{"check":null,"uid":"3d71a5311314cebb","title":"Kevin Leiske v. Robert Gregory Kidd","title_generated":false,"country":"США","organ":"Суды США (CourtListener)","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-13","summary":"Суд рассмотрел дело о нарушении правил подачи документов с использованием генеративного искусственного интеллекта (GenAI). Податели жалобы использовали инструмент GenAI без должной проверки точности вывода, что привело к представлению суду ложных цитат и искажённых юридических аргументов. Суд установил обязанность юристов проверять точность информации, созданной с помощью таких инструментов, и наложил штраф за нарушение правила профессиональной ответственности. Решение подчёркивает важность соблюдения этических норм при использовании новых технологий в юридической практике.","snippet":"","topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":21156,"versions":2,"url":"https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/11061197/kevin-leiske-v-robert-gregory-kidd/","first_seen":"2026-11-14","last_checked":"2026-11-16 08:07","relevance":"hit","score":6,"query":"artificial intelligence","source_key":"courtlistener_us","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":6,"topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"искусственн интеллект","weak":false,"pos":124,"ctx":"d суд рассмотрел дело о нарушении правил подачи документов с использованием генеративного искусственного интеллекта (genai). податели жалобы использовали инструмент genai без должной проверки точности выво","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":616,"ctx":"ounsel,  this letter resolves an order to show cause concerning the misuse of  generative artificial intelligence (“genai”). the plaintiffs submitted fabricated  quotations and mischaracterized legal aut","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":8686,"ctx":"opinion 512.18 in july 2025, rlf’s board of  directors adopted a comprehensive generative artificial intelligence policy.19 the  policy requires an experienced lawyer to review genai output for accuracy","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"generative ai","weak":false,"pos":14109,"ctx":", or any other paper filed in any court should contain any citations— whether provided by generative ai or any other source—that the attorney responsible for submitting the pleading has not per","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-11-16","meta":{"court":"Court of Chancery of Delaware","court_id":"delch","docket":"2025-0426-CDW","status":"Published","cluster_id":"11061197","opinions_total":1,"ids_from":"discovery","opinions":1,"text_from":["plain_text"]},"source_url":"https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/11061197/kevin-leiske-v-robert-gregory-kidd/","text":"COURT OF CHANCERY\nOF THE\nSTATE OF DELAWARE\nLORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER\nVICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400\nWILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734\nNovember 13, 2026\n\nRichard P. Rollo, Esquire Margaret M. DiBianca, Esquire\nTravis S. Hunter, Esquire DiBianca Law, LLC\nRichards, Layton & Finger, P.A. 1201 North Orange Street, Suite 504\n920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801\nWilmington, Delaware 19801\n\nRE: Kevin Leiske et al. v. Robert Gregory Kidd et al.,\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\n\nDear Counsel,\n\nThis letter resolves an Order to Show Cause concerning the misuse of\n\ngenerative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”). The plaintiffs submitted fabricated\n\nquotations and mischaracterized legal authorities in a brief filed with this court.\n\nAfter the defendants identified these errors, the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged\n\nusing a GenAI tool without verifying its output and filed a corrected brief that\n\nremoved the quotation marks but retained inaccurate legal propositions. I ordered\n\nthe partner who signed the brief and his law firm to show cause why sanctions should\n\nnot issue.\n\nThe use of GenAI in legal practice is neither forbidden nor inherently\n\nproblematic. Practitioners are increasingly turning to these tools, which offer\n\nsubstantial benefits and opportunities for efficiency. But counsel must use them with\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 2 of 13\n\nthe care required by Court of Chancery Rule 11 and the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules\n\nof Professional Conduct. That obligation includes ensuring the accuracy of each\n\nauthority and citation presented to the court.\n\nThat care was lacking here. Counsel failed to verify the accuracy of the\n\nanswering brief despite his law firm’s comprehensive GenAI policy and mandatory\n\nethics training. Given the firm’s commendable efforts to prevent GenAI misuse, I\n\ndecline to sanction it. Counsel—who has since accepted full responsibility and\n\nexpressed sincere contrition—is sanctioned $2,500 under Rule 11, payable\n\npersonally to the Court of Chancery.\n\nI. BACKGROUND\n\nOn January 22, 2026, the plaintiffs filed an answering brief opposing the\n\ndefendants’ exceptions to a Magistrate in Chancery’s final report on advancement.1\n\nFive days later, the defendants’ reply brief identified that the answering brief\n\ncontained fabricated quotations, inaccurate citations, and hallucinated legal\n\npropositions.2\n\nOn January 28, plaintiffs’ lead counsel—the signatory on the brief—filed a\n\nletter acknowledging that a GenAI tool had been used to revise the brief, and\n\n1\nPls.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 62).\n2\nReply Br. in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Exceptions to Magistrate’s Jan. 2, 2026 Report\n(Dkt. 65) 12-13 nn. 4-6, 16 n.7.\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 3 of 13\n\nsubmitted a corrected answering brief.3 That letter attributed the failure to catch the\n\nfabricated quotations and citation errors to an oversight during a paralegal’s cite-\n\ncheck.4 Although the corrected brief removed quotation marks around the\n\nnonexistent quotes, it retained the inaccurate descriptions of the underlying cases.5\n\nAfter the defendants’ counsel filed a letter detailing these remaining\n\nmisrepresentations, the plaintiffs’ lead counsel responded on January 29 by faulting\n\nopposing counsel for failing to “meet and confer” before alerting the court and\n\ninsisting that the cited authorities “are real” and “support the arguments advanced.”6\n\nOn February 2, I overruled the defendants’ exceptions and affirmed the\n\nMagistrate’s final report on the merits, while retaining jurisdiction to address the\n\nGenAI errors in the plaintiffs’ brief.7 On July 1, after further merits-based\n\nproceedings, I entered an Order to Show Cause directing the plaintiffs’ lead counsel\n\nand his law firm to explain why sanctions should not issue under Rule 11(c) and this\n\n3\nLetter Providing Corrected Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 68); Pls.’\nCorrected Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 69) (“Pls.’ Corrected\nAnswering Br.”).\n4\nLetter Providing Corrected Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 68) 2.\n5\nSee Letter in Resp. to Pls.’ Letter Regarding GenAI Errors (Dkt. 70) 1-2 (asserting that\nthe corrected brief “merely fixes citation errors as if they are typographical only” and “still\nmischaracterizes some of the Courts’ analyses”).\n6\nLetter in Resp. to Defs.’ Jan. 28 Letter (Dkt. 71) 1-2.\n7\nLetter Op. Resolving Exceptions (Dkt. 74) 7 n.40.\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 4 of 13\n\ncourt’s inherent authority.8 Richard Rollo, Esq., on his own behalf, and Paul N.\n\nHeath, Esq., on behalf of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. (“RLF”), filed detailed\n\naffidavits in response to that Order.9 Having reviewed those affidavits, I conclude\n\nthat a separate evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and that the matter can be resolved\n\non the papers.10\n\nII. ANALYSIS\n\nUnder Rule 11(b)(2), an attorney presenting “a pleading, written motion, or\n\nother paper” to the court certifies that “to the best of the person’s knowledge,\n\ninformation, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the\n\ncircumstances,” the “legal contentions” made “are warranted by existing law.”11\n\n“An attorney’s signature on a court filing is not a procedural formality; it is a\n\ncertification to the tribunal.”12 A fake quotation or a fabricated legal synthesis\n\n8\nLetter Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Issue (Dkt. 102) (“Rule 11 Letter\nOrder”) 6-8 (specifying what the affidavits from counsel and the firm must include).\n9\nAff. of R. Rollo, Esq. (Dkt. 103) (“Rollo Aff.”); Aff. of P. Heath, Esq. (Dkt. 103) (“Heath\nAff.”).\n10\nSee Hill v. Workday, Inc., 2026 WL 1146289, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2026) (observing\nthat a separate sanctions hearing is not required when counsel gets a chance to respond in\nwriting) (citing Pac. Harbor Cap., Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118\n(9th Cir. 2000)).\n11\nCt. Ch. R. 11(b)(2).\n12\nRule 11 Letter Order 4 (citing Crumplar v. Superior Ct. ex rel. New Castle Cnty., 56\nA.3d 1000, 1005-06 (Del. 2012)).\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 5 of 13\n\ngenerated by an algorithm is not “existing law,” and presenting unverified GenAI\n\noutput to a court violates Rule 11(b)(2).13\n\nA. Law Firm Responsibility Under Rule 11\n\nRule 11(c)(1) mandates that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law firm\n\nmust be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates,\n\nor employees.”14 In determining whether a law firm should be relieved of joint\n\nresponsibility for a lawyer’s Rule 11 violation, professional conduct standards\n\ngoverning law firm management provide useful guidance. Under Delaware\n\nLawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1(a), law firm leadership must make\n\nreasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has measures in effect giving reasonable\n\nassurance that all lawyers conform to those rules.15 Consistent with that principle,\n\nABA Formal Opinion 512 instructs “[m]anagerial lawyers” to “establish clear\n\npolicies regarding the law firm’s permissible use of G[en]AI” and “supervisory\n\n13\nCt. Ch. R. 11(b)(2); see Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)\n(“A fake opinion is not ‘existing law’ . . . .”); see also Lexos Media IP, LLC v.\nOverstock.com, Inc., 2026 WL 265581, at *10 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2026) (“There is no\nquestion that citing to a nonexistent case, attributing a nonexistent quotation to an existing\ncase, and misstating the law violates Rule 11(b).”).\n14\nCt. Ch. R. 11(c)(1).\n15\nDel. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 5.1(a) (“A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer\nwho individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial\nauthority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect\nmeasures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of\nProfessional Conduct.”).\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 6 of 13\n\nlawyers” to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm’s lawyers and\n\nnonlawyers comply with their professional obligations when using G[en]AI tools.”16\n\nRLF has demonstrated exceptional circumstances relieving it of joint\n\nresponsibility. Its response to the emergence of GenAI reflects substantial\n\ninstitutional efforts to prevent the very problem at issue. RLF barred the use of\n\nunapproved GenAI tools in March 2023.17 In 2024, the firm formed a working group\n\nof directors and professional staff to evaluate GenAI tools and study ethical\n\nguidance, including ABA Formal Opinion 512.18 In July 2025, RLF’s Board of\n\nDirectors adopted a comprehensive Generative Artificial Intelligence Policy.19 The\n\npolicy requires an experienced lawyer to review GenAI output for accuracy and\n\ncompleteness and prohibits its use as a substitute for independent judgment or legal\n\nanalysis.20 RLF also developed an internal training program addressing\n\nhallucinations, ABA Formal Opinion 512, and professional obligations concerning\n\ncompetence, confidentiality, meritorious claims, candor, and supervision.21 The\n\n16\nABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 512, at 10 (2024); see Lexos Media,\n2026 WL 265581, at *16.\n17\nHeath Aff. ¶ 8.\n18\nId. ¶¶ 9-14.\n19\nId. ¶ 15.\n20\nId. ¶¶ 15-16.\n21\nId. ¶¶ 23, 25-28.\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 7 of 13\n\nprogram was accredited for one hour of Enhanced Ethics credit by Delaware’s\n\nCommission on Continuing Legal Education and completed by over 200 RLF\n\nemployees by January 2026.22\n\nIn short, RLF did the right thing. It warned of GenAI risks, established clear\n\nverification policies, and trained its personnel through a substantial, multi-layered\n\napproach. RLF acted reasonably to prevent GenAI misuse and should not be\n\nsanctioned for an individual lawyer bypassing those controls.23 These safeguards\n\nwere in place before the offending brief was filed. RLF is therefore released from\n\nthis proceeding without sanction.\n\nB. Individual Responsibility Under Rule 11\n\nRule 11(c)(1) authorizes the court to impose an appropriate sanction on “any\n\nattorney . . . that violated [Rule 11(b)] or is responsible for the violation.” 24 The\n\nrule’s certification requirement reinforces a lawyer’s ethical duty of candor toward\n\nthe tribunal under Delaware Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) and\n\n22\nId. ¶¶ 24, 29.\n23\nSee Johnson v. Dunn, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1260-62 (N.D. Ala. 2025) (declining to\nsanction a law firm under the court’s inherent authority where the firm had warned\nattorneys of hallucination risks, required permission and independent verification for\nGenAI use, and strengthened its safeguards after discovering the misconduct, finding that\nthe firm “acted reasonably in its efforts to prevent this misconduct” when a partner misused\nGenAI).\n24\nCt. Ch. R. 11(c)(1).\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 8 of 13\n\nthe duty to supervise nonlawyer assistants under Rule 5.3.25 As ABA Formal\n\nOpinion 512 emphasizes, a lawyer may not delegate professional judgment to a\n\nGenAI tool and remains responsible for verifying all work product before it is filed.26\n\nThe affidavit of plaintiffs’ lead counsel candidly explains how the errors\n\noccurred. As Chair of RLF’s AI Subcommittee, he was leading a pilot evaluation of\n\nPerplexity Enterprise, a tool that had not been approved for general firm use. 27 He\n\nused the tool to help draft and condense arguments in the answering brief. That\n\nprocess introduced fabricated quotations, flawed citations, and a mischaracterized\n\ncase holding into the text.28 He then delegated citation checking to a junior attorney\n\nand a paralegal and filed the brief without personally verifying the authorities or\n\nchecking the citations and quotations after that review.29\n\nThree points warrant emphasis.\n\nFirst, the duty of candor to the court and the obligation to conduct a reasonable\n\ninquiry under Rule 11 are personal and nondelegable.30 Although practitioners\n\n25\nDel. Lawyers’ Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1), 5.3.\n26\nABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 512, at 3-4, 10 (2024).\n27\nRollo Aff. ¶¶ 9, 25; see also Heath Aff. ¶¶ 17, 19, 33-34.\n28\nRollo Aff. ¶¶ 10-13.\n29\nId. ¶¶ 14-16.\n30\nSee Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“[T]he purpose\nof Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 9 of 13\n\nroutinely and appropriately rely on skilled paralegals and junior attorneys for cite-\n\nchecking, a senior attorney who signs a brief cannot disclaim responsibility when\n\nunverified GenAI output is submitted to the court.31 When an attorney knowingly\n\nintroduces text produced by GenAI into a draft, the signatory must ensure that the\n\nunderlying authorities have been reviewed and support the propositions for which\n\nthey are cited.\n\nSecond, it is no excuse that the cases cited are real decisions or that the\n\noverarching legal propositions are arguably consistent with general principles of\n\nlaw. GenAI tools do not only invent case captions. They also fabricate plausible-\n\nsounding quotations or stretch a real decision to stand for a proposition it never\n\naddressed.32 That existing law may generally support a party’s ultimate position\n\nresponsibility.”); Lexos Media, 2026 WL 265581, at *9 (noting that the Rule 11 duty to\nconduct a reasonable inquiry into existing law is “nondelegable”).\n31\nSee Hill, 2026 WL 1146289, at *3, *8 (“The duty to check every paper filed in court for\naccuracy and veracity is nondelegable to other attorneys or to technology.” (citation\nomitted)); In re Kenney, 422 So. 3d 905, 913, 920-21 (La. Ct. App. 2025) (affirming\nsanctions against counsel who relied on paralegals to check citations but failed to\nindependently verify AI-generated authorities against actual judicial opinions); see also\nNoland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 901 (Ct. App. 2025) (“[N]o brief,\npleading, motion, or any other paper filed in any court should contain any citations—\nwhether provided by generative AI or any other source—that the attorney responsible for\nsubmitting the pleading has not personally read and verified.”).\n32\nSee, e.g., Lexos Media, 2026 WL 265581, at *2-5 (detailing GenAI hallucinations\ninvolving fabricated quotations attributed to actual decisions and mischaracterizations of\ntheir holdings); Hill, 2026 WL 1146289, at *2 (addressing a brief that cited a nonexistent\ncase and misrepresented the holding of an actual decision); Wilson v. Kipp Texas, Inc.,\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 10 of 13\n\ndoes not excuse the submission of fabricated quotations or mischaracterized\n\nholdings.33 If GenAI errors are detected, counsel has an affirmative duty to review\n\nthe underlying authorities and correct any inaccurate quotations or characterizations.\n\nIt is not enough to remove quotation marks and leave a fabricated legal synthesis in\n\nplace.34\n\nThird, as explained in the Order to Show Cause, faulting opposing counsel for\n\nfailing to “meet and confer” before alerting the court to GenAI errors misstates the\n\npurpose of that requirement.35 There is nothing to negotiate when false citations or\n\n2025 WL 3030444, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2025) (sanctioning counsel for presenting\nGenAI-fabricated statements as verbatim quotations in a court filing).\n33\nSee Johnson, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1262 (rejecting an argument that sanctions should be\nminimal because “actual authorities stand for the proposition that the bogus authorities\nwere offered to support,” and noting that “any sanctions discount on this basis would\namplify the siren call of unverified AI for lawyers who are already confident in their legal\nconclusion”); Lexos Media, 2026 WL 265581, at *3-5, *13-14 (sanctioning counsel where\na brief attributed nonexistent quotations and holdings to real precedent and rejecting\ncounsel’s attempt to downplay the errors by claiming that the brief was overwhelmingly\nhuman-drafted).\n34\nSee Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 461, 464 (noting that Rule 11 obligations continue when\n“later advocating” a prior filing and sanctioning counsel who continued to defend\nfabricated authorities after opposing counsel flagged them); Hill, 2026 WL 1146289, at *3\n(“Upon detection of fabricated or erroneous citations, an attorney has an affirmative,\npersonal, non-delegable duty to review all citations for accuracy and validity and to correct\nthem . . . .” (citing Kenney, 422 So. 3d at 915-16, 920-21)).\n35\nRule 11 Letter Order 5-6.\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 11 of 13\n\nfabricated quotations are presented to a tribunal. Opposing counsel was fully\n\njustified in bringing such errors directly to the court’s attention.36\n\nC. Sanctions\n\nA Rule 11 sanction “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the\n\nconduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”37 The purpose of such\n\na sanction is to vindicate judicial authority and deter carelessness—not to punish or\n\ncompensate litigants.38\n\nIn setting an appropriate sanction, I consider the specific circumstances of this\n\ncase. On the one hand, plaintiffs’ lead counsel initially shifted blame to a paralegal\n\nand, even after removing quotation marks, retained the inaccurate characterizations\n\n36\nOn August 4, 2026, the defendants’ counsel filed a letter requesting leave to present\nbilling records and information about the plaintiffs’ counsel’s time records. Letter from\nM. DiBianca (Dkt. 104). That request is denied. Because this Rule 11 inquiry was initiated\nsua sponte to address misconduct affecting the court, rather than on a motion for sanctions,\nan award of attorneys’ fees is unavailable under Rule 11. See Ct. Ch. R. 11(c)(4); Lexos\nMedia, 2026 WL 265581, at *7 n.63; Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 465-66. Because the\nplaintiffs’ counsel has acknowledged the Rule 11 violation under oath and I credit the\nsworn affidavits submitted in response to the Order to Show Cause, inviting opposing\ncounsel to raise purported discrepancies in billing records would serve no useful purpose.\n37\nCt. Ch. R. 11(c)(4); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx\nCorp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (identifying deterrence as Rule 11’s central purpose).\n38\nSee Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (“An attorney may be required to pay a fine, or, in the\nwords of Rule 11, a ‘penalty,’ to advance the interests of deterrence and not as punishment\nor compensation.” (citing Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., 784 F.3d 99, 103-04\n(2d Cir. 2015))); Johnson, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1265-66 (emphasizing deterrence and\nvindicating judicial authority in fashioning sanctions under the court’s inherent power).\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 12 of 13\n\nof legal authority. On the other hand, in his affidavit, counsel accepted full\n\nresponsibility for the filings, disavowed any suggestion that others were to blame,\n\nand expressed sincere contrition.39 He has practiced before this court with\n\ndistinction for years.40 And because he has completed multiple CLE courses on\n\nGenAI ethics and leads internal training efforts, ordering additional mandatory CLE\n\nwould be redundant.41\n\nConsistent with the range of monetary penalties imposed by courts in similar\n\nsua sponte Rule 11 proceedings, the plaintiffs’ lead counsel is sanctioned in the\n\namount of $2,500.42 Given the nondelegable nature of Rule 11’s verification\n\n39\nRollo Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, 22, 30.\n40\nId. ¶¶ 1, 30.\n41\nId. ¶¶ 24-26; see Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (concluding that because counsel’s firm\nhad arranged mandatory CLE training on technological competence and AI tools,\n“[i]mposing a sanction of further and additional mandatory education would be\nredundant”).\n42\nSee, e.g., Gill v. Everyday Dose, Inc., 2026 WL 3390881, at *5-7 (D. Del. Nov. 9, 2026)\n(imposing $3,000 fines on two attorneys who submitted AI-hallucinated authorities and\ndeflected responsibility for the errors); Jimenez-Fogarty v. Fogarty, 831 F. Supp. 3d 253,\n266-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2026) (imposing a $2,500 fine in a sua sponte Rule 11 proceeding);\nWadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 498-99 (D. Wyo. 2025) (imposing a $3,000\nfine on counsel who drafted a filing containing fabricated authorities); Mattox v. Prod.\nInnovations Rsch., LLC, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1351-52 (E.D. Okla. 2025) (imposing\ngraduated fines of $3,000, $2,000, and $1,000 based on counsel’s respective\nresponsibilities); Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F. Supp. 3d 341, 351 (E.D.N.Y.\n2025) (imposing a $1,000 fine after considering counsel’s remorse and remedial AI\ntraining).\nC.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\nNovember 13, 2026\nPage 13 of 13\n\nrequirement, he must personally pay this amount to the court within 14 days of this\n\ndecision.43 He must also file an affidavit confirming payment upon completion.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\n\nSincerely yours,\n\n/s/ Lori W. Will\n\nLori W. Will\nVice Chancellor\n\n43\nSee Hill, 2026 WL 1146289, at *9 (ordering sanctioned partner to “pay this amount\ndirectly and personally (and this amount shall not be paid by the . . . law firm)”); Ct. Ch.\nR. 11(c)(4).","changes":[{"id":1373,"doc_id":21746,"v_from":22668,"v_to":22854,"detected_at":"2026-11-16 08:07:32","added":519,"removed":208,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-## COURT OF CHANCERY\n-\n-## OF THE\n-\n-## STATE OF DELAWARE\n-\n-## LORI W. WILL\n-\n-## VICE CHANCELLOR\n-\n-## LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER\n-\n-## 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400\n-\n-## WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734\n-\n-Richard P. Rollo, Esquire Travis S. Hunter, Esquire Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. 920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801\n-\n-Margaret M. DiBianca, Esquire DiBianca Law, LLC 1201 North Orange Street, Suite 504 Wilmington, Delaware 19801 RE: Kevin Leiske et al. v. Robert Gregory Kidd et al.,\n+COURT OF CHANCERY\n+OF THE\n+STATE OF DELAWARE\n+LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER\n+VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400\n+WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734\n+November 13, 2026\n+\n+Richard P. Rollo, Esquire Margaret M. DiBianca, Esquire\n+Travis S. Hunter, Esquire DiBianca Law, LLC\n+Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. 1201 North Orange Street, Suite 504\n+920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801\n+Wilmington, Delaware 19801\n+\n+RE: Kevin Leiske et al. v. Robert Gregory Kidd et al.,\n+C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)\n-This letter resolves an Order to Show Cause concerning the misuse of generative artificial intelligence (“GenAI”). The plaintiffs submitted fabricated quotations and mischaracterized legal authorities in a brief filed with this court.\n-\n-After the defendants identified these errors, the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged using a GenAI tool without verifying its output and filed a corrected brief that removed the quotation marks but retained inaccurate legal propositions. I ordered the partner who signed the brief and his law firm to show cause why sanctions should not issue.\n-\n-The use of GenAI in legal practice is neither forbidden nor inherently problematic. Practitioners are increasingly turning to these tools, which offer substantial benefits and opportunities for efficiency. But counsel must use them with\n-\n-Page 2 of 13 the care required by Court of Chancery Rule 11 and the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct. That obligation includes ensuring the accuracy of each authority and citation presented to the court.\n-\n-That care was lacking here. Counsel failed to verify the accuracy of the answering brief despite his law firm’s comprehensive GenAI policy and mandatory ethics training. Given the firm’s commendable efforts to prevent GenAI misuse, I decline to sanction it. Counsel—who has since accepted full responsibility and expressed sincere contrition—is sanctioned $2,500 under Rule 11, payable personally to the Court of Chancery.\n-\n-I.\n-\n-## BACKGROUND\n-\n-On January 22, 2026, the plaintiffs filed an answering brief opposing the defendants’ exceptions to a Magistrate in Chancery’s final report on advancement.1\n-\n-Five days later, the defendants’ reply brief identified that the answering brief contained fabricated quotations, inaccurate citations, and hallucinated legal propositions.2\n-\n-On January 28, plaintiffs’ lead counsel—the signatory on the brief—filed a letter acknowledging that a GenAI tool had been used to revise the brief, and\n-\n-1 Pls.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 62)."}]}