{"check":null,"uid":"4da71378b4ca275c","title":"MICHAEL JANISCH v THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-10","summary":"Суд рассмотрел апелляцию музыканта Майкла Янича против отказа органа регулирования раскрывать личность заявителя жалобы на нарушение правил землепользования со стороны местного совета. Суд постановил, что совет имел право отказать в предоставлении информации из-за защиты личных данных заявителя жалобы, учитывая отсутствие доказательств того, что раскрытие могло бы причинить ему вред или привести к репрессиям. Полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"HTTPStatusError: Client error '404 Not Found' for url 'https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1530/data.xml'\nFor more information check: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Status/404","text_len":42935,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1530","first_seen":"2026-11-11","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:28","relevance":"hit","score":44,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":44,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"General Data Protection Regulation","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":1056,"ctx":"is decision the following definitions are used: -  freedom of information act 2000  foia  data protection act 2018  dpa18  environmental information regulations 2004  eir  united kingdom general","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":1161,"ctx":"act 2018  dpa18  environmental information regulations 2004  eir  united kingdom general data protection regulation  ukgdpr  the tribunal procedure (first-tier tribunal) (general regulatory cham","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":6086,"ctx":"nt.  i understand that the identity of the complainant may be redacted in accordance with privacy regulations, and i fully respect that.\"  11.  although there appears to be a possible con","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":6468,"ctx":"he request did seek the identity despite the appellant recognising that there might be a \"privacy\" issue with that part of the request. we are also satisfied that the council and ic proce","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":9686,"ctx":"equest by sending you a copy of the complaint but withheld the name of the complainant on data protection grounds\". the council went on to refuse to provide the identity of the complainant by ref","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":12808,"ctx":"and defend myself properly against the allegations, as required under article 6(1)(f) uk gdpr.\"  20.  the relief sought is for the tribunal to (29): -  \"1, set aside decision notice i","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":22,"ctx":"MICHAEL JANISCH v THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER 1.  This decision relates to an appeal brought by the Appellant p ursuant to section 57","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"General Data Protection Regulation","weak":false,"pos":1200,"ctx":"otection Act 2018  DPA18  Environmental Information Regulations 2004  EIR  United Kingdom General Data Protection Regulation  UKGDPR  The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules","zone":"акт","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":1103,"ctx":"is decision the following definitions are used: -  Freedom of Information Act 2000  FOIA  Data Protection Act 2018  DPA18  Environmental Information Regulations 2004  EIR  United Kingdom General Data Prot","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-11-11","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01530 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1530","text":"1.\n\nThis decision relates to an appeal brought by the Appellant p\nursuant to\nsection 57\n\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\nand regulation 18 Environmental Information Regulations 2004. It is in respect of a decision notice issued by the Respondent on 16 September 2025 with reference IC-366484-P7B3 in which it was decided that Reigate & Banstead Borough Council had been entitled to rely on section 40(2) Freedom of Information Act 2000 when refusing to provide the answer to part of the Appellant's request for information of 23 January 2025.\n\n2.\n\nW\nhat follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and our view of the law. It does not seek to\nprovide every step of our reasoning.\nThe absence of a reference to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered. In this decision, page numbers indicated by their inclusion in brackets refer to pages of the bundle and if the letters CB are added, it is to the closed bundle.\n\n3.\n\nIn this decision the following definitions are used: -\n\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\n\nFOIA\n\nData Protection Act 2018\n\nDPA18\n\nEnvironmental Information Regulations 2004\n\nEIR\n\nUnited Kingdom General Data Protection Regulation\n\nUKGDPR\n\nThe Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009\n\n2009 Rules\n\nthe Appellant's request for information\n\nthe Request\n\nthe Appellant's property\n\nthe Property\n\nReigate & Banstead Borough Council\n\nthe Council\n\nthe Respondent\n\nthe IC\n\nthe IC's decision notice\n\nthe DN\n\nUpper Tribunal & First-tier Tribunal\n\nUT & FtT\n\nthe person who complained to the Council\n\nthe Complainant\n\nthe Complainant's complaint\n\nthe Planning Complaint\n\nArts Council England\n\nACE\n\nCase Management Directions\n\nCMD\n\n4.\n\nIn this decision we have purposely not identified the Complainant or provided the address of the Property.\n\nRule 32 2009 Rules\n\n5.\n\nRule 32 2009 Rules provides that: -\n\n\"(1)\n\nSubject to paragraphs (1A), (2) and (3), the Tribunal must hold a hearing before making a decision which disposes of proceedings unless (a) each party has consented to the matter being determined without a hearing; and (b) the Tribunal is satisfied that it can properly determine the issues without a hearing.\"\n\n6.\n\nCMD of 27 January 2026 stated that\n\"2. The case appears suitable to be decided without a hearing and all parties have given their consent\" The\nappeal was listed to be dealt with \"on the papers\" on 7 June 2026 but adjourned part-heard with CMD given. Further CMD were given on 25 August 2026 which included that\n\"3. unless, within 10 days of being sent these Directions, either party withdraws their consent for the appeal to be determined without a hearing (and subject to the Tribunal's view) the appeal shall continue on the papers.\"\nIn his response of 2 September 2026, the IC confirmed that consent was not withdrawn and it does not appear that the Appellant withdrew consent.\n\n7.\n\nThe Tribunal considered whether it was satisfied that it could properly determine the issues without a hearing. Having reviewed the issues to be determined and the evidence and submissions provided including the material that had been provided after the part-heard hearing in June 2026, the Tribunal was satisfied that it would be fair and just to do so.\n\nBackground\n\n8.\n\nThe Appellant is a musician and has a\n\"long-standing partnership\"\nwith ACE. He owns the Property, part of which is an outbuilding described as being a double garage in Dutch Barn style. He says that it is his own home studio that he has used for music projects as a professional musician\n\"with over 20 years of successful ACE awards.\"\n\n9.\n\nWe were provided (as closed material) with a copy of the Planning Complaint that had been submitted online and in which can be seen the identity of the Complainant. This resulted in the Council's Enforcement and Monitoring Officer sending a letter of 17 January 2025 to the Appellant as follows:-\n\n\"\nTOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990 (AS AMENDED)\n\n[redacted address]\n\nDESCRIPTION: Erection of Barn for Non Ancillary Purposes\n\nThe local Authority has received an enquiry that there may have been a breach of planning control at the above-mentioned premises. Allegedly a barn has been erected that may not conform to permitted development requirements set out under Schedule 2,Part 1, Class E of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development)(England) Order 2015.\n\nWhere an alleged breach of planning is reported the council has a duty to investigate in order to maintain planning control and provision. This can be found at section 196A(1)(a) and (4) of the Planning and Compensation Act 1996.\n\nCould you please contact me via the below outlets to discuss this in greater detail.\"\n\nThe Request to the DN\n\n10.\n\nOn 23 January 2025 (53), following a visit from the Council, the Appellant submitted the Request which asked as follows:-\n\n\"\nI am writing to formally request information under the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\nin relation to a complaint made about [the Property] The outbuilding in question is a double garage in Dutch barn style, which I personally constructed in early 2021.\n\nI received a letter dated today: January 23, 2025, referencing 25/00018/UA3, which mentioned an enquiry regarding a potential breach of planning control related to this outbuilding. I would like to request the following information related to the complaint:\n\n1.\n\nA copy of the formal complaint or enquiry lodged regarding the outbuilding at the above address. If it was a handwritten or typed letter, a PDF photocopied version would suffice, so long as I can read the original text provided.\n\n2.\n\nAny associated records or documentation related to this complaint, including the details of the complainant (if available), and the nature of the complaint.\n\n3.\n\nAny correspondence, internal notes, or records from your office regarding this complaint or enquiry.\n\n4.\n\nAny other relevant documentation related to planning, enforcement, or compliance actions taken regarding this complaint.\n\nI understand that the identity of the complainant may be redacted in accordance with privacy regulations, and I fully respect that.\"\n\n11.\n\nAlthough there appears to be a possible contradiction between the words \"\nincluding the details of the complainant (if available)\"\nand the explicit acceptance that the Complainant's identity may need to be redacted we are satisfied that the Request did seek the identity despite the Appellant recognising that there might be a\n\"privacy\"\nissue with that part of the Request. We are also satisfied that the Council and IC proceeded on that basis.\n\n12.\n\nThe Council replied on 3 February 2025 (53) and said:-\n\n\"We can provide information for part of your enquiry but not for the entire request as we only partially hold the necessary material. Please find below the relevant details: Attached is a Pdf document with the requested information to each question raised however with Planning Enforcement cases we can not divulge information with the complainant name nor information that will lead to revealing who made the complaint. We have photographs on file that the enforcement officer\nt\nook when she visited your property but not notes or any judgement at this stage. I understand a Planning Contravention has been sent to you and once received the Council will be in a better position to advise you further.\"\n\n13.\n\nIn answer to the four numbered questions the Council said (41):-\n\n1.\n\nThe problem/harm being caused: The building is commercial and Michael Janisch is offering it for hire to musicians. Mr Janisch has illegally funded this project via a company he set up called Lost Creek Road Ltd with a fraudulent application to Arts Council England in which he claims the studio will be used to\n\"The Barn Sessions showcases, via digital platforms, new collaborations with musicians from around the world; performing jazz/improv music in the unique acoustics of a purpose built \"barn\" studio, via a partnership with Whirlwind Recordings (owned by Janisch) & others, supporting emergent/ underrepresented musicians\".\n[redacted hyperlink] Lost\nCreek Ltd is now defunct. I am concerned that this venture will not offer a safe environment for musicians. Will there be insurance? Does the building have safety equipment and fire and smoke alarms. It is of wooden construction and will contain a large amount of electrical equipment. The stated aims of the business may not be possible without significant disturbance to neighbours.\"\n\n2 See above\n\n3.\n\nNot applicable – all Planning Authority correspondence sent in letter to owner\n\n4.\n\nPlanning Contravention Notice with questions relevant to the Council’s enquiries from a planning perspective sent to owner – awaiting completion and return.\"\n\n14.\n\nThereafter the Appellant's focus was on the question of the identity of the Complainant and not on the rest of the 4 replies. The Appellant asked for a review (42) on 4 February 2025. He asked the Council to:-\n\n\"1 Recognise this complaint as vexatious under FOIA and planning law.\n\n2 Reconsider withholding the complainant’s identity, given the serious allegations made.\n\n3 Confirm whether planning enforcement action can be pursued based on a complaint containing demonstrably false and irrelevant accusations.\"\n\n15.\n\nOn 20 February 2025 (49) the Council said\n\"Thank you for your email of 4th February in which you request an internal review of the way in which the Council dealt with your freedom of information request about the identity of the person who made the planning enforcement complaint about your property... The Council replied to your original request by sending you a copy of the complaint but withheld the name of the complainant on data protection grounds\".\nThe Council went on to refuse to provide the identity of the Complainant by reference to section 40(2) FOIA.\n\n16.\n\nIt is not our role to seek to reach conclusions about the Planning Complaint but, for balance, we consider it right to record that the Appellant refutes all the allegations contained in the Planning Complaint both as regards planning questions and otherwise and also to record that:-\n\n(a)\n\nultimately, on 17 December 2025 (132), the Council issued the Appellant with a certificate saying:-\n\n\"The Reigate and Banstead Borough Council hereby certify that on 23rd October 2025 the existing use or development described in the First Schedule to this certificate in respect of the land specified in the Second Schedule to this certificate and edged black on the plan attached to this certificate, was lawful within the meaning of\nSection 191\nof the\nTown and Country Planning Act 1990\n(as amended), for the reason described in the Third Schedule to this certificate.\n\n(b)\n\nthe Appellant said\n\"I have never obtained Arts Council funding for construction. My relationship with the Arts Council remains exemplary, with multiple active grant programmes\"\n\n(c)\n\nACE said to the Appellant on 20 February 2026 (67)\n\"We have searched our records and can confirm that we have not received any complaints regarding your National Lottery Project Grant application.\"\n\n17.\n\nOn 25 February 2025 the Appellant complained to the IC (56) with detailed grounds (58) about the Council's refusal to identify the Complainant. This concluded (66):-\n\n\"The gravity of these fabricated accusations, the complainant’s evident vendetta, the abuse of the planning system, and the lack of any legitimate basis—substantiated by my attached FOI requests and Arts Council confirmation—demand the complainant’s identity be disclosed. The cited case law demonstrates that such malicious misuse shifts the public interest toward transparency, enabling me to defend my reputation and professional standing. I trust you will weigh this evidence and ensure fairness in this matter. I am available to provide further clarification if needed.\"\n\n18.\n\nThe IC decided that the Council was entitled to refuse to provide this information by section 40(2) FOIA.\n\nThe appeal\n\n19.\n\nBy the appeal, commenced on 2 December 2025 (12), the Appellant asked the Tribunal to set aside the DN and to substitute its own decision requiring the Council (21)\n\"... to disclose the complainant’s full identity and all associated identifying information, including name, email address, and relevant metadata.\"\nThe grounds of appeal were:-\n\n\"The Decision Notice contains material legal and factual errors, and a remittal to the Information Commissioner would simply prolong the process and risk repeating the same flawed analysis. The Council relied on a complaint containing objectively false and defamatory allegations that carry serious professional consequences for me. Disclosure is necessary in order for me to identify the individual, obtain legal advice, and defend myself properly against the allegations, as required under Article 6(1)(f) UK GDPR.\"\n\n20.\n\nThe relief sought is for the Tribunal to (29): -\n\n\"1, Set aside Decision Notice IC-366484-P7B3.\n\n2.\n\nSubstitute a decision that section 40(2) FOIA does not apply and order the Information Commissioner to require Reigate & Banstead Borough Council to disclose the complainant’s identity and contact details.\n\n3.\n\nIn the alternative, remit the case to the Commissioner with directions to reconsider the Article 6(1)(f) balance with explicit findings on (a) misuse of process, (b) the defamatory and false nature of the complaint, and (c) my legitimate interest in legal redress.\n\n4.\n\nIn the event that the Tribunal finds that section 40(2) does not apply, or alternatively on remittal, I respectfully request the Tribunal to order production of any and all metadata or submission records held by the Information Commissioner and/or Reigate & Banstead Borough Council relating to the complaint, including the complainant’s name, any contact details, account username, full email headers, timestamps, originating IP addresses, device identifiers, server logs, and any internal records showing the provenance of the complaint.\"\n\n21.\n\nOn 2 January 2026 the IC responded to the appeal and the Appellant replied on 19 January 2026. CMD were given on 10 June 2026\nand 25 August 2026 in response to which:-\n\n(a)\n\nby email of 24 June 2026 the Appellant provided further clarifications regarding his appeal with a copy of the Council's letter of 17 January 2025;\n\n(b)\n\non 25 June 2026 the Council provided open submissions and closed information including a copy of the Planning Complaint to be held by rule 14 2009 Rules.; and\n\n(c)\n\non 2 September 2026 the IC provided further open submissions and separately closed submissions.\n\nRole of the Tribunal\n\n22.\n\nThe Tribunal's role, in an appeal brought under\nsection 57\nFOIA, is as set out in section 58 FOIA which provides that:-\n\n(1)\n\nIf on an appeal under\nsection 57\nthe Tribunal considers—\n\n(a)\n\nthat the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or\n\n(b)\n\nto the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.\n\n(2)\n\nOn such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.\n\n23.\n\nIn\nPeter Wilson -v- The Information Commissioner [2022] UKFTT 0149\nthe FtT said (with which we agree)\n\"30...the Tribunal’s statutory role is to consider whether there is an error of law or inappropriate exercise of discretion in the Decision Notice. The Tribunal may not allow an appeal simply because it disagrees with the Information Commissioner’s Decision. It is also not the Tribunal’s role to conduct a procedural review of the Information Commissioner’s decision making process or to correct the drafting of the Decision Notice.”\n\n24.\n\nAs regards the burden of proof we noted that in\nForstater v Information Commissioner and others\n[2023] UKUT 303 (AAC)\n\nthe UT, at [40], said that while this burden rests with an appellant except where statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise\n\"(3)...the concept of the burden of proof is of secondary importance in tribunal proceedings which involve a full merits review, since to apply strict burdens of proof may prevent the tribunal from properly discharging its responsibility to decide the facts for itself and/or exercise any discretion afresh...\"\n\nIssues\n\n25.\n\nIn his email of 24 June 2026 the Appellant said that\n\"I confirm that I do not dispute the redaction and non-disclosure of the names and other personal data of Council officials contained within the closed bundle.\nMy appeal concerns only the identity and identifying information of the complainant. I do not seek disclosure of the personal data of Council officers.\"\nAccordingly we\nidentified the following issues to be determined:-\n\n(a)\n\nwhether the Request was subject to the EIR or FOIA\n\n(b)\n\nwhether or not it would be a breach of the data protection principles for the Council to disclose the Complainant's identity.\n\n26.\n\nWe noted the Appellant's concern about the allegations made in the Planning Complaint however it is not part of the Tribunal's role to decide if the Appellant has been defamed or harassed or what the motive was for making the Planning Complaint.\n\nEvidence and matters considered\n\n27.\n\nFor the appeal we had a bundle of 134\npages and a closed bundle held pursuant to rule 14 2009 Rules about which we kept in mind our continuing duty to ensure fairness with regard to it (see B\nrowning -v- Information Commissioner\n[2014] EWCA Civ 1050\n)\n. Additionally we had the items listed at para 21(a)-(c).\n\n28.\n\nThe need for a gist of the closed bundle material was considered in light of authorities such as\nBarrett v The Information Commissioner & Financial Ombudsman Service [2024] UKUT 107.\nAs explained in the Reasons for the CMD of 10 June 2026 no gist was required because of the content of para 8 of those Reasons and because of what the Appellant was able to see for example on pages 88 -90 of the bundle. However, in fairness to the Appellant and because further closed material has been provided, set out below is a description of the closed material seen by the Tribunal.\n\n29.\n\nThe closed bundle consisted of 14 pages after a cover sheet and index at 1CB-2CB. Thereafter:-\n\n(a)\n\npages 3CB – 5CB contain an unredacted version of a letter from the Council to the IC of 2 September 2025 seen in its partially redacted form in the bundle at pages 88-90. The redactions on pages 88-90 of the bundle are of the name and the gender of the Complainant and the name and role of an official at the Council. This material is in scope as it contains the Complainant's personal data. In light of the position taken by the Appellant on 24 June 2026 we did not consider the redaction of officials' personal data to be an issue in this appeal;\n\n(b)\n\nthe top of 6CB is a letter of 5 August 2025 from the IC to the Council which can be seen in its redacted form at page 83 of the bundle. This contains the personal data of an official at the Council but not of the Complainant. In light of the position taken by the Appellant we did not consider the redaction of officials' personal data to be an issue in this appeal;\n\n(c)\n\nthe bottom of 6CB and page 7CB is the un-redacted version of page 82 in the bundle. This contains personal data of an official at the Council but not of the Complainant. In light of the position taken by the Appellant we did not consider the redaction of officials' personal data to be an issue in this appeal;\n\n(d)\n\nat pages 8CB to 13CB is a form called \"PCN returned\" and is headed \"schedule.\" It contains a schedule of handwritten information dated 5 February 2025 provided by the Appellant to the Council. It does not appear in the bundle. We concluded that this was the requester's own data, not in-scope of the Request and not in fact held as at the date of the Request. It would also not be subject to the EIR, by reg 5(3), and if FOIA applied it would be subject to the absolute exemption at section 40(1);\n\n(e)\n\npage 14CB is entirely blank;\n\n(f)\n\npage 15CB has just a person's name and the address of the Town Hall in Reigate. It does not appear in the bundle. It contains personal data of an official at the Council but not of the Complainant. It does not identify the Complainant and in light of the position taken by the Appellant we did not consider the redaction of officials' personal data to be an issue in this appeal; and\n\n(g)\n\nt\nhe index describes page 16CB as \"Initial contact to Council via online report.\" P\na\nge 16CB is a letter of 16 January 2025 from the Council to the Complainant. It is an email from noreply@reigate-banstead.gov.uk. It contains the Complainant's personal data as it is addressed to the Complainant and contains an email address for the Complainant.\n\n30.\n\nThe IC's closed submissions of 2 September 2026 dealt with his view on pages 8CB-13CB, 14CB and 15CB of the closed bundle. The closed part of the Council's submission of 25 June 2026 accompanied the provision of the Planning Complaint as required by para 10 of the CMD of 10 June 2026.\n\nFOIA or EIR?\n\n31.\n\nThe parties proceeded on the basis that the issues were to be decided by reference to section 40(2) FOIA. However the Request arose from the Planning Complaint sent to the Council which the Appellant said related to\n\"an enquiry regarding a potential breach of planning control related to this outbuilding.\"\nAlthough the focus shifted to the single issue of the identity of the Complainant, in our view, the Request was for environmental information as defined. On 2 September 2026 the IC confirmed that the EIR applied to the Request but that \"10...\nhe maintains that the disputed information should not be disclosed and that the appeal should be dismissed.\"\nWe concluded that the EIR applied and proceeded on that basis.\n\nEIR\n\n32.\n\nReg 5 EIR states\n\"Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request.\"\nThese rights and obligations are subject to a number of exceptions. Relevant to this appeal are regs 12(3) and 13 EIR.\n\n33.\n\nReg 12(3) EIR states \"\n(3)To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject, the personal data shall not be disclosed otherwise than in accordance with regulation 13.\"\nThe presumption at reg 12(2) EIR does not apply when dealing with a request for personal data under the EIR.\n\n34.\n\n\"Personal Data\n\"\nis defined in section 3(2) DPA18 as\n“any information relat\ni\nng to an identified or identi\nfiable livi\nng individual.” \"Identifiable living individual\"\nmeans, by section 3(3) DPA18,\n\"...a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to (a) an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or (b)one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the individual.\"\n\n35.\n\nThese parts of reg 13 EIR are relevant:-\n\n\"(1)\n\nTo the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject, a public authority must not disclose the personal data if—\n\n(a)\n\nthe first condition is satisfied...\n\n(2A)\n\nThe first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations (a) would contravene any of the data protection principles...\"\n\n36.\n\nThe relevant data protection principles are those set out in the UKGDPR. Article 5(1)(a) provides that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. Article 6(1) sets out that processing of personal data shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the specified set of conditions applies. In this case the relevant condition would be that\n\"(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data in particular where the data subject is a child.\"\n\n37.\n\nAs set out by t\nhe\nSupreme Court in\nSouth Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner\n[2013] UKSC 55\n(29 July 2013)\nat [18] l\nawful processing of personal data requires the consideration of three questions being:-\n\n(a)\n\ni\ns the data controller or a third party pursuing a\nlegitimate interest\nor interests?\n\n(b)\n\ni\ns the processing of the personal data involved necessary for the purposes of those interests?\n\n(c)\n\nIs the processing of the personal data for the pursuit of the legitimate interest(s) identified overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject?\n\n38.\n\nIn explanatory notes that accompanied the DN the IC said (11):-\n\n\"In considering any legitimate interests in the disclosure of the requested information under the FOIA, the Commissioner recognises that such interests can include broad general principles of accountability and transparency for their own sakes as well as case specific interests.\n\nFurther, a wide range of interests may be legitimate interests. They can be the requester's own interests or the interests of third parties, and commercial interests as well as wider societal benefits. They may be compelling or trivial, but trivial interests may be more easily overridden.\"\n\n39.\n\nAs regards\n“Necessity”\nthe UT in\nGoldsmith International Business School -v- The Information Commissioner and the Home Office\n[2014] UKUT 0563 (AAC)\n\nsaid from para 36:-\n\n(a)\n\nit\nmeans \"\nreasonable necessity\"\nand\n\"more than desirable but less than indispensable or absolute necessity.\"\n\n(b)\n\n\"T\nhe test of reasonable necessity itself involves the consideration of alternative measures, and so “a measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim could be achieved by something less”; accordingly, the measure must be the “least restrictive” means of achieving the legitimate aim in question.”\n\n40.\n\nThe balancing in this case of the legitimate interests and the Complainant's rights is tested when the Council did (or should have) provided its response.\nThis test is not the same as the public interest balancing test for qualified exemptions/exceptions\n.\nIn\nCox v Information Commissioner and Home Office\n[2018] UKUT 119 (AAC)\n\nat [42]\nthe UT said\n:-\n\n“…the balancing process in the application of the Goldsmith questions “is different from the balance that has to be applied under, for example, section 2(1)(b) of FOIA”...Furthermore FOIA stipulates that the section 40(2) exemption applies if disclosure would contravene the data protection principles enshrined in the DPA, so it is the DPA regime which must be applied. There is no obvious reason why the general transparency values underpinning FOIA should automatically create a legitimate interest in disclosure under the DPA.\"\n\n41.\n\nIn addition to being lawful, processing must also be carried out in a fair and transparent manner as regards the data subject.\n\n42.\n\nThe Appellant referred in the grounds of appeal to a number of cases. In the CMD of 10 June 2026 he was asked to provide for the Tribunal:-\n\n(a)\n\nthe case citation in full and\n\n(b)\n\nthe paragraph numbers of any particular passages from the case reports the Tribunal should consider in particular.\n\n43.\n\nIn his email of 24 June 2026, in response to the CMD, the Appellant provided a number of case references.\nDespite reasonable efforts, the Tribunal was unable to identify the authorities referred to as Lennon v Information Commissioner (EA/2006/0074) and Khan v London Borough of Hillingdon from the information provided. The Tribunal has therefore proceeded on the basis of the authorities cited elsewhere in this decision.\n\n44.\n\nThe Tribunal is grateful to the Appellant, as a litigant in person, for seeking to assist by identifying authorities considered relevant to his position. However, the Tribunal was satisfied that the authorities referred to elsewhere in this decision were sufficient to determine the issues arising in this appeal.\n\nPersonal data\n\n45.\n\nThe relevant information sought in the Request was \"t\nhe details of the complainant\"\nincluding the identity.\nIn our view, to the extent that this information is held, it is personal data.\n\nLegitimate Interest\n\n46.\n\nThe Planning Complaint was submitted using an online portal for reporting suspected planning breaches and part of it did refer to planning issues which were then raised by the Council in their letter to the Appellant of 17 January 2025. Had the Planning Complaint only referred to actual planning questions then, while the Appellant might have wanted to know who the Complainant was, in our view, while he would have had some legitimate interest, it would not have been particularly strong.\n\n47.\n\nHowever the Planning Complaint also included the allegation that the Appellant had \"...\nillegally funded this project via a company he set up...with a fraudulent application to Arts Council England.\"\nIt is not the role of this Tribunal to consider whether or not these allegations are defamatory and\nwe are not in a position to conclude whether or not such allegations were made maliciously by the Complainant as alleged by the Appellant. However,\ndespite ACE setting out its position on that allegation on\n20 February 2026 (about a year later), we do understand,\nfrom the Appellant's perspective\n, why he said for example only: -\n\n(a)\n\n\"\nThe complainant has accused me of opening front companies to fraudulently obtain Arts Council funds—a claim that is entirely fabricated and poses a grave threat to my personal and professional reputation (65)\"\n\n(b)\n\n\"\nThe accusation....is an objectively false and defamatory statement....It is untrue, harmful, and potentially career-ending.\"\n\n(c)\n\n\"The allegations, if believed, would falsely imply criminal fraud and could devastate my reputation and livelihood\"\n\n(d)\n\n(65) These false allegations not only jeopardize my standing but also risk undermining my vital relationship with the Arts Council and harming the musicians I support. The complainant’s detailed focus on my funding history, possibly gleaned through FOI requests, suggests a calculated, malicious intent to defame me.\n\n(e)\n\nAllegations of this nature strike directly at the Appellant’s professional reputation and his ability to earn a living. They are not abstract or trivial.\n\n(f)\"\nThis allegation imputes serious criminal fraud and could jeopardise ongoing funding, professional relationships, and my standing across the UK music sector. It is a charge that any fair-minded reader would see as gravely damaging.\"\n\n(g)\n\n\"\nit is a malicious attempt to smear me for reasons I cannot fathom\"\n\n48.\n\nWhen seeking a review (42) and in the complaint to the IC (59) the Appellant said that he needed to know the identity of the complainant\nas he wished to pursue legal action for defamation and harassment and/or issue a pre-action letter to protect his reputation(29).\n\n49.\n\nWhether or not the Appellant decides to take legal action we are satisfied, because of these specific allegations, that he has a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of the Complainant. We also concluded that in its analysis of the legitimate interest, the Council ascribed too little weight to this interest. It is possible that this was due to it being disproportionately focused on the planning aspects of the Planning Complaint rather than the inclusion of the \"\nnon-planning\"\nallegations which, in our view, bolsters the interest materially. The Tribunal emphasises that acceptance of a legitimate interest does not involve the finding of any facts regarding the allegations made in the Planning Complaint. It reflects only the Tribunal's conclusion that the nature of those allegations is capable of giving rise to a legitimate interest in discovering the identity of the Complainant.\n\n50.\n\nThere was however no material legitimate interest that would benefit the public more broadly because:-\n\n(a)\n\nthe Request is for the name (and metadata) of one person and relates to a complaint about one specific person and property;\n\n(b)\n\ndisclosing the name would not assist, to any material extent, in the promotion of the Council's accountability and transparency or a better understanding of its public duties;\n\n(c)\n\ndisclosing the name would not lead to any broader societal benefits; and\n\n(d)\n\ndisclosing the name could lead to others being less willing to bring concerns to the attention of the appropriate authorities.\n\nNecessity\n\n51.\n\nWhile it appears that the Appellant may seek legal advice (30) to pursue a Norwich Pharmacal application and it can be possible to commence legal action against an unnamed defendant we accept that the name of the Complainant would be reasonably needed for the legitimate purpose and we therefore agree with the IC's conclusion at para 25 of the DN.\n\nAre the legitimate interests overridden?\n\n52.\n\nIn reply to the Request for a review the Council said (49):-\n\n\"Any legitimate interest you may have in receiving the data is overridden by the need to protect the confidentiality of complainants. To breach such confidentiality could lead to complainants being subject to reprisals and could mean that members of the public will be unwilling to report breaches of planning control to the Council, which would not be in the public interest.\"\n\n53.\n\nWhen setting out its position to the IC, the Council made these submissions on the question of the balance and why, in their view, it favoured non-disclosure (89):-\n\n(a)\n\nthe Complainant had a right to expect that personal data would not be disclosed without consent and\n\"they are not willing to give consent\";\n\n(b)\n\nFOIA disclosure is to the world not just the Appellant;\n\n(c)\n\nDisclosure would unfairly reveal the identity of the Complainant and their personal involvement in making the Planning Complaint\n\n(d)\n\ndisclosure could cause distress and leave the Complainant\n\"open to possible reprisals.\"\n\n(e)\n\n\"There is no, or only very limited, public interest in publishing this information\" but \"There is a strong public interest in protecting complainants’ identities to avoid deterrence from raising legitimate concerns.\"\n\n54.\n\nThe IC's decision in the DN (8) was that the identified legitimate interests were not sufficient to override\n\"\nthe interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data\"\nbecause:-\n\n(a)\n\nthe individual that made the Planning Complaint to the Council would have had a reasonable expectation that their name and contact details would not be disclosed to the world at large under FOIA;\n\n(b)\n\nthe Council confirmed the individual had been asked whether they are willing to consent to the disclosure of their personal data, and they said they are not willing to give consent;\n\n(c)\n\ndisclosing the information would cause harm and distress to the complainant; and leave them open to possible reprisals; and\n\n(d)\n\nwhat was disclosed was adequate to meet the needs of transparency.\n\n55.\n\nIn his grounds of appeal (29) and his Reply (36) the Appellant's response on the question of the balance was that:-\n\n(a)\n\nthe IC's conclusions about the Complainant's distress were based on assumptions;\n\n(b)\n\nthe IC ignored the actual harm caused to the Appellant;\n\n(c)\n\n\"\nWhere a statutory process is misused to make false criminal allegations, any expectation of anonymity must be critically examined.\";\nand\n\n(d)\n\nthe balance clearly favoured disclosure.\n\nThe Tribunal's analysis\n\n56.\n\nFirstly it is right to keep in mind that disclosure of the Complainant's personal data would be to the world and not just to the Appellant.\n\n57.\n\nPara 11 of the CMD of 10 June 2026 required the Council to\n\"provide to the parties its position (supported by evidence if available) on the following questions:-(a) as at the date of the complaint to the Council in this case what assurances of confidentiality would have been given or seen by those making complaints\"\nThe Council said:-\n\n\"The complainant would have been advised that the Council do not share any personal information with the alleged offender during the enforcement investigation. The Council’s website sets out the following: “Remember, our enforcement files are confidential. However, if formal action is taken it may not be possible to keep your complaint confidential. If an appeal is lodged against an\nenforcement notice or other notice or if a planning\napplication is\nsubmitted, we will notify anyone who informed us of the matter and ask if they wish to submit additional information or appear at an inquiry/hearing to support the Council’s case. Please remember that the strength of local support can be crucial to the Council’s case. However you should remember that at this point any representations you make will become available for public inspection, including inspection by the site owner, appellant and any legal representatives.\"\n\n58.\n\nFrom this we concluded that the Council, had overstated the position by saying, in somewhat absolute terms, that the Complainant had a right to expect that personal data would not be disclosed without consent. In our view the Complainant, having given their name when making the Planning Complaint, had a reasonable expectation that their personal data would not be disclosed during an investigation but that it would likely not remain confidential if the investigation led to enforcement action.\n\n59.\n\nIn its reply to the request for a review the Council referred to the public interest in members of the public being willing to report\n\"breaches of planning control\"\nto the Council and that disclosure of the name of the Complainant risked reducing that willingness which would reduce that public interest.\n\n60.\n\nWe accept that it is in the public interest for members of the public to feel able and willing to bring to the attention of the relevant authorities concerns that they may have on planning issues. We also accept that disclosure of the name of complainants prior to any enforcement does risk reducing that willingness because of the reasonable expectation referred to. On this basis we accept that disclosure in this case (where there was no enforcement action taken) risks harming that public interest.\n\n61.\n\nHowever, the weight attributed to that risk is reduced by the inclusion within the Planning Complaint of the allegations that the Appellant had\n\"illegally funded this project...with a fraudulent application to Arts Council England.\"\nAny connection this has to a planning issue is tangential at best but, more realistically non- existent as evidenced by the Council making no reference to it in their letter of 17 January 2025 to the Appellant. This analysis weakens (but does not extinguish) both the concern raised about protecting the public interest in people reporting planning concerns and also the Complainant's expectation that personal data would not be disclosed without consent unless and until any planning enforcement action was taken.\n\n62.\n\nAs regards the concern about\ndistress\nwe noted that the DN (8) said that disclosure \"\nwould\ncause harm and distress\"\nbut that the Council in its submissions to the IC (90) said that disclosure\ncould\ncause distress to the Complainant. It appears that the Council was in touch with the Complainant when asking about consent and it may be that this issue was raised at that time. However, in the absence of evidence that this disclosure was expected to cause distress to this Complainant we do not accept that it\nwould\ndo so. We however do accept disclosure\ncould\n(ie has the capability to) cause distress.\n\n63.\n\nReference is made to the risk of reprisals. The Council, when considering the balance, said (50)\n\"...To breach such confidentiality could lead to complainants being subject to reprisals and could mean that members of the public will be unwilling to report breaches of planning control to the Council, which would not be in the public interest.\"\n\n64.\n\nIn our view a \"\nreprisal\"\nin this context would be a retaliatory act\nof revenge or\npunishment directed against the Complainant. As it has a pejorative and negative connotation we would not, for example, characterise the issuing of legitimate legal proceedings to protect one's position or reputation or to seek lawful redress as being a\n\"reprisal.\"\nWe accept that it will sometimes be the case that questions of planning, planning disputes and complaints may lead to disputes and that such disputes could lead to one interest group or party seeking to get back at a complainant if their identity was revealed. This could risk others being reluctant to come forward – against the public interest.\n\n65.\n\nIt is also important to note that there was no specific evidence provided in this case to suggest that the Complainant was concerned about possible reprisals from the Appellant. From the structure and language of this part of the Council's response to the request for a review (50) we concluded that this submission was not meant as being specifically relevant to this case but formed part of a precedent designed to explain generically relevant parts of UKGDPR.\n\nConclusion\n\n66.\n\nAs can be seen above, we ascribed more weight to the Appellant's legitimate interest and less weight to the concerns about the Complainant's expectations, distress and reprisals and the risk of there being less willingness to report breaches, than is seen in the DN. The difference in these assessments results principally from the inclusion, within the Planning Complaint, of the allegations about defrauding ACE.\n\n67.\n\nHowever, notwithstanding this we concluded, narrowly, that the Appellant's legitimate interests did not override the Complainant's data protection rights because:-\n\n(a)\n\nthe Planning Complaint did include some planning matters, did not lead to enforcement action and so the Complainant had at least some expectation of confidentiality;\n\n(b)\n\nthe legitimate interests are the Appellant's private interests;\n\n(c)\n\ndisclosure does risk, at least to some degree, dissuading others who may have otherwise been minded to report planning concerns; and\n\n(d)\n\nany disclosure is to the world\n.\n\nFairness and\ntransparency\n\n68.\n\nIn light of our conclusion above we did not consider it necessary to consider this.\n\nDecision\n\n69.\n\nFor the reasons set out above, although the DN referred to FOIA rather than the EIR, we agree that the Council was entitled to withhold the identity of the Complainant in response to the Request. For the avoidance of doubt this outcome would have been the same had we considered the appeal under FOIA. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.\n\nSigned\nJudge Heald\nDate:\n10 November 2026","changes":[]}