{"check":null,"uid":"28c40d13716e9099","title":"Philip Swift v Information Commissioner & Anor","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-07","summary":"Суд рассмотрел апелляцию гражданина против отказа Национальной полиции чiefs' council предоставить информацию о потерянных или украденных автомобилях за определённый период времени. Отказ был основан на том, что запрос считался вялотекущим из-за длительного взаимодействия заявителя с полицией и предполагаемой чрезмерной нагрузки на полицию при обработке запроса. Суд пришёл к выводу, что совокупная нагрузка от предыдущих запросов заявителя превысила публичную ценность запрашиваемой информации, поэтому отказ был правомерен.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":55758,"versions":2,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1388","first_seen":"2026-10-08","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:36","relevance":"hit","score":6,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":6,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":7657,"ctx":"tness statement of ashleigh beney, head of the national police freedom of information and data protection unit. the witness statement set out the request history relied upon by the npcc, the reso","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":31975,"ctx":"is upon the limited resources available to the national police freedom of information and data protection unit. the evidence established that the unit operated with a very small number of staff w","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":35802,"ctx":"ond respondent was ashleigh beney, head of the national police freedom of information and data protection unit. we found her to be a generally credible and reliable witness. she answered question","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":15,"ctx":"Philip Swift v Information Commissioner & Anor Суд рассмотрел апелляцию гражданина против отказа Национальной полиции чiefs' coun","zone":"орган","weight":3}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-10-20","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01388 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1388","text":"Introduction\n\n1.\n\nThis is an appeal brought by Philip Swift (\"the Appellant\") under\nsection 57\nof the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\n(\"FOIA\") against Decision Notice IC\n-\n387981\n-\nN0T4 of the Information Commissioner (\"the Commissioner\") dated 5 November 2025.\n\n2.\n\nThe Decision Notice upheld the decision of the National Police Chiefs' Council (\"NPCC\") to refuse the Appellant's request for information dated 4 April 2025, NPCC reference 2233/2025, pursuant to section 14(1) FOIA on the basis that the request was vexatious.\n\n3.\n\nThe Tribunal heard oral submissions from the Appellant and from counsel on behalf of the Second Respondent. The Tribunal also heard oral evidence from Ashleigh Beney on behalf of the Second Respondent. The First Respondent relied upon written submissions and did not attend the hearing.\n\nContext\n\n1.\n\nThe appeal arises in the context of a lengthy history of engagement between the Appellant and the NPCC concerning issues relating to vehicle crime, vehicle records, the Police National Computer (\"PNC\"), lost or stolen vehicle markers, data disclosure, and the activities of the National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service (“NaVCIS”).\n\n2.\n\nThe Appellant has a longstanding personal and professional interest in vehicle crime matters. The evidence demonstrates that he has spent considerable time analysing vehicle crime data, corresponding with public authorities, and engaging in issues concerning vehicle recovery, crime recording, vehicle provenance and related matters.\n\n3.\n\nThe NPCC's position is that the request forming the subject of this appeal cannot be viewed in isolation and must instead be considered against a wider background of requests, reviews, appeals and associated correspondence extending over a significant period.\n\nBackground to Appeal\n\n4.\n\nThis Appeal dated 30 November 2025 and made by Mr Philip Swift (the “Appellant”) arises following a request for information (the “Request”) made by the Appellant to the NPCC on 4 April 2025 in the following terms:\n\n“In Excel format, an example of which can be found here [link provided] I ask to be provided, with a vehicle per row, the like information relating to the NPCC/NaVCIS1 submissions to the PNC LoS (Police National Computer, Lost or Stolen) register for the period[s]: 01/01/2023 to 31/12/2023 [and] 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2023 [sic]\n\nI do not know how you hold or submit LoS records. But these are placed to the PNC which then causes the records to pass to the DVLA. Assuming the information is held in a similar format to that of Essex constabulary, at the above link, I ask to be provided:\n\n• Created Date – ‘taken’ date\n\n• Vehicle Make\n\n• Vehicle Model\n\n• Recovered/Not Recovered\n\n• Vehicle age (characters 3 & 4 of VRM)\n\n• Vehicle Recovered Date\n\n• The vehicle value – as at the date of loss or the criteria you use for value*\n\nI appreciate you have, in the past, kindly hand-held me regarding information held in a readily available format. Should any of the above not fall to such categorisation, but similar, helpful (insofar as it will help me to understand the number and type of losses/recoveries)\n\nplease withdraw items that would fall foul of s12 and substitute the data you do hold to hand.\n\nAdditionally:\n\nAssuming this is recorded, the offence associated with the submission i.e. the reason for creating a ‘lost’ or ‘stolen’ entry which I assume will include obtained by fraud and, if possible, the type of fraud – such as impersonation, intentionally avoidance of repayments, coercion etc.\n\nI am not seeking detail of the offence and possibly you have your own codes for these, your own categorisations – please provide.\n\nYour criteria/policy for submission to PNC – the grounds for recording or not recording on PNC LoS\n\nWhether the PNC entry is annotated to the effect the vehicle was obtained by fraud, as opposed to stolen, where this is the case\n\nYour criteria/policy for seizure of vehicles placed to PNC LoS\n\nFor the above calendar years, the number of complaints you received –irrespective of whether the vehicle was placed to PNC LoS, the number of vehicles for which you received a complaint. To clarify, a complaint may relate to more than one vehicle and may be treated as a single\n\ninvestigation. However, I wish to know the number of vehicles reported.\n\n*I am assuming, for accounting/funding purposes detailed information is held on a system, in a readily retrievable format.”\n\n5.\n\nThe NPCC responded on 11 April 2025 refusing the request pursuant to section 14(1) FOIA. It relied upon the cumulative burden associated with the history of requests and correspondence and concluded that the request was vexatious.\n\n6.\n\nFollowing receipt of the refusal, the Appellant submitted a request for internal review. The Appellant prepared extensive written representations challenging the basis upon which section 14(1) had been applied and disputing the NPCC's characterisation of his earlier requests. The Appellant's case was that the requests relied upon by the NPCC were materially different, that the burden had not been properly evidenced and that the request possessed substantial public value.\n\n7.\n\nOn 20 May 2025 the NPCC completed its internal review and upheld the original decision. The reviewer concluded that the request had properly been refused under section 14(1). The internal review maintained that the cumulative effect of the Appellant's previous dealings with the authority, together with the anticipated burden associated with future engagement, justified reliance upon the exemption.\n\n8.\n\nThe Appellant thereafter exercised his right under section 50 FOIA to complain to the Information Commissioner. The Commissioner opened an investigation into the complaint and sought information from the NPCC concerning the request history, the resource implications relied upon by the authority and the context in which the decision had been taken.\n\n9.\n\nFollowing investigation of the Appellant's complaint, the Information Commissioner issued Decision Notice IC\n-\n387981\n-\nN0T4 on 5 November 2025. The Commissioner concluded that the NPCC was entitled to rely upon section 14(1) FOIA and therefore upheld the refusal of the request. The Commissioner found that the request had to be considered in its wider factual context, including the history of previous requests and associated correspondence, and concluded that the cumulative burden imposed upon the NPCC outweighed the public value of responding to the request. No further steps were required of the NPCC.\n\nAppeal and Responses\n\n10.\n\nThe appeal relates to the application of the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\n.\n\n11.\n\nOn 30 November 2025 the Appellant lodged a notice of appeal with the Tribunal challenging the Commissioner's Decision Notice. The grounds of appeal were extensive but, in summary, alleged that the Commissioner had failed to scrutinise properly the evidential basis of the NPCC's burden arguments, had accepted unsupported assertions concerning similarity and overlap, and had failed to attach appropriate weight to the public-interest value of the request.\n\n12.\n\nThe Commissioner’s response to the appeal maintains that the Decision Notice is correct and that in all the circumstances, the request was vexatious pursuant to the case law set out by the Court of Appeal in\nDransfield v Information Commissioner & Devon County Council\n[2015] EWCA Civ 454\n(which did not depart from the UT findings in\nInformation Commissioner v Dransfield\n[2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)\n).\n\n13.\n\nThe NPCC, as Second Respondent, filed a detailed response together with the witness statement of Ashleigh Beney, Head of the National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit. The witness statement set out the request history relied upon by the NPCC, the resources available within the FOI team, the alleged burden generated by the Appellant's requests and the basis for the NPCC's conclusion that a tipping point had been reached.\n\nEvidence\n\n14.\n\nThe Tribunal considered the documentary evidence contained within the 577-page appeal bundle. The Tribunal also considered the skeleton arguments of both parties.\n\n15.\n\nAt the oral hearing on 22 September 2026, the Tribunal heard oral submissions from the Appellant, who appeared as a litigant in person, and from counsel, Mr Edmund Garnett on behalf of the NPCC. The Tribunal also heard oral evidence from Ashleigh Beney, who adopted her witness statement and was questioned by the Tribunal and by the Appellant. The Information Commissioner did not attend the hearing and relied upon written submissions previously filed with the Tribunal.\n\nApplicable Law\n\n16.\n\nThe relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows:\n\n1\n\nGeneral right of access to information held by public authorities.\n\n(1)\n\nAny person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—\n\n(a)\n\nto be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and\n\n(b)\n\nif that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.\n\n12\n\nExemption where cost of compliance exceeds appropriate limit.\n\n(1)\n\nSection 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for\ninformation if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with the\nrequest would exceed the appropriate limit.\n\n(2)\n\nSubsection (1) does not exempt the public authority from its obligation to\ncomply with paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost of\ncomplying with that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit.\n\n(3)\n\nIn subsections (1) and (2) “the appropriate limit” means such amount as\nmay be prescribed, and different amounts may be prescribed in relation to\ndifferent cases. [...]\n\n14\n\nVexatious or repeated requests.\n\n(1)\n\nSection 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.\n\n(2)\n\nWhere a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.\n\n16\n\nDuty to provide advice and assistance\n\n(1)\n\nIt shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance,\nso far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons\nwho propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it.\n\n(2)\n\nAny public authority which, in relation to the provision of advice or\nassistance in any case, conforms with the code of practice under section 45\nis to be taken to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation\nto that case.\n\n17\n\nRefusal of request.\n\n(5)\n\nA public authority which, in relation to any request for information, is relying on a claim that section 12 or 14 applies must, within the time for complying with section 1(1), give the applicant a notice stating that fact.\n\n(6)\n\nSubsection (5) does not apply where—\n\n(a)\n\nthe public authority is relying on a claim that section 14 applies,\n\n(b)\n\nthe authority has given the applicant a notice, in relation to a previous request for information, stating that it is relying on such a claim, and\n\n(c)\n\nit would in all the circumstances be unreasonable to expect the authority to serve a further notice under subsection (5) in relation to the current request.\n\n58\nDetermination of appeals\n.\n\n(1)\n\nIf on an appeal under\nsection 57\nthe Tribunal considers—\n\n(a)\n\nthat the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or\n\n(b)\n\nto the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently,\n\nthe Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.\n\n(2)\n\nOn such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based\n\n17.\n\nThere is no further guidance on the meaning of “vexatious” in the legislation. The leading guidance is contained in the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) decision in\nInformation Commissioner v Dransfield\n[2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)\n, as upheld and clarified in the Court of Appeal\n(“CA”) in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another & Craven v Information Commissioner and another\n[2015] EWCA Civ 454\n(CA)\n.\n\n18.\n\nAs noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the CA in Dransfield, the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one:\n“…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious.” (para 68).\n\n19.\n\nJudge Wikeley’s decision in the UT Dransfield sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the CA. The ultimate question is, “is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?” (para 43). It is important to adopt a “holistic and broad” approach, emphasising “manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests.” (para 45). Arden LJ in the CA also emphasised that a “rounded approach” is required (para 69), and all evidence which may shed light on whether a request is vexatious should be considered.\n\n20.\n\nThe UT set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious:\n\na.\n\nThe burden imposed on the public authority by the request.\nThis may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings between the parties. “…the context and history of the particular request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor.” (para 29).\n\nb.\n\nThe motive of the requester.\nAlthough FOIA is motive-blind, “what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority.” (para 34).\n\nc.\n\nThe value or serious purpose\n. Lack of objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own, but is part of the balancing exercise – “does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?” (para 38).\n\nd.\n\nAny harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff\n. This is not necessary in order for a request to be vexatious, but “vexatiousness may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive.” (para 39).\n\n21.\n\nOverall, the purpose of section 14 is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (UT para 10), subject always to the high standard of vexatiousness being met.\n\nThe Issues\n\n22.\n\nThe central issue for determination by the Tribunal is whether the Information Commissioner was correct, on the evidence available and applying the relevant legal principles, to conclude that the NPCC was entitled to rely upon section 14(1) FOIA when refusing the Appellant's request for information dated 4 April 2025. The Tribunal's task is therefore not to determine whether the requested information ought ultimately to be disclosed, nor to determine wider questions concerning the operation of NaVCIS, policing policy, vehicle crime recording practices, or the merits of the Appellant's underlying concerns. Rather, the Tribunal must decide whether the Commissioner's Decision Notice correctly found that the request, viewed in its proper factual and procedural context, was vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1) FOIA and could therefore lawfully be refused by the NPCC.\n\n23.\n\nIn determining that overarching question, the Tribunal must consider a number of subsidiary issues arising from the parties' submissions and the evidence before it. These include the nature and extent of the history of requests and correspondence preceding the request under appeal; the degree of connection between those requests and the subject matter of the request under consideration; the burden imposed upon the NPCC by the cumulative pattern of requests, reviews, appeals and associated communications; the public value and serious purpose of the request; and the extent to which the Commissioner was entitled to rely upon the evidence placed before him when concluding that a tipping point had been reached such that the request had become vexatious. The Tribunal must assess those matters holistically and determine whether, in all the circumstances, the Commissioner's conclusion was correct.\n\nAppellant’s Submissions\n\n24.\n\nThe Tribunal summarises the Appellant’s case as advanced in his notice of appeal, written submissions, witness evidence, skeleton argument and oral submissions at the hearing. The following summary is not intended to reproduce every aspect of the Appellant’s case but identifies the principal matters relied upon in support of the appeal.\n\nSimilarity\n\n25.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the Commissioner and the NPCC had materially overstated the degree of similarity between the request under appeal and earlier requests made by him. He contended that the various requests relied upon by the NPCC concerned distinct subjects, including weeding of lost and stolen vehicle records, disclosure gateways, ACRO notifications, disclosure of police reports, Chief Constables' circulars, governance arrangements and other matters which, although broadly connected to vehicles, did not seek the same information and should not properly have been characterised as repetitive or substantially overlapping requests. The Appellant submitted that the NPCC had impermissibly grouped a wide range of unrelated requests together under the general heading of vehicle crime and had thereby exaggerated the apparent pattern of repetition. He further argued that neither the NPCC nor the Commissioner had undertaken a request-by-request analysis demonstrating any substantial informational overlap between the requests relied upon and the request which forms the subject matter of this appeal.\n\nBurden\n\n26.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the burden relied upon by the NPCC had not been properly evidenced. Particular criticism was directed to the references within the refusal notice, internal review and witness evidence to 191 emails and subsequently 270 emails. The Appellant argued that those figures were unsupported by any schedule, breakdown or contemporaneous record and that neither the Commissioner nor the Tribunal had been provided with evidence sufficient to understand how those figures had been calculated. He contended that the figures appeared to incorporate internal communications wholly outside his control and that the NPCC had failed to demonstrate what actual burden was attributable to the request itself as opposed to its own internal processes. The Appellant further submitted that no request-specific retrieval assessment had been undertaken before section 14(1) was applied and that there was no evidence that compliance with the request would have imposed a significant burden upon the authority.\n\nPublic Interest\n\n27.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the request possessed substantial objective public value and serious purpose. He argued that the information sought concerned issues of public accountability relating to vehicle crime, crime recording, vehicle recovery, police databases and the use of public and private funds and resources in the investigation and recovery of vehicles. He contended that the request was directed towards understanding and improving systems rather than pursuing any private grievance and that the Commissioner had materially understated the weight to be attached to the public interest in disclosure. The Appellant emphasised that vehicle crime affects a large number of individuals and that transparency concerning the manner in which vehicle-related information is recorded, processed and used within policing structures gives rise to legitimate matters of public concern.\n\nNaVCIS/FLA Issues\n\n28.\n\nA significant aspect of the Appellant's case concerned the activities of NaVCIS and its relationship with the Finance & Leasing Association (\"FLA\"). The Appellant submitted that earlier disclosures had revealed a funding model involving payments, referrals, recoveries and associated vehicle data and that those disclosures had led him to seek a better understanding of the operation of the unit. He contended that the request was motivated by a desire to understand how information was recorded and used within a specialist policing environment and to examine the interaction between privately funded vehicle-crime activity and police-operated systems. The Appellant argued that these matters were not only of interest to him personally but raised wider questions concerning transparency, accountability and the operation of specialist vehicle-crime arrangements. He also relied on subsequent engagement with individuals connected to vehicle-crime reduction initiatives as demonstrating that his interest in these matters was recognised as legitimate and informed.\n\nNPCC Evidence\n\n29.\n\nThe Appellant advanced extensive criticism of the evidence relied upon by the NPCC. He submitted that many of the assertions contained within the witness statement of Ashleigh Beney were unsupported by contemporaneous documentation and rested largely upon recollection and opinion. During the hearing he questioned the basis upon which conclusions had been reached concerning matters such as staff distress, burden, management involvement, request history and the significance of various email addresses. He submitted that important assertions had not been corroborated by underlying records and contended that the absence of supporting material should cause the Tribunal to treat parts of the NPCC's evidence with caution. He further maintained that aspects of the evidence mischaracterised his conduct and failed to distinguish between legitimate pursuit of information and genuinely vexatious behaviour.\n\nCommissioner’s Decision\n\n30.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the Commissioner had failed properly to scrutinise the NPCC's case before upholding the refusal. He argued that the Decision Notice relied too heavily upon general assertions of burden and request history without requiring the NPCC to provide sufficient particulars or supporting evidence. In particular, he contended that the Commissioner had accepted the existence of a tipping point without requiring a detailed explanation as to how that tipping point had been reached or why the request itself should be regarded as contributing materially to it. The Appellant further submitted that the Commissioner had attached insufficient weight to the public value of the request and had failed adequately to engage with his arguments concerning the differences between the requests relied upon by the NPCC. He therefore contended that the Decision Notice was not in accordance with the law and should be set aside.\n\nThe Commissioner’s Position\n\n31.\n\nThe Information Commissioner did not attend the oral hearing and relied upon the written position contained in the Decision Notice and the materials filed in the proceedings. The Commissioner's position throughout was that the NPCC had correctly applied section 14(1) FOIA and that the request was properly characterised as vexatious when viewed in its relevant factual context.\n\nBurden\n\n32.\n\nIn the Decision Notice, the Commissioner concluded that the request could not properly be assessed in isolation from the Appellant's wider history of requests and correspondence with the NPCC. Applying a contextual approach to section 14(1), the Commissioner considered the cumulative effect of the Appellant's previous requests, internal reviews, follow-up enquiries and associated correspondence, and accepted the NPCC's evidence that those activities had generated a substantial administrative burden. The Commissioner found that the volume of requests, the continuing engagement they generated and the demands placed upon the NPCC's Freedom of Information function were relevant and significant considerations in assessing whether the request was vexatious and concluded that the cumulative burden arising from that pattern of engagement outweighed the value of requiring a substantive response to the request under appeal.\n\nContext\n\n33.\n\nThe Commissioner adopted the view that the request under appeal should be considered against the background of the Appellant's previous dealings with the authority. The Commissioner's position was that section 14(1) permits consideration of the history of requests, the duration of engagement, the volume of correspondence and the likely future impact on the public authority. The Decision Notice therefore treated the request as one element of a broader course of conduct rather than as an entirely standalone request.\n\nTipping Point\n\n34.\n\nThe Commissioner accepted that the request had some objective value and public-interest significance, particularly given the subject matter of vehicle crime and police information systems. However, the Commissioner concluded that the cumulative burden generated by the Appellant's requests and associated correspondence had reached a tipping point at which further compliance would represent a disproportionate use of the FOIA process. The Decision Notice therefore found that, notwithstanding the existence of some public value in the information sought, the balance fell in favour of maintaining the section 14(1) exemption and upholding the NPCC's refusal of the request.\n\nSecond Respondent’s Submissions\n\n35.\n\nThe Tribunal summarises the Second Respondent's case as advanced in its refusal notice, internal review decision, witness evidence and oral submissions. The following summary is not intended to reproduce every aspect of that case but identifies the principal matters relied upon.\n\n36.\n\nThe NPCC relied upon the written evidence of Ashleigh Beney, the refusal notice, the internal review outcome, its written response to the appeal and oral submissions made on its behalf by Mr Garnett of Counsel. The essence of the Second Respondent's case was that the request could not properly be viewed in isolation and that, when placed in its full historical context, the cumulative burden generated by the Appellant's requests, reviews and associated correspondence justified the application of section 14(1) FOIA. The NPCC did not suggest that the Appellant was abusive, aggressive or acting in bad faith. Rather, its case was that the cumulative effect of the requests had become disproportionate.\n\nRequest History\n\n37.\n\nThe NPCC submitted that the request under appeal formed part of a long-running and continuing series of requests relating broadly to vehicle-crime matters. It relied upon evidence that the Appellant had made numerous requests, internal reviews and appeal-related communications over a period extending back to 2023. Whilst accepting that the requests did not seek identical information, the NPCC submitted that they were sufficiently connected by subject matter and context to form part of a continuing pattern of engagement concerning vehicle crime, lost and stolen vehicle markers, vehicle intelligence, disclosure practices, NaVCIS activity and associated governance issues. The NPCC's position was that the Tribunal should not assess the request in isolation but should consider the cumulative history of dealings between the parties when determining whether section 14(1) was engaged.\n\nEmails\n\n38.\n\nThe NPCC relied upon evidence that the requests had generated significant volumes of correspondence. Particular reliance was placed upon a figure of 191 emails identified in connection with a subset of the relevant requests. Through the evidence of Ashleigh Beney, the NPCC explained that these were not simply emails sent by or to the Appellant. Rather, they represented work generated in responding to the requests, including communications with business areas, requests for information, clarification exercises, internal consultations, management discussions and correspondence involved in formulating responses. The NPCC submitted that the significance of the figure lay not in the exact number itself, but in what it demonstrated regarding the resources consumed in handling the requests. It argued that the Appellant's focus upon who sent particular emails missed the essential point that the burden created by a request necessarily includes the internal work undertaken by an authority in order to respond to it.\n\nBurden\n\n39.\n\nThe NPCC submitted that burden was the central issue in the appeal. Its case was not that the request was objectionable by reason of its content alone, nor that any particular request became vexatious immediately upon receipt. Rather, the Second Respondent argued that the Tribunal was required to consider the cumulative effect of previous requests, the associated correspondence, the reviews, the clarifications and the anticipated future work generated by the continuing pattern of engagement. It submitted that, by the time request 2233/2025 was received, the position had reached a tipping point. The NPCC argued that every response gave rise to further questions, further clarification requests or additional requests for information, creating what was, effectively, a continuous cycle of work. The burden relied upon was therefore not confined to the processing of a single request but extended to the broader impact upon the authority's ability to carry out its functions.\n\n40.\n\nThe NPCC also submitted that it was not relying upon section 12 FOIA and therefore did not undertake a detailed retrieval exercise before refusing the request. Its position was that the request was refused because of the cumulative burden associated with the history of requests and correspondence rather than because the information could not be retrieved within the statutory cost limit (i.e. the appropriate limit under section 12(5)).\n\nDistress and Welfare Concerns\n\n41.\n\nAlthough the NPCC's written evidence referred to distress and welfare concerns amongst staff, counsel for the Second Respondent made clear at the hearing that the authority was not advancing a case based upon deliberate harassment, aggression or intentional misconduct by the Appellant. Nonetheless, the NPCC maintained that the volume and persistence of the requests had generated concern amongst staff responsible for handling them. Ms Beney's evidence was that welfare measures had been introduced, including management reviewing relevant emails before they were passed to FOI officers. The Second Respondent submitted that these matters formed part of the overall factual context relevant to the assessment of burden, even if they were not relied upon as a standalone basis for establishing vexatiousness.\n\nResources\n\n42.\n\nThe NPCC placed considerable emphasis upon the limited resources available to the National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit. The evidence established that the unit operated with a very small number of staff while supporting a substantial national organisation. The Second Respondent submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to take account of those limited resources when assessing whether the burden created by the requests had become disproportionate. It argued that the level of managerial oversight, consultation and engagement required in dealing with the Appellant's requests had become excessive when compared with the resources available and with the demands generated by other requests received by the NPCC. Whilst accepting that limited resources alone do not establish vexatiousness, the NPCC contended that they were an important contextual factor when considering the cumulative impact of the requests.\n\nPersistence\n\n43.\n\nThe NPCC's case placed particular emphasis upon what it characterised as a continuing pattern of persistence. It submitted that responses to requests regularly generated further questions, reviews, requests for clarification and additional requests for information. The authority submitted that the pattern of requests and follow-up correspondence meant that information disclosed in one matter frequently led to further enquiries and that the Appellant’s persistent desire for information made clear to the NPCC that the Appellant would unlikely ever be satisfied by a response. During the hearing, counsel for the Second Respondent submitted that this pattern was more significant than any individual request and demonstrated why the request under appeal had to be viewed within its wider context. The NPCC argued that by April 2025 the continuing cycle of requests and follow-up engagement had become sufficiently burdensome to justify reliance upon section 14(1) FOIA.\n\n44.\n\nThe NPCC emphasised that it was not suggesting that the Appellant himself was a vexatious person. Its position was that section 14 had been applied to requests falling within the relevant pattern of vehicle-crime related requests and correspondence, and that future requests would continue to be considered individually on their merits.\n\nPublic Interest\n\n45.\n\nThe NPCC accepted that there is some value in the accountability and transparency of public authorities, including in relation to the matters raised by the Appellant. However, it submitted that the public value of the request was insufficient to outweigh the cumulative burden generated by the Appellant's repeated requests on the same broad topic\n\nFindings of Fact\n\nThe Appellant\n\n46.\n\nThe Tribunal found the Appellant to be a sincere and intelligent witness with a genuine and longstanding interest in matters relating to vehicle crime, vehicle provenance, vehicle recovery, crime recording and associated policing issues. His evidence demonstrated extensive knowledge of the subject matter and a considerable personal commitment to pursuing what he regarded as matters of public importance. We accept that he has devoted substantial time and effort to understanding and analysing vehicle-crime related issues and that his requests were motivated by a genuine desire to obtain information and improve understanding of the systems with which he was concerned.\n\n47.\n\nWe do not find that the Appellant was motivated by malice, hostility or a desire to harass the NPCC or its staff. Nor do we find that he bears any personal grudge against the Second Respondent. Indeed, the hearing reinforced our view that the Appellant is motivated principally by an intense interest in the subject matter and a belief that further scrutiny and investigation may lead to improvements in policy and practice.\n\nAshleigh Beney as a Witness\n\n48.\n\nThe principal witness called by the Second Respondent was Ashleigh Beney, Head of the National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit. We found her to be a generally credible and reliable witness. She answered questions directly and candidly and, where she did not know the answer to a question, she said so rather than speculating.\n\n49.\n\nOf particular significance was her correction of the figure contained in her witness statement. During oral evidence she acknowledged that the reference to 37 originating requests was incorrect and that the correct figure was 34. She explained how the error had arisen and did not seek to minimise or conceal it. We regard that as supporting, rather than undermining, her credibility.\n\n50.\n\nWhilst the Appellant criticised the absence of additional supporting documentation for certain aspects of Ms Beney's evidence, the Tribunal does not consider that this renders her evidence unreliable. We found Ms Beney to be a credible witness and there is no evidential basis for concluding that the Tribunal was being misled or that the matters described did not occur. In those circumstances, we see no reason to reject her evidence merely because further documentary corroboration was not produced. As recognised in\nMaurizi v Information Commissioner and Crown Prosecution Service\n[2019] UKUT 262 (AAC)\nat [190] the Tribunal is entitled to accept evidence which it considers reliable and to make findings of fact accordingly. Therefore, we accept Ms Beney’s evidence insofar as it relates to the volume of work generated by the requests, the demands placed upon the FOI team and the operational impact of the requests on the unit.\n\nRequest History\n\n51.\n\nWe find that, prior to the request under appeal, the Appellant had made a substantial number of requests for information to the NPCC concerning matters connected with vehicle crime and related issues. Whilst there was some disagreement about the precise number of requests and the treatment of reviews and appeals, we accept the essence of the NPCC's evidence that there had been a prolonged and continuing history of requests, reviews and associated correspondence extending over a significant period from 2023 to April 2025.\n\n52.\n\nWe further find that the request under appeal did not arise in isolation. It formed part of a wider sequence of enquiries through which the Appellant sought information about matters connected with stolen vehicles, vehicle intelligence, disclosure, governance, crime recording and related subjects. Although the individual requests were not identical, they formed part of an identifiable pattern of engagement.\n\nSimilarity of Requests\n\n53.\n\nWe accept the Appellant's submission that the requests relied upon by the NPCC were not all identical in subject matter and did not all seek the same information. Some concerned weeding, some disclosure issues, some governance questions, and some requests relating directly to NaVCIS activity. We therefore reject any suggestion that every request was essentially the same request repeated.\n\n54.\n\nHowever, we also find that there was substantial thematic continuity across the requests. The overwhelming majority related in one way or another to vehicle crime, police systems relating to vehicles, vehicle intelligence, lost or stolen markers, vehicle recovery activity, or associated governance and disclosure matters. Whilst the requests differed in form and content, they fell within a relatively narrow field of interest and inquiry.\n\n55.\n\nWe therefore find that the requests were sufficiently connected to constitute a relevant history for the purposes of a section 14(1) assessment, albeit not because they were identical or substantially identical in wording.\n\nEmails\n\n56.\n\nWe accept that the figure of 191 emails did not represent 191 emails sent personally by the Appellant. The oral evidence established that the figure reflected a broader body of work generated by the handling of the relevant requests, including communications with information holders, requests for clarification, internal consultations and management discussions.\n\n57.\n\nWe accept the Appellant's criticism that the precise composition of the figure was not fully particularised. No schedule of all 191 emails was produced and the NPCC was unable to identify precisely how many of those emails were communications with the Appellant as opposed to internal communications\n\n58.\n\nNevertheless, we do not find that the NPCC's case stands or falls on the exact number of emails. The figures are indicative rather than determinative. The wider evidence satisfies us that a substantial volume of work was generated as a consequence of the requests and associated correspondence.\n\nResources and Burden\n\n59.\n\nWe find that the NPCC FOI function operated with limited staffing resources during the relevant period. We accept Ms Beney's evidence regarding the size of the team and the breadth of the organisation which it supported.\n\n60.\n\nWe further find that the burden relied upon by the NPCC was not confined to the request under appeal viewed in isolation. The burden arose from the cumulative history of requests, clarifications, reviews, appeals and associated correspondence. We accept the NPCC's evidence that responses frequently generated further enquiries and that multiple matters were often being dealt with simultaneously.\n\n61.\n\nWe accept the NPCC's explanation that it was not relying on section 12 FOIA and did not consider it necessary to assess precisely how difficult it would be to retrieve the information before deciding that, in context, the request had become vexatious.\n\n62.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the NPCC ought first to have considered whether the request could be answered within the cost limits prescribed by\nthe Act\nand, if necessary, should have provided advice and assistance to enable the request to be refined. He argued that section 12 and section 16 represented the more appropriate statutory mechanisms and that the request should not have been refused under section 14(1) without a substantive assessment of the information held.\n\n63.\n\nThe Tribunal does not accept that submission. The NPCC's case was not that the request exceeded the statutory cost limit or that the information could not be retrieved within an appropriate timescale. Rather, its case was that, when viewed in the context of the history of requests, reviews and associated correspondence, the request was vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1). The evidence of Ashleigh Beney was that section 14 was relied upon because of the cumulative burden arising from the pattern of engagement and not because of the volume of information sought by this request in isolation.\n\n64.\n\nIn those circumstances, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the NPCC was required to undertake a section 12 assessment before it could rely upon section 14(1). Nor are we satisfied that the absence of further advice and assistance undermines the lawfulness of the decision under appeal.\n\n65.\n\nTaking the matter as a whole, we find that by April 2025 the cumulative burden imposed by the pattern of requests and associated engagement was substantial.\n\nPublic Value and Serious Purpose\n\n66.\n\nWe find that the request possessed genuine public value and serious purpose. The issues raised by the Appellant concerning vehicle crime, crime recording, vehicle recovery, transparency and the operation of specialist units are capable of attracting legitimate public interest.\n\n67.\n\nWe further accept that the Appellant genuinely believed that the information sought would assist in understanding and potentially improving aspects of vehicle-crime policy and practice. His evidence on this point was sincere and consistent.\n\n68.\n\nHowever, we find that public value is only one factor within the overall balancing exercise required by section 14(1). The existence of serious purpose does not prevent a request from becoming vexatious where the cumulative burden associated with it becomes disproportionate.\n\nDistress and Welfare\n\n69.\n\nWe do not find that the Appellant deliberately sought to harass, intimidate or distress members of staff within the NPCC. Nor do we find that his requests were motivated by hostility towards the authority or its employees.\n\n70.\n\nWe nevertheless accept the NPCC's evidence that the cumulative effect of the requests and associated correspondence created concern within the FOI team and led management to become directly involved in monitoring and managing correspondence relating to the Appellant. We accept that welfare measures were implemented and that staff experienced concern regarding the volume and continuing nature of the requests.\n\n71.\n\nWe place only limited weight on allegations concerning personal distress or welfare impacts when considered in isolation. However, we regard them as relevant contextual factors which support the broader picture of burden relied upon by the NPCC. We therefore treat those matters as contributing to, rather than independently establishing, the conclusion that the overall pattern of engagement had become disproportionate by the time the request under appeal was received.\n\nDiscussion and Conclusions\n\n72.\n\nIn accordance with section 58 FOIA, the Tribunal has considered the matter afresh and the issue for the Tribunal to decide upon is whether the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and whether the Commissioner was correct in finding that the NPCC was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA in refusing to reply to the Appellant’s request of 4 April 2025.\n\n73.\n\nUnder section 58(2) FOIA, the Tribunal is able to review any finding of fact upon which the Decision Notice was based, consider all of the evidence before it and reach its own decision.\n\n74.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered the suggested list of factors set out in the\nDransfield\ncase and the overall circumstances of the case, including the history of the relationship between the parties.\n\nValue or Serious Purpose\n\n75.\n\nThe Tribunal begins with the issue of value and serious purpose. We are satisfied that the request possessed genuine objective value and cannot be characterised as trivial, frivolous or lacking in purpose. The subject matter of the request concerned vehicle crime, vehicle recovery, lost or stolen vehicle markers, police information systems and the activities of NaVCIS. Those are matters capable of engaging legitimate public interest and public scrutiny. We therefore reject any suggestion that the request lacked seriousness or sought information of no public significance.\n\n76.\n\nWe also accept that the Appellant's motives were genuine. His evidence demonstrated a longstanding interest in vehicle-crime related issues and a substantial degree of knowledge concerning the subject matter of the request. The Tribunal is satisfied that he genuinely believed the information sought would contribute to a better understanding of matters which he regarded as important and which, at least to some extent, are capable of being matters of public concern.\n\n77.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore attaches significant weight to the existence of a serious purpose behind the request. This is not a case where FOIA has been used for purely private ends, nor is it a case where the requester lacked any rational basis for seeking the information. The Commissioner accepted that the request possessed some public value, and we agree with that assessment.\n\n78.\n\nThe Appellant submitted that the NPCC had overstated the degree of overlap between his requests. We accept that many of the requests relied upon by the NPCC were not identical and that some concerned distinct issues, such as disclosure arrangements, governance matters, circulars, weeding of records and other vehicle-related topics. This is not a case where the Appellant repeatedly submitted the same request in different forms.\n\n79.\n\nHowever, the Tribunal does not consider that the correct question is whether the requests were identical. The evidence demonstrates that they formed part of a continuing pattern of enquiries concerned with a relatively narrow field of activity. Although different aspects of that field were explored, the requests were linked by a common interest in vehicle crime, vehicle records, lost-or-stolen markers, recovery activity, disclosure practices and organisational arrangements connected with those issues.\n\n80.\n\nThe Tribunal therefore accepts the Commissioner's approach that the request must be viewed in context rather than in isolation. The significance of the previous requests is not that they sought precisely the same information, but that they formed part of an extensive history of engagement which provides the factual setting for the request under appeal.\n\nBurden\n\n81.\n\nThe burden imposed upon the public authority is, in the Tribunal's judgment, the central issue in this appeal. Whilst the Appellant was entitled to challenge aspects of the NPCC's evidence, the overall picture remains compelling.\n\n82.\n\nWe accept that the figure of 191 emails was not supported by the degree of particularisation that might have been expected by the Appellant. That said, we do not regard the appeal as turning upon the precise numerical accuracy of those figures. The significance of the email evidence lies in its illustration of a much broader point, namely the volume of work generated by the requests and associated correspondence. The oral evidence established that the figures were intended to capture work undertaken in processing requests, seeking information from relevant units, clarifying issues, consulting internally and preparing responses.\n\n83.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that compliance with FOIA is not limited to the exchange of correspondence between a requester and the public authority. A request generates work within the authority itself. In this case, the evidence demonstrates a sustained pattern of internal and external activity associated with the Appellant's requests. We therefore accept that the burden relied upon by the NPCC extended beyond the request itself and included the wider administrative work required to manage it.\n\n84.\n\nMoreover, the Tribunal accepts the NPCC's submission that the burden created by the request could not be assessed solely by reference to the work required to answer that request. The evidence demonstrated a consistent pattern in which responses generated further enquiries, further requests and further correspondence. Information provided by the NPCC rarely concluded a line of enquiry; rather, it typically became the starting point for additional investigation by the Appellant. The Tribunal is satisfied that the NPCC was entitled to take account of that reasonably anticipated future burden when assessing whether a tipping point had been reached for the purposes of section 14(1) FOIA.\n\n85.\n\nThe Tribunal further accepts that by April 2025 there had been a lengthy history of requests, reviews, clarifications and appeals. Even allowing for the fact that some references relied upon by the NPCC were reviews or appeal processes rather than originating requests, the cumulative workload generated by that history was substantial.\n\nDistress or Harassment\n\n86.\n\nThe Tribunal does not accept that this is a case involving deliberate harassment. We do not find that the Appellant intended to distress staff or that he made requests for that purpose. Nor do we find that he was motivated by personal animosity or bad faith.\n\n87.\n\nNevertheless,\nthe Tribunal accepts the evidence that the cumulative effect of the requests created difficulties for the FOI team and led to management involvement. The evidence established that concerns were raised regarding the volume and continuing nature of the requests and that steps were taken to assist staff in handling the associated correspondence. Whilst those matters are not decisive in themselves, they form part of the overall factual context.\n\n88.\n\nAccordingly, whilst we attach limited weight to distress as an independent factor, we do regard it as a consequence of the burden generated by the requests and therefore as something which properly forms part of the section 14 assessment.\n\nMotive\n\n89.\n\nThe Tribunal has considered the issue of motive. We do not accept that the Appellant was motivated by malice, hostility or a desire to harass the NPCC or its staff. Nor do we accept that the evidence establishes that he was pursuing a personal grudge against the authority. We found the Appellant's evidence that he has a longstanding interest in vehicle-crime related issues to be genuine.\n\n90.\n\nWe further accept that the Appellant believed that the information sought could contribute to a better understanding of matters which he regarded as important and that he pursued the requests for reasons he considered to be in the public interest.\n\n91.\n\nNevertheless, the Tribunal does not regard motive as a decisive factor in this appeal. Even where a requester is acting in good faith and pursuing a request which possesses serious purpose, section 14(1) may still be engaged where the cumulative burden imposed upon the authority becomes disproportionate when assessed in the round. The significance of motive in the present case is therefore that it weighs in the Appellant's favour, but it is not sufficient to outweigh the factors relating to burden, persistence and context discussed above.\n\nThe overall assessment of the case\n\n92.\n\nIn applying the approach set out in Dransfield, the Tribunal has considered all of the circumstances of the case in the round.\nThe various considerations relied upon by the parties overlap and cannot sensibly be compartmentalised. The Tribunal must therefore stand back and assess the overall picture.\n\n93.\n\nWhen we do so, we conclude that the request under appeal sits within a prolonged and escalating pattern of requests, reviews, clarifications and continuing correspondence. We accept that the requests were motivated by genuine concerns and that they possessed identifiable public value. We also accept that the Appellant acted in good faith. However, good faith and public value do not determine the outcome of the appeal. The statutory question remains whether the cumulative burden imposed on the authority had become disproportionate.\n\n94.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that the factors of motive and serious purpose weigh in the Appellant's favour. Had the request been assessed in isolation, those factors would have carried considerable weight. However, section 14 requires the Tribunal to evaluate the request in its full factual context. When the history of requests, reviews, clarifications and associated correspondence is taken into account, the Tribunal concludes that the cumulative burden upon the NPCC outweighed those factors.\n\n95.\n\nIn our judgment, by April 2025, that point had been reached. The request formed part of a continuing process in which information disclosed in one context routinely generated further requests and further engagement. The burden generated by that process had become substantial. Although each individual request may have been capable of justification, the cumulative effect was such that the Commissioner was entitled to conclude that the balance had shifted in favour of the NPCC.\nThe Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner was entitled to look beyond the immediate administrative burden created by the request itself. The evidence demonstrated a pattern in which disclosure commonly generated further enquiries and additional requests. It was therefore legitimate to take account of the reasonably anticipated future burden likely to arise if that cycle continued, as well as the burden which had already been incurred.\n\n96.\n\nHaving considered all of the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal therefore agrees with the Commissioner's conclusion that the request was vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1) FOIA and accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nSigned\nJudge Peri Mornington\nDate:\n6 October 2026\n\nAmended pursuant to Rule 40 of the 2009 Rules on16 October 2026","changes":[{"id":1238,"doc_id":15529,"v_from":16685,"v_to":17158,"detected_at":"2026-10-20 02:55:32","added":4,"removed":2,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-This Appeal dated 30 November 2025 and made by Mr Philip Smith (the “Appellant”) arises following a request for information (the “Request”) made by the Appellant to the NPCC on 4 April 2025 in the following terms:\n+This Appeal dated 30 November 2025 and made by Mr Philip Swift (the “Appellant”) arises following a request for information (the “Request”) made by the Appellant to the NPCC on 4 April 2025 in the following terms:\n-In accordance with section 58 FOIA, the Tribunal has considered the matter afresh and the issue for the Tribunal to decide upon is whether the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and whether the Commissioner was correct in finding that the NPCC was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA in refusing to reply to the Appellant’s request of 11 April 2025.\n+In accordance with section 58 FOIA, the Tribunal has considered the matter afresh and the issue for the Tribunal to decide upon is whether the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and whether the Commissioner was correct in finding that the NPCC was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA in refusing to reply to the Appellant’s request of 4 April 2025.\n+\n+Amended pursuant to Rule 40 of the 2009 Rules on16 October 2026"}]}