{"check":null,"uid":"3ee1b91186afa1a8","title":"JIN ZIKAI v. GRIFFIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LTD AND ANOTHER, [2026] HKDC 1847, DCMP480/2024","title_generated":false,"country":"Гонконг","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-15","summary":"Суд рассмотрел апелляционную жалобу второго ответчика на решение суда первой инстанции о взыскании с него денежных средств, похищенных в результате телефонного мошенничества. Суд отклонил все доводы жалобы, указав, что ответчик не доказал свою добросовестность при приобретении активов, полученных от мошенника, и не смог опровергнуть доказательства причастности к отмыванию денег. Решение имеет значение для защиты прав потерпевших в делах о мошенничестве и борьбе с финансированием преступной деятельности.","snippet":"","topics":["Криптоактивы и блокчейн"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":23728,"versions":1,"url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=186075&currpage=T","first_seen":"2026-10-17","last_checked":"2026-11-16 07:36","relevance":"hit","score":4,"query":"","source_key":"legalref_hk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":4,"topics":["Криптоактивы и блокчейн"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"crypto","weak":false,"pos":15032,"ctx":". regarding §2.3 of the draft notice, the pattern of transactions in the 2 nd defendant’s cryptocurrency account - which, the 2 nd defendant contends, shows she consistently acquired usdt at a l","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"stablecoin","weak":false,"pos":15863,"ctx":"ontends there was no proper evidential basis for the judge to find that she sold her usdt stablecoins at an undervalue or overvalue, or that her sale was not in accordance with the market pri","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"stablecoin","weak":false,"pos":16550,"ctx":"y’s statement in paragraph 89 of the judgment was appropriate. it shows that the price of stablecoins (including usdt) typically fluctuates within a limited range and does not generally trend","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"stablecoin","weak":false,"pos":21293,"ctx":"to paragraph 88 of the judgment and claims that the court recorded she had sold her usdt stablecoins at a fixed price of $7.91 to $7.92 per unit on multiple occasions to purchasers unrelated","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-10-17","meta":{"case_no":"DCMP480/2024","ncn":"[2026] HKDC 1847","parties":"JIN ZIKAI v. GRIFFIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LTD AND ANOTHER","lang":"English","uploaded":"2026-10-15","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга"},"source_url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=186075&currpage=T","text":"DCMP480B/2024 JIN ZIKAI v. GRIFFIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LTD AND ANOTHER\n\nDCMP 480/2024\n\n[2026] HKDC 1847\n\nIN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE\n\nHONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION\n\nMISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 480 OF 2024\n\n-------------------------\n\nIN THE MATTER OF HK$155,000.00 deposited in the bank account no. 004- 582637799838 of GRIFFIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LIMITED held at The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited and HK$199,900.00 deposited in the bank account no. 388-756045496550 of LIU YAFANG held at Livi Bank Limited\n\nand\n\nIN THE MATTER of Order 15 Rule 16 of the Rules of District Court, Cap 336H\n\n-------------------------\n\nBETWEEN\n\nJIN ZIKAI (金子楷)\n\nPlaintiff\n\nand\n\nGRIFFIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDING LIMITED\n\n(格萊國際控股有限公司)\n\n1\nst\nDefendant\n\nLIU YAFANG (劉雅芳)\n\n2\nnd\nDefendant\n\n-------------------------\n\nBefore:\n\nDeputy District Judge Anthony Chow in Chambers (Paper Disposal)\n\nDate of the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s written submissions:\n\n8 July 2026\n\nDate of the Plaintiff’s written submissions:\n\n21 July 2026\n\nDate of Decision:\n\n15 October 2026\n\n--------------------------\n\nDECISION\n\n--------------------------\n\nAPPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL\n\n1.\nThis is the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s application, by inter partes summons, for leave to appeal against the judgment I handed down on 23 March 2026 (“the Judgment”). In the Judgment, I ordered, among other things, that the 2\nnd\nDefendant must forthwith pay the Plaintiff the sum of $199,900.00 deposited in her bank account (no. 388-756045496550) at Livi Bank Limited, together with interest.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\n2.\nThe facts of this case are set out in detail in the Judgment, and I do not propose to repeat them here.\n\n3.\nIn summary, the Plaintiff was the victim of a telephone fraud, in which he was deceived by fraudsters into making a series of deposits totalling $2,796,875 into his newly opened account at Hang Seng Bank. He handed over the control of the account to the fraudster. When the scam was discovered, only $395 remained in the account, resulting in a loss of $2,796,480.\n\n4.\nThe investigation revealed that, without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, the fraudster transferred part of the funds from the Hang Seng Bank account to an intermediary account held by Ng Ka Kin. From this intermediary account, $155,000 was transferred to the 1\nst\nDefendant’s account at Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on 26 April 2023, and a further $199,000 was transferred to the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s account (no. 388-756045496550) at Livi Bank on 27 April 2023.\n\n5.\nThe police subsequently froze both sums in the respective bank accounts.\n\n6.\nOn 23 January 2024, the Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover these sums from the respective Defendants.\n\n7.\nThe 1\nst\nDefendant did not contest the Plaintiff’s claim, and a default judgment was entered against it on 17 April 2025.\n\n8.\nThe 2\nnd\nDefendant was not legally represented at trial. She claimed that the $199,000 in question was transferred by Ng Ka Kin, as purchaser, to her Livi Bank account as payment for the sale of 25,239.89 units of USDT by the 2\nnd\nDefendant. As explained in the Judgment, her principal defence in her affirmations, in effect, was that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.\n\n9.\nIn the Judgment, this Court held that, on a balance of probabilities, the 2\nnd\nDefendant failed to prove that the transaction was genuine and that she had no notice of the Plaintiff’s equity in the funds. I therefore found that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was unjustly enriched and was liable to make restitution.\n\nTHE APPLICATION\n\n10.\nBy a summons dated 20 April 2026, the 2\nnd\nDefendant seeks leave to appeal against the Judgment on the grounds as set out in the draft Notice of Appeal (“Draft Notice”) annexed thereto. She also seeks costs of the application.\n\n11.\nIn the Draft Notice, the 2\nnd\nDefendant advances the following grounds of appeal:\n\n(1) The Judge made the wrong enquiry (§1 of the Draft Notice) - where the only cause of action advanced by the Plaintiff is a personal claim for restitution in unjust enrichment, the Judge erred in analysing whether the 2\nnd\nDefendant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, as opposed to the proper enquiry of whether the 2\nnd\nDefendant had changed her position in good faith (“Ground 1”);\n\n(2) Lack of evidential basis (§2 of the Draft Notice) - the Judge erred in making the findings that the 2\nnd\nDefendant (a) assisted the fraudster in money laundering; and/or (b) was even part of the fraud perpetrated by the fraudster based on impermissible reasoning and which findings were wholly without evidential basis (“Ground 2”);\n\n(3) Improper inference of knowledge of fraud (§3 of the Draft Notice) - in the context of the “bona fide change of position’ defence, the Judge erred in making an inferential finding that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was aware that the monies she received from the fraudster (for the acquisition of her USDT stable coins) represented proceeds of crime or were otherwise tainted with illegality (“Ground 3”).\n\n(4) Wrong in law in making the findings on fraud against the 2\nnd\nDefendant (§4 of the Draft Notice) (“Ground 4”).\n\nTHE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES\n\n12.\nThe test for granting leave to appeal is well established and uncontroversial. The applicant must demonstrate that the appeal - based on the grounds set out in the Notice of Appeal - has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice for the appeal to be heard (see s 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336). A “reasonable prospect of success” requires an arguable case with a chance of success that is more than merely “fanciful,” though it need not be “probable”: see\nWing Tat Haberdashery Company Limited v Elegance Development &\n\nIndustrial Co Limited\n[2011] 5 HKC 474 (CA), at p 476B-C; and\nSMSE v KL\n[2009] 4 HKLRD 125 (CA), at p 129, §17.\n\nDISCUSSION\n\n13.\nIn assessing the merit of this application, I am mindful that, under Order 59 Rule 3(1) of the Rules of High Court, an appeal to the Court of Appeal proceeds by way of re-hearing - though it is a re-hearing based solely on the record. The Court of Appeal will examine this Court’s findings to determine whether there has been an error of law or procedure, or, in respect of findings of primary fact, whether such findings lacked any reasonable basis or were plainly wrong.\n\n14.\nWhere the appeal concerns findings of fact based on inference, the Court of Appeal will consider whether, on the primary facts found, the trial judge’s inference was plainly wrong or unsustainable. To apply the ‘plainly wrong’ test, the applicant must pinpoint the palpable errors made by the Judge, that is, errors of such nature which warrant intervention of the appellate court:\nDBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v Sit Pan Jit\n, CACV 91/2015, unreported, 10 June 2016, at §§111-116. Thus, if more than one inference is reasonably open, the appellate court will not substitute its preferred inference merely because it might have reached a different conclusion.\n\n15.\nOnly errors that are sufficiently fundamental will justify the appellate court in overturning this Court’s judgment. These standards of review are integral to our legal system, as they promote finality in the adjudication of cases. Accordingly, I must consider whether the grounds of appeal advanced by the 2\nnd\nDefendant in the Draft Notice have a reasonable prospect, as defined by the authorities, of meeting these standards of review.\n\n16.\nI will address the four grounds of appeal and the related complaints raised in the Draft Notice in turn below.\n\nGround 1: the proper enquiry should be whether the 2\nnd\nDefendant has changed her position in good faith\n\n17.\nUnder Ground 1, the 2\nnd\nDefendant argues that, because the Plaintiff’s sole cause of action is a personal claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment, the proper inquiry should be whether she changed her position in good faith.\n\n18.\nThis ground lacks merit.\n\n19.\nThe 2\nnd\nDefendant cites\nZief Incorporated v Tekchandani Ajai Mohan\n[2021] 3 HKC 69 (§§30, 33) and contends that the defence of ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’ is available only where the plaintiff’s restitutionary claim seeks to vindicate property rights. This contention is not supported by the cited authority. In\nZief Incorporated\n, Recorder Fung (as he then was) did not make such a finding; instead, since both parties accepted that the defence generally applies to all restitutionary claims, the case proceeded on that basis.\n\n20.\nThe defences of ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’ and ‘bona fide change of position’ are distinct, though they may sometimes overlap. For example, overlap may occur where a defendant receives misdirected funds or property and provides value to a third party in return. Although it might appear that the defendant has changed position by giving value, the orthodox analysis is that this situation constitutes a bona fide purchase if the defendant acquired an interest in property from a third party for value and without notice.\n\n21.\nIn an unjust enrichment claim, a defendant may rely on the defence of ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’, the ‘change of position’ defence, or both, depending on whether the case is concerned with transactional security or with reliance-based unfairness.\n\n22.\nIn this case, the 2\nnd\nDefendant relied solely on a ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’ defence in her affirmation\n[1]\nand closing submissions\n[2]\n. If she intended also to invoke a ‘bona fide change of position’ defence, she should have stated this clearly in her affidavit evidence as a defence to the Plaintiff’s claim, so that its factual merits could be examined at trial: Goff & Jones, The Law of Unjust Enrichment (10th edn), at §27-08.\n\n“The onus of pleading a change of position defence lies on the defendant, who must put it forward “fairly and squarely” in his statement of case so that “its factual merits can be explored at the trial”. The defendant must also adduce evidence and give disclosure in support of the defence.”\n\n23.\nAs the 2\nnd\nDefendant did not raise a ‘bona fide change of position’ defence at trial or in her affidavit evidence, there is no basis for her to contend that the proper inquiry for this Court was whether she had changed her position in good faith.\n\n24.\nEven if I am mistaken, and as the 2\nnd\nDefendant now argues, this Court should have considered whether she changed her position in good faith, it is important to note that, to establish the ‘change of position’ defence, the 2\nnd\nDefendant must demonstrate not only a causal link between the receipt of the benefit and her change of position, but also that her position changed in circumstances rendering it inequitable to require restitution to the Plaintiff.\n\n25.\nOn the facts of this case, in considering whether it would be inequitable to require the 2\nnd\nDefendant to return the funds in her Livi Bank account to the Plaintiff, the same facts and observations set out in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment remain relevant. Taking the evidence as a whole, I would have reached the same conclusion on the balance of probabilities: the 2\nnd\nDefendant was aware of the fraud perpetrated on the Plaintiff, and/or by effecting the transaction in question, was assisting the fraudsters in laundering the funds. Consequently, it would not be inequitable to require the 2\nnd\nDefendant to make restitution.\n\n26.\nAccordingly, I hold that this ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.\n\nGround 2 – Lack of evidential basis\n\n27.\nIt is clear that the 2\nnd\nDefendant bears the burden of proving her defence, whether as a ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’ or under a ‘bona fide change of position’ defence. Apart from a document showing that $199,000 was paid from Ng Ka Kin’s account for the purchase of 25,239.89 units of USDT from the 2\nnd\nDefendant, the only evidence she provided was her assertion that she did not know Ng Ka Kin and was unaware of the source of the funds in question.\n\n28.\nAs stated in paragraph 40 of the Judgment, the Plaintiff had no knowledge of any relationship between the fraudsters and the 2\nnd\nDefendant, nor of the reasons for transferring the disputed sum from Ng Ka Kin’s account to the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s account at Livi Bank. Consequently, the Plaintiff was unable to produce any direct evidence to challenge the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s assertion of being a bona fide purchaser without notice, except by testing her credibility against contemporaneous documents presented at trial.\n\n29.\nAccordingly, as noted in paragraph 41 of the Judgment, I held that the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s defence of ‘bona fide purchaser for value without notice’ rests entirely on the credibility of her evidence, particularly her assertion of being a bona fide purchaser without notice.\n\n30.\nAt trial, the Plaintiff relied on the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s conduct at the relevant time to assert that she had knowledge of, or at least constructive notice of, the fraud.\n[3]\n\n31.\nBased on the evidence presented by both parties, including the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s testimony at trial about how USDT transactions operate on the Binance platform, I made a series of factual findings and observations, detailed in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment.\n\n32.\nIn evaluating the credibility of the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice, the Court compared her evidence with these factual findings and observations (see\nPacific Rainbow International Inc v Shenzhen Wolverine Tech Ltd & Ors\n, HCA 3023/2016, 2 May 2017, at §50). Notably, the 2\nnd\nDefendant does not contest this approach in her Draft Notice.\n\n33.\nAfter this analysis and consideration of the matters set out in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment, I was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was a bona fide purchaser without notice. I therefore found that she had not discharged her burden of proof.\n[4]\nThis finding was based on her credibility and demeanour.\n\n34.\nAlthough the 2\nnd\nDefendant failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice in relation to the transaction with Ng Ka Kin on 27 April 2023, I further inferred from the other evidence, including that referenced in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment, that it was more probable than not she assisted the fraudster in laundering the funds received.\n[5]\n\n35.\nI will now address the various complaints raised by the 2\nnd\nDefendant under this ground.\n\nGround 2(a) - The Judge erred in making the findings that the 2\nnd\nDefendant assisted the fraudster in money laundering\n\n36.\nWith respect to §§2.1–2.2 of the Draft Notice, the fact that contemporaneous documents indicate the disputed sum was paid for the purchase of USDT from the 2\nnd\nDefendant is irrelevant to the question of whether, by effecting the transaction, the 2\nnd\nDefendant was assisting the fraudster in money laundering.\n\n37.\nRegarding §2.3 of the Draft Notice, the pattern of transactions in the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s cryptocurrency account - which, the 2\nnd\nDefendant contends, shows she consistently acquired USDT at a lower price and sold to multiple purchasers at a higher price - does not necessarily establish that the transactions with Ng Ka Kin on 26, 27, and 28 April 2023 were genuine. Moreover, the pattern does not clarify whether the other purchasers were connected to the fraudsters. As explained in paragraphs 76 to 89 of the Judgment, when the pattern of transactions is considered alongside the relevant factual background, particularly the platform’s operation, it strongly suggests that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was not an innocent seller of USDT in the transactions with Ng Ka Kin.\n\n38.\nIn paragraph 2.4 of the Draft Notice, the 2\nnd\nDefendant contends there was no proper evidential basis for the Judge to find that she sold her USDT stablecoins at an undervalue or overvalue, or that her sale was not in accordance with the market price of USDT during that period.\n\n39.\nThis complaint is, again, misconceived. The Court made no finding as to whether the 2\nnd\nDefendant sold her USDT at an undervalue or overvalue. Paragraph 85 of the Judgment explicitly states that the Court could not determine whether the fluctuations in USDT price in the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s transaction records reflected the actual market fluctuation.\n\n40.\nAs to paragraph 2.4(a) of the Draft Notice, the reference to the Chief Executive of the Monetary Authority’s statement in paragraph 89 of the Judgment was appropriate. It shows that the price of stablecoins (including USDT) typically fluctuates within a limited range and does not generally trend upward over time. Thus, if the unit price of USDT is high at a certain time, it will inevitably decrease at some stage - indeed, according to the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s transaction records, such decreases can occur within hours, and occasionally even within minutes\n[6]\n. Given this market behavior, there was no commercially sensible reason for the fraudster to repeatedly purchase USDT from the 2\nnd\nDefendant at the same relatively high price if she were an innocent seller.\n\n41.\nHence, the grounds advanced by the 2\nnd\nDefendant fail to demonstrate that the inference drawn by this Court was unsustainable or plainly wrong.\n\n42.\nThe 2\nnd\nDefendant does not challenge the validity of the factual findings stated in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment, nor does she contend that any of the observations therein were irrational or made without factual basis.\n\n43.\nEven if this Court’s inference that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was assisting in money laundering were impermissible, it does not follow that the Court must accept her unsubstantiated assertion of innocence, especially in light of the findings and observations in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment. The 2\nnd\nDefendant has, in any event, failed to discharge her burden of proving her ‘bona fide purchaser without notice’ defence.\n\nGround 2(b) - The Judge erred in making the findings that the 2\nnd\nDefendant\n\nwas part of the fraud perpetrated by the fraudster (§§2.1, 2.2 and 2.5 of the Draft Notice)\n\n44.\nThis complaint is misconceived. The Judgment contains no suggestion, much less a factual finding, that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was complicit in the fraud. Paragraph 101 merely observes that, if the 2\nnd\nDefendant were part of the fraudsters, her conduct and reactions at the relevant time would be explicable and expected. No factual finding was made on this point.\n\n45.\nAs clearly stated in paragraph 102 of the Judgment, the Court found that (a) the 2\nnd\nDefendant failed to discharge her burden of proof in respect of her defence, and (b) on balance, it was more probable that she was assisting the fraudsters in money laundering.\n\nGround 3 - The Judge erred in making an inferential finding that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was aware that the monies she received from the Fraudster (for the acquisition of her USDT stable coins) represented proceeds of crime or were otherwise tainted with illegality (§3 of the Draft Notice)\n\n46.\nThe grounds set out in paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, and their subparagraphs of the Draft Notice were advanced in the context of the ‘bona fide change of position’ defence.\n\n47.\nFor the reasons set out above, the arguments relating to this new defence, which was not raised by the 2\nnd\nDefendant in her affidavit evidence or at trial, have no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal.\n\n48.\nNonetheless, I consider it necessary to address several points raised by the 2\nnd\nDefendant under this ground to prevent any potential confusion.\n\n49.\nIn paragraph 3.2 of the Draft Notice, the 2\nnd\nDefendant repeatedly asserts that, if a fact was not specifically mentioned in the Plaintiff’s affirmations, it is unpleaded and the Court may not make a factual finding based on it. For example, in subparagraph 3.2(a), the 2\nnd\nDefendant contends that, because the Plaintiff did not mention the timing of her opening of the Livi Bank account, it was an impermissible and unpleaded complaint. She suggests that the Court was not entitled to find that the Livi Bank account was opened on 11 April 2023 or to proceed on that basis.\n\n50.\nThe 2\nnd\nDefendant has cited no authority in support of this broad contention. She is, in effect, suggesting that the Court may only consider facts set out expressly in the Plaintiff’s affirmations, even if they are apparent from undisputed documentary records. This cannot be correct. In the present example, the date of opening the account was evident from the bank statement produced by the 2\nnd\nDefendant and was not disputed by her during cross-examination.\n\n51.\nIn paragraph 3.2(d) of the Draft Notice, the 2\nnd\nDefendant misinterprets paragraph 80 of the Judgment. As noted there, the Plaintiff's legal representative, Mr Ng, suggested that the Livi Bank account was controlled and used by a money laundering syndicate for illicit activities, but the Court observed that no evidence was adduced by the Plaintiff in support of this suggestion. The Court did not reject any contention that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was using her bank account for money laundering purposes.\n\n52.\nIn paragraph 3.2(f)(iii) of the Draft Notice, the 2\nnd\nDefendant refers to paragraph 88 of the Judgment and claims that the Court recorded she had sold her USDT stablecoins at a fixed price of $7.91 to $7.92 per unit on multiple occasions to purchasers unrelated to the fraudster. This is incorrect. There was no evidence to show that the other purchasers were unrelated to the fraudster, and no factual finding was made on this point, let alone recorded in the Judgment.\n\nGround 4 - Wrong in law in making the findings on fraud against the 2\nnd\nDefendant (§4 of the Draft Notice)\n\n53.\nThis complaint is also without merit.\n\n54.\nIn the Judgment, no findings of fraud were made against the 2\nnd\nDefendant.\n\n55.\nAs previously stated, the Court found, on the balance of probabilities, that the 2\nnd\nDefendant was assisting the fraudsters in money laundering with respect to the disputed sum. To the extent this conduct constituted serious wrongdoing, the finding was based on the factual evidence presented and the circumstances and observations detailed in sections D1 to D10 of the Judgment.\n\n56.\nAccordingly, this ground has no reasonable prospect of success on appeal.\n\nDISPOSITION\n\n57.\nIn order for the Court to grant leave to appeal, the grounds identified in the (draft) Notice of Appeal must satisfy the legal test for granting leave. Specifically, the points raised in the intended appeal must have a reasonable prospect of success.\n\n58.\nFor the reasons stated in the Discussion section above, I conclude that the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s intended appeal, based on the grounds stated in the Draft Notice, does not have a reasonable prospect of success. Accordingly, I dismiss the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s application for leave to appeal.\n\n59.\nConsequently, I further make a costs order\nnisi\nthat the costs arising from the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s application shall be paid by the 2\nnd\nDefendant to the Plaintiff forthwith. Such costs are summarily assessed at $110,000. The Plaintiff’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. The aforesaid costs order\nnisi\nwill become absolute within 14 days of this decision if neither party applies for a variation.\n\n( Anthony Chow )\n\nDeputy District Judge\n\nMr Ng Man Kin of Kwok, Ng & Chan, for the Plaintiff\n\nMr Martin Ho & Ms Celeste Chan, instructed by Charles Yeung Clement Lam Liu & Yip, for the 2\nnd\nDefendant\n\n[1]\nSee section “一” of 劉雅芳非宗教式誓詞 2\n\n[2]\nSee sections “六” and “七” of the 2\nnd\nDefendant’s 結案陳詞\n\n[3]\n2\nnd\nAffirmation of Jin ZiKai §16\n\n[4]\nsee §§100 – 102 of the Judgment\n\n[5]\nsee §102 of the Judgment\n\n[6]\nSee §88 of the Judgment","changes":[]}