{"check":null,"uid":"291937aa81b3fd49","title":"Jeffrey Leeks v Information Commissioner","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-05","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина Лиэкса на задержку органа по защите данных (ICO) при рассмотрении запроса о предоставлении персональных данных. Хотя ICO признало потенциальное нарушение прав доступа Лиэкса и уведомило фирму о необходимости предоставить ответ в установленный срок, суд счёл, что предоставленный органом ответ является достаточным основанием для отказа в выдаче приказа о продвижении рассмотрения жалобы. Суд подтвердил полномочия ICO как эксперта в области защиты данных и указал, что роль трибунала ограничена контролем за действиями регулятора, а не разрешением споров или выдачей приказов о раскрытии информации.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":9150,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1523","first_seen":"2026-11-06","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:29","relevance":"hit","score":10,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":10,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"орган","name":"ICO","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":23,"ctx":"acronyms used  dpa the data protection act 2018  ftt the first-tier tribunal general regulatory chamber  ico information commiss","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":416,"ctx":"in april 2026, mr leeks asked a firm (now referred to as “hr firm”) to provide to him all personal data which they held about him.  3.  on 01 june 2026, mr leeks filed a complaint with the ico","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":1102,"ctx":"leeks informing him that they had found a potential breach of his access rights under the data protection legislation. on that same date the hr firm indicated that it would provide a response to","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":5812,"ctx":"formed mr delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with uk gdpr.  15.  therefore, the ftt on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":8537,"ctx":"pplying the law, is highly unlikely to make an order to progress under section 166 of the data protection act 2018 . the ico, in its role as expert regulator, has considered that it they have pro","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":8985,"ctx":"ogress. as set out above, it is not for the ico to order disclosure; the ico’s role is as data protection regulator, the data protection act 2018 is clear that it is for a court to make an order","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":16,"ctx":"Jeffrey Leeks v Information Commissioner Acronyms used  DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regu","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"ICO","weak":false,"pos":146,"ctx":"DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber  ICO Information Commissioner’s Office  Background  1.  This Tribunal is concerned with an app","zone":"орган","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":64,"ctx":"Jeffrey Leeks v Information Commissioner Acronyms used  DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber  ICO Information Commissioner’s O","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-11-06","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01523 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1523","text":"Acronyms used\n\nDPA\nthe\nData Protection Act 2018\n\nFtT\nthe First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber\n\nICO\nInformation Commissioner’s Office\n\nBackground\n\n1.\n\nThis Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress made about ICO reference number IC-521635-L2D2.\n\n2.\n\nThe underlying issue is that, in April 2026, Mr Leeks asked a firm (now referred to as “HR firm”) to provide to him all personal data which they held about him.\n\n3.\n\nOn 01 June 2026, Mr Leeks filed a complaint with the ICO about that firm’s handling of his request.\n\n4.\n\nOn 13 July 2026, the ICO acknowledged the complaint and explained that it would be allocated to a Case Officer, further information was sent by Mr Leeks and received by the ICO on 28 July and 17 August 2026. On 21 September 2026, the ICO informed Mr Leeks that his complaint was still awaiting allocation to a Case Officer.\n\n5.\n\nBy GRC3 dated 21 September 2026, Mr Leeks sought an Order to Progress.\n\n6.\n\nOn 08 October 2026, the ICO wrote to Mr Leeks informing him that they had found a potential breach of his access rights under the data protection legislation. On that same date the HR firm indicated that it would provide a response to Mr Leeks’ request within a timeframe which the ICO had specified.\n\n7.\n\nBy GRC5 dated 22 October 2026, the ICO responded applied to the Tribunal for the application to be struck out; that application was accompanied by the ICO’s rule 23 response to the application within which the ICO set out their submissions concerning the strike out application. The ICO accepted there had been a delay in responding to Mr Leeks’ complaint. They argued that, as a response had, by that time, been provided, there is no reasonable prospect of the Tribunal making an order under section 166.\n\n8.\n\nThe initial directions (dated 24 September 2026) gave Mr Leeks the opportunity to respond to such application. Mr Leeks sent an email to the Tribunal (copied to the ICO) on 29 October 2026 at 18:32 hours. Mr Leeks sets out that he has sent the ICO 4 further emails to which he has not received a response; he acknowledges the limit of the FtT’s jurisdiction. I acknowledge that in that email, Mr Leeks wrote:\n\nPlease add this correspondence to the existing case file and advise whether the Tribunal requires any further submissions from me in response to the Information Commissioner’s strike-out application.\n\n9.\n\nIt is not for the Tribunal to decide whether Mr Leeks should make further representations about the strike out; he was given the opportunity to make representations, and I take account of what he sent to the Tribunal.\n\nThe Law\n\n10.\n\nThe key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are\nKillock and VeaIe v\nInformation Commissioner\n[2022] 1 WLR 2241\n(\nKillock\n),\nR (Delo) v Information\nCommissioner\n(\nDelo\n) in the High Court (\n[2023] 1 WLR 1327\n) and Court of Appeal\n(\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n) and\nSmith v Information Commissioner\n[2025] UKUT 74\n(AAC) (\nSmith\n).\n\n11.\n\nIn\nKillock\n, the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances\nin which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section\n165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an\nappropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The\nUpper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast\na critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to\nachieve a different complaint outcome.”\n\n12.\n\nIn\nKillock\n, the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in\nterms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight\nto the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed\nthe view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and\nis in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any\nparticular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal\nindicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other\ninvestigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources\neffectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider\nregulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special\nposition. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in\nKillock\n.\n\n13.\n\nIn\nR (Delo) v Information Commissioner\n\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n, in the Court of Appeal,\nWarby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant\nlegislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a\ncomplaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further\ninvestigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that,\nhaving done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine\nwhether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view\nabout the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80).\n\n14.\n\nIn\nDelo\n, Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits\nwould clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader\nconnotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in\nKillock\nthat the word\n“outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also\nagreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in\nDelo\nin the High Court that outcome would\nproperly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint,\nhaving informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be\ncompliant with UK GDPR.\n\n15.\n\nTherefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the\nmerits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision\nin\nSmith\nconfirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the Commissioner has issued a\ncomplaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application.\nBut, as Judge Stout also explained in\nSmith\nat [60], in a case where the Commissioner\nhas carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a\nsection 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons.\n\n16.\n\nThe first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a\nprocedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether\nthe Commissioner has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot\nbe used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application\nto the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages\nagainst the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s\ndecision (see further [74] of\nKillock\n).\n\n17.\n\nThe second reason is because the Commissioner has a wide discretion under section\n165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the\nscope for the FTT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is\nlimited.\nEW\n, decided alongside\nKillock\n, was an exceptional case where the\nCommissioner, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at\nall. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in\nDelo\n, the Commissioner is not required\nto determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further\n([64]), the Commissioner is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78])\nand\nhas a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so,\nto what extent” ([80]).\n\nApplication of law to facts\n\n18.\n\nAn outcome has now been provided by the ICO to Mr Leeks about his original request that the ICO consider the HR firm’s response made in April 2026. The FtT’s role is to cast a critical eye on that outcome.\n\n19.\n\nThe outcome appears to meet what is required – the ICO sets out its view (as Regulator) about the response and also sets out actions that it told the HR firm to take. In the outcome the ICO also refers to Mr Leeks’ ability to enforce his data rights through the courts (i.e. County Court or High Court).\n\n20.\n\nOn balance, I consider that the ICO response provided, whilst late, is sufficient to conclude that this Tribunal, properly applying the law, is highly unlikely to make an Order to Progress under\nSection 166\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n. The ICO, in its role as expert regulator, has considered that it they have provided an appropriate response to the issue raised by Mr Leeks’ complaint to them.\n\n21.\n\nI accept that Mr Leeks still pursues matters with the ICO by sending further correspondence; that does not, however, mean that the Tribunal would make an Order to Progress. As set out above, it is not for the ICO to order disclosure; the ICO’s role is as Data Protection Regulator, the\nData Protection Act 2018\nis clear that it is for a Court to make an order for disclosure.\n\nSigned:\nJudge Worth\n\nDate:\n05 November 2026","changes":[]}