respondent did not apply directly to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal.\n\n(iii)\n\nThat Judge Heald’s remarks in his refusal of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, where he stated\n“…the Tribunal’s findings of fact on the evidence were in part at odds with some of Mr Kirby’s statement”\ngives the impression that some parts of Mr Kirby’s statement were not believed. This raises the question of whether the various claims made by this witness were untruthful, intended to mislead, were knowingly false, or were simply careless. It may therefore be that this was, in itself, a contempt.\n\n(iv)\n\nThat the Respondent has engaged in behaviour throughout the appeal proceedings which were intended to “drag out proceedings” or were “playing for time”.\n\nRespondent’s Submissions\n\n21.\n\nThe Respondent has provided a response to the application dated 9\nth\nOctober 2025. A summary of its submissions is as follows:\n\n(i)\n\nThe information which the First-tier Tribunal ordered to be disclosed in its Substituted Decision Notice was disclosed on 24\nth\nApril 2025, albeit 17 days after the amended deadline of 7\nth\nApril 2025.\n\n(ii)\n\nThat the regrettable delay was caused by a confluence of factors, but it nonetheless sincerely apologises to both the First-tier Tribunal and the Applicant.\n\n(iii)\n\nThat it initially intended to renew its application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, and having sought and obtained advice from external counsel, and then having instructed counsel to prepare the relevant documentation, internal queries as to whether to pursue the application were raised, but the decision was ultimately taken not to proceed with any renewed application. The Respondent’s intention was to comply with the terms of the Substituted Decision Notice.\n\n(iv)\n\nThe in-house solicitor with conduct of the matter, and who habitually dealt with contentious FOIA issues, was unfortunately on long-term sickness absence and consequently different personnel who were not familiar with the proceedings, or indeed FOIA appeals generally, were dealing with the matter. The Respondent therefore considered that it would be prudent to check with external counsel whether the proposed disclosure was in accordance with the Substituted Decision notice.\n\n(v)\n\nUnfortunately, the dates coincided with school holidays, religious festivals and bank holidays, and as a result, the Respondent chased external counsel on 14\nth\nand 22\nnd\nApril 2025. Counsel was finally in a position to advise on 23\nrd\nApril 2025.\n\nOn 24\nth\nApril 2025, the information was disclosed, accompanied by the following covering message to the Applicant:\n\n“You will have today received by way of e-mail the documents request in the above matter. We are aware that the information was due to be disclosed by us on or around the 11th April 25.\n\nMany apologies for the delay in disclosing this information as per the last Court Order. The delay is due to a number of factors, the most significant being that the personnel involved in dealing with this matter were not available, so it has taken longer for the Council to ensure that it is disclosing the correct information in compliance with the substituted decision notice from the Tribunal. Furthermore, as some of the personnel were new to the case, we needed to doubly check the information. Once the Council decided not to pursue its application for permission to appeal, this process unfortunately could not be finalised before the expiry of the deadline.\n\nAfter the decision not to appeal was made the plan was to disclose as soon as we could, but it simply took time to check all the documents. No disrespect was intended to you or the Court. We trust that, in light of this disclosure, you will now withdraw your contempt of court application, and we would be grateful if you would confirm at your earliest convenience.”\n\nAnalysis and Conclusions\n\n22.\n\nThe Respondent was not a party to the proceedings (EA/2023/0217) when the substantive appeal hearing took place in 2024 or when the decision was given on 8\nth\nJanuary 2025. Indeed, it was not until 11\nth\nFebruary 2025 that the Respondent was added as the Second Respondent to the appeal, with the Tribunal taking the view that it should be added as a party to permit it to make an application for permission to appeal against the Tribunal’s decision of 8\nth\nJanuary 2025. At that stage, Judge Heald, who was the presiding judge for the substantive appeal hearing, suspended the time for complying with the Substituted Decision Notice until further Order. It was then, following his refusal of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 7\nth\nMarch 2025, that the suspension was lifted and the time for complying with the terms of the Substituted Decision Notice were extended to 4pm on 7\nth\nApril 2025.\n\n23.\n\nGiven that the Respondent was not a party to the proceedings until 11\nth\nFebruary 2025, there is no proper basis for the Applicant’s suggestions that the Respondent has sought to\n“drag out proceedings”\nor having been\n“playing for time”\n. The Applicant has of course referred the Tribunal to matters which came before the appeal was submitted to the Tribunal, and indeed before the Respondent was joined as a party to the proceedings, to contend that there has been some\n“low level contempt over a long period”\non the part of the Respondent. In particular, the Applicant points to the opportunity given to the Respondent the Tribunal’s email of 22\nnd\nJune 2023 which stated that\n“A copy of this email (without attachments) will be sent to the public authority to which you made your Freedom of Information request to let it know about your appeal. The public authority should write to the Tribunal and the other parties within 14 days of receipt to state whether it wishes to be joined to the appeal as Second Respondent in order to give evidence and/or make submissions.”\n. The criticism levelled at the Respondent by the Applicant is that it was only after the appeal hearing had taken place that the Respondent sought to be joined as a party to the appeal. However, this was not the case, as the Respondent made a number of unsuccessful applications to be joined as a party to the appeal, including in an email of 20\nth\nMay 2024, and by way of a completed GRC5 form of 7\nth\nJune 2024. However, those earlier applications were refused by the Tribunal, and I am not satisfied that any of the other matters referred to by the Applicant, which pre-date the Respondent being joined as a party to the appeal, are acts or omissions which are capable by their nature of constituting a contempt.\n\n24.\n\nAs regards the Applicant’s suggestion that Judge Heald’s remarks within the refusal of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal give rise to any conclusive determination that the witness statement of Mr Kirby was untruthful, intended to mislead, were knowingly false, or were simply careless, I am not satisfied that any such conclusion was reached. The fact that Judge Heald chose to use the words\n“…the Tribunal’s findings of fact on the evidence were in part at odds with some of Mr Kirby’s statement”\n, does not without more give rise to any conclusion of dishonesty. Indeed, had the judge come to that conclusion, I take the view that he would, in all likelihood, have used words which were more concrete in their interpretation. The courts and the tribunals will often come across evidence which may be ‘at odds’ with other evidence in any case, but that does not always lead to a conclusion that there has been a deliberate intention to mislead or be untruthful. It is for the court or tribunal concerned to weigh and balance the evidence in any case, and to reach considered conclusions in respect of that evidence. Indeed, if all of the evidence in any case tended towards one conclusion at the outset, before proceedings took place, then it is unlikely that a court or tribunal would need to be engaged in the first place. It is exactly because there are often contrary positions taken that a court or tribunal is needed. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that Mr Kirby’s statement of 25\nth\nJune 2024 could be said to be an act or omission which is capable of constituting a contempt.\n\n25.\n\nIn relation to the Respondent’s failure to comply with the Substituted Decision Notice, I take a rather different view. A breach of the Tribunal’s order is an omission which is capable of constituting a contempt, and in this instance, the Respondent’s failure to comply with the ordered deadline for disclosure of 7\nth\nApril 2025 is such a breach. I must therefore go on to decide whether to exercise my discretion to certify and send the matter to the Upper Tribunal.\n\n26.\n\nIn considering whether to exercise my discretion, I have regard to the general propositions of law in relation to civil contempts which were set out by the Court of Appeal in\nNavigator Equities Limited\n. I am satisfied that the terms of the Substitute Decision Notice were clear and unambiguous, in that the order stipulated what was to be disclosed and by when (as varied by Judge Heald on 7\nth\nMarch 2025), and I consider that the bringing of committal proceedings by the Applicant was the only means by which he could seek enforcement of the Tribunal’s order. It was therefore both an appropriate and legitimate application to make in circumstances where, at the time of his application, the Respondent was yet to comply with the order.\n\n27.\n\nBy the time that effect was given to the order for disclosure, compliance was 17 days overdue. It was not simply a matter of being a day or so beyond the date for compliance, and I therefore take the view that this was a serious, rather than a purely technical breach. However, I must additionally have regard to the factors which the Respondent avers combined and led to the breach of the order. The long-term sickness of the in-house solicitor who was dealing with matters on behalf of the Respondent led to other staff, who were not familiar with FOIA or the proceedings, having to step into the breach. That is, of course, a double-edged sword, as if the solicitor concerned was on long-term sickness, then it might have been prudent of the Respondent to have engaged the services of external counsel or alternative in-house representation at an earlier stage, rather than at the point where compliance with the order was upon them. No blame is placed at the door of external counsel in this regard, however, as their commitments were such that they were not able to provide any advice or assistance until 23\nrd\nApril 2025, whereupon the Respondent then complied with the Tribunal’s order, albeit significantly after the date for doing so.\n\n28.\n\nSome of the delay has been explained as being as a consequence of not submitting an application for permission to appeal directly with the Upper Tribunal as had been planned. That was a decision which the Respondent was entitled to take, but having done so, it should have then ensured that it was in a position to comply with the Tribunal’s order within the required timeframe. Indeed, any such decision should realistically have been made before the date for complying with the Substituted Decision Notice, but I recognise that it was a peculiar situation that arose where the order required compliance by 7\nth\nApril 2025, but the time for submitting a direct application for permission to appeal was by 11\nth\nApril 2025. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon any party to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal, and in this instance, the Respondent failed in its duty to do so.\n\n29.\n\nIn making his application to certify a contempt to the Upper Tribunal on 23\nrd\nApril 2026, the Applicant was seeking the enforcement of the Tribunal’s order which required the Respondent to provide him with a number of redacted documents. The very next day, the Respondent provided him with the disclosure he was seeking, and apologised, both to him and the Tribunal, for having not complied with the order until that point. Undoubtedly recognising that it had now provided the Applicant with the disclosure he was seeking, and which had been ordered by the Tribunal, the Respondent’s accompanying message invited the Applicant to withdraw his certification application. The fact that the Applicant did not withdraw his application, having been provided with the requested disclosure, does not mean that he has acted improperly, but it is nonetheless important to recognise that the breach had been remedied by that stage. Having regard to all of the matters I have discussed, and the fact that what appears to have been a sincere apology was forthcoming upon providing the Applicant with the disclosure he was seeking, and again in the submissions advanced by counsel, I am persuaded, just, not to exercise my discretion to certify and send this matter to the Upper Tribunal.\n\n30.\n\nThe application is refused.","changes":[]}