{"check":null,"uid":"37065b92afaaea47","title":"Peter Szabo, R (on the application of) v NHS Southeast London Integrated Care Board (No 2)","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-20","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина против интегрированного совета здравоохранения Юго-Восточной Лондона относительно отказа провести независимую проверку жалоб на действия медицинского учреждения. Суд счёл аргументы заявителя заслуживающими внимания и удовлетворяющими пороговую вероятность успеха при рассмотрении дела. Рассмотрены вопросы соблюдения органом здравоохранения своих публичных обязанностей, процедур рассмотрения жалоб и применения альтернативных мер защиты прав граждан. Суд отклонил доводы ответчика об использовании альтернативных средств правовой защиты и предоставил заявителю право обратиться с иском в суд первой инстанции.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":14272,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/admin/2026/2692","first_seen":"2026-10-22","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:33","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"data protection","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":882,"ctx":"edies. One alternative remedy relied on is “the statutory procedures available under” the Data Protection Act 2018 , and the case of AB v Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust  [2020] EWHC 2287 (Adm","zone":"акт","weight":3}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":791,"ctx":"edies. one alternative remedy relied on is “the statutory procedures available under” the data protection act 2018 , and the case of ab v northumbria healthcare nhs foundation trust  [2020] ewhc","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-22","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] EWHC 2692 (Admin)","court":"The Administrative Court (King's Bench Division)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/admin/2026/2692","text":"FORDHAM J:\n\nIntroduction\n\n1.\n\nI am granting permission for judicial review in this case. I am satisfied that the claim crosses the threshold of arguability with a realistic prospect of success. I have found no knockout blow within the response to the claim which has helpfully been provided on behalf of the Defendant in writing and orally. I have had to consider whether it is highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would have been no different had the alleged public law errors been absent. I cannot be satisfied that the Defendant can meet that high bar.\n\n2.\n\nAmong the points raised by the Defendant in resisting permission for judicial review concerns what are said to be alternative remedies. One alternative remedy relied on is “the statutory procedures available under” the\nData Protection Act 2018\n, and the case of\nAB v Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust\n\n[2020] EWHC 2287 (Admin)\nhas been cited by the Defendant. Another alternative remedy relied on by the Defendant is the Public Service Ombudsman (formerly the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman) under the\nhealth Service Commissioners Act 1993\n. The PSO stands as what Mr Thomas for the Defendant emphasises is the “Second Stage” of the Defendant’s Complaints Policy and Procedure (CG05) v2.0 (page 20). I make clear that, in granting permission for judicial review, I am not foreclosing on the Defendant being able to raise at the substantive hearing in this case the alternative remedy arguments, so that consideration can be given by the judge at that substantive hearing of whether and to what extent this claim is answered by either of those safeguards. But, for the purposes of today, I have not been persuaded that either of those routes presents a decisive answer warranting the refusal of permission, on any ground for judicial review.\n\n3.\n\nNothing that I say in this brief judgment is intended to constrain or steer the parties, or the Court, as this case now proceeds to its substantive hearing. However, there is a large amount of material before the Court today, including a wide range of contentions being put forward. Having had the benefit of consideration of the papers, and the benefit of being addressed by way of oral submissions from both parties, I consider it appropriate to give a brief explanation of what – for my part – I have seen as key features of this case.\n\nBackground\n\n4.\n\nThe starting point is the Claimant’s set of complaints made to the Defendant on 27 October 2023, featuring 6 specific topics. They each related to what had previously happened and, in particular, contentions which the Claimant was making about the conduct of Cator Medical Practice (CMP). Those October 2023 complaints, and the Defendant’s function of investigating them, arrived at this Court in a previous set of judicial review proceedings. The background was set out in detail in the judgment of DHCJ John Halford: see\nSzabo (No.1)\n\n[2025] EWHC 2235 (Admin)\n. The upshot, in that first set of proceedings, was this. It was recognised that, if the Claimant were to provide a consent which had been requested by the Defendant, that would trigger an investigation and then a decision by the Defendant (see §§80-86). Those circumstances made it academic for the Court, in that first judicial review claim, to consider questions about the alleged unlawfulness of an alleged failure by the Defendant to investigate the complaint. What happened next culminated in an Outcome Decision issued on 10 October 2025 by the Defendant. Attached to the Outcome Decision was a response, on the face of it addressed to the Claimant. It written by CMP and dated “May 2025”. The Defendant’s Outcome Decision is the target for this second judicial review challenge. Permission for judicial review was refused on the papers but my responsibility has been to consider afresh, with the benefit of this oral hearing, whether the claim is one which has any viability.\n\nReliance on CMP\n\n5.\n\nIn my judgment, it is arguable that the Defendant in its Outcome Decision failed to discharge its public law duties, because of the reliance that was placed on the attached CMP response of May 2025. As the Claimant pithily summarised his grievance (10 October 2025), he says the “actions taken [by the Defendant] were limited to relaying [CMP]’s statements and summarising them, without undertaking any independent verification or fact-finding”. This topic is all about whether the Defendant investigated the facts for itself, considered the relevant materials itself, and arrived at findings upholding or not upholding the various complaints as an exercise of its own judgment. The point is brought into added focus by the emphasis which DHCJ Halford gave to the Defendant’s responsibility in first seeking information from CMP but in then itself determining the complaint (see §16). What will need resolution at the substantive hearing will include whether Mr Thomas is right to submit that reading the Outcome Decision, read fairly and as a whole and in context, is to be understood as having “determined” the complaints, and having identified the extent to which the Claimant’s complaints were upheld or not upheld.\n\nImmediacy-Removal\n\n6.\n\nAnother key point in the case relates specifically to the removal of the Claimant from CMP’s list of patients, which had been communicated to the Claimant in a letter dated 20 October 2023. Both parties in these proceedings have characterised that as a removal from the list “with immediate effect”. The Claimant’s complaints to the Defendant made a number of points about that action by CMP. He complained that the accusations of abusive language on which that immediacy-removal was said to have been based were false accusations. As to that, he made reference to documents and recordings. He also complained that the motivation for CMP’s immediacy-removal was because of a series of complaints which he had made. He says CMP retaliated by taking him off their list of patients. Alongside these features, the Claimant has also made points about the seriousness and stigma of a decision to remove with immediate effect. He points to a statutory provision (National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations 2015, reg.25) which describes removal “with immediate effect” on the grounds that “the person has committed an act of violence”. The Claimant’s concerns included the stigmatising implications of having an immediacy-removal on his record. He also points to a linked question, namely the lack of protection if he were unable to seek medical care because of immediacy-removal with its accompanying absence of any “grace period”. I am satisfied that it is arguable that the Outcome Decision of 10 October 2025, and the investigation which preceded it, have failed to discharge the Defendant’s public law duties in grappling with all of these points about the immediacy-removal. By way of illustration, the Outcome Decision itself refers to “the 8 day removal grace period”. This description begs the question of what this 20 October 2023 removal was or was not, or should or should not have been, even if the accusations of abusive language were a proper basis and even if this was not removal in retaliation for his complaints. It became clear to me that there are questions relating to immediacy-removal, and relating to what would or would not be a basis for upholding a complaint about an immediacy-removal, which are not presently decisively answered by the Defendant’s response to this claim.\n\nStatutory Discussion\n\n7.\n\nThe next topic which I consider it helpful for me to identify concerns the “discuss[ion] with the complainant” for which provision is made by reg.13(7) and (8) of the Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009. Again there is a helpful reference point in the judgment of DHCJ Halford, in emphasising the importance of that discussion in the present case (see §81). What then happened was that there were email communications between the Defendant and the Claimant on 24 March 2025 and 27 March 2025. The Defendant’s case is first that the “offer” of a discussion itself discharged the statutory duty (see reg.13(7)). Further or alternatively, the Defendant says that the subsequent email communications reflect the lawful conduct of such “discussion” as the Claimant requested. It is arguable, in my judgment, that that Defendant’s reg.13(7) and (8) statutory duty was not discharged in this case; that the “offer” of discussion was of itself sufficient; that what mattered was that there should be a dialogue, even if it were one which was undertaken through email, which the Claimant has today candidly told me was his choice. It is arguable that there was no dialogue or “discussion” by email to satisfy the statutory duty. The context in this case includes important points relating to the public sector equality duty and reasonable adjustments, under the\nEquality Act 2010\n, both of which may be relevant to the legal analysis of this point.\n\nProcedural Fairness\n\n8.\n\nAlso relevant is the public law duty of procedural fairness. It links not only to the points which I have already identified, but also to a further point. The Claimant tells me that the May 2025 response from CMP was not in fact written to him in May 2025, nor received by him in May 2025. His case is that it was a response which was obtained by the Defendants. There is a reference point in the Complaints Policy and Procedure (p.23), to the managing of an investigation into a complaint, where the investigation involves the care service provider “issuing a response to the patient experience team”. On the face of it, for the purposes of this permission hearing, it is arguable in my judgment that this is what the May 2025 response from CMP was. I have referred already to a substantive issue about the reliance which the Outcome Decision of October 2025 placed on that May 2025 CMP response. The reason for returning to it now is because of a procedural point. I am satisfied that it is arguable that it was unfair that the Claimant was not provided with that May 2025 CMP response and was not given the opportunity to make points about. Particularly given the strong reliance that the Defendant then, at least arguably, placed on that CMP response when communicating what was said to be its own Outcome Decision. And also bearing in mind the five-month period in between the CMP May 2025 response and the Defendant’s October 2025 outcome decision. On the face of it, the Claimant was not made aware that the Defendant was proposing effectively to adopt what it had been told by CMP. Still less was he given an opportunity to respond to that as a method; nor to respond to the contents of CMP’s rebuttal of his complaints, set out in its May 2025 response. In my judgment, this was arguably procedurally unfair.\n\nOther Points\n\n9.\n\nThere are other points in the case. There are the Claimant’s points about unanswered complaints, of which there were not just one but three. There are points, in the context of complaints, about whether or not the Defendant invoked the exclusion within regulation 8 of the 2009 regulations; and whether the Defendant has now resurrected a point made in a 6 November 2023 communication (“we cannot reinvestigate”), which DHCJ Halford recorded was a response which could not be defended (see §§17, 36, 68). This is linked to the arguable lack of clarity in the way in which the Defendant “determined” the Claimant’s complaints, if it did. Next, there are points about medical records and failures to remove what appear on medical records. I am sceptical about whether that aspect of this claim can thrive, in circumstances where that is an aspect which on the face of it was the subject of what was a positive determination – and arguably the only positive determination – with the Outcome Decision because of the view expressed by the Defendant that CMP had “correctly” explained that they were not able to remove entries from a patient’s medical history. Added to that answer there may, as I have said, also be an answer lying in the procedures under\nthe 2018 Act\n.\n\nOmbudsman\n\n10.\n\nI add the following footnote. As I have said, Mr Thomas for the Defendant maintained his reliance on the ombudsman (PSO) as Stage 2 as an alternative remedy, making judicial review inappropriate. He recognised that recent case law on alternative remedies in judicial review has further illuminated the extent to which an ombudsman will stand as an alternative remedy. He referred to\nMcAleenon\n\n[2024] UKSC 31\n\n[2025] AC 1362\n. His submission came to this. Whatever are the limits of an ombudsman for alternative remedy purposes more generally, in this particular context the PSO stands as a powerful answer, given that the ombudsman is interwoven as a Stage 2 within the Complaints Handling Policy. The argument the Defendant makes is that the ombudsman stands as a complete answer, in this context, in relation to all and any public law deficiencies in the dealing by the Defendant with a complaint. A complainant can always go to the Stage 2 ombudsman. They should always do that, before bringing any claim for judicial review. This defence will be open to the Defendant to advance at the substantive hearing. But in my judgment it is at least arguable that the Claimant is entitled in law to a lawful decision at Stage 1 by the Defendant; and that absent a lawful decision at Stage 1 by the Defendant, the Court would properly address and resolve the question of public law lawfulness and insist that a decision be taken, and retaken, so that the Claimant receives the lawful decision to which he is entitled under the scheme.\n\nOrder\n\n11.\n\nIn all the circumstances, and having regard to the key points that I have mentioned, I grant permission for judicial review in this claim. I do not make any directions, since the Civil Procedure Rules and the\nAdministrative Court Judicial Review Guide\nset out in very clear terms what the next steps, are and what the relevant deadlines are for those further steps to take place. I will discharge the costs order which was imposed in this case when permission for judicial review was refused on the papers on 22 May 2026.","changes":[]}