{"check":null,"uid":"4652b239a8aa88d6","title":"Health and Safety Executive v Information Commissioner & Anor","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-22","summary":"Суд рассмотрел два запроса граждан о предоставлении информации об использовании профессиональных пользователей пестицидов в определённых географических зонах Уэльса. Информация запрашивалась согласно Регламенту (ЕС) № 1107/2009 и Экологическим информационным правилам 2004 года. Суд установил, что информация хранилась профессиональными пользователями от имени заявителя и была признана необходимой для удовлетворения запросов. Суд отклонил аргументы заявителя о чрезмерной административной нагрузке и пришёл к выводу, что публичный интерес в раскрытии информации перевешивает необходимость сохранения ресурсов государственных органов.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":202020,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1448","first_seen":"2026-10-23","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:33","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"automated decision","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":8,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":30,"ctx":"Health and Safety Executive v Information Commissioner & Anor INTRODUCTION  1.  These appeals concern requests for environmental information rel","zone":"орган","weight":3}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":43399,"ctx":"n require review before disclosure. that exercise might include identifying and redacting personal data, removing or obscuring material outside the scope of the request and dealing with records","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 8)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-23","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01448 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1448","text":"INTRODUCTION\n\n1.\n\nThese appeals concern requests for environmental information relating to the use of plant protection products within two geographical areas of Wales. The information sought is contained in records maintained pursuant to Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (“Article 67 records”), which requires professional users of plant protection products to keep records of their use of those products and to retain them for at least three years. The first request concerns the use of glyphosate within a ten-mile radius of Carmarthen during 2022. The second concerns the use of plant protection products within a defined area to the east of Wrexham during the calendar years specified in that request.\n\n2.\n\nThe appeals were brought by the Health and Safety Executive (“HSE”) against decisions of the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) requiring HSE to respond to the requests on the basis that the information was held for the purposes of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“the EIR”) and that the requests were not manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b). WildFish Conservation (“WildFish”), which made the Wrexham request and has an interest in the Carmarthen appeal, is the Second Respondent. The appeals were heard together because, notwithstanding the differences between the requests, they raise substantially the same questions under the EIR.\n\n3.\n\nThe appeals raise three principal questions. First, whether information contained in Article 67 records retained by professional users was held by those users on behalf of HSE within regulation 3(2)(b). Secondly, if it was held, whether either request was manifestly unreasonable because of the burden which compliance would impose. Thirdly, if regulation 12(4)(b) was engaged, whether the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosure.\n\n4.\n\nFor the reasons which follow, the Tribunal concludes that the information sought was held by professional users on behalf of HSE within regulation 3(2)(b). It accepts that compliance with each request would require a substantial commitment of time and resources, and that the burden associated with the Wrexham request would be the greater. Having considered the nature and extent of that burden together with the other circumstances of the requests, however, the Tribunal is not satisfied that either was manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b). Had that exception been engaged, the Tribunal would in any event have concluded that the public interest in maintaining it did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.\n\nTHE REQUESTS AND THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISIONS\n\n5.\n\nThese appeals arise from two requests made under the EIR for information concerning the use of plant protection products recorded pursuant to Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. Although the requests differed in their geographical and temporal scope, and in the range of products to which they related, they raised a common question as to whether the requested information was held for the purposes of the EIR. If it was, each appeal also required consideration of whether HSE was entitled to refuse the relevant request as manifestly unreasonable under regulation 12(4)(b).\n\nThe Carmarthen request\n\n6.\n\nOn 8 December 2023, the Environment Project, a pro bono unit within Cardiff University’s School of Law and Politics, made a request to HSE under the EIR for information concerning the use of glyphosate in Wales. Insofar as material to this appeal, it sought all Article 67 records relating to the use of glyphosate by farmers or their contractors in Carmarthenshire, Pembrokeshire and the Vale of Glamorgan during 2022. The request also contained a separate limb concerning information held by HSE about adverse reactions or negative effects associated with the use of glyphosate in Wales since 2020. That part of the request was not pursued in the complaint to the Commissioner and does not arise in this appeal.\n\n7.\n\nHSE refused the Article 67 element of the request on 12 January 2024. It explained that professional users were not required routinely to provide copies of their records to HSE and that HSE did not request or hold those records as a matter of course. HSE considered that compliance would require it to identify and contact the professional users operating within the three counties, a group which it regarded as potentially encompassing a very large number of agricultural holdings. It concluded that the administrative and financial burden of doing so rendered the request manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n8.\n\nIn response, the requester reduced the geographical scope of the request. On 29 February 2024, it wrote:\n\n“…in the hope that this will bring the request under the ‘manifestly unreasonable’ bar, we would like to limit the request to Article 67 records for glyphosate, covering 2022, to those farms in an area radius 10 miles centred on Carmarthen.”\n\nIt is this narrowed request which we refer to as “the Carmarthen request”.\n\n9.\n\nHSE refused the narrowed request on 3 April 2024. It stated that it did not hold a list or map identifying all farm holdings within the relevant area and that the ten-mile radius was nevertheless likely to encompass a substantial number of relevant users. HSE maintained that identifying those users, obtaining their records and preparing the responsive information for disclosure would impose a burden sufficient to engage regulation 12(4)(b). Following a request for internal review dated 19 April 2024, HSE upheld its refusal on 18 June 2024.\n\n10.\n\nThe requester complained to the Commissioner, who issued a Decision Notice on 10 January 2025. The Commissioner did not determine whether the information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE. That issue had not formed part of HSE’s reasons for refusing the Carmarthen request and was first raised by HSE in its appeal. The Decision Notice was confined to HSE’s reliance on regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n11.\n\nThe Commissioner accepted that compliance would require HSE to identify farms within the relevant area, contact the relevant users, record and follow up their responses, and review and prepare the information received for disclosure. HSE had estimated that this work would require 302 hours, at an indicative cost of £7,550. The Commissioner did not accept that estimate. Having considered the individual stages of the proposed exercise, he estimated that compliance would require approximately 26 hours, at an indicative cost of £650. He concluded that the request was not manifestly unreasonable and required HSE to issue a fresh response which did not rely on regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n12.\n\nHSE appealed against the Decision Notice. In addition to challenging the Commissioner’s assessment of the burden of compliance, HSE contended in its grounds of appeal that the requested information was not held for the purposes of the EIR because the Article 67 records were retained by professional users and were not held by those users on HSE’s behalf. WildFish, which had not made the Carmarthen request, was joined as the Second Respondent. It supported the Commissioner’s conclusion on regulation 12(4)(b) and opposed HSE’s case that the information was not held.\n\nThe Wrexham request\n\n13.\n\nOn 29 February 2024, Guy Linley-Adams, on behalf of WildFish Conservation, made a request to HSE under the EIR. The request was accompanied by a map marking an area to the east of Wrexham and sought the following information:\n\n“In relation to these sites, we would be grateful if you could provide any data held by HSE which would help to identify quantities of (i) biocides and (ii) plant protection products being used within the purple area on the map, for each calendar year 2020 to 2023.”\n\nWe refer to this as “the Wrexham request”.\n\n14.\n\nIn March 2024, HSE refused the request under regulation 12(4)(a). It explained that users were not required routinely to notify HSE of spraying information and that its inspectors might request Article 67 records where, for example, there had been an adverse incident. As HSE had not requested records relevant to the area and period identified by WildFish, it stated that it held no information falling within the scope of the request. WildFish sought an internal review on 17 April 2024. HSE upheld its decision on 5 June 2024, maintaining that the requested information was not held for the purposes of the EIR.\n\n15.\n\nWildFish complained to the Commissioner. On 12 November 2024, the Commissioner issued a Decision Notice in which he concluded that there was a sufficient degree of connection between the requested information and HSE’s functions for the information to be held by HSE for the purposes of the EIR. He required HSE to issue a fresh response on that basis. HSE did not appeal against that Decision Notice.\n\n16.\n\nIn response to the Decision Notice, HSE issued a fresh response on 10 December 2024. It stated that it held no information concerning the use of biocides within the identified area because there was no legal requirement for information about their use to be recorded or maintained. In relation to plant protection products, HSE refused the request under regulation 12(4)(b). It estimated at that stage that compliance would cost a minimum of £9,425 and concluded that the burden was disproportionate to the public interest in disclosure.\n\n17.\n\nWildFish sought an internal review on 6 January 2025. It accepted HSE’s position concerning biocides and confined the continuing request to Article 67 records relating to plant products used in a farming context. On 31 July 2025, HSE upheld its refusal. It maintained that the information was not held within regulation 3(2)(b) and in the alternative, that the request was manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n18.\n\nThe Commissioner’s subsequent investigation was directed at HSE’s reliance on regulation 12(4)(b). During that investigation, HSE revised its assessment of the work required to 264.4 hours, equivalent to £6,600 at the hourly rate used for the assessment. On 7 October 2025, the Commissioner issued a second Decision Notice. He proceeded on the basis of his earlier, unappealed conclusion that the information was held and did not determine that question afresh.\n\n19.\n\nThe Commissioner accepted that HSE did not have routine procedures for requesting and collecting Article 67 information on the scale contemplated by the Wrexham request and that compliance would involve a considerable body of work. He nevertheless considered that parts of HSE’s estimate were too high, particularly the allowances made for recording and following up responses and for reviewing and processing the records received. He considered that, even if those stages required approximately 124 hours at an indicative cost of £3,100, the value of the requested information made it proportionate to require HSE to respond. He therefore concluded that the request was not manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b). As that exception was not engaged, he did not determine the public-interest balance under regulation 12(1)(b). The Commissioner required HSE to issue a fresh response which did not rely on regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n20.\n\nHSE appealed against the second Decision Notice. It challenged the Commissioner’s assessment of the burden imposed by compliance and maintained that regulation 12(4)(b) was engaged. It also sought to challenge the earlier conclusion that the information was held for the purposes of the EIR, notwithstanding that it had not appealed against the first Decision Notice. The procedural consequences of that omission are considered below. We have therefore considered the common legal questions together, while addressing separately the differences in scope, burden and potential utility which are material to the determination of each appeal.\n\nTHE APPEALS AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS\n\nThe appeals and conjoined hearing\n\n21.\n\nHSE appealed against the Carmarthen Decision Notice. WildFish had not made the Carmarthen request, but was joined as the Second Respondent because of its interest in the information sought and the connection between that appeal and the Wrexham request. HSE subsequently appealed against the second Wrexham Decision Notice. By directions made on 25 November 2025, the Tribunal directed that the two appeals be heard together.\n\n22.\n\nThe conjoined appeals were heard by Cloud Video Platform (“CVP”) on 1 May 2026. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from Sarah Frow on behalf of HSE and from Dr Justin Neal on behalf of WildFish. Dr Justin Neal adopted the witness statement of Guy Linley-Adams so far as he was able, subject to the limits of his own knowledge and involvement. The Tribunal also received the written evidence of Guy Linley-Adams and Professor Dave Goulson.\n\n23.\n\nIn addition to the witness evidence, the Tribunal considered the Decision Notices, the parties’ statements of case, the open hearing bundle, the agreed authorities, the parties’ skeleton arguments and their oral submissions. Following the hearing, the Tribunal also received further written submissions concerning information held by Fera Science Limited in connection with the Pesticide Usage Survey. We are grateful to the parties’ representatives for the care with which their respective cases were presented and for the assistance provided to the Tribunal.\n\nThe first Wrexham Decision Notice\n\n24.\n\nA procedural issue arose concerning HSE’s challenge to the Commissioner’s conclusion that the information sought by the Wrexham request was held for the purposes of the EIR. That conclusion had been reached in the first Wrexham Decision Notice, issued on 12 November 2024. HSE did not appeal against that notice within the prescribed period. Instead, it issued the fresh response required by the Commissioner and relied upon regulation 12(4)(b). The second Wrexham Decision Notice, against which the present appeal was brought, was confined to HSE’s reliance upon that exception and did not determine the “held” issue afresh.\n\n25.\n\nHSE submitted that it was entitled to raise the issue in its appeal against the second Decision Notice. It relied upon the Tribunal’s\nde novo\njurisdiction and upon\nDepartment for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Information Commissioner and Birkett\n\n[2011] EWCA Civ 1606\n, in which the Court of Appeal held that a public authority may rely before the Tribunal upon an exception which it had not previously raised. HSE maintained that the Tribunal was required to determine the correct legal position and should not be prevented from doing so by what it characterised as a technical procedural objection.\n\n26.\n\nThe Commissioner submitted that\nBirkett\ndid not confer a right to reopen a conclusion contained in an earlier Decision Notice which had not been appealed. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the present appeal was directed to the lawfulness of the second Decision Notice, whereas the conclusion that the information was held had been reached in the first. The Commissioner relied also upon the time limit in rule 22 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009. He submitted that the effectiveness of that time limit would be undermined if a party could challenge an earlier Decision Notice through an appeal against a later notice dealing with a different aspect of the same request. The Commissioner nevertheless accepted that, in the particular circumstances of these conjoined proceedings, it would be sensible for the Tribunal to permit HSE to challenge the first Decision Notice out of time.\n\n27.\n\nWe accept the Commissioner’s submission that HSE was not entitled, merely by appealing against the second Decision Notice, to reopen as of right a conclusion reached in the earlier notice.\nBirkett\nconcerned the raising of an additional exception in an appeal properly brought against the Decision Notice under challenge. It did not decide that an appeal against a later Decision Notice carries with it an unrestricted entitlement to challenge a separate and earlier notice after the period for appealing against it has expired. The\nde novo\nnature of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not dispense with the procedural requirement that an appeal against a Decision Notice be brought within the applicable time limit, or that an extension of time be obtained where it is not.\n\n28.\n\nWe nevertheless considered it appropriate to extend time and permit HSE to challenge the first Wrexham Decision Notice. The same question under regulation 3(2)(b) was properly before the Tribunal in the Carmarthen appeal, and the two appeals had been directed to be heard together. The issue had been fully pleaded and addressed in the parties’ written and oral submissions. The Commissioner did not oppose an extension in the circumstances of these proceedings, and neither respondent identified any forensic or procedural prejudice arising from the Tribunal determining the issue in both appeals. To have determined the question in the Carmarthen appeal while declining to consider it in the Wrexham appeal would have risked leaving inconsistent conclusions in relation to materially the same category of information and the same statutory scheme.\n\n29.\n\nWe therefore extended time for HSE to challenge the first Wrexham Decision Notice and admitted that challenge. This conclusion is confined to the particular procedural circumstances of these conjoined appeals. It should not be understood as permitting a party, as of right, to reopen an earlier Decision Notice through an appeal against a later notice concerning the same request. We accordingly consider the application of regulation 3(2)(b) to both requests in the substantive analysis below.\n\nAdmission of Dr Justin Neal’s evidence\n\n30.\n\nAt the outset of the hearing, WildFish applied for permission to call Dr Justin Neal to give oral evidence and to adopt, so far as he was able, the witness statement of Guy Linley-Adams. The parties’ case-management responses had proceeded on the basis that Sarah Frow would be the only witness to give oral evidence. In the Commissioner’s skeleton argument, however, counsel indicated that she wished to ask questions of WildFish’s witnesses concerning the value and utility of the requested information. Guy Linley-Adams was no longer available to attend the hearing, and WildFish therefore proposed that Dr Justin Neal, its in-house solicitor, should give evidence in his place. We considered it regrettable that WildFish had released Mr Linley-Adams from attending the hearing before it had been established that his oral evidence would not be required. His subsequent unavailability created an avoidable difficulty and resulted in an application being made at a very late stage.\n\n31.\n\nHSE objected to the application. It relied upon the late stage at which the proposal had been made and upon the parties’ previous understanding that Sarah Frow would be the only oral witness. HSE submitted that Dr Justin Neal had not been involved in the events giving rise to either request and could not give first-hand evidence about matters within Guy Linley-Adams’s personal knowledge. It also submitted that WildFish’s written evidence had been available for a considerable period, that HSE had previously indicated that it did not intend to question those witnesses, and that calling a substitute witness would add little while placing further pressure upon the hearing timetable.\n\n32.\n\nThe Commissioner and WildFish opposed the objection. They submitted that the value and potential utility of the requested information were relevant both to the application of regulation 12(4)(b) and, if that exception were engaged, to the public-interest balance. Although HSE did not dispute that information about pesticide use was capable of serving a public interest, its written case questioned the extent to which the particular information sought could support the purposes for which WildFish said it was required. WildFish emphasised that it was not seeking to introduce a new statement or to enlarge its case. It accepted that Dr Justin Neal could not give first-hand evidence about matters known personally to Guy Linley-Adams but submitted that the limits of his knowledge were matters affecting the weight of his evidence rather than a sufficient reason to exclude it.\n\n33.\n\nWe granted the application because the evidence was relevant to matters which the Tribunal was required to determine. HSE accepted that information concerning pesticide use was capable of serving a public interest but disputed the value of the particular information sought by these requests. Its case included the contention that information obtained from the defined areas would be of limited assistance in understanding pesticide use more widely and could not safely support the broader conclusions for which WildFish contended. The evidence contained in Guy Linley-Adams’s statement addressed the nature of the information contained in Article 67 records, the purposes for which WildFish sought access to it, the respects in which it differed from information available through existing datasets, and the contribution which disclosure might make to the investigation and understanding of pesticide use and its environmental consequences. Those matters were relevant to the assessment of whether the requests were manifestly unreasonable and, if regulation 12(4)(b) were engaged, to the public-interest balance. We were therefore satisfied that the evidence was capable of assisting the Tribunal in determining issues which remained in dispute.\n\n34.\n\nWe did not regard Dr Justin Neal’s lack of direct involvement in the making of the requests as a sufficient reason to exclude his evidence. We accepted that he could not give first-hand evidence about matters which depended upon Guy Linley-Adams’s personal involvement or knowledge, and that the act of adopting the statement could not place him in the same evidential position as its author. Those limitations were relevant to the weight which could properly be attached to particular parts of the evidence. They did not, however, render inadmissible evidence which Dr Justin Neal was able to give from his own knowledge of WildFish’s work, his understanding of the documentary material, and his familiarity with the purposes for which the information was sought. Questioning also enabled the basis of his knowledge to be identified and distinguished from matters of which he had no direct knowledge. We were able to take those distinctions into account when evaluating the evidence.\n\n35.\n\nWe were also satisfied that admitting the evidence would not cause material unfairness to HSE. The substance of Guy Linley-Adams’s evidence had been before HSE for a considerable period, and WildFish did not seek through Dr Justin Neal to introduce a new witness statement or advance a materially different case. HSE was aware of the evidence concerning the claimed value and utility of Article 67 records and had addressed that subject in its written case. It had the opportunity to question Dr Justin Neal about the matters within his knowledge, to expose the limits of his ability to adopt the statement, and to make submissions about the weight which should be attached to his evidence. In those circumstances, the lateness of the application and the resulting pressure upon the hearing timetable did not outweigh the assistance which the evidence was capable of providing. We therefore permitted Dr Justin Neal to give evidence and to adopt Guy Linley-Adams’s statement so far as he was able. He did not purport to adopt the separate evidence of Professor Dave Goulson.\n\nFurther submissions concerning Fera\n\n36.\n\nDuring Sarah Frow’s oral evidence, it emerged that Fera Science Limited (“Fera”) retained statistical information collected for the Pesticide Usage Survey, which it conducted under contractual arrangements with HSE. As it was unclear whether any such information was held on HSE’s behalf or fell within either request, the Tribunal directed the parties to provide further written submissions after the hearing.\n\n37.\n\nHaving examined the contractual arrangements and the parties’ practices concerning the survey information, HSE accepted that the statistical survey information underlying the Pesticide Usage Survey was held by Fera on its behalf. HSE maintained, however, that the contractual relationship with Fera was materially different from the statutory relationship between HSE and professional users under Article 67. WildFish submitted that the Fera arrangement did not determine whether Article 67 information was held, which remained a question to be answered by reference to the Article 67 regime itself.\n\n38.\n\nIn relation to Wrexham, Fera supplied HSE on 21 April 2026 with a small sample dataset falling within the plant protection product element of the request. HSE confirmed that the material supplied by Fera comprised all the information which Fera held within the scope of that request. The Commissioner accepted that no further steps were required in relation to the Wrexham request and that no question remained concerning the application of regulation 12(4)(b) to information held by Fera. In relation to Carmarthen, the Commissioner submitted that information held by Fera might fall within the request even though it was not contained in Article 67 records, because a request under the EIR is directed to information rather than documents in a particular form. HSE thereafter confirmed that, so far as it was aware, Fera possessed no relevant information concerning the geographical area covered by the Carmarthen request.\n\n39.\n\nWe were therefore satisfied that no unresolved issue concerning information held by Fera remained in either appeal. The Fera material did not determine whether Article 67 information retained by professional users was held on HSE’s behalf, which depends upon the distinct statutory relationship considered below. The nature and limitations of the Pesticide Usage Survey remain relevant to the utility of the information sought.\n\nTHE ISSUES\n\n40.\n\nIn light of the Tribunal’s ruling concerning the first Wrexham Decision Notice, the following issues arise for determination:\n\n(1)\n\nWhether the requested information contained in the relevant Article 67 records was held by professional users on behalf of HSE within the meaning of regulation 3(2)(b) of the EIR;\n\n(2)\n\nif the information was held, whether either the Carmarthen request or the Wrexham request was manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of regulation 12(4)(b); and\n\n(3)\n\nif regulation 12(4)(b) was engaged in relation to either request, whether, in all the circumstances, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosure.\n\n41.\n\nThe first issue raises a common question concerning the legal and practical relationship between HSE, professional users and Article 67 information. The second and third issues must be determined separately in relation to each request, having regard to the differences in their scope, the burden which compliance would impose and the purpose and potential utility of the information sought.\n\nTHE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK\n\nThe Environmental Information Regulations 2004\n\n42.\n\nThe EIR provide a right of access to environmental information held by public authorities. Regulation 5(1) provides that, subject to the Regulations, a public authority which holds environmental information must make that information available on request.\n\n43.\n\nRegulation 3(2) defines when environmental information is held by a public authority:\n\n“For the purposes of these Regulations, environmental information is held by a public authority if the information -\n\n(a)\n\nis in the authority’s possession and has been produced or received by the authority; or\n\n(b)\n\nis held by another person on behalf of the authority.”\n\nThe information contained in the relevant Article 67 records retained by professional users was not in HSE’s possession when the requests were received and had not been produced or received by it. Regulation 3(2)(a) is therefore not engaged in relation to that information. The dispute concerns regulation 3(2)(b).\n\n44.\n\nRegulation 12 provides, so far as material:\n\n“(1)\n\nSubject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if—\n\n(a)\n\nan exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and\n\n(b)\n\nin all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.\n\n(2)\n\nA public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.\n\n…\n\n(4)\n\nFor the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that—\n\n(a)\n\nit does not hold that information when an applicant’s request is received;\n\n(b)\n\nthe request for information is manifestly unreasonable;…”\n\n45.\n\nEven where an exception under regulation 12(4) is engaged, regulation 12(1) permits a public authority to refuse disclosure only if, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. Regulation 12(2) requires the authority to apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.\n\nRegulation (EC) No 1107/2009\n\n46.\n\nRegulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, forms part of domestic law as assimilated direct legislation. It establishes rules governing the authorisation, placing on the market, use and control of plant protection products. It is common ground that HSE is the competent authority for the purpose’s material to these appeals.\n\n47.\n\nArticle 1 provides that the purpose of the Regulation is to ensure a high level of protection of human and animal health and the environment and to improve the functioning of the internal market through the harmonisation of the rules governing the placing of plant protection products on the market, while improving agricultural production. The Regulation is underpinned by the precautionary principle in order to ensure that active substances and products placed on the market do not adversely affect human or animal health or the environment.\n\nArticle 67\n\n48.\n\nArticle 67(1) imposes record-keeping obligations upon producers, suppliers, distributors, importers and exporters of plant protection products, and upon professional users of those products. So far as material to these appeals, it provides:\n\n“Professional users of plant protection products shall, for at least 3 years, keep records of the plant protection products they use, containing the name of the plant protection product, the time and the dose of application, the area and the crop where the plant protection product was used.\n\nThey shall make the relevant information contained in these records available to a competent authority on request. Third parties such as the drinking water industry, retailers or residents, may request access to this information by addressing the relevant competent authority.\n\nThe competent authorities shall provide access to such information in accordance with applicable national or Community law.”\n\n49.\n\nA failure by a professional user to comply with the obligation to make the relevant information available to the competent authority is an offence under the domestic enforcement provisions. The records are not required to be maintained in any prescribed form. The obligation is to retain the specified information for at least three years and to make the relevant information contained in the records available to the competent authority on request.\n\n50.\n\nRecital 44 explains the purpose of the record-keeping and information provisions:\n\n“Provisions on record-keeping and information about the use of plant protection products should be established in order to raise the level of protection of human and animal health and the environment by ensuring the traceability of potential exposure, to increase the efficiency of monitoring and control and to reduce the costs of monitoring water quality.”\n\nEVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT\n\nThe witnesses and the scope of their evidence\n\n51.\n\nThe parties agreed upon many of the basic features of the Article 67 regime, including that professional users create and retain the relevant records, that the records are not routinely supplied to HSE, and that HSE does not maintain a central repository containing them. The factual disputes concerned principally the practical steps required to identify relevant users and obtain and process their records, the burden which those steps would impose, and the value and potential uses of the information sought. The legal significance of the facts we find is considered separately below.\n\n52.\n\nHSE relied upon two witness statements from Sarah Frow, who also gave oral evidence. Her evidence addressed HSE’s regulatory responsibilities, its practical use of Article 67 information, the steps which would be required to respond to the requests, and HSE’s estimates of the resulting burden. We regarded her evidence as careful and given in good faith. She was willing to distinguish between matters within her direct experience and matters which depended upon information from colleagues, general understanding or prediction. She also acknowledged the uncertainty inherent in estimating work which had not yet been undertaken and accepted that HSE’s estimates had developed as it gained further practical experience.\n\n53.\n\nWe nevertheless distinguish between different aspects of Sarah Frow’s evidence when determining the weight to be attached to it. We place greater weight upon her evidence concerning HSE’s own systems, the work which she or her team had undertaken, and the practical difficulties demonstrated by actual requests. Some of her evidence concerning enforcement practice, the likely conduct of professional users and the proportion of responses which might require further work was not based upon her own operational experience and was necessarily predictive. We have taken that evidence into account, but do not treat every assumption underlying HSE’s burden calculations as an established fact.\n\n54.\n\nWildFish relied upon the witness statements of Guy Linley-Adams and Professor Dave Goulson. Justin Neal was permitted to adopt Guy Linley-Adams’s statement so far as he was able and gave oral evidence on WildFish’s behalf. We considered that Justin Neal approached the limits of his evidence appropriately. He did not suggest that he had been involved when either request was made, and he distinguished matters within his own knowledge from matters derived from the documentary record, from discussions after he joined WildFish, or from Guy Linley-Adams’s personal involvement.\n\n55.\n\nWe do not treat Justin Neal’s adoption of the statement as converting all matters recorded by Guy Linley-Adams into first-hand evidence from Justin Neal. We give weight to Justin Neal’s evidence concerning WildFish’s work, the intended uses of the requested information, and his understanding of the available datasets, insofar as those matters fell within his own knowledge. Where a matter depended upon Guy Linley-Adams’s personal involvement in the requests or upon scientific expertise which Justin Neal did not possess, we have assessed the underlying written evidence on its own terms and with appropriate caution.\n\n56.\n\nProfessor Dave Goulson did not give oral evidence, and Justin Neal did not purport to adopt his statement. His evidence was therefore not tested in questioning. HSE had, however, received the statement well before the hearing and had not sought to require Professor Dave Goulson’s attendance. We have taken his written evidence into account, particularly where it addresses the potential scientific value of localised information about plant protection product use, while recognising that the Tribunal did not have the benefit of oral evidence from him.\n\nThe creation, retention and regulatory use of Article 67 records\n\n57.\n\nArticle 67 requires professional users to keep specified information about their use of plant protection products for at least three years. The required information includes the name of the product, the time and dose of application, and the area and crop on which it was used. The obligation to create and retain that information rests upon the professional user. The records are not required to be maintained in any prescribed form.\n\n58.\n\nProfessional users are the ordinary custodians of the records. They create and retain them, and the information is not routinely transmitted to HSE. HSE does not maintain a central repository of Article 67 records and does not ordinarily have access to their contents unless it takes steps to obtain them. It may therefore have no prior knowledge of the contents of a particular record or, without further enquiry, of the identity of the person holding the relevant information.\n\n59.\n\nArticle 67 requires professional users to make the relevant information contained in their records available to the competent authority on request. Sarah Frow explained that HSE had used that power occasionally in connection with enforcement activity, including investigations concerning overspray or unauthorised use of plant protection products. Where a concern is investigated, HSE may seek the relevant records to establish matters such as the product used, the place and time of its application, and the person responsible for applying it.\n\n60.\n\nThe person holding the relevant information will not necessarily be the owner or occupier of the farm or land in question. A professional user may be a contractor engaged to apply the product, and identifying the relevant record-holder may therefore require HSE to make enquiries of the landowner or occupier. The steps required will depend upon the information available about the location and nature of the reported activity. Where an incident is associated with a clearly identified property, the appropriate enquiries may be relatively direct. A concern expressed in relation to a wider geographical area may require a broader process of identification.\n\n61.\n\nWe accordingly find that Article 67 information is ordinarily created and retained by professional users rather than HSE; that HSE does not routinely receive or centrally store it; and that obtaining particular information ordinarily requires HSE first to identify and approach the relevant professional user. We also find that HSE may require the relevant information to be made available under Article 67 and that, when obtained, the information may be used in the discharge of its investigation and enforcement functions.\n\nIdentifying relevant professional users\n\n62.\n\nThe evidence established that HSE has access to a register of professional users maintained under the relevant regulatory arrangements. The register contains information capable of assisting HSE to identify persons who use plant protection products in the agricultural sector, including address information and whether products are used on the registrant’s own premises. Sarah Frow accepted that HSE could access the register for the purpose of responding to a request under the EIR and that searches by postcode and relevant categories could assist in identifying users connected with the areas covered by the requests.\n\n63.\n\nThe register would provide HSE with a practical starting point, but it would not by itself identify every person holding information falling within either request. It is a register of professional users rather than a definitive map of farms or of all land upon which plant protection products have been applied. A user’s registered address may not identify the location at which a product was used and, in the case of a contractor, may be some distance from the land in question. A search confined to users whose registered address fell within the relevant area could therefore omit persons who had applied products there, while also identifying persons whose use occurred elsewhere.\n\n64.\n\nFurther enquiries might accordingly be required. In some cases, HSE could approach the owner or occupier of identified land and ask who had applied the relevant product and who retained the records. In others, information held on the register might need to be considered alongside maps, address information or enquiries of landowners, occupiers or contractors. The extent of that work would depend upon the geographical scope of the request, the information available to HSE and the relationship between the registered user and the land on which the product had been used.\n\n65.\n\nWe find that the register would provide HSE with an accessible and potentially useful starting point for identifying relevant professional users. It would materially assist that exercise but would not provide a complete or automatic means of identifying every person holding information within scope of either request. Additional enquiries would therefore be required to establish a sufficiently reliable group of potential record-holders in each geographical area.\n\nObtaining and processing Article 67 information\n\n66.\n\nOnce relevant professional users had been identified, HSE would need to contact them and request the information falling within the scope of the relevant request. HSE had already prepared a letter for use in connection with the Chipps Farm request. Sarah Frow accepted that this could provide a template for the present requests, subject to appropriate amendment. The evidence also established that electronic communication would be available in at least some cases, although it did not establish the proportion of relevant users for whom an email address would be available or whether every request could appropriately be sent in that way.\n\n67.\n\nArticle 67 does not prescribe the form in which the required information must be recorded. The material supplied in response to a request might therefore include handwritten records, scanned documents, photographs or records produced through different commercial systems. Some material might be readily intelligible, while other records could require clarification or further communication with the user. We accept that the absence of a standard format would add to the work required and that the process could not safely be treated as one of merely collecting and forwarding documents.\n\n68.\n\nHSE would also need to determine whether the material received fell within the scope of the relevant request. That task would differ between the two appeals. The Wrexham request concerns plant protection products generally, whereas the Carmarthen request is confined to glyphosate. In the Carmarthen case, a record might identify a product by its commercial name rather than by reference to glyphosate as its active substance. HSE would therefore need, where necessary, to check the product against its register of authorised plant protection products. The evidence established that the register provides a means of carrying out that check, but that multiple products or variants might need to be considered.\n\n69.\n\nThe information received would then require review before disclosure. That exercise might include identifying and redacting personal data, removing or obscuring material outside the scope of the request and dealing with records supplied in forms not immediately suitable for disclosure. HSE might also need to provide explanatory material sufficient to identify what had been disclosed. We accept that these tasks would require staff time and informed review, although their extent would depend upon the form, quality and content of the material received.\n\n70.\n\nSome efficiencies would be likely to arise as the exercise progressed. Templates could be reused; electronic communication could reduce the time required in some cases; recurring commercial products or record formats would become more familiar; and repeated tasks might be completed more quickly with experience. Sarah Frow accepted that familiarity with recurring formats could produce some improvement in speed. We also accept, however, that HSE could not safely assume that all information appeared in the same place on each form or that products sharing similar commercial names were identical. The likely efficiencies were therefore real but limited.\n\n71.\n\nWe find that obtaining and processing the requested information would involve several substantive stages: contacting potentially relevant users, receiving and recording responses, pursuing clarification or non-response where necessary, identifying information within scope, reviewing and redacting the material, and preparing an intelligible response. The work would be greater than that required to retrieve information already contained within HSE’s own systems. At the same time, the evidence identified practical means by which parts of the exercise could be standardised or made more efficient. The likely burden cannot therefore be assessed on the basis either that every response would proceed smoothly or that every response would present the most difficult circumstances encountered in the evidence.\n\nThe practical examples\n\n72.\n\nHSE relied principally upon its experience of responding to requests concerning two identified farms, including the Chipps Farm request, as practical evidence of the work involved in obtaining and processing Article 67 information. Those examples were of greater evidential value than estimates based solely upon assumptions because they recorded work which HSE had actually undertaken. They demonstrated that even a request concerning a single identified holding could require communications with the relevant user, the receipt and handling of material in multiple files or formats, consideration of whether the information supplied fell within scope, and review before disclosure.\n\n73.\n\nThe Chipps Farm request was deliberately confined to one identified farm. HSE received the responsive material through a number of emails and attachments, including images of records generated using a commercial recording system. Sarah Frow explained that the material required downloading, examination and, in some instances, clarification because the content was not immediately clear or readily searchable. We accept that the exercise provides concrete support for HSE’s evidence that obtaining Article 67 information may involve substantially more than sending a request and forwarding the documents received.\n\n74.\n\nThe example also illustrates the limits of extrapolating from a single exercise. Chipps Farm had already been identified when the request was made, so HSE did not first have to identify the relevant user from a wider geographical area. The form, volume and quality of the records supplied in response to other requests might differ materially. Some users might provide a smaller amount of well-organised information, while others might provide records requiring more extensive follow-up or review. The evidence did not establish that the circumstances encountered at Chipps Farm were representative of all professional users likely to fall within either request.\n\n75.\n\nHSE also relied upon its experience of a further single-farm request concerning Belaugh Green Farm. Its evidence was that the time required was broadly comparable to the Chipps Farm exercise. That second example supports the conclusion that the difficulties encountered at Chipps Farm were not necessarily unique. It remains, however, another request concerning a specifically identified holding and does not establish the average time which would be required across the substantially larger group of users potentially engaged by the Carmarthen and Wrexham requests.\n\n76.\n\nWe therefore attach significant, but qualified, weight to the practical examples. They establish that the work identified by HSE is real and that the collection and processing of Article 67 information can be labour-intensive, even where the relevant holding is already known. They do not establish that every response would reproduce the same difficulties or require a comparable amount of time. Nor do they provide a sufficient evidential basis for multiplying the time taken in single-farm exercise by the estimated number of users within each geographical area. The examples are properly treated as evidence of the nature and potential complexity of the work, rather than as a reliable measure of the total burden associated with either request.\n\nThe nature and utility of the requested information\n\n77.\n\nArticle 67 information records the name of the plant protection product used, the time and dose of application, and the area and crop to which it was applied. It is therefore capable of providing geographically and operationally specific information about the use of plant protection products within a defined locality. The evidence before us was that information of that degree of specificity is not generally available through the published Pesticide Usage Survey or other publicly accessible datasets.\n\n78.\n\nThe two requests sought to use that information for different, although related, purposes. The Carmarthen request sought information concerning glyphosate use within a defined area and period. The evidence of Guy Linley-Adams was that the request was intended to improve understanding of the scale and pattern of glyphosate use and to contribute to the wider public and scientific debate concerning its effects. We accept that information concerning actual use within the specified area would provide a factual basis for examining local patterns of glyphosate use which was not otherwise available in equivalent detail.\n\n79.\n\nThe Wrexham request arose in the context of WildFish’s SmartRivers work within a small sub-catchment of the Welsh River Dee near Wrexham. WildFish’s evidence was that the invertebrate-sampling results disclosed a significant “chemical fingerprint” in a predominantly rural catchment, which strongly suggested an agricultural source for any contamination, and that plant protection products might be playing a role. We accept that comparing Article 67 information with the local monitoring evidence could assist in identifying substances or patterns requiring further investigation.\n\n80.\n\nWe do not find that Article 67 information would, by itself, establish that the use of a particular product had caused a particular environmental effect. The presence of a product in the records and an observed ecological condition within the same area would not, without further evidence and analysis, establish causation. The interpretation of any apparent relationship would require attention to such matters as the type of agricultural activity, local geography, the timing and quantity of applications, other possible sources of chemical pressure, and the characteristics of the receiving environment.\n\n81.\n\nNor do we accept that information from one defined locality could automatically be treated as representative of plant protection product use or environmental conditions elsewhere. Justin Neal accepted that differences in agricultural practice, land use and local conditions would affect the extent to which conclusions could be transferred from one area to another. The information might nevertheless assist in identifying questions for further investigation, in comparing areas with relevant shared characteristics, or in refining the scope of future research or information requests. Its inability to provide a complete or nationally representative picture does not deprive it of local or investigative value.\n\n82.\n\nWe accordingly find that the requested information has genuine potential utility. It could contribute to public understanding of plant protection product use within the specified areas, assist in examining local patterns and possible environmental relationships, and inform further investigation or research. Its value must, however, be assessed with appropriate caution. The information is localised, does not itself establish causation, and would require contextual and scientific analysis before wider conclusions could properly be drawn.\n\nThe Pesticide Usage Survey\n\n83.\n\nThe Pesticide Usage Survey is conducted by Fera under contractual arrangements with HSE. Fera selects a sample of agricultural holdings, collects information voluntarily from participating users, collates the resulting data and publishes aggregated reports concerning the use of plant protection products. The survey is designed to provide representative information about patterns of use by reference to matters including geographical region, year, crop and active substance. The published information does not identify individual holdings.\n\n84.\n\nThe survey and Article 67 records are not equivalent sources of information. The survey is based upon a sample of participating holdings rather than a complete collection of records from every professional user within a defined locality. HSE itself emphasised in its post-hearing submissions that survey information was available only insofar as it arose from voluntary sampling, was not representative of all pesticide use within any given area, and that the absence of survey information could not be taken to establish that no relevant product had been used there.\n\n85.\n\nThat does not mean that the survey lacks value or that its methodology is incapable of producing representative results for the purposes for which it was designed. Fera is responsible for the statistical sample design, and the aim of the survey is to produce representative results concerning pesticide usage. The published survey information is capable of assisting an understanding of broader patterns of use. It does not, however, ordinarily provide a complete account of the products used by all professional users within a narrowly defined geographical area, or the field-level and operational detail contained in the underlying Article 67 information.\n\n86.\n\nJustin Neal described the published survey material as too aggregated to permit the comparison which WildFish wished to undertake between pesticide use and observations arising from its SmartRivers work. We accept that evidence to the extent that the published survey did not provide information of equivalent geographical and operational specificity. We do not accept the broader implication that sampled or aggregated information is necessarily unreliable or incapable of informing analysis. The distinction is one of the nature, completeness and granularity of the available information, rather than an absence of value in the survey itself.\n\n87.\n\nThe post-hearing enquiries established that Fera held a small sample dataset falling within the plant protection product element of the Wrexham request, but held no relevant information concerning the geographical area covered by the Carmarthen request. The limited Wrexham dataset did not provide an equivalent substitute for the body of Article 67 information sought. We therefore find that the availability of published survey information, and of the limited underlying Fera data identified after the hearing, did not remove the potential utility of obtaining the Article 67 information described in the preceding section.\n\nGROUND 1: INFORMATION HELD\n\nThe Issue\n\n88.\n\nThe principal issue arising in these appeals is whether information contained within Article 67 records maintained by professional users of plant protection products was information held by those users on behalf of HSE within the meaning of regulation 3(2)(b) of the EIR. The issue is of foundational importance. If HSE is correct that the information was not held on its behalf within regulation 3(2)(b), the requests fall outside the scope of regulation 5 and the appeals succeed without the need to consider either regulation 12(4)(b) or the public interest. If, however, the information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE, it becomes necessary to consider HSE’s alternative arguments concerning burden and the applicability of the exception upon which it relies.\n\n89.\n\nAlthough the parties’ submissions on this issue were extensive, the Tribunal considers it important to observe at the outset that much of the underlying factual position is not in dispute. The parties agree that the requested records were not physically possessed by HSE at the time the requests were made. Nor is it suggested that regulation 3(2)(a) applies. They further agree that the records were created and retained by professional users of plant protection products pursuant to obligations imposed by Article 67 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009. The records were not routinely transmitted to HSE, nor did HSE maintain a central repository containing them. It follows that this is not a case concerned with information physically held within HSE’s own systems.\n\n90.\n\nThe parties agree that HSE may require production of Article 67 records. They disagree, however, as to the significance of that power. HSE contends that a statutory power to obtain information cannot, without more, establish that information is held on its behalf. The Commissioner and WildFish contend that the power forms part of a broader statutory scheme within which the records are created, retained and made available for regulatory purposes. The evidence of Ms Frow established that HSE may call for such records when carrying out investigative, supervisory or enforcement functions and that such records may be relied upon in the discharge of those responsibilities. The disagreement concerns the legal significance of those powers when considered alongside the other features of Article 67 and the wider statutory framework.\n\n91.\n\nHSE contends that the records remain the records of professional users. It submits that HSE neither possesses, stores nor routinely receives them and that the existence of a statutory power of access is insufficient to establish that they are held on its behalf. HSE further submits that a contrary interpretation risks extending regulation 3(2)(b) to a wide range of information maintained by regulated persons in other statutory contexts. The Commissioner and WildFish contend that Article 67 records differ materially from ordinary regulatory records because their creation, retention and continuing availability are mandated by the statutory scheme itself and because they are capable of being used for the purposes of the regulatory framework administered by HSE.\n\n92.\n\nOwnership, physical possession, and responsibility for creating and retaining the records are relevant features of the factual context, but none determines the application of regulation 3(2)(b). The statutory question is whether the information is held by another person “on behalf of” the public authority. The Tribunal must therefore assess the relationship between the information, the professional users who retain it and HSE, having regard to all the relevant circumstances.\n\n93.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore approaches Ground 1 by examining the meaning of the words “held by another person on behalf of the authority” and the legal and practical relationship created by Article 67 between the professional users, the information and HSE. The “appropriate connection” identified in\nBUAV\nassists in evaluating that relationship but does not replace the statutory language or operate as a free-standing test.\n\nThe Parties’ Positions\n\n94.\n\nAlthough the dispute between the parties ultimately crystallised around a relatively narrow legal question, namely whether Article 67 records are held by professional users on behalf of HSE for the purposes of regulation 3(2)(b), the routes by which the parties arrived at their respective conclusions were materially different.\n\n95.\n\nOn behalf of HSE, Mr Mehta submitted that the Commissioner had adopted an impermissibly expansive interpretation of regulation 3(2)(b). He argued that the requested records remain, at all times, the records of the professional users by whom they are created and retained. The legal obligation to create and preserve those records is imposed directly upon professional users rather than upon HSE. The records remain in their possession and are not routinely supplied to HSE. HSE does not maintain a central repository of them and, in many cases, may have no knowledge of either their contents or the identity of the person by whom they are held. In those circumstances, HSE submitted that the records cannot properly be characterised as information held on its behalf.\n\n96.\n\nMr Mehta further submitted that the statutory power conferred upon HSE to obtain Article 67 records when required does not alter that position. In his submission, the existence of a power of access cannot be equated with the concept of holding information. He argued that many regulators possess powers to require information from regulated persons and that it would be an extraordinary consequence if all information capable of being obtained pursuant to such powers were thereby treated as being held by the authority concerned. The Commissioner, he submitted, had failed adequately to distinguish between information held by an authority and information which a regulator is merely empowered to obtain in the exercise of its statutory functions.\n\n97.\n\nHSE also emphasised what it characterised as the wider consequences of the Commissioner’s interpretation. Mr Mehta argued that, if the Commissioner’s reasoning were correct, numerous categories of information maintained by regulated persons across a wide range of regulatory contexts could potentially fall within the scope of regulation 3(2)(b). References were made to other regulatory schemes and to categories of records maintained by regulated professionals, including solicitors and others whose records may be subject to extensive regulatory oversight. In HSE’s submission, the Commissioner’s interpretation lacks any satisfactory limiting principle and therefore risks extending the concept of information held on behalf of a public authority beyond its proper scope. HSE submitted that no coherent basis had been identified for distinguishing Article 67 records from other categories of records maintained by persons subject to statutory regulation.\n\n98.\n\nHSE relied upon the decisions in\nBUAV\n,\nHolt\n,\nJeffs\nand\nPlevin\n. It submitted that the ordinary meaning of “on behalf of” imports a relationship of agency, although a particular statutory or contractual context may justify a wider meaning. HSE further submitted that those authorities require close attention to the relationship between the information and the authority and that none supports the proposition that information becomes held on behalf of a public authority merely because the authority has statutory power to obtain it.\n\n99.\n\nHSE placed particular reliance upon\nJeffs\n. It submitted that the existence of a statutory obligation upon a private body to retain information, coupled with a public authority’s power to require that information in specified circumstances, was held not to establish the relationship required by the equivalent provision in FOIA. HSE relied upon the similarities which it identified between that case and the present appeals, including HSE’s lack of control over the creation and storage of Article 67 records, access to them by others and the costs of their creation and retention.\n\n100.\n\nHSE also disputed the respondents’ construction of the third party-access wording in Article 67. It submitted that the obligation upon competent authorities to provide third parties with access to “such information” applies only to information which has already been made available to, and obtained by, the competent authority. On that construction, Article 67 does not impose upon HSE a responsibility to obtain from professional users, for the purposes of third-party access, records which HSE does not already possess.\n\n101.\n\nThe Commissioner advanced a different analysis. On behalf of the Commissioner, Ms John accepted that HSE did not physically possess the requested records and accepted that the records were maintained by professional users pursuant to obligations imposed directly upon them. However, she submitted that those matters do not determine the application of regulation 3(2)(b). In her submission, the focus of the inquiry must be the statutory framework within which the records exist and the function that those records perform within that framework.\n\n102.\n\nThe Commissioner submitted that Article 67 records are not simply documents which happen to be capable of being obtained by a regulator. Rather, they are records whose creation is required by legislation, whose retention is required by legislation and whose information must be made available to the competent authority on request. They are maintained within a statutory regime administered by HSE as the competent authority and are intended to remain available for regulatory scrutiny, investigation and use. The Commissioner contended that these features establish the requisite relationship between the information and HSE for the purposes of regulation 3(2)(b).\n\n103.\n\nThe Commissioner further submitted that the concept of holding cannot be reduced to questions of possession, ownership or physical custody. Relying upon\nBUAV\n, Ms John argued that the Tribunal’s task is to identify whether there exists an appropriate connection between the information and the public authority such that the information may properly be regarded as being held on that authority’s behalf. In her submission, the Commissioner was correct to conclude that such a connection exists in the present case.\n\n104.\n\nWildFish supported the Commissioner’s position but placed particular emphasis upon the function performed by Article 67 records within the wider regulatory framework. Mr Lockley submitted that their creation, retention and content are prescribed by the legislative scheme. He argued that the records should not be viewed as ordinary private business records which happen to be available for inspection. Rather, they are maintained pursuant to Article 67 so that the prescribed information remains available to the competent authority when required.\n\n105.\n\nWildFish submitted that Article 67 provides two routes to the conclusion for which it contends. Its primary submission was that Article 67 places HSE, as the competent authority, under a responsibility to provide third parties with access to Article 67 information in accordance with applicable national law. It submitted that professional users’ statutory retention of the information, coupled with their obligation to make it available to HSE, enables HSE to discharge that responsibility and means that the information is retained on HSE’s behalf.\n\n106.\n\nAlternatively, WildFish submitted that, even if the third party-access obligation applies only to information already obtained by HSE, the wider legal and practical relationship created by Article 67 is sufficient to satisfy regulation 3(2)(b). Mr Lockley accepted that a mere power to obtain information cannot establish holding. He argued, however, that the prescribed creation and retention of the information, its mandatory availability to HSE, the consequences of failing to provide it and its intended role in traceability, monitoring and control collectively establish a relationship materially stronger than a contingent regulatory power to inspect ordinary private records.\n\n107.\n\nIt can therefore be seen that the dispute between the parties is not principally one of fact. The essential characteristics of the Article 67 regime are largely uncontroversial. The parties differ principally as to the legal significance and proper interpretation of its features when determining whether the requested information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE for the purposes of the EIR. They also differ as to the proper construction and effect of Article 67’s third party-access provision. The Tribunal must therefore determine both the meaning of the statutory phrase “on behalf of” and the legal relationship which Article 67 creates.\n\nMatters Accepted from HSE’s Case\n\n108.\n\nBefore turning to the Tribunal’s analysis of the parties’ competing submissions, it is important to identify those aspects of HSE’s case which the Tribunal accepts. The Tribunal does so because the issues have sometimes been characterised in a manner which risks obscuring the extent of the common ground between the parties. In the Tribunal’s judgment, the present appeals do not turn upon any substantial disagreement concerning the practical operation of the Article 67 regime. Rather, they turn upon the legal significance of facts that are largely undisputed.\n\n109.\n\nFirst, the Tribunal accepts that HSE did not physically possess the requested records at the time the requests were made. The evidence of Ms Frow, which the Tribunal accepts, established that Article 67 records are ordinarily retained by professional users of plant protection products and not by HSE. HSE does not maintain a comprehensive central repository of such records and does not routinely receive them as part of the ordinary operation of the regulatory regime. The records therefore remained outside HSE’s physical possession unless and until steps were taken to obtain them.\n\n110.\n\nSecondly, the Tribunal accepts that the legal obligation to create and retain Article 67 records is imposed directly upon professional users. Article 67 does not require HSE to create the records, maintain the records or preserve the records. Those obligations rest squarely upon the professional users themselves. The Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that this is a significant feature of the statutory framework and one which cannot be ignored when considering the application of regulation 3(2)(b).\n\n111.\n\nThirdly, the Tribunal accepts that HSE does not ordinarily know the contents of Article 67 records. The evidence established that HSE does not have routine visibility of the information contained within those records and may have no knowledge of their contents unless it takes positive steps to obtain them. Indeed, the evidence demonstrated that HSE may have no knowledge of the existence of a particular record or the person holding it until a regulatory need arises which makes it necessary to identify and obtain it.\n\n112.\n\nFourthly, the Tribunal accepts that HSE does not necessarily know the identity of every person by whom relevant records are held. The practical reality, as described by Ms Frow, is that identifying relevant professional users may itself form part of a regulatory investigation. The Tribunal accepts that this feature differentiates Article 67 records from information maintained within a public authority’s own systems and readily accessible to it.\n\n113.\n\nFifthly, the Tribunal accepts that HSE must generally take positive steps if it wishes to obtain Article 67 records. Such records do not automatically enter HSE’s possession and are not routinely supplied to it. Access to the records ordinarily requires the exercise of statutory powers and, as the evidence demonstrated, may involve engagement with a number of professional users before the relevant records are secured.\n\n114.\n\nSixthly, and importantly, the Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that a statutory power to require production of information is not, without more, equivalent to holding that information. The Tribunal considers that proposition to be plainly correct as a matter of principle. Public authorities and regulators frequently possess powers enabling them to obtain documents, records and information from third parties. It does not follow that every item of information capable of being obtained pursuant to such powers is therefore held by, or on behalf of, the authority concerned. The Tribunal accepts that this submission identifies an important distinction which must be respected if regulation 3(2)(b) is not to be interpreted more broadly than its language permits.\n\n115.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts that caution is required before concluding that information maintained by regulated persons is held on behalf of the regulator responsible for overseeing the relevant activity. The concept of information held on behalf of a public authority must retain meaningful limits, and any interpretation of regulation 3(2)(b) must be capable of distinguishing between records that fall within that concept and those that do not.\n\n116.\n\nFinally, the Tribunal accepts much of HSE’s wider factual description of the relationship between HSE and Article 67 records. The records originate with professional users. They remain in the possession of professional users. HSE does not routinely inspect them. HSE does not possess comprehensive knowledge of their contents. HSE acquires access to them only when a regulatory reason arises for doing so. The Tribunal accepts all of those propositions.\n\n117.\n\nIt follows that the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion on Ground 1 does not depend upon any rejection of HSE’s evidence concerning the practical operation of the Article 67 regime. Nor does it depend upon any finding that HSE exercises direct possession, routine control or day-to-day oversight of the records. On the contrary, the Tribunal accepts many of the factual premises upon which HSE’s case is founded.\n\n118.\n\nThe question which therefore remains is whether those accepted facts nevertheless coexist with a legal relationship under which professional users hold the requested information on behalf of HSE. That requires the Tribunal first to construe the words “on behalf of” in regulation 3(2)(b), then to determine the proper construction and effect of Article 67, and finally to decide whether the relationship created by Article 67 satisfies the statutory requirement. The Tribunal considers the respondents’ primary and alternative routes separately.\n\nThe Legal Approach\n\n119.\n\nThe parties were agreed that the starting point for the analysis is regulation 3(2) of the EIR. It is common ground that regulation 3(2)(a) is not engaged. The requested information was not in HSE’s possession at the time the requests were made and had not been produced or received by HSE. The issue is therefore confined to regulation 3(2)(b), namely whether the requested information was held by another person on behalf of HSE.\n\n120.\n\nAlthough the statutory language is succinct, the authorities make clear that the concept of information being held “on behalf of” a public authority is neither purely physical nor purely proprietary in nature. The question is not answered simply by identifying where information happens to be stored, who created it, who owns it or who has immediate custody of it. Equally, the issue cannot be resolved merely by asking whether a public authority possesses legal powers enabling it to obtain the information. The Tribunal must construe the words “on behalf of” and examine the legal and practical relationship between the information, the person possessing it and the public authority.\n\n121.\n\nHSE relied upon\nPlevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd\n\n[2014] UKSC 61\n,\n[2014] 1 WLR 4222\n. In that case, Lord Sumption observed that, in their ordinary and natural meaning, the words “on behalf of” import agency, although a special statutory or contractual context may require the expression to bear a wider meaning, such as “in the place of”, “for the benefit of” or “in the interests of” another person.\n\n122.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that the ordinary meaning identified in\nPlevin\nprovides an important starting point. Information does not fall within Regulation 3(2)(b) merely because it serves a public purpose, concerns an authority’s functions or is capable of being obtained by the authority. Treating any of those features as sufficient would deprive the words “on behalf of” of meaningful content.\n\n123.\n\nThe Tribunal does not, however, understand\nPlevin\nas requiring proof of a conventional private-law agency relationship in every case. The statutory context may establish that one person holds information in the place of, for the benefit of or in the interests of a public authority. Whether that broader relationship exists must be determined from the particular statutory scheme and the legal and practical function performed by the information within it. The phrase “appropriate connection”, considered below, assists that inquiry but does not replace it.\n\n124.\n\nThe principal information-rights authority relied upon by the parties was\nUniversity of Newcastle upon Tyne v Information Commissioner and BUAV\n\n[2011] UKUT 185 (AAC)\n. The Tribunal considers that decision to provide important guidance for the analysis in the present appeals. Whilst the case concerned provisions contained within the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\nrather than the EIR, the parties were agreed that the principles identified by the Upper Tribunal are equally applicable in the present context.\n\n125.\n\nIn\nBUAV\n, the Upper Tribunal rejected an unduly mechanistic approach to the concept of holding. It expressly approved the First-tier Tribunal’s observation that “\nthere must be an appropriate connection between the information and the authority, so that it can be properly said that the information is held by the authority\n” and subsequently stated that it regarded that approach as an accurate statement of the law. The concept of holding therefore requires examination of the relationship between the information and the public authority concerned and is not answered solely by reference to physical possession. Whilst the phrase “appropriate connection” is not intended to operate as a free-standing legal test, it captures the essential point that the inquiry requires consideration of substance rather than form.\n\n126.\n\nThe Tribunal derives a number of propositions from\nBUAV\nwhich are relevant to the present appeals. First, physical possession and legal holding are not necessarily co-extensive concepts. Information may in some circumstances be physically possessed by one person whilst nevertheless being held on behalf of another. Secondly, the inquiry is fact-sensitive and depends upon the particular relationship existing between the information and the authority in question. Thirdly, the question whether information is held cannot be answered solely by reference to any single factor. Rather, the Tribunal must examine the relationship between the information, its physical holder and the authority in order to determine whether the information may properly be regarded as being held on behalf of the authority.\n\n127.\n\nThe Tribunal also derives from\nBUAV\nan important note of caution. Matters such as physical possession, legal ownership, contractual rights, powers of access and practical control may all be relevant to the inquiry, but the authorities do not support a rigid or formulaic approach in which any of those matters is treated as determinative. The task remains to determine whether the relationship, assessed in its legal and practical context, is one in which the other person holds the information on the authority’s behalf.\n\n128.\n\nHSE placed particular reliance upon\nJeffs v Information Commissioner\n[2014] UKFTT 0047 (GRC). That case concerned flight-surveillance information retained by a private body under regulatory requirements and capable of being required by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch in connection with an accident or serious incident. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that there was an insufficient connection between the information and the public authority for the information to be regarded as held on its behalf.\n\n129.\n\nThe factors identified in\nJeffs\nincluded the public authority’s lack of access to the information except in limited circumstances, its lack of control over the recording and storage of the data, and its lack of control over who could access the information or the other parties to whom it might be provided. The Tribunal accepts that\nJeffs\nbears material similarities to the present appeals. HSE does not control the creation or storage of Article 67 records, does not routinely access them and does not bear the cost of their creation or retention.\n\n130.\n\nJeffs\ntherefore supports HSE’s submission that mandatory retention combined with a statutory power of acquisition is not sufficient, without more, to establish that information is held on behalf of an authority. Although the decision is not binding upon this Tribunal, its reasoning must be addressed when determining whether Article 67 creates a materially different relationship. The Tribunal considers that question after construing the relevant provisions of Article 67.\n\n131.\n\nHSE additionally relied upon\nHolt\n, submitting that it provides further guidance on the concept of information being “held” for the purposes of information-rights legislation.\n\n132.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that\nHolt\nis an important authority. In that case, the Upper Tribunal was required to consider whether original wills stored by a third-party contractor remained held by the High Court for the purposes of FOIA. Applying the approach in\nBUAV\n, the Upper Tribunal concluded that physical possession was not determinative and that, notwithstanding the physical custody of the documents by a third party, the information continued to be held by the High Court because of the legal relationship between the documents and the court and the continuing control exercised by the High Court over them.\n\n133.\n\nHowever, the Tribunal does not regard\nHolt\nas determining the outcome of the present appeals. In\nHolt\n, the question was whether information which was already accepted to be held within the judicial sphere ceased to be held by the High Court when its physical custody was transferred elsewhere. The Upper Tribunal concluded that it did not. In the present appeals, the question is different. The issue is whether information created and retained by professional users pursuant to Article 67 is held by those users on behalf of HSE for the purposes of regulation 3(2)(b) at all.\n\n134.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore does not consider that\nHolt\nsupplies a direct analogy. Its significance lies in its application of the principles identified in\nBUAV\nto a different statutory scheme and in its demonstration that the question whether information is held requires examination of the legal relationship between the information and the body said to hold it. In\nHolt\n, the statutory framework was held to demonstrate the continuing connection between the information and the High Court notwithstanding the physical custody of the documents by a third party. The degree of continuing control present in\nHolt\nis not present here, and the Tribunal does not rely upon that case as establishing that Article 67 information is held on HSE’s behalf.\n\n135.\n\nDrawing these authorities together, the Tribunal considers that the following propositions emerge and provide the appropriate framework for the analysis which follows. First, the issue cannot be determined simply by identifying who physically possesses the records. Secondly, neither ownership nor custody is determinative. Thirdly, the existence of a statutory power to obtain information may be relevant but cannot, of itself, answer the question. Fourthly, the fact that legislation requires a regulated person to create and retain information does not, without more, mean that the information is held on behalf of the regulator. Fifthly, the Tribunal must examine whether the particular statutory context establishes a relationship under which the person holds the information in the place of, for the benefit of or in the interests of the authority, rather than merely holding it in order to comply with obligations imposed upon that person.\n\n136.\n\nFinally, the relationship must be sufficiently distinct from a regulator’s ordinary capacity to inspect or compel production of records held by a regulated person. The requirement identified in\nBUAV\nfor an “appropriate connection” is satisfied only if the legal and practical relationship supports the conclusion that the information is held on the authority’s behalf. It is not satisfied merely because the information is relevant or useful to the authority’s regulatory functions.\n\n137.\n\nIt is against the background of those principles that the Tribunal turns to the proper construction and effect of Article 67. That issue is central to both routes advanced by the respondents and to the question whether the present case is materially distinguishable from Jeffs and the other regulatory examples relied upon by HSE.\n\nThe Construction and Effect of Article 67\n\n138.\n\nArticle 67 requires professional users of plant protection products to keep records of the products which they use, including the name of the product, the time and dose of application, the area and the crop concerned. The records must be retained for the prescribed period, and professional users must make the relevant information available to the competent authority on request. The statutory scheme therefore identifies the information to be recorded, places responsibility for creating and retaining it upon professional users and provides for its production to the competent authority when required.\n\n139.\n\nThe second paragraph of Article 67(1) provides that professional users shall make the relevant information contained in the records available to the competent authority on request. It further provides that third parties, including the drinking-water industry, retailers and residents, may request access to “this information” by addressing the competent authority, and that competent authorities shall provide access to “such information” in accordance with applicable national or Community law.\n\n140.\n\nThe parties differed as to the information to which the third party-access provision applies. HSE submitted that “this information” and “such information” refer only to information which a professional user has already made available to the competent authority following a request from that authority. On that construction, the competent authority is required to provide third-party access only to information which it has already obtained. It is not required, upon receiving a third-party request, to obtain information which remains with professional users.\n\n141.\n\nWildFish advanced a broader construction. It submitted that “this information” and “such information” refer to the relevant information contained in Article 67 records, whether or not it has already been obtained by the competent authority. On that construction, Article 67 directs third parties to the competent authority because the competent authority is responsible for providing access, in accordance with applicable national law, to information which professional users are required to retain and make available to it.\n\n142.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that the wording is capable of giving rise to the competing interpretations advanced by the parties. Read in isolation, the expression “this information” might be understood as referring to the information which has already been made available to the competent authority. The provision must, however, be read as a whole and in the context of the functions assigned to the competent authority.\n\n143.\n\nArticle 67 does not state that third parties may request access only to information already obtained or physically possessed by the competent authority. Nor does it direct third parties to the professional users who possess the records. It directs them to the competent authority and provides that the competent authority shall provide access in accordance with applicable law. The information to which access is contemplated is identified by reference to the Article 67 information retained by professional users, rather than by reference to the happenstance of whether the competent authority has previously required its production.\n\n144.\n\nThe Tribunal also considers that HSE’s narrower construction would make the extent of the third party-access provision depend upon whether HSE had previously exercised its regulatory power for another purpose. A third party’s ability to seek access through the competent authority would then extend only to the subset of Article 67 information which HSE happened already to have obtained. The provision does not expressly draw that distinction.\n\n145.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore prefers the respondents’ construction. In its judgment, Article 67 contemplates that third parties may address the competent authority for access to the relevant Article 67 information, and that the competent authority will provide access in accordance with the applicable information-access regime. That conclusion does not mean that Article 67 itself creates an unrestricted right of access or displaces the exceptions and other provisions of the EIR. The words “in accordance with applicable national or Community law” preserve the operation of those rules.\n\n146.\n\nThe purposes identified in recital 44 are consistent with that construction, although they do not determine it. The record-keeping and information provisions are directed towards ensuring the traceability of potential exposure, increasing the efficiency of monitoring and control and reducing the costs of monitoring water quality. Those purposes explain why the prescribed information must remain available and why access is channelled through the competent authority. They do not, by themselves, establish that the information is held on HSE’s behalf.\n\nThe Tribunal’s Analysis\n\n147.\n\nOn that construction of Article 67, the relationship between the information and HSE extends beyond a regulator’s ordinary power to inspect or compel the production of records. Professional users are required to retain prescribed information and make it available to HSE as the competent authority. Third parties seeking access to that information are directed not to the professional users, but to HSE, which is given responsibility for providing access in accordance with applicable law.\n\n148.\n\nThe Tribunal considers that this feature supplies a relationship not present merely because information may be useful to a regulator or obtainable in enforcement circumstances. Professional users retain the information within a statutory arrangement under which HSE is the authority through which both regulatory access and third-party access are to be provided. Their retention of the prescribed information enables HSE to perform the access responsibility assigned to it by Article 67.\n\n149.\n\nThe Tribunal does not suggest that professional users act as HSE’s agents in creating the records, or that HSE owns or controls them. In the particular statutory context, however, the information is retained not only to enable professional users to demonstrate compliance, but also so that it remains available to HSE for the performance of the regulatory and access functions assigned to the competent authority. In that sense, the professional users retain the information for the benefit of, and in the interests of, HSE in the discharge of those functions.\n\n150.\n\nThe Tribunal is therefore satisfied, on its preferred construction of Article 67, that the relationship falls within the wider meaning which the statutory context may give to the words “on behalf of”, as recognised in\nPlevin\n. The professional users physically possess the information but retain it within a statutory scheme which assigns HSE responsibility for obtaining it when required and for providing access to third parties in accordance with applicable law.\n\n151.\n\nThe conclusion does not follow from HSE’s acquisition power alone. It follows from the interaction between the professional users’ obligations to create, retain and provide the prescribed information and HSE’s corresponding position as the competent authority responsible for regulatory access and for responding to third-party requests. That interaction provides the “appropriate connection” described in\nBUAV\nand supports the conclusion that the information is held by professional users on HSE’s behalf.\n\n152.\n\nThis also provides a principled distinction from the ordinary regulatory examples relied upon by HSE. A requirement to maintain records, coupled with a regulator’s power to inspect them, does not establish that the records are held on the regulator’s behalf. The additional feature here is that Article 67 places the competent authority between the information-holder and third parties seeking access and assigns the competent authority responsibility for providing access under the applicable legal regime.\n\n153.\n\nThe Tribunal accordingly concludes, as its primary route, that the requested information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE within regulation 3(2)(b). The Tribunal nevertheless considers HSE’s narrower construction of the third party-access provision in the alternative. Even if that construction is correct, the Tribunal would reach the same conclusion for the reasons which follow.\n\n154.\n\nFor the purposes of its alternative analysis, the Tribunal assumes that HSE is correct that the obligation to provide third party access under Article 67 applies only to information which has already been obtained by the competent authority. On that assumption, the third party access provision does not itself establish that professional users retain information on HSE’s behalf. The Tribunal must therefore consider whether the remaining features of the Article 67 regime independently establish the relationship required by regulation 3(2)(b).\n\n155.\n\nThe Tribunal begins by reiterating what is insufficient. The fact that Article 67 requires professional users to create records does not, by itself, establish that the resulting information is held on HSE’s behalf. The prescribed retention period does not, by itself, establish that relationship. Nor does HSE’s power to require production, the relevance of the information to HSE’s functions, or the possibility that the records may later be used in an investigation or enforcement action. Each of those features is capable of existing in a regulatory regime without the regulated person holding information on behalf of the regulator.\n\n156.\n\nThe alternative route therefore cannot be determined merely by adding together several features which are individually insufficient. The fact that mandatory creation, retention and regulatory access coexist does not necessarily establish that the records are held on behalf of HSE. The Tribunal must identify what the combined operation of those provisions requires professional users to do for HSE, or in HSE’s place or interests, rather than merely what they are required to do in order to comply with obligations imposed upon them.\n\n157.\n\nThe critical question is therefore whether Article 67 requires professional users to retain the prescribed information solely on their own account, so that they can demonstrate compliance if required, or whether it also requires them to preserve a body of regulatory information for the performance of functions assigned to HSE as the competent authority. The fact that the records serve professional users’ own compliance and operational purposes does not necessarily prevent them from also being held on HSE’s behalf. The issue is whether the statutory scheme creates that additional relationship.\n\n158.\n\nArticle 67 itself prescribes the core information which professional users must record. It requires records of the plant protection products used, including the name of the product, the time and dose of application, and the area and crop concerned. The obligation is therefore not merely a general requirement that a regulated person maintain adequate business or professional records. The legislation identifies information which must continue to exist and be capable of production to the competent authority.\n\n159.\n\nThe Tribunal does not regard prescription of the information as sufficient by itself. Its significance lies in its interaction with the retention and production obligations. Professional users must not merely create the specified information for their own purposes. They must preserve it for the prescribed period and make the relevant information available to HSE on request. Failure to provide records requested under Article 67 is capable of attracting the enforcement consequences prescribed by the domestic statutory scheme.\n\n160.\n\nThe purposes identified in recital 44 assist in explaining that arrangement. The record-keeping and information provisions are intended to ensure the traceability of potential exposure, increase the efficiency of monitoring and control and reduce the costs of monitoring water quality. The Tribunal does not treat those public or regulatory purposes as sufficient to establish that the information is held on HSE’s behalf. They do, however, demonstrate that preservation of the information is not directed solely towards the private affairs of professional users. The information must remain available because its continuing existence serves monitoring, control and traceability functions within the statutory regime.\n\n161.\n\nThe evidence of Ms Frow established how that statutory arrangement operates in practice. HSE has used Article 67 information in targeted investigative and enforcement circumstances, including where an incident or suspected unauthorised use gives rise to a need to identify products applied at a particular place and time. The Tribunal does not infer from occasional use that HSE exercises continuing control over every Article 67 record. The evidence does, however, confirm that the production obligation is a practical mechanism by which HSE obtains the prescribed information for the monitoring and enforcement functions contemplated by the legislative scheme.\n\n162.\n\nThe Tribunal does not treat the fact that the records concern the activity regulated by HSE as a distinctive or decisive feature. As HSE correctly submitted, records held by solicitors and other regulated professionals may equally concern the very activity overseen by their regulators and may be relevant to an assessment of professional compliance. Subject-matter relevance does not transform information held by a regulated person into information held on behalf of the regulator.\n\n163.\n\nNor does the Tribunal place decisive weight upon the fact that HSE may rely upon the records in an investigation or enforcement action. Information held entirely on a regulated person’s own account may later become relevant evidence for a regulator. The material feature of Article 67 is more specific: the legislation prescribes the information, requires its preservation for a defined period and obliges professional users to make it available to the competent authority so that the monitoring, control and traceability functions for which it was prescribed can be performed.\n\n164.\n\nThe Tribunal considers that this creates a closer relationship than one in which a regulator merely has power to obtain pre-existing private records if they happen to become relevant. Article 67 establishes in advance the body of information which must be generated and preserved so that it can be supplied to the competent authority when required. Professional users remain responsible for the records and retain them in their own possession, but the statutory scheme requires them to preserve the prescribed information as a continuing source of information available for the competent authority’s functions.\n\n165.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered whether\nJeffs\nrequires a different conclusion. As a decision of the First-tier Tribunal,\nJeffs\nis not binding upon us, although its reasoning is relevant. It also concerned the equivalent provision in FOIA rather than the EIR. That distinction does not render the decision inapplicable, but the present issue must be determined in the particular statutory context of the EIR and Article 67. There are important factual similarities. In each case, the public authority lacked physical possession and routine access, did not control day-to-day recording or storage, and could obtain information only in circumstances contemplated by the relevant regulatory scheme. Those similarities provide support for HSE’s case and demonstrate why the mere combination of retention and acquisition powers cannot be sufficient.\n\n166.\n\nThe Tribunal nevertheless considers the Article 67 relationship to be materially stronger in two connected respects. First, Article 67 prescribes a defined body of information about each professional user’s use of plant protection products, rather than merely requiring retention of data generated independently through another operational system. Secondly, the purpose and structure of Article 67 link the preservation and mandatory production of that prescribed information directly to traceability, monitoring and control by the competent authority. The information is therefore generated and preserved as a standing regulatory record which HSE is entitled to call upon for the functions contemplated by the provision.\n\n167.\n\nThe Tribunal has also considered HSE’s analogy with solicitors and other regulated professionals. That analogy correctly demonstrates that records do not become held on behalf of a regulator merely because professional rules require their creation or retention, because the regulator can inspect them, or because they may evidence compliance. The distinction identified by the Tribunal is narrower. Article 67 itself defines information which must be recorded about the regulated activity and maintained as an available source of information for the competent authority’s traceability, monitoring and control functions. It is that statutory integration of prescribed creation, continuing preservation and mandatory production for identified competent-authority functions which, in the Tribunal’s judgment, creates the additional relationship required by regulation 3(2)(b).\n\n168.\n\nThis decision does not establish that information is held on behalf of a public authority merely because the authority possesses statutory powers enabling it to obtain that information, because legislation requires a regulated person to create and retain it, or because the information is subject to regulatory supervision. Many professions and industries operate within detailed statutory frameworks under which an authority may inspect records, require their production or take enforcement action in relation to them. Those features cannot, without more, establish that the information is held on the authority’s behalf. Such a conclusion would go significantly beyond the language of regulation 3(2)(b) and anything established by the authorities.\n\n169.\n\nUnder the Tribunal’s primary route, the limiting feature is the specific third-party access arrangement established by Article 67. HSE’s analogy with solicitors and other regulated professionals demonstrates that records do not become held on behalf of a regulator merely because a third party may complain to the regulator and the regulator may obtain the records for investigative or enforcement purposes. Article 67 goes further. It requires professional users to preserve the prescribed information and make it available to HSE, expressly directs third parties seeking access to that information to HSE, and requires HSE to provide access in accordance with applicable law. It is that reciprocal statutory relationship between the users’ retention and production obligations and HSE’s responsibility for third-party access, rather than the mere existence of record-keeping, inspection or investigatory powers, which supports the conclusion that the information is held on HSE’s behalf.\n\n170.\n\nUnder the alternative route, the limiting principle is narrower and does not depend upon the third party access provision applying to information which HSE has not already obtained. The Tribunal relies upon the statutory integration of three connected requirements: Article 67 prescribes the particular information which must be generated about the regulated activity; requires that information to be preserved for a defined period; and requires professional users to make it available to HSE for the traceability, monitoring and control functions contemplated by the provision.\n\n171.\n\nThe Tribunal does not treat the mere aggregation of individually insufficient features as sufficient. The alternative conclusion depends upon the function created by their combined operation. Professional users are required to maintain an identified body of regulatory information as a continuing source of information which HSE may require for defined competent authority functions. In the Tribunal’s judgment, that arrangement goes beyond a regulator’s contingent power to inspect ordinary private or professional records which exist independently of the statutory scheme.\n\n172.\n\nThe Tribunal recognises that the distinction is fact sensitive. It does not follow that every statutory requirement to maintain prescribed records for possible regulatory production will satisfy regulation 3(2)(b). Relevant considerations will include the language and purpose of the particular provision, whether the information is generated independently for the holder’s own purposes or is specifically prescribed as part of the regulatory mechanism, the functions for which it must remain available, and the nature of the relationship thereby created between the holder and the authority.\n\n173.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore accepts that HSE’s concern provides an important constraint upon the interpretation of regulation 3(2)(b) but does not consider that the conclusion in these appeals entails that regulatory records are generally held on behalf of regulators. The conclusion is confined to the relationship created by the particular terms and operation of Article 67.\n\nThe Tribunal’s Conclusions\n\n174.\n\nThe Tribunal has accepted much of HSE’s factual case. The records are created and retained by professional users pursuant to obligations imposed directly upon them. HSE does not maintain a central repository of Article 67 records, does not routinely receive them and may have no advance knowledge of their contents or of the identity of the relevant record-holder. HSE must ordinarily take positive steps to obtain the information, and a statutory power of access cannot, without more, establish that information is held on behalf of a public authority.\n\n175.\n\nThe Tribunal’s primary conclusion rests upon its construction of Article 67’s third party access provision. Professional users are required to create and preserve the prescribed information and make it available to HSE on request. Third parties seeking access to Article 67 information are directed to HSE, which is assigned responsibility for providing access in accordance with applicable law. The professional users’ retention and production obligations enable HSE to perform that statutory responsibility. In that particular statutory context, the information is retained for the benefit of, and in the interests of, HSE in the performance of the functions assigned to it as competent authority.\n\n176.\n\nIf HSE’s narrower construction of the third party access provision is correct, the Tribunal would reach the same conclusion by its alternative route. Article 67 prescribes the information which professional users must generate about the use of plant protection products, requires its continuing preservation and requires its production to HSE for the traceability, monitoring and control functions contemplated by the provision. Professional users thereby preserve a defined body of regulatory information not only for their own compliance purposes, but also as an available source of information for HSE’s performance of those competent-authority functions.\n\n177.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered carefully whether\nJeffs\nand the analogies with solicitors and other regulated professionals require a different conclusion. They demonstrate that acquisition powers, mandatory retention, relevance to the regulated activity and possible regulatory use are insufficient by themselves. The distinction in the present appeals is that Article 67 identifies the information which must be generated, requires its continuing preservation and makes its mandatory production to HSE part of the mechanism by which the specified traceability, monitoring and control functions are performed. The Tribunal’s conclusion is confined to the particular relationship created by Article 67 and does not establish that ordinary private or professional records subject to regulatory inspection are generally held on behalf of the relevant regulator.\n\n178.\n\nAccordingly, the Tribunal reaches the same conclusion by either route. The requested information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE within the meaning of regulation 3(2)(b) of the EIR. In relation to Wrexham, the Commissioner did not err in reaching that conclusion in the first Decision Notice. In relation to Carmarthen, the issue arises for determination in the appeal because it was not determined in the Decision Notice. HSE’s challenge on Ground 1 fails in both appeals.\n\nGROUND 2: MANIFESTLY UNREASONABLE\n\nThe Issue and Legal Approach\n\n179.\n\nHaving concluded that the requested information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE for the purposes of regulation 3(2)(b), it is necessary to address HSE’s alternative case under regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR. HSE contends that, even if the information was held, the requests were properly characterised as manifestly unreasonable because of the burden that compliance would impose. The Commissioner rejected that contention in the Carmarthen Decision Notice and the second Wrexham Decision Notice. Ground 2 therefore requires the Tribunal to determine whether the Commissioner erred in those conclusions.\n\n180.\n\nThe Tribunal considers it important at the outset to identify the precise nature of the issue before it. The question is not whether compliance with the requests would involve work. Nor is it whether compliance would require a substantial commitment of public resources. Indeed, a significant feature of these appeals is that there is relatively little disagreement between the parties that responding to the requests would require a considerable amount of effort. The real dispute concerns whether the burden identified by HSE reaches the threshold established by regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n181.\n\nThe wording of the exception is significant. The EIR do not provide that a request may be refused whenever compliance would be burdensome or resource intensive. Nor is the question determined simply by whether disclosure would involve more than a reasonable amount of work. The statutory language requires the request to be “manifestly unreasonable”. As the authorities discussed below demonstrate, an excessive and disproportionate cost or administrative burden may be sufficient to engage the exception. The task for the Tribunal is therefore not simply to quantify the burden asserted by HSE, but to evaluate whether that burden, considered in all the circumstances, is such that the requests themselves may properly be described as manifestly unreasonable.\n\n182.\n\nThe Tribunal also bears in mind that regulation 12(4)(b) forms part of a wider legislative scheme intended to facilitate access to environmental information. The exception must therefore be applied in a manner that is consistent with the objectives of the EIR and with the presumption in favour of disclosure contained in regulation 12(2). Those considerations do not diminish the importance of protecting public authorities from genuinely disproportionate requests. They form part of the legal context within which the Tribunal must evaluate HSE’s case. They do not replace either the statutory test under regulation 12(4)(b) or the separate public-interest balance required if the exception is engaged.\n\n183.\n\nIn approaching the issue, the Tribunal has found it helpful to distinguish between two separate questions. The first is factual: what burden would compliance with each request be likely to impose upon HSE? The second is evaluative: having made findings about that burden, does it render the relevant request manifestly unreasonable within regulation 12(4)(b)? The Tribunal’s analysis proceeds on that basis.\n\n184.\n\nAs will become apparent, the Tribunal accepts much of the evidence advanced by HSE concerning the practical difficulties associated with obtaining, reviewing and disclosing Article 67 information. The question is not whether those difficulties are real; the Tribunal is satisfied that they are. The question is whether, viewed in the round and in the context of each request, they are sufficient to justify the conclusion that the request was manifestly unreasonable.\n\n185.\n\nAlthough much of the evidence is common to both appeals, each request must be assessed on its own facts. The requests differ in geographical scope, subject matter, period, likely number of relevant professional users and volume of responsive information. The conclusion reached in relation to one request does not therefore determine the other.\n\n186.\n\nIn\nDransfield v Information Commissioner and Craven v Information Commissioner\n\n[2015] EWCA Civ 454\n,\n[2015] 1 WLR 5316\n, the Court of Appeal held that the expressions “vexatious” under\nsection 14\nof the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\nand “manifestly unreasonable” under regulation 12(4)(b) are, for practical purposes, of substantially similar effect. The assessment is objective and requires the relevant circumstances to be considered in their proper context. The inclusion of the word “manifestly” requires the unreasonableness to be clearly shown.\n\n187.\n\nThe Court of Appeal also confirmed that the cost of compliance may be taken into account. There is no rule that a request cannot be manifestly unreasonable solely because of the administrative or financial burden which it would impose. In\nNI v Information Commissioner and Buckinghamshire County Council\n\n[2016] UKUT 520 (AAC)\n, the Upper Tribunal confirmed that an excessive and disproportionate burden may be sufficient even where the information sought has some public value. No particular number of hours or level of cost is, however, conclusive.\n\n188.\n\nThe costs limit prescribed under section 12 of FOIA does not apply directly under the EIR. It may provide a useful point of comparison but does not operate as a statutory threshold under regulation 12(4)(b). A request does not become manifestly unreasonable merely because the estimated cost of compliance exceeds that limit. Equally, the absence of a prescribed EIR costs limit does not prevent a sufficiently serious cost or resource burden from engaging the exception.\n\n189.\n\nThe application of regulation 12(4)(b) therefore requires an evaluative judgment. Relevant matters may include the scope and nature of the request, the work reasonably required to identify, obtain, review and disclose the information, the staff time and expertise involved, the resources available to the public authority, the extent to which compliance would divert staff from other functions, the reliability of the burden estimates, any efficiencies which could reasonably be expected to arise, and the serious purpose or value of the request insofar as that bears upon whether the burden is disproportionate. No single factor is determinative. The fact that requested information relates to an authority’s functions does not mean that any burden associated with compliance must necessarily be regarded as proportionate.\n\n190.\n\nThat assessment must remain distinct from the public-interest test. At the first stage, the Tribunal determines whether regulation 12(4)(b) is engaged. If it is, regulation 12(1)(b) requires a separate determination of whether the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The value of the information may bear upon whether a burden is disproportionate, but consideration of that value at the engagement stage does not determine the subsequent public-interest balance.\n\n191.\n\nRegulation 12(2) requires a presumption in favour of disclosure. That presumption informs the application of the EIR but does not prevent an excessive burden from engaging regulation 12(4)(b), alter the ordinary approach to fact-finding or replace the separate balancing exercise under regulation 12(1)(b).\n\n192.\n\nFinally, the prospective nature of the assessment must be recognised. A public authority cannot ordinarily prove with mathematical precision the consequences of an exercise which it has not undertaken. Estimates based upon reasonable assumptions may constitute important evidence. The Tribunal must nevertheless distinguish between work shown to be reasonably required and assumptions about what may occur and must determine what weight the resulting figures can properly bear.\n\nThe Parties’ Positions\n\n193.\n\nThere was no significant disagreement between the parties that compliance with the requests would require a substantial amount of work. The principal disagreement concerned the scale of that work and whether, having regard to the circumstances of each request, the resulting burden made the request manifestly unreasonable.\n\n194.\n\nHSE’s submissions were advanced principally through the evidence of Sarah Frow and through the detailed analysis undertaken by her of the practical implications of the requests. Mr Mehta submitted that the Commissioner had materially underestimated both the complexity and the scale of the exercise that would be required. He emphasised that the requested information was not held within a central database or system maintained by HSE and that the authority would therefore be required first to identify relevant professional users before any process of obtaining, reviewing or disclosing information could begin.\n\n195.\n\nHSE submitted that the process would involve a number of distinct and resource-intensive stages. These included identifying relevant professional users within the scope of the requests; obtaining contact information for those users; seeking production of records; recording and pursuing responses; reviewing the records received; determining whether the material fell within scope; identifying information requiring redaction or exclusion; and preparing material for disclosure. Mr Mehta argued that it was necessary to evaluate the cumulative effect of these requirements rather than considering each stage in isolation.\n\n196.\n\nParticular reliance was placed upon Sarah Frow’s evidence concerning the nature of Article 67 records themselves. HSE submitted that the records were not maintained in a standardised format and that the information might be recorded in a variety of ways. The Tribunal was referred to evidence demonstrating that records might be handwritten, partially illegible, supplied in photographic or scanned form or generated through different commercial systems. Mr Mehta submitted that the practical difficulties arising from these variations had been insufficiently recognised by the Commissioner.\n\n197.\n\nHSE also relied upon the evidence derived from the Chipps Farm exercise. It was submitted that this exercise provided a practical illustration of the work involved in identifying, obtaining and processing Article 67 records. Mr Mehta argued that the difficulties encountered in relation to a single identified source demonstrated the scale of the challenge that would arise if HSE were required to conduct a substantially broader exercise covering numerous users and potentially large volumes of information. HSE also relied upon its experience of the Belaugh Green Farm request as a further practical example.\n\n198.\n\nMore generally, HSE submitted that the burden assessment undertaken by Sarah Frow was grounded in practical experience and reflected a genuine attempt to understand the consequences of compliance. Mr Mehta argued that the Commissioner had criticised aspects of HSE’s calculations without identifying a sufficiently robust evidential basis for doing so. In his submission, the Commissioner had speculated about efficiencies that might arise in practice whilst attaching insufficient weight to the difficulties that HSE would actually encounter.\n\n199.\n\nHSE’s estimates changed as the requests and the proposed methodology were examined more closely. For Carmarthen, HSE initially estimated that compliance would require 302 hours of work, at a cost of £7,550. Its revised estimate was 137 hours, or £3,425, based upon approximately 100 potentially relevant professional users. The Commissioner’s estimate was approximately 26 to 28 hours, or £650 to £700.\n\n200.\n\nFor Wrexham, HSE initially estimated 377 hours, or £9,425. Its revised estimate was 264.4 hours, or approximately £6,600, based upon approximately 125 potentially relevant professional users. The Commissioner’s materials referred to estimates of approximately 98 to 124 hours, or approximately £2,450 to £3,100.\n\n201.\n\nHSE submitted that the reductions demonstrated that it had engaged constructively with the Commissioner’s criticisms and refined its methodology as further experience became available. It maintained that its final estimates were realistic and already allowed for significant efficiencies. The Commissioner submitted that the scale of the revisions demonstrated how significantly the totals depended upon the assumptions adopted.\n\n202.\n\nHSE also relied upon the opportunity cost of compliance. Its staff and expertise were finite, and the work could not be undertaken without diverting resources from investigation, enforcement and its other regulatory functions. HSE further submitted that compliance was likely to encourage additional requests for Article 67 information, thereby increasing the longer-term impact upon its resources.\n\n203.\n\nThe Commissioner did not dispute that compliance would require significant work. Ms John accepted that the requests would involve obtaining information from professional users and that the exercise could not be characterised as routine. However, she submitted that HSE’s estimates materially overstated the likely burden and that a number of assumptions embedded within the calculations were excessively cautious or insufficiently supported by the available evidence.\n\n204.\n\nIn particular, the Commissioner submitted that the burden analysis advanced by HSE depended upon a series of assumptions regarding the time required for user identification, the preparation and sending of correspondence, the recording and pursuit of responses, record review and information processing. Ms John argued that those assumptions were not established by evidence but represented estimates of what might occur in the most demanding scenarios. The Commissioner contended that a more realistic assessment would recognise that efficiencies would emerge as the exercise progressed and that repeated exposure to similar formats and products would reduce the time required for later stages of the work. The Commissioner also questioned whether HSE would need to collate the information into a newly created dataset, rather than identify and redact responsive information within the records supplied.\n\n205.\n\nThe Commissioner further submitted that some aspects of HSE’s analysis had the effect of treating all uncertainty as though it would operate against the authority. Whilst accepting that compliance would involve a significant commitment of resources, Ms John argued that the available evidence did not establish that the resulting burden made either request clearly unreasonable.\n\n206.\n\nThe Commissioner did not suggest that the proposed efficiencies would eliminate the burden. She accepted that Wrexham would involve a large piece of work and that even the lower estimate represented a considerable cost. The Commissioner’s submission was that the FOIA costs limit was not determinative under the EIR and that the burden had to be considered alongside HSE’s resources, the nature of the requested information and the purpose of each request.\n\n207.\n\nWildFish broadly supported the Commissioner’s approach. Mr Lockley accepted that compliance would require substantial work but submitted that the burden had been overstated in a number of respects. He argued that the requests must be assessed in the context of the information sought, the purpose of the EIR and the environmental significance of the records in question. In his submission, the fact that disclosure would require effort could not, without more, justify reliance upon regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n208.\n\nMr Lockley submitted that Article 67 records form part of the regulatory framework governing pesticide use and that the requests concern environmental information of a kind which the legislative scheme itself requires to be created and preserved. He submitted that this context was relevant both to the assessment of burden and to the overall evaluation of whether it was unreasonable to require HSE to undertake the work necessary to secure disclosure. Mr Lockley also relied upon regulation 4 of the EIR, submitting that HSE should not be permitted to rely without qualification upon administrative difficulties arising from the way in which relevant environmental information had been organised. HSE disputed that submission, maintaining that regulation 4 did not require it to create a central repository of information retained by professional users.\n\nMatters accepted from HSE’s burden case\n\n209.\n\nBefore turning to the Tribunal’s evaluation of the competing analyses advanced by the parties, it is important to identify those aspects of HSE’s burden evidence which the Tribunal accepts. The Tribunal does so for two reasons. First, because a fair reading of the evidence demonstrates that many of the practical difficulties identified by HSE are real and substantial. Secondly, because it is important that the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion is not misunderstood as resting upon any rejection of Sarah Frow’s evidence or any finding that HSE overstated the nature of the practical work required. The dispute concerns the likely scale and duration of that work and its legal significance.\n\n210.\n\nThe Tribunal begins by accepting that the requested information could not be retrieved from any pre-existing HSE database or information-management system. As the evidence established, HSE does not hold the requested Article 67 records in any central repository and does not maintain a database capable of generating a response to the requests through ordinary searches. Compliance would therefore require HSE to undertake a process that goes significantly beyond the retrieval of information already within its possession.\n\n211.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts that responding to the requests would necessarily involve a number of distinct stages, each requiring the commitment of staff time and resources. As Sarah Frow explained, HSE would first need to identify professional users falling within the scope of the requests. It would then need to obtain records from those users, record and pursue responses, review the material received, assess whether the information fell within scope, undertake any necessary processing and prepare information for disclosure. The Tribunal accepts that these are genuine stages of the exercise and that each would contribute to the overall burden imposed upon the authority.\n\n212.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts that identifying relevant professional users would itself require work. The professional-user register provided an accessible and potentially useful starting point but did not constitute a complete geographical record of every person who had applied plant protection products in the areas covered by the requests. Registered addresses might not correspond with the land on which products were used, particularly where applications had been undertaken by contractors. Additional enquiries might therefore be necessary.\n\n213.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts the evidence concerning the nature of Article 67 records themselves. The records are not maintained in a single standard format. The evidence demonstrated that they may exist in handwritten form, in scanned form, in photographic form or within a variety of commercial recording systems. The Tribunal accepts that this variation creates practical difficulties when reviewing information and determining whether particular records contain information relevant to the requests. The Tribunal also accepts that the process involves more than a simple administrative exercise and may require informed examination of the material received.\n\n214.\n\nThe Tribunal similarly accepts that a review exercise would be required. The information sought by the requests is not necessarily identifiable solely by reference to the face of the records themselves. As HSE submitted, additional work may be required in some cases to identify products, active ingredients, locations or other matters relevant to determining whether information falls within the scope of a request. In Carmarthen, this might require HSE to establish whether a product identified by its commercial name contained glyphosate. HSE’s register of authorised plant protection products could assist with that task, but the necessary checks would require time. In Wrexham, the broader subject matter and longer period were likely to produce a greater quantity and variety of information.\n\n215.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts HSE’s submission that compliance would require engagement with external parties. Unlike a request directed solely at information already held internally, the present requests envisage communication with professional users, the obtaining of records from those users and potentially the resolution of difficulties arising from incomplete, unclear or inconsistent information. The Tribunal accepts that this feature increases the complexity of the exercise and distinguishes it from many routine requests made under the EIR.\n\n216.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts the evidence concerning the Chipps Farm exercise. Without prejudging the weight which should ultimately be attached to that evidence, the Tribunal accepts that the exercise provided a practical illustration of some of the challenges which may arise in obtaining and processing Article 67 records. The Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that the experience gained from that exercise was capable of informing its assessment of the workload likely to be associated with broader requests of the kind presently under consideration. The Tribunal reaches the same conclusion, subject to appropriate caution, in relation to the Belaugh Green Farm example.\n\n217.\n\nMost importantly, the Tribunal accepts that the burden identified by HSE is genuine. The Tribunal does not regard the burden case as speculative, artificial or contrived. It is evident from the evidence of Sarah Frow that considerable thought was given to the practical implications of compliance and that the estimates advanced by HSE represented a genuine attempt to assess the work likely to be involved. The evidence demonstrates a conscientious attempt to understand and quantify the practical consequences of the requests.\n\n218.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts that compliance with the requests would divert resources from other work undertaken by HSE. It is neither realistic nor appropriate to assume that such work could be undertaken without opportunity cost. Time devoted to identifying users, obtaining records and preparing information for disclosure would necessarily be time unavailable for the performance of other regulatory activities. The Tribunal accepts that this is a legitimate and important consideration in the assessment required by regulation 12(4)(b).\n\n219.\n\nDrawing these matters together, the Tribunal is satisfied that HSE has established that compliance with the requests would require a substantial exercise involving the commitment of significant staff time and expertise. The Tribunal therefore approaches the remainder of its analysis on the basis that the burden identified by HSE is both genuine and substantial. Neither request could be answered through routine retrieval, and Wrexham would impose the greater burden.\n\n220.\n\nHowever, the acceptance of those matters does not determine the outcome of Ground 2. The question posed by regulation 12(4)(b) is not answered merely by establishing that the requests would be substantial, demanding or resource intensive. Nor is the question whether HSE’s burden evidence is genuine. The question is whether the burden relied upon by HSE reaches the level necessary before the relevant request is properly characterised as manifestly unreasonable. It is to that evaluative question that the Tribunal now turns.\n\nAssessment of the Burden\n\n221.\n\nThe Tribunal’s assessment of HSE’s burden case is informed principally by the evidence of Sarah Frow. The Tribunal’s assessment of her reliability, knowledge and the limit of her evidence is set out in its findings of fact above.\n\n222.\n\nThe Tribunal has already accepted that HSE’s analysis represented a genuine and conscientious attempt to estimate the work which compliance would entail. The issue at this stage is the evidential weight which can properly be attached to the assumptions underlying the resulting calculations.\n\n223.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts a number of the criticisms advanced by the Commissioner concerning the assumptions underpinning aspects of that analysis. As Sarah Frow acknowledged during her evidence, the calculations necessarily depended upon a range of matters that could not be known with certainty at the time the requests were refused. The assessment therefore involved prediction as well as observation.\n\n224.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts that some elements of the modelling reflected assumptions about matters such as response rates, review times and processing requirements which could not be verified in advance. The Tribunal does not criticise HSE for adopting that approach. Any attempt to estimate the burden associated with a future exercise inevitably requires assumptions to be made. Nevertheless, the consequence is that the estimates cannot be treated as establishing with precision the burden which compliance would be likely to impose.\n\n225.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore regards Sarah Frow’s evidence as a useful and important indicator of the likely scale and complexity of the task which compliance would present. The Tribunal does not, however, accept that every assumption embedded within the calculations should be treated as established fact. Nor does it consider that the estimates can simply be adopted as a measure of the burden which compliance would inevitably entail.\n\n226.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore distinguishes between the practical stages which the evidence establishes would be required and the assumptions made about their frequency, duration and cumulative effect.\n\n227.\n\nA feature of HSE’s burden case, to which the Tribunal attaches considerable significance, is that the analysis necessarily involved a substantial predictive element. This is not a criticism of HSE. It is an inherent consequence of the exercise. HSE was attempting to estimate the resources required to comply with requests which had not been fulfilled. A degree of forecasting was therefore unavoidable.\n\n228.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that HSE could not know in advance how many professional users would ultimately be identified as falling within the scope of the requests, how many would hold responsive information, how those users would respond, the form in which records would be supplied, the quantity and quality of those records, or the extent to which supplementary enquiries, clarification or redaction might prove necessary. Each of those matters had the potential either to increase or decrease the burden ultimately involved. The estimates relied upon by HSE were therefore necessarily dependent upon assumptions concerning future events rather than observed outcomes.\n\n229.\n\nThe Tribunal regards this as an important consideration because it affects the evidential weight that can properly be attached to the calculations themselves. Estimates of future burden are not rendered unreliable merely because they involve assumptions. Indeed, it would often be impossible for a public authority to advance a case under regulation 12(4)(b) without relying upon estimates of this type. Nevertheless, where a case depends substantially upon projections and modelling, the Tribunal must remain alert to the distinction between what is known and what is anticipated.\n\n230.\n\nThe evidence demonstrated that a number of the figures adopted by HSE were derived from assumptions regarding matters such as response rates, review times, correspondence requirements and the level of scrutiny likely to be required for individual records. The Tribunal accepts that there was a rational basis for making those assumptions. It also accepts the Commissioner’s submission that they were not facts established by evidence. They were estimates of what might occur under a range of circumstances.\n\n231.\n\nThe Tribunal is particularly conscious that the burden analysis often proceeded on the basis of prudent or cautious assumptions. Again, the Tribunal does not criticise HSE for adopting that approach. A cautious estimate may be entirely appropriate where the purpose of the exercise is to assess the possible demands that might be placed upon an authority. However, a prudent estimate of potential burden is not necessarily a reliable measure of the burden most likely to arise in practice.\n\n232.\n\nThe Tribunal was also struck by the extent to which individual assumptions interacted with one another. The overall estimates advanced by HSE did not derive from a single calculation but from the cumulative effect of numerous projected stages within the process. The consequence is that relatively small differences in a number of assumptions have the potential to produce significantly different outcomes when viewed across the exercise as a whole. In those circumstances, the Tribunal considers it necessary to approach the resulting figures with appropriate caution.\n\n233.\n\nThe Commissioner submitted that HSE’s calculations should be treated as representing a worst-case or near worst-case scenario. The Tribunal does not accept that characterisation. In the Tribunal’s judgment, the estimates advanced by HSE were genuine attempts to model the likely implications of compliance rather than attempts to identify the most burdensome conceivable outcome. The evidence does not, however, establish that every cautious assumption reflected the outcome most likely to arise. The final estimates are therefore better understood as prudent projections than as demonstrated measures of the probable burden.\n\n234.\n\nUltimately, the Tribunal’s conclusion is that the burden evidence provides a useful indication of the likely scale and complexity of the work which compliance would involve, but not a precise measure of that burden. The predictive nature of the exercise means that the Tribunal cannot assume that every estimated stage would materialise in the manner anticipated, nor that every assumption would operate in the direction most unfavourable to HSE. Equally, the Tribunal cannot assume that every uncertainty would resolve in the manner most favourable to HSE. The actual burden might be lower than HSE estimated, but it might also be higher than the Commissioner’s calculations.\n\n235.\n\nThis does not weaken the conclusion, already reached by the Tribunal, that compliance would involve a substantial exercise. It does, however, affect the degree of confidence with which the Tribunal can accept the higher-end projections relied upon by HSE when assessing whether either request was manifestly unreasonable. It is therefore necessary to examine whether, and to what extent, the Commissioner was correct to contend that the analysis did not fully account for efficiencies and practical realities which might emerge during the exercise.\n\n236.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered carefully the criticisms advanced by the Commissioner in relation to HSE’s burden assessment. The Commissioner did not contend that compliance with the requests would be straightforward or that it could be achieved through routine retrieval of information already held within HSE’s systems. Nor did the Commissioner dispute that compliance would require the expenditure of time and resources. The criticism was a narrower one. In essence, the Commissioner submitted that HSE’s assessment overstated the likely burden because a number of the assumptions underpinning the analysis were either insufficiently evidenced or failed adequately to account for the practical realities of the exercise.\n\n237.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts aspects of that criticism. As discussed above, a notable feature of HSE’s analysis is that it necessarily depends upon assumptions concerning future events. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that those assumptions were advanced in good faith and with a rational basis, it does not accept that each should be treated as equally probable or as representing the outcome most likely to arise in practice. The Commissioner was entitled to question whether a number of the estimates reflected prudent projections rather than demonstrated requirements.\n\n238.\n\nThe Tribunal was particularly persuaded by the Commissioner’s submission that caution is required before treating cumulative estimates as though they represented established fact. Several stages of HSE’s analysis involved assumptions about the amount of time likely to be required to complete individual tasks. Considered in isolation, many of those assumptions were not unreasonable. However, when a series of cautious assumptions is combined, the resulting estimate may present a picture of burden materially greater than that which would ultimately be experienced in practice. The Tribunal considers that concern to be well founded.\n\n239.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts the Commissioner’s criticism that aspects of HSE’s assessment tended to assume that uncertainty would operate consistently in one direction. The evidence demonstrated a range of possible outcomes. Some circumstances might increase the burden associated with compliance, while others might reduce it. The Tribunal does not consider that it can safely proceed on the basis that every uncertain factor will resolve in the manner most resource-intensive for HSE. Nor does the Tribunal proceed on the basis that every uncertainty would resolve in the manner assumed by the Commissioner.\n\n240.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that identifying relevant professional users would require more than a straightforward postcode search. The professional-user register did not identify every relevant holding or the location of every application, and further enquiries might be required. The Commissioner’s lowest allowance did not fully reflect that work. The register nevertheless provided HSE with a material starting point and reduced the extent of the exercise when compared with a process beginning without any existing information.\n\n241.\n\nPreparing and sending correspondence would require staff time, but HSE had already prepared correspondence for the Chipps Farm request which could be adapted. Electronic communication could reduce the administrative burden in at least some cases, although the evidence did not establish the proportion of professional users for whom suitable email addresses would be available.\n\n242.\n\nSome professional users might require reminders or clarification, and HSE was entitled to allow for that possibility. The evidence did not establish the proportion who would fail to respond promptly or would provide unclear information. An assessment which assumed a material amount of follow-up work in every case would therefore be too cautious.\n\n243.\n\nThe extent of any collation exercise was also disputed. HSE would need to organise and understand the information sufficiently to determine what fell within scope and to prepare an intelligible disclosure. It would not necessarily need to create a wholly new consolidated dataset. In some cases, responsive records could be disclosed in their existing form following appropriate review and redaction.\n\n244.\n\nHSE was entitled to anticipate that redaction might be required, but it could not be assumed that every response or page would contain personal data or other information requiring extensive redaction. Similarly, the time required to process individual responses would vary. Some records might be extensive or difficult to interpret, while others might be clear and readily processed. HSE’s calculations properly allowed for informed review but did not establish that the same amount of work would be required for every user, response or year.\n\n245.\n\nThe Commissioner suggested that HSE could ask professional users to provide the information in a form which assisted processing. HSE could properly make such a request. Article 67 did not, however, prescribe the form in which records were to be maintained, and the evidence did not establish that HSE could require users to reformat their existing records for the purposes of an EIR response. The Tribunal therefore attaches limited weight to that proposed efficiency.\n\n246.\n\nThe Tribunal does not accept all of the Commissioner’s criticisms. In particular, it is not persuaded that the burden can be substantially discounted simply by reference to potential efficiencies or administrative simplifications. The Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that obtaining records from multiple external parties, reviewing information maintained in different formats and assessing the scope of that information would remain a significant undertaking even if efficiencies emerged as the exercise progressed.\n\n247.\n\nNor does the Tribunal accept any suggestion that the practical difficulties identified by HSE are theoretical or exaggerated. The evidence, including the results of the Chipps Farm exercise, demonstrates that Article 67 records can present genuine challenges in terms of collection, review and interpretation. The Tribunal therefore rejects any analysis that would minimise the scale of the task confronting HSE.\n\n248.\n\nThe Tribunal likewise accepts HSE’s criticism of certain aspects of the Commissioner’s alternative calculations. Whilst the Commissioner was entitled to challenge the assumptions made by HSE, some of the Commissioner’s own estimates appeared to rest upon assumptions of equal uncertainty. The Tribunal does not consider that the exercise can properly be resolved by substituting one set of estimates for another. The evidence does not permit that level of precision.\n\n249.\n\nIn the Tribunal’s judgment, the proper conclusion lies between the parties’ competing positions. The Commissioner was correct to observe that the burden analysis advanced by HSE contains assumptions which cannot be treated as established facts and that some of those assumptions were open to legitimate challenge. Equally, HSE was correct to emphasise that the exercise would involve significant practical difficulties and that the burden should not be understated.\n\n250.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore accepts the Commissioner’s criticism insofar as it demonstrates that the estimates relied upon by HSE are not determinative of the issue before the Tribunal. The figures advanced by HSE provide an indication of the potential scale of the exercise, but they cannot be treated as establishing with confidence the precise burden which compliance would entail. At the same time, the Tribunal rejects any suggestion that those estimates may simply be discounted. They remain an important evidential indicator of the work likely to be involved.\n\n251.\n\nThe result is that the Tribunal approaches the remainder of its analysis on the basis that compliance would require a substantial commitment of resources, whilst recognising that the precise extent of that commitment cannot be known with certainty and is unlikely to correspond exactly with any single set of estimates advanced by either party. That conclusion informs the Tribunal’s assessment of the practical examples and, ultimately, the question whether the burden demonstrated by HSE made either request manifestly unreasonable.\n\n252.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered with care the evidence relating to the Chipps Farm exercise, upon which HSE placed significant reliance as an illustration of the practical difficulties associated with obtaining and processing Article 67 records. The Tribunal accepts that the exercise is relevant to its assessment of burden because it moves beyond abstract modelling and provides an example of how aspects of the regime operate in practice. In that respect, the evidence is capable of shedding light on the realities of obtaining records, reviewing information and identifying material falling within the scope of a request.\n\n253.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that the exercise demonstrated a number of genuine practical challenges. It illustrated that Article 67 records may not be maintained in a uniform format, that information may require careful examination before its significance can be understood and that the process of obtaining and processing records can involve more work than might be apparent from a purely theoretical consideration of the requests. The Tribunal also accepts that the exercise provided some evidential foundation for HSE’s broader contention that compliance with the requests would not be a simple or routine administrative task.\n\n254.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts that the exercise is particularly valuable because it is grounded in experience rather than assumption. Much of the burden assessment necessarily involved projections concerning future events. By contrast, the Chipps Farm exercise demonstrated what occurred in an actual attempt to obtain and assess relevant records. The Tribunal therefore considers that the evidence derived from that exercise deserves careful consideration and should not be dismissed as merely anecdotal.\n\n255.\n\nThe Tribunal does not consider that the exercise can bear the full weight which HSE seeks to place upon it. The exercise concerned a specifically identified holding. HSE did not first need to identify the relevant holding or record-holder from within a wider geographical area. Whilst it demonstrates what may occur, it does not establish what will occur across the wider body of records potentially falling within the scope of the requests. The Tribunal therefore accepts the Commissioner’s submission that caution is required before extrapolating too directly from the experience of a single example to the burden associated with the requests as a whole.\n\n256.\n\nThe Tribunal is also mindful that the evidential significance of the Chipps Farm exercise is not entirely straightforward. In one sense, it supports HSE’s case because it demonstrates that obtaining and reviewing Article 67 records can be labour-intensive. In another sense, however, it illustrates that such records can in fact be obtained, reviewed and analysed. The exercise therefore provides evidence not only of difficulty but also of practical achievability. The Tribunal considers both aspects to be relevant.\n\n257.\n\nNor does the Tribunal accept that the exercise establishes the level of burden which would necessarily be encountered in respect of every record-holder or every category of record. The evidence before the Tribunal does not permit a conclusion that the circumstances encountered at Chipps Farm are representative of all circumstances likely to arise in response to the requests. Equally, the Tribunal cannot conclude that they are unrepresentative. The most that can safely be said is that the exercise provides a useful illustration of the kinds of practical issues which may be encountered.\n\n258.\n\nDrawing those matters together, the Chipps Farm exercise confirms that HSE’s burden case is grounded in real operational experience and that obtaining and processing Article 67 information may be labour-intensive. It does not establish that the same difficulties would arise in relation to every record-holder or provide a reliable basis for calculating the overall burden of either request. The Tribunal therefore attaches significant but qualified weight to the evidence.\n\n259.\n\nHSE also relied upon its experience of the Belaugh Green Farm request. That example provides some further support for HSE’s case that the practical difficulties encountered at Chipps Farm were not necessarily unique. It remains, however, another example involving a specifically identified holding. Neither exercise required HSE first to identify the relevant holding or record-holder from within a wider geographical area.\n\n260.\n\nThe two examples therefore strengthen the evidential basis for HSE’s description of the nature of the work but do not establish the average time which would be required across the wider groups of users potentially engaged by the requests. Nor do they justify multiplying the time taken in either case by the estimated number of potential users.\n\n261.\n\nThe Commissioner and WildFish submitted that HSE’s assessment did not make sufficient allowance for efficiencies which would arise as the exercise progressed. HSE accepted that some efficiencies were possible but maintained that they would not materially alter the substantial nature of the work.\n\n262.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that genuine efficiencies would arise as the exercise progressed. Existing correspondence could be reused and adapted rather than prepared afresh for every professional user. Electronic communication would reduce administrative work in at least some cases, although the evidence did not establish the proportion of users for whom suitable email addresses would be available.\n\n263.\n\nStaff would also acquire familiarity with recurring procedures and, where the same commercial systems or record formats appeared, might process later records more quickly. That familiarity would not remove the need to review each response, but it would be unrealistic to assess the entire exercise on the basis that every record would be encountered without the benefit of knowledge gained from earlier responses.\n\n264.\n\nIn Carmarthen, once HSE had established whether a particular commercial product contained glyphosate, that work could assist with later records identifying the same product. HSE would still need to distinguish between different formulations or variants, but it would not be reasonable to assume that every product check would require the same amount of work as the first.\n\n265.\n\nHSE could also refine its recording methods, identify recurring issues and develop a more consistent approach to questions of scope, clarification and redaction. That does not mean that every later response would be simpler. Difficult or extensive records might continue to require substantial individual attention. The likely effect would be some improvement in efficiency across the exercise as a whole, rather than a uniform reduction in the time required for every response.\n\n266.\n\nThe Tribunal does not accept that those efficiencies would transform compliance into a routine or largely automated process. The information would still be obtained from external record-holders in potentially different forms and of differing quality. HSE would remain required to determine whether particular information fell within scope and whether clarification or redaction was necessary. Templates, recurring products and increasing familiarity would reduce some work, but would not remove the need for informed review.\n\n267.\n\nEqually, the Tribunal does not accept HSE’s estimates to the extent that they assume substantially the same amount of time for recurring work without adequate allowance for learning and repetition. The evidence does not permit the efficiencies to be quantified precisely. They would reduce the burden below an assessment which treated each user and response as requiring a wholly separate exercise, but would not eliminate the substantial commitment of staff time and expertise which the Tribunal has already found.\n\n268.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that compliance would divert staff time and expertise from HSE’s other activities. The work could not be undertaken without opportunity cost, and the possible need for informed or specialist review adds to the significance of that diversion.\n\n269.\n\nWildFish relied upon HSE’s size and resources. Its written case referred to approximately 3,000 full-time equivalent staff and a budget of £262 million. Those figures provide some institutional context, but do not establish that any burden identified in these appeals was necessarily reasonable for HSE to bear.\n\n270.\n\nThe evidence did not permit a precise finding about the effect of compliance upon particular programmes, investigations or statutory functions. Nor did it provide a sufficiently detailed account of the staff and resources available to undertake the work for the Tribunal to calculate the burden as a proportion of HSE’s operational capacity.\n\n271.\n\nThe Tribunal does not therefore proceed on the basis that a burden of this scale was proportionate merely because HSE is a national authority. Equally, the absence of a quantified instance of operational harm does not make the diversion of resources immaterial. The Tribunal gives substantial weight to the opportunity cost established by HSE, while recognising that its precise operational consequences were not demonstrated.\n\n272.\n\nThe principal estimates substantially exceeded the £600 FOIA costs limit used by the parties as a comparator. On HSE’s final assessment, Carmarthen exceeded that figure several times over and Wrexham by a still greater margin. Even the Commissioner’s lower Wrexham calculations involved costs of approximately £2,450 to £3,100.\n\n273.\n\nThose comparisons confirm that neither request was routine and materially support HSE’s burden case. They do not, however, determine regulation 12(4)(b). The FOIA limit does not operate as a statutory ceiling under the EIR. The extent to which an estimate exceeds that figure is relevant evidence, but the conclusion remains one to be reached by considering all the circumstances.\n\n274.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered separately the practical implications of the two requests. Both would require HSE to identify relevant professional users, obtain records, review the information received and prepare responsive material for disclosure. Carmarthen was confined to glyphosate use within one calendar year, although product checks might be required. Wrexham concerned plant protection products generally, covered four calendar years and was likely to engage a larger number of users and a greater quantity and variety of information.\n\n275.\n\nNeither request could be answered through routine retrieval. Each would require a significant commitment of staff time and expertise, together with engagement with external record-holders and meaningful review and processing of the information received. Compliance would therefore impose a substantial burden in Carmarthen and a greater burden in Wrexham, with genuine opportunity cost for HSE’s other regulatory activities.\n\n276.\n\nThe evidence did not permit that burden to be quantified precisely. HSE’s assessment necessarily involved prediction and assumptions concerning future events; some efficiencies would arise; and the single-farm examples could not safely be treated as representative of the requests as a whole. The Tribunal therefore proceeds on the basis of its qualitative findings as to the substantial burden in Carmarthen and the even greater burden in Wrexham\n.\n\nApplication of Regulation 12(4)(b)\n\n277.\n\nThe Tribunal applies regulation 12(4)(b) within the statutory framework of the EIR, including the presumption in favour of disclosure and the restrictive interpretation of exceptions. Those principles do not reverse the burden of proof, prevent a substantial and disproportionate burden from engaging the exception or predetermine the result. The question is whether, in all the circumstances of each request, the burden was excessive and disproportionate so that the request was clearly unreasonable.\n\nThe Carmarthen Request\n\n278.\n\nThe Carmarthen request sought Article 67 information concerning the use of glyphosate during 2022 within the specified geographical area. HSE estimated that approximately 100 professional users might be relevant. The request was confined to one active substance, one calendar year and a defined locality. Those limitations reduced its scope when compared with Wrexham, although they did not make compliance straightforward.\n\n279.\n\nHSE would still need to identify potentially relevant professional users, request information from them, record and pursue responses, and review the material received. The restriction to glyphosate would also create an additional task at the review stage. Article 67 records might identify products by their commercial names rather than by reference to glyphosate as an active substance. HSE might therefore need to check particular products against its register of authorised plant protection products. That work was genuine and could not simply be disregarded.\n\n280.\n\nHSE’s final estimate of 137 hours was conscientiously prepared and rationally based. It reflected genuine operational concerns and represented a serious attempt to quantify the work which compliance would require. The Tribunal does not regard that figure as speculative, artificial or advanced as a means of avoiding the request.\n\n281.\n\nThe Commissioner’s estimate provides a useful indication of the work involved, but the Tribunal considers that the likely burden was greater. The estimate may not have made full allowance for the work required to identify potentially relevant users, obtain information from external record-holders, review records supplied in differing formats and, where necessary, clarify responses and determine whether products identified by their commercial names contained glyphosate.\n\n282.\n\nNor, however, does the Tribunal find that HSE’s estimate of 137 hours established the burden most likely to occur. The calculation aggregated cautious assumptions across approximately 100 potential users and several stages of work. The evidence did not establish that every person approached would hold responsive information, that every response would require follow-up or clarification, or that every set of records would require the same degree of examination and processing.\n\n283.\n\nThe estimate also did not fully reflect the efficiencies which the Tribunal has found would be likely to arise. Existing correspondence could be adapted; electronic communication could be used in at least some cases; and familiarity with repeated procedures would reduce some elements of the work. Once HSE had established whether a recurring commercial product contained glyphosate, that work could assist with later records identifying the same product, subject to the need to distinguish between different formulations or variants.\n\n284.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore concludes that the probable burden lay between the parties’ competing calculations, although the evidence does not permit a precise numerical finding. Mathematical precision is not required before regulation 12(4)(b) can be engaged. The absence of a precise figure does not diminish the Tribunal’s finding that compliance would require a substantial commitment of staff time and would involve genuine opportunity cost.\n\n285.\n\nThe FOIA costs comparator provides material support for HSE’s case. On HSE’s final estimate, the cost of compliance would be £3,425, substantially exceeding the £600 figure relied upon by the parties. That comparison confirms that the request was not routine and that the burden was considerably greater than that associated with many information requests. It does not, however, determine the application of regulation 12(4)(b), because the FOIA limit does not operate as a statutory ceiling under the EIR.\n\n286.\n\nAgainst that burden, the Tribunal has considered the scope and serious purpose of the request. Carmarthen was carefully confined to glyphosate use within a defined locality during a single calendar year. It was not frivolous, improper or unfocused. The request sought information concerning actual local use which was not available in equivalent detail elsewhere.\n\n287.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that the information would not provide a complete picture of glyphosate use more generally and could not, by itself, establish environmental or health effects. The information related to one locality and one year, and any conclusions drawn from it would require appropriate context and analysis. Those limitations reduce the breadth of the conclusions which the information could support. They do not deprive the request of a serious local and investigative purpose.\n\n288.\n\nThe Tribunal gives significant weight to the work which compliance would require, the consequential diversion of HSE’s resources and the extent to which HSE’s estimate exceeded the FOIA costs comparator. Those considerations demonstrate that the request was substantially more burdensome than an ordinary request for information already held within an authority’s systems. They do not, however, determine whether the request was manifestly unreasonable. HSE’s estimate of 137 hours was a conscientious and rationally based projection, but the evidence did not establish that it represented the burden most likely to arise. It combined cautious assumptions across approximately 100 potential users, some of whom might hold no responsive information, while the extent of any follow-up, clarification and review would vary between responses. The estimate also did not fully reflect the efficiencies likely to arise through the reuse of correspondence, electronic communication, repeated procedures and familiarity with recurring products and record formats.\n\n289.\n\nThose uncertainties are material when the likely burden is considered alongside the nature of the request. The request was confined to one active substance, one calendar year and a defined geographical area. It sought otherwise unavailable information about actual glyphosate use within that locality and served a serious, albeit limited, investigative purpose. The Tribunal accepts that compliance would require a substantial commitment of staff time and would involve genuine opportunity cost. However, having regard to the request’s confined scope, the likely efficiencies, the uncertainty surrounding the higher estimate and the value of the information sought, the evidence does not establish that the likely burden was excessive and disproportionate so as to make the request clearly unreasonable. Regulation 12(4)(b) was therefore not engaged in relation to Carmarthen.\n\nThe Wrexham Request\n\n290.\n\nThe Wrexham request sought information identifying the quantities of plant protection products used within the area shown on the map for each calendar year from 2020 to 2023. Following the internal review, the dispute was confined to Article 67 information concerning plant protection products used in a farming context. HSE estimated that approximately 125 professional users might be relevant.\n\n291.\n\nWrexham was materially broader than Carmarthen. It concerned plant protection products generally rather than one active substance, covered four calendar years and was expected to engage a larger number of professional users and a greater volume and variety of responsive information. The broader product scope removed the need to establish whether each product contained glyphosate, but increased the likely quantity and range of the information requiring review.\n\n292.\n\nThe preliminary identification exercise would itself be substantial. The professional-user register provided a useful starting point but did not identify automatically every person who had applied products within the mapped area. Contractors registered outside the area might hold relevant records, while professional users registered within it might have applied products elsewhere. Further enquiries might therefore be required before HSE could identify a sufficiently reliable group of potential record-holders.\n\n293.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that Wrexham presents the stronger burden case. Even the Commissioner’s estimates of approximately 98 to 124 hours represented a large exercise and a considerable cost. HSE’s final estimate of 264.4 hours reflected genuine operational concerns arising from the number of potential users, the four-year period, the quantity and variety of the likely information and the need to obtain records from external parties.\n\n294.\n\nThe Commissioner’s figures represented one reasonable assessment of an exercise which was necessarily difficult to quantify in advance. The Tribunal considers, however, that the likely burden was greater, having regard to the potential scale of identifying relevant users, the collection of information covering several years, and the practical uncertainties illustrated by the Chipps Farm and Belaugh Green Farm examples. The Tribunal therefore proceeds on the basis that compliance was likely to require more time than the Commissioner estimated.\n\n295.\n\nNor, however, does the Tribunal find that HSE’s estimate of 264.4 hours established the burden most likely to arise. That figure combined cautious assumptions across approximately 125 potential users and multiple stages of the process. The evidence did not establish that every potential user would hold information falling within scope, that every person approached would require reminders or clarification, or that each response would involve equivalent quantities of information or require the same degree of review.\n\n296.\n\nThe estimate also did not fully reflect the efficiencies likely to arise across an exercise of this scale. Existing correspondence and recording processes could be reused; electronic communication could be employed in at least some cases; and HSE staff would acquire familiarity with recurring procedures, record formats and commercial systems. Those efficiencies would not eliminate the burden or make compliance routine but would reduce some elements of the work below an assessment which treated every user and response as an entirely separate exercise.\n\n297.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore cannot determine the probable burden with numerical precision. It would, however, be very substantial. Compliance would require the diversion of significant staff time and, in some instances, informed or specialist expertise from HSE’s other functions. The work would extend well beyond ordinary retrieval and would involve genuine and potentially significant opportunity cost.\n\n298.\n\nThe FOIA costs comparator provides material support for HSE’s case. HSE’s final estimate was approximately £6,600. Even the Commissioner’s lower calculations produced estimated costs of approximately £2,450 to £3,100, several times the £600 FOIA limit used as a comparator. Although that limit does not govern the EIR, the comparison confirms that Wrexham represented a considerable demand upon HSE’s resources.\n\n299.\n\nThe request nevertheless had a defined and serious purpose. It arose from WildFish Conservation’s SmartRivers work within a small sub-catchment of the Welsh River Dee near Wrexham. WildFish Conservation’s evidence was that the invertebrate-sampling results disclosed a significant “chemical fingerprint” in a predominantly rural catchment, which strongly suggested an agricultural source for any contamination, and that plant protection products might be playing a role. WildFish sought localised information concerning plant protection product use in order to assist in identifying substances or patterns requiring further investigation.\n\n300.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts HSE’s submission that the information could not, by itself, establish that the use of a particular product had caused an observed ecological condition. Any apparent association would require further evidence and scientific analysis. The information would also be limited to the products, locations and periods falling within the request and would not provide a complete account of pesticide use more generally.\n\n301.\n\nThose limitations are material when assessing the conclusions which could properly be drawn from the information. They do not, however, deprive the request of a serious investigative purpose. The information could contribute to a targeted local investigation by identifying products or patterns requiring further examination and was not available in equivalent geographical and operational detail elsewhere.\n\n302.\n\nThe question in relation to Wrexham is finely balanced. The number of potential users, the four-year period, the likely volume and variety of records, the need to obtain information from external record-holders, and the resulting opportunity cost all provide substantial support for HSE’s case. Even the Commissioner’s assessment involved a cost several times greater than the FOIA comparator. The Tribunal therefore accepts that compliance would impose a very substantial burden and would approach the boundary of what could reasonably be required under the EIR.\n\n303.\n\nThere are, however, material uncertainties as to the burden most likely to arise. HSE’s estimate of 264.4 hours was a conscientious and prudent projection, but it combined cautious assumptions across approximately 125 potential users and several stages of work. The evidence did not establish that every potential user would hold responsive information, require follow-up or clarification, or supply records requiring an equivalent degree of review. Nor did the estimate fully reflect the efficiencies likely to arise through reusable correspondence, electronic communication, recurring procedures and increasing familiarity with record formats and commercial systems. Those considerations would not make compliance routine, but they mean that HSE’s final total cannot safely be treated as the probable burden.\n\n304.\n\nThe likely burden must also be considered in the context of the request itself. Although broader than Carmarthen, Wrexham was confined to a defined geographical area, a four-year period and plant protection products used in a farming context. It was directed towards a specific environmental investigation arising from monitoring within the relevant sub-catchment. The information could not establish causation, but it could identify products or patterns requiring further examination and was not available in equivalent geographical and operational detail from other sources. The request therefore had a serious and particularised investigative purpose rather than being speculative or unfocused.\n\n305.\n\nThe Tribunal has given substantial weight to the staff time, expertise and opportunity cost which compliance would require. The conclusion is not that the burden would be modest, or that uncertainty should simply be resolved against HSE. Rather, the evidence establishes a very substantial burden without establishing that the burden most likely to arise would be as high as HSE’s final projection. When that evidential position is considered alongside the request’s defined scope, the limited efficiencies likely to arise and the particular investigative value of the information, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the burden was shown to be excessive and disproportionate so as to make the request clearly unreasonable. Regulation 12(4)(b) was therefore not engaged in relation to Wrexham, although the Tribunal reaches that conclusion more narrowly than in relation to Carmarthen.\n\n306.\n\nHSE also relied upon the possibility that compliance would lead to further requests for Article 67 information. The evidence established that HSE had received other requests for information of this nature, and the Tribunal accepts that further related requests were possible. It did not, however, establish their likely number, scope, frequency or burden. Any future request would require assessment on its own facts. It might differ materially in scope, overlap with information previously obtained or benefit from experience and processes developed through earlier work. The possibility of further requests therefore adds some, but limited, weight to HSE’s burden case. It does not establish that either of the present requests was manifestly unreasonable.\n\n307.\n\nWildFish submitted that HSE’s burden case should be considered in the context of regulation 4 and that more could have been done to systematise or digitise Article 67 record-keeping. Regulation 4 requires a public authority, in respect of environmental information which it holds, progressively to make the information available electronically and to take reasonable steps to organise information relevant to its functions with a view to active and systematic dissemination. It does not prescribe the creation of a central repository containing all Article 67 information retained by professional users. Nor was there sufficient evidence to determine what alternative system HSE could reasonably have implemented, the measures or resources which that would have required, or the extent to which it would have reduced the burden arising from these requests. It is unnecessary for the Tribunal to determine whether HSE complied with regulation 4. The evidence does not establish that the burden should be disregarded or assessed on the hypothetical basis that a different information-management system was already in place. The regulation 4 argument does not materially alter the Tribunal’s assessment of either request.\n\nConclusion on Ground 2\n\n308.\n\nHSE established that compliance would involve a genuine and substantial burden. The requested information could not be retrieved from a central database, and compliance would require the identification of relevant professional users, the collection and review of records in differing forms, decisions concerning scope and redaction, and the preparation of responsive information for disclosure. The burden would be substantial in Carmarthen and even greater in Wrexham.\n\n309.\n\nThe Tribunal has not adopted either party’s numerical assessment. HSE’s final estimates were conscientious and rationally based projections but combined cautious assumptions which were not all established as the outcomes most likely to arise. The Commissioner’s lower calculations did not give sufficient weight to the work of identifying relevant users, obtaining information from external record-holders and processing the material received.\n\n310.\n\nThe practical examples confirmed that obtaining and processing Article 67 information may be labour-intensive but did not establish the average work required across the wider groups of potential users. Genuine efficiencies would arise through reusable correspondence, recurring procedures and increasing familiarity, although they would not transform compliance into a routine exercise.\n\n311.\n\nIn Carmarthen, the substantial likely burden did not outweigh the significance of the request’s confined subject matter, single-year period, defined geographical scope and serious local purpose to the extent required for the request to be clearly unreasonable. Regulation 12(4)(b) was therefore not engaged.\n\n312.\n\nWrexham presented a materially stronger case. Compliance would approach the boundary of what could reasonably be required under the EIR. The evidence did not, however, demonstrate that the very substantial likely burden was excessive and disproportionate to the request’s defined scope and serious investigative purpose. Regulation 12(4)(b) was therefore not engaged in relation to Wrexham.\n\n313.\n\nGround 2 is accordingly dismissed in both appeals. Although that conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the ground, the parties addressed the public-interest balance fully. The Tribunal therefore considers that issue in the alternative.\n\nGROUND 3: PUBLIC INTEREST\n\n314.\n\nHaving concluded that HSE has not established that either request was manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of regulation 12(4)(b), it is not strictly necessary for the Tribunal to determine where the balance of the public interest lies. The Tribunal’s conclusion on Ground 2 is sufficient to dispose of HSE’s alternative case. However, given the extent of the evidence and submissions directed to the issue, and in light of the importance attached to the public-interest balance by the parties, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to express a concluded view on the issue in the alternative.\n\n315.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore proceeds on the alternative assumption that regulation 12(4)(b) is engaged in relation to each request. On that basis, the Tribunal must determine whether, in all the circumstances of each appeal, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure.\n\n316.\n\nThe parties were agreed that the balancing exercise must be conducted in the context of the EIR as a whole. The Tribunal therefore approaches the issue bearing in mind the presumption in favour of disclosure contained in regulation 12(2). That presumption does not predetermine the outcome of the exercise. Nor does the statutory framework diminish the need to give proper weight to legitimate concerns regarding the use of public resources. The Tribunal must identify and weigh the actual public interests engaged on each side. The presumption in favour of disclosure forms part of the statutory framework within which that balance must be assessed, but does not itself determine the weight to be given to any particular public interest.\n\n317.\n\nThere was no material dispute that the requested information was environmental information. It concerns the use of plant protection products and therefore activities capable of affecting the environment. The issue is what weight should be attached to the particular public interests in maintaining the exception and in disclosure in relation to each request.\n\n318.\n\nHSE submitted that substantial weight should be attached to the public interest in preserving finite public resources and ensuring that HSE is able to direct those resources towards its wider regulatory responsibilities. The Commissioner and WildFish accepted that those considerations are relevant and potentially significant. However, they argued that the information sought is of substantial environmental importance, is not available in equivalent detail from other sources and would make a significant contribution to transparency, regulatory accountability and public understanding of pesticide use.\n\n319.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that legitimate and weighty public interests arise on both sides. The question is where the balance lies in the particular circumstances of Carmarthen and Wrexham.\n\nPublic Interest in Maintaining the Exception\n\n320.\n\nHSE relied principally upon the public interest in the effective and efficient use of public resources. It submitted that compliance with the requests would require the diversion of significant staff time from other regulatory activities and that this consequence carried substantial public-interest weight. The Tribunal accepts that submission. Public authorities are entrusted with finite resources and it is plainly in the public interest that those resources are deployed in a manner that enables statutory functions to be discharged effectively.\n\n321.\n\nThe Tribunal has already found that compliance with the requests would involve a substantial undertaking. Identifying relevant professional users, obtaining records from those users, reviewing the material received and preparing information for disclosure would require the commitment of administrative resources and, in some instances, informed or specialist staff. Resources devoted to the requests would necessarily be unavailable for other activities undertaken by HSE in connection with its regulatory responsibilities. The public interest engaged is therefore not merely an interest in avoiding administrative inconvenience. It is an interest in preserving HSE’s capacity to direct finite staff time and expertise towards investigation, enforcement and its other regulatory functions.\n\n322.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts that the burden identified by HSE is not confined to routine administrative work. The evidence established that Article 67 records may require informed review and interpretation and that meaningful compliance with the requests may involve the application of specialist expertise. The diversion of such expertise carries particular public-interest weight because the staff and expertise used to comply with the requests would not be available for HSE’s substantive regulatory work.\n\n323.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore attaches substantial weight to the public interest in maintaining HSE’s capacity to undertake investigations, enforcement activity and other regulatory work. The weight of that interest is greater in relation to Wrexham, because the Tribunal has found that compliance with that request would impose the greater burden and require a more substantial commitment of resources.\n\n324.\n\nFor the reasons given under Ground 2, the possibility that compliance might lead to further related requests attracts limited weight. The evidence did not establish the likely number, scope, frequency or burden of any future requests. Any such request would require assessment on its own facts.\n\n325.\n\nDrawing these considerations together, the Tribunal accepts that there is a genuine and important public interest in maintaining the exception. The burden identified by HSE is real, would involve the commitment of significant resources and would divert those resources from other aspects of HSE’s work. Those factors attract substantial weight within the balancing exercise and represent the strongest aspect of HSE’s public-interest case. The weight is materially greater in Wrexham than in Carmarthen.\n\n326.\n\nThe public interest relied upon by HSE is not merely an interest in avoiding administrative burden. It concerns the effective deployment of finite public resources and the preservation of HSE’s capacity to discharge its regulatory functions. That interest must be weighed against the public interests which disclosure of the requested information would serve.\n\nPublic Interest in Disclosure\n\n327.\n\nAgainst those considerations must be weighed a public interest closely aligned with the underlying purposes of the EIR. The information sought concerns the use of plant protection products and is therefore information relating directly to activities capable of affecting the environment. Access to information concerning activities with potential environmental consequences is capable of serving significant public interests in transparency, accountability, informed public participation and further investigation. The weight of those interests must, however, be assessed by reference to the particular information sought and the contribution which its disclosure would make.\n\n328.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts the evidence of Dr Neal and Mr Linley-Adams that Article 67 records provide a level of detail concerning pesticide use which is not replicated in existing publicly available datasets. Whilst broader survey material and aggregate information exist, the evidence established that Article 67 records are capable of providing location-specific and activity-specific information concerning the use of plant protection products. The Tribunal accepts that this characteristic materially increases the public interest in disclosure. Information that is already available elsewhere may attract a reduced disclosure interest. Information that is not available from alternative sources stands in a different position.\n\n329.\n\nThe Tribunal also accepts that disclosure would promote public understanding of pesticide use. The Tribunal does not accept HSE’s submission that the public interest is removed because the records would not provide a complete picture of pesticide use or because they cannot, without more, establish environmental impact. Information need not be exhaustive in order to be valuable. Nor must it provide definitive answers before a substantial public interest in disclosure arises. Its limitations are nevertheless relevant to the weight of that interest.\n\n330.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that the requested information would not provide comprehensive data concerning pesticide use across Wales or Great Britain. Conclusions drawn from localised records would require appropriate context and analysis, and Article 67 records would not, without more, establish environmental impacts or causal relationships between the use of particular products and particular environmental outcomes. Those limitations reduce the breadth and strength of the conclusions which could properly be drawn from the information. They do not deprive the information of value as a potential contribution to public understanding, informed scrutiny and further investigation.\n\n331.\n\nThe Tribunal also attaches weight to the role that disclosure would play in promoting transparency and accountability. Public access to environmental information serves purposes extending beyond the interests of the individual requester. In these appeals, disclosure would provide information about which plant protection products were used, where they were used and, where the records permitted, patterns of use within the relevant localities and periods. It could thereby inform public debate and enable the information to be compared with local environmental monitoring and other relevant evidence.\n\n332.\n\nThe Tribunal does not treat the statutory requirement to create and retain Article 67 records as an independent reason favouring disclosure. The significance of those records lies in the information which they contain and the contribution which that information could make to understanding actual plant protection product use within the areas and periods covered by the requests.\n\n333.\n\nThe public interest in disclosure is therefore not based simply upon the fact that the information is environmental. It arises from the combination of the environmental subject matter, the geographical and operational detail available from Article 67 records, the absence of equivalent publicly available information and the potential contribution of the information to informed local scrutiny and investigation.\n\n334.\n\nThe Tribunal does not consider that the public interest favouring disclosure is materially weakened merely because the information requires cautious interpretation and cannot provide definitive answers. Those matters affect the weight and proper use of the information, but do not create a public interest in withholding it. The Tribunal has taken the limitations of the information into account when assessing the strength of the disclosure interest in relation to each request.\n\n335.\n\nDrawing these matters together, the Tribunal concludes that disclosure would serve substantial public interests. The requested information was not available in equivalent geographical and operational detail through existing public sources. Subject to its limitations, it was capable of contributing to public understanding of plant protection product use, informing local environmental scrutiny and assisting the identification of products or patterns which might warrant further investigation.\n\n336.\n\nThose interests extend beyond the purposes of the individual requester and engage broader interests in environmental transparency, informed participation and accountability. Their precise weight is not identical in Carmarthen and Wrexham, because the requests differ in scope, purpose, likely utility and burden. The Tribunal therefore turns to balance the competing public interests separately in relation to each request.\n\nThe Balance\n\n337.\n\nIn weighing the competing interests, the Tribunal has not treated the presumption in favour of disclosure as decisive. Nor has it proceeded on the basis that environmental information must be disclosed regardless of cost, or that HSE must absorb any burden associated with information relevant to its functions. The Tribunal has given substantial weight to the resource implications identified by HSE. The question is whether that public interest outweighs the concrete contribution which disclosure of the information sought by each request could make to public understanding, scrutiny and investigation.\n\nCarmarthen\n\n338.\n\nIn Carmarthen, the public interest in maintaining the exception is substantial. Compliance would require work materially exceeding an ordinary internal search and would divert HSE’s staff from its other responsibilities. The Tribunal has rejected the Commissioner’s lower calculation. It has also taken account of the degree by which HSE’s estimate exceeded the FOIA costs comparator, while recognising that the comparator is not determinative under the EIR.\n\n339.\n\nThe public interest in disclosure is narrower than in Wrexham but remains significant. The request was confined to actual glyphosate use within a defined locality during a single calendar year. The information could not establish environmental or health effects and could not support broader conclusions about glyphosate use outside the specified area and period. It could nevertheless provide localised factual information which was not available in equivalent detail elsewhere and could support informed scrutiny or further enquiry concerning the use of glyphosate within that locality.\n\n340.\n\nThe Tribunal gives particular weight to the focused nature of the request. Carmarthen did not seek an unrestricted body of information about plant protection products generally or information covering several years. Its subject matter, period and geographical scope were each defined. Those limitations did not remove the burden of compliance, but they confined both the exercise required of HSE and the use which could properly be made of the resulting information.\n\n341.\n\nThe Tribunal has weighed the substantial resource interest against that focused disclosure interest. It does not consider the disclosure interest overwhelming. It concludes, however, that the public interest in preserving HSE’s resources does not outweigh the public interest in making available otherwise unavailable factual information about actual glyphosate use within the specified locality and period. That conclusion recognises the substantial burden established by HSE but gives decisive weight to the combination of the request’s narrow scope, the absence of equivalent public information and the capacity of disclosure to support informed local scrutiny. The public interest therefore favours disclosure in Carmarthen.\n\nWrexham\n\n342.\n\nWrexham presents a materially closer balance. The public interest in maintaining the exception is significantly stronger than in Carmarthen. The request covered four calendar years, concerned plant protection products generally and was likely to engage a larger number of potential record-holders and a greater quantity and variety of information. Even the Commissioner’s lower calculations described a considerable exercise. Compliance would involve a very substantial commitment of staff time and expertise and would carry significant opportunity cost for HSE’s other regulatory functions.\n\n343.\n\nThe Tribunal has given that resource interest substantial weight. It has not reduced its weight because HSE is a national authority, because the information concerns HSE’s regulatory functions or because the precise operational consequences could not be quantified. The work and diversion established by HSE represent a powerful public interest in maintaining the exception. If the disclosure interest were general, speculative or substantially met by information already available elsewhere, that resource interest might well prevail.\n\n344.\n\nThe disclosure interest in Wrexham is more directly connected to an identified investigative purpose. The request arose from WildFish Conservation’s SmartRivers work within a small sub-catchment of the Welsh River Dee near Wrexham. WildFish Conservation’s evidence was that the invertebrate-sampling results disclosed a significant “chemical fingerprint” in a predominantly rural catchment, which strongly suggested an agricultural source for any contamination, and that plant protection products might be playing a role. The requested information could not establish the source or cause of the identified pressure. It could, however, identify plant protection products used within the mapped area during the relevant period and thereby assist in identifying substances or patterns requiring further scientific examination.\n\n345.\n\nThat is a concrete potential use of the information, not merely an abstract appeal to transparency. Disclosure could enable the Article 67 information to be considered alongside the local monitoring evidence which gave rise to the investigation. It could narrow the subjects requiring further enquiry, identify possible lines of investigation or demonstrate that particular suspected patterns were not present. The fact that further investigation would remain necessary does not negate that utility. It defines the proper and limited role which the information could perform.\n\n346.\n\nThe geographical and temporal limits of the request are also relevant. Wrexham was considerably broader than Carmarthen, but it was not unlimited. It concerned a mapped area, a four-year period and, following internal review, plant protection products used in a farming context. Those limits confined the investigation to information potentially relevant to the identified local concern. The request was therefore broader and more burdensome but also directed towards a more developed and particularised investigative purpose.\n\n347.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered whether the more substantial resource burden nevertheless outweighs that disclosure interest. It concludes, although narrowly, that it does not. The decisive considerations are the absence of equivalent information from public sources, the location-specific and operational character of the Article 67 information, and its potential contribution to WildFish’s existing investigation into the chemical fingerprint identified within the relevant sub-catchment. Together, those matters give disclosure a substantial practical value which goes beyond general public curiosity or a broad interest in pesticide use.\n\n348.\n\nThe Tribunal does not reach that conclusion on the basis that the public interest in environmental information invariably outweighs the use of regulatory resources, it does not. It reaches it because, in the particular circumstances of Wrexham, the information could make a distinct contribution to a focused investigation which could not be made by existing datasets, while the request remained defined by area, period and farming context. Those factors are sufficient, although only narrowly sufficient, to outweigh the very substantial public interest in preserving HSE’s resources.\n\nConclusion on Ground 3\n\n349.\n\nThe public-interest balance therefore favours disclosure in each appeal, but for reasons reflecting the different circumstances of the two requests. In Carmarthen, the substantial resource interest is outweighed by the focused public interest in otherwise unavailable information concerning actual glyphosate use within a defined locality and single year. In Wrexham, the much stronger resource interest is narrowly outweighed by the particular value of otherwise unavailable, localised information to an existing and focused environmental investigation.\n\n350.\n\nAccordingly, if the Tribunal is wrong in its conclusion that regulation 12(4)(b) was not engaged, it would nevertheless conclude that, in relation to each request, the public interest in maintaining the exception did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Ground 3 would therefore also fail.\n\nOVERALL CONCLUSIONS\n\n351.\n\nFor the reasons set out above, the Tribunal concludes that the requested information was held by professional users on behalf of HSE for the purposes of regulation 3(2)(b) of the EIR. Ground 1 is therefore dismissed.\n\n352.\n\nThe Tribunal further concludes that HSE has not established that either the Carmarthen request or the Wrexham request was manifestly unreasonable within the meaning of regulation 12(4)(b). Although compliance with Carmarthen would impose a substantial burden, and compliance with Wrexham would impose an even greater burden, Wrexham presented a materially closer case, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the burden in either case was excessive and disproportionate so that the particular request was clearly unreasonable. Ground 2 is therefore dismissed in both appeals.\n\n353.\n\nIn the alternative, if regulation 12(4)(b) were engaged, the Tribunal concludes that the public interest in maintaining the exception would not outweigh the public interest in disclosure in relation to either request. The balance favours disclosure in Carmarthen because of the focused public interest in otherwise unavailable information concerning actual glyphosate use within a defined locality and single year. In Wrexham, the balance favours disclosure more narrowly because of the particular value of otherwise unavailable, localised information to an existing and focused environmental investigation. Ground 3 is therefore also dismissed.\n\n354.\n\nNone of HSE’s grounds succeeds. The Carmarthen appeal and the appeal against the second Wrexham Decision Notice are dismissed. HSE’s admitted challenge to the conclusion in the first Wrexham Decision Notice also fails.\n\nSigned\nDate:\n\nJudge Kiai\n9 October 2026","changes":[]}