{"check":null,"uid":"289b41d4c99accb3","title":"Raj Pal Senna v Lewis Silkin LLP & Ors","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-03","summary":"Суд рассмотрел дело гражданина Радж Пал Сенны против юридической фирмы и ее сотрудников, связанных с торговыми марками. Рассматривались вопросы злоупотребления процессуальными мерами, использования информации о прошлом правонарушителе и подготовки доказательств в рамках разбирательства. Суд отказал заявителю в праве вносить изменения в исковое заявление и постановил прекратить разбирательство из-за отсутствия оснований для продолжения дела.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":75641,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2026/2806","first_seen":"2026-11-07","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:30","relevance":"hit","score":13,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":13,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":5,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":17192,"ctx":"dings and the defence of this put forward in the glass letter;  (2)  a claim under the uk gdpr, against the first defendant as data controller, for unlawful processing of the claimant’","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":17630,"ctx":"letter;  (3)  a claim for misuse of private information founded on the same facts as the data protection claim, as well as disclosing the information to hoya/those instructing the first defendan","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":19742,"ctx":"hat they agreed to use means that were unlawful, viz the breach of the roa, the breach of data protection legislation, the misuse of the claimant’s private information and the publication of mali","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":28998,"ctx":"llc [2019] ewhc 799 (qb) , [2019] qb 344 , a case where the claimants sought remedies in data protection law and the tort of misuse of private information in respect of google’s failure to delis","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":33497,"ctx":"nd misuse of private information and also under the human rights act 1998 ( hra ) and the data protection act 2018 ( dpa 2018 ).  59.  the distinctive features of the case, it was argued, were (1","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":39172,"ctx":"ntencing hearings in criminal proceedings would be vulnerable to claims in defamation and privacy on a huge scale: surely something that parliament cannot have intended. if it is the latt","zone":"текст","weight":0}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Интеллектуальная собственность в цифровой среде","term":"intellectual property","weak":true,"pos":348,"ctx":".  2.  the claim concerns the defendants’ conduct in trade mark proceedings before the uk intellectual property office ( ipo ) between 2023 and 2025 ( the trade mark proceedings ). the latest version o","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 5)"},{"topic":"Интеллектуальная собственность в цифровой среде","term":"intellectual property","weak":true,"pos":5802,"ctx":"mr bryant’s decisions either to the high court or the “appointed person” (an independent intellectual property practitioner): see trade marks act 1994 & trade mark rules 2008, r.70. it did not do so.","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 5)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-11-07","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] EWHC 2806 (KB)","court":"The King's Bench Division of the High Court"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2026/2806","text":"The Honourable Mr Justice Eardley:\n\nIntroduction\n\n1.\n\nThis is my judgment following the hearing of the Defendants’ application for a terminating ruling in these proceedings and the Claimant’s cross-application for permission to amend his Particulars of Claim.\n\n2.\n\nThe claim concerns the Defendants’ conduct in trade mark proceedings before the UK Intellectual Property Office (\nIPO\n) between 2023 and 2025 (\nthe Trade Mark Proceedings\n). The latest version of the Claimant’s Draft Amended Particulars of Claim (\nDAPOC\n) puts his case in a considerably more restricted way than originally pleaded, and it is this reformulation I shall address. It is the third draft amendment that he has put forward. The Defendants maintain that the claim, even as reformulated, is an abuse of process and fails to disclose any case with a realistic prospect of success.\n\n3.\n\nThe Claimant has some disabilities. He was assisted in court by his carer. We made various adjustments to accommodate his needs, and I am very grateful for the assistance of Court staff in relation to this. The Claimant appeared satisfied that he had been able to present his case as he wished.\n\n4.\n\nThis judgment is structured as follows:\n\nA.\n\nThe Parties [5]-[7]\n\nB.\n\nThe Trade Mark Proceedings – overview [8]-[13]\n\nC.\n\nThe Claimant’s spent conviction and its deployment in the Trade Mark Proceedings [14]-[27]\n\nD.\n\nOther relevant aspects of the Trade Mark Proceedings [28]-[35]\n\nE.\n\nThe Draft Amended Particulars of Claim [36]-[41]\n\nF.\n\nTerminating rulings and applications to amend [42]-[46]\n\nG.\n\nThe\nRehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974\n[47]-[55]\n\nH.\n\nImmunity from suit [56]-[73]\n\nI.\n\nAbuse of process [74]-[91]\n\nJ.\n\nThe claims now advanced by the Claimant [92]-[133]\n\nK.\n\nConclusion [134]-[138]\n\nA.\n\nTHE PARTIES\n\n5.\n\nThe Claimant was sole director of a company called Photo-Image Ltd (\nPhoto-Image\n) until 27 February 2024. He says that Photo-Image is a non-trading company that holds trade marks and domain names. He says that he personally carries on business, using the marks and domain names held by Photo-Image. He says his business includes making and supplying parts for various vintage cameras, including the Asahi Pentax camera, an iconic but now discontinued camera that was once marketed by a Japanese company eventually known as Pentax Corporation. He says he has been actively involved in the camera business since the 1980’s.\n\n6.\n\nThe First Defendant is a well-known firm of solicitors and the other Defendants are a solicitor, a paralegal, and two trade mark attorneys who work (or in the Fifth Defendant’s case, worked) for the firm.\n\n7.\n\nThe Fifth Defendant left the First Defendant firm sometime in 2023 to work elsewhere, as the Claimant accepts. She previously worked at another firm, Ablett & Stebbing, a fact on which the Claimant places reliance. The Defendants’ solicitor in the present action (Timothy Shepherd of RPC) has stated in a Witness Statement that the Fifth Defendant joined Ablett & Stebbing in 2015 and was never a partner. The Claimant did not distinctly accept this information, but neither did he identify any basis on which he might be able to dispute it, now or in the future.\n\nB. THE TRADE MARK PROCEEDINGS - OVERVIEW\n\n8.\n\nIn January 2023 Photo-Image applied to register two marks, each consisting of the words “ASAHI PENTAX” and a logo containing the letters AOCO. The Claimant represented Photo-Image throughout the ensuing proceedings, even after he ceased to be a director.\n\n9.\n\nPhoto-Image’s application was opposed by Hoya Corporation (\nHoya\n). The opposition was notified on 14 June 2023. Hoya is a Japanese company that says it acquired Pentax Corporation through a merger and then sold its camera business to another company, now called RICOH Imaging Company Ltd (\nRIC\n). RIC is said to own the Japanese trade mark for the AOCO device. The First Defendant acted (or purported to act) for Hoya in the Trade Mark Proceedings and the other Defendants worked on the case (although, in the Fifth Defendant’s case, this must have been for a very limited time). Hoya’s contention was that Photo-Image had applied to register the marks in bad faith:\nTrade Marks Act 1994\n,\ns3(6)\n.\n\n10.\n\nIn the course of the Trade Mark Proceedings, there were two case management conferences. The first was on 7 February 2024 (\nthe First CMC\n) which resulted in a written decision by the Hearing Officer (Judi Pike) dated 12 February 2024. I was told that this is publicly available.\n\n11.\n\nThe final hearing took place before another Hearing Officer, Mark Bryant, who, in a published written decision dated 14 July 2025, refused Photo-Image’s application for registration. He held that it fell short of acceptable standards of commercial behaviour and amounted to bad faith in that it was made with the intention of appropriating the ASAHI PENTAX brand through registration without the authority of the brand’s owner(s) and of misleading consumers into believing it was the brand owner. Mr Bryant rejected the remaining limb of Hoya’s allegation of bad faith, namely that Photo-Image had engaged in “trade mark squatting” (intentionally acquiring the marks, not with a view to using them in its own business, but with the intention of selling or licensing them back to Hoya). He said there was no evidence to this effect,\n“Rather, the evidence appears to illustrate that the applicant erroneously believed it is entitled to register and use the mark for its own business”\n.\n\n12.\n\nIn a supplementary decision dated 30 September 2025, Mr Bryant awarded Hoya “off-scale” costs, based on the manner in which the Claimant had conducted the proceedings on behalf of Photo-Image.\n\n13.\n\nPhoto-Image could have appealed against Mr Bryant’s decisions either to the High Court or the “Appointed Person” (an independent intellectual property practitioner): see\nTrade Marks Act 1994\n& Trade Mark Rules 2008, r.70. It did not do so. However, the Claimant (not Photo-Image) has brought three sets of proceedings which the Defendants characterise as an abusive attempt to relitigate the Trade Mark Proceedings or to pursue grievances about the conduct of those proceedings: this claim, a claim against Hoya’s counsel (Sam Carter) which has now been struck out, and a judicial review of the IPO decision.\n\nC. The Claimant’s spent conviction and its deployment in the Trade Mark Proceedings\n\n14.\n\nIn 1998 the Claimant was convicted under a different name for an offence and sentenced to a substantial term of imprisonment (\nthe Conviction\n). I do not need to give further details in this public judgment. The Claimant contends that dishonesty was not an essential ingredient of the offence, but the cases he cited do not seem to support that proposition. I do not need to determine the point.\n\n15.\n\nIn June 2023, in anticipation of the Trade Mark Proceedings, the First Defendant instructed a specialist trade mark research and brand protection agency, Cerberus IP Ltd (\nCerberus)\nto conduct an investigation into the Claimant. The instructions referred to an online press article that mentioned the Conviction and asked Cerberus to obtain “any past criminal records” for the Claimant and “any other information which would undermine Mr Senna’s credibility and show his bad faith intent”.\n\n16.\n\nCerberus reported back on 14 June 2023, confirming the Conviction as well as other information about the Claimant’s lengthy history of civil litigation, noting at the time that he was the subject of an Extended Civil Restraint Order. Their report said it had been compiled using “open-source searches” and referred in particular to a judgment of Julian Knowles J from 2020 which identifies the Claimant by his current name and gives details of the Conviction and resulting sentence. Other cases were identified as well.\n\n17.\n\nCerberus appear to have used subscription databases to find these cases, but Mr Shepherd exhibited 3 judgments which mention the Conviction (the latest of which being the Knowles J judgment) printed off from Bailii, the well-known free database of caselaw. Mr Harris told me these are also likely to be available and easy to locate on the National Archives website, which I accept.\n\n18.\n\nThe Claimant contends that Hoya’s Statement of Grounds of Opposition, filed in the Trade Mark Proceedings in July 2023, relied on the Conviction. That is demonstrably not the case. The document was in evidence before me and all that it says about information obtained from Cerberus is that\n“The results of the investigation have shown compelling evidence that Mr Senna was/is engaged in trade mark squatting activities”\n(an allegation which, I have already mentioned, was ultimately rejected by Mr Bryant).\n\n19.\n\nHowever, the Second Defendant did make reference to the Conviction and the Claimant’s long litigation history in a Witness Statement filed in the Trade Mark Proceedings on 19 January 2024.\n\n20.\n\nAt the First CMC, counsel for Hoya (Mr Carter, instructed by the First Defendant) deployed the Conviction when resisting the Claimant’s objection to the Second Defendant’s evidence on grounds of relevance. He said,\n“I think we accept that it may not be relevant”\nbut then submitted that “\nA conviction of that nature necessarily involves an intent to defraud\n[and]…\na finding of dishonesty\n”, the implication being that it was a form of bad character evidence that could support a case that the Claimant had dishonest intentions when causing Photo-Image to register the marks. The Claimant objected vociferously to this.\n\n21.\n\nThe Claimant also complains that, though they referred to the Conviction, the Defendants and counsel did not draw attention to the fact that he was “acquitted” in related confiscation proceedings in 1998.\n\n22.\n\nIn her written decision following the First CMC, Ms Pike referred to\n“the evidence pertaining to his interactions with the judicial system”\nand said\n“the weight of evidence is a matter for me to assess at the end of the proceedings. I may give this particular evidence some weight in the context of the bad faith claim or I may give it none at all…The evidence is admissible and will not be excluded.”\n\n23.\n\nThe Claimant wrote a letter of claim to the First Defendant complaining (among other things) about the acquisition and use of the information about the Conviction. In a letter of response on 27 February 2024 (referred to by the Claimant as the\nGlass Letter\n) the First Defendant defended its conduct.\n\n24.\n\nIn June 2024 however, the First Defendant withdrew its reliance on the Conviction and filed a redacted version of the Second Defendant’s Witness Statement omitting the reference to the Conviction and other aspects of the Claimant’s litigation history.\n\n25.\n\nHoya’s representatives placed no reliance on the spent conviction at the final hearing but the Claimant chose to bring it up. However, Mr Bryant noted in his Decision that\n“the opponent voluntarily removed from its evidence all references to this and it formed no part of my considerations”\n.\n\n26.\n\nMr Bryant referred to the Conviction once again in his supplementary decision on costs, stating,\n“It is clear that Mr Senna perceived the opponent’s initial reliance upon the existence of a spent conviction to contribute to his perception of a ‘hostile situation’. However, despite a previous hearing officer allowing the opponent’s reliance upon this spent conviction, following further information provided by Mr Senna, the opponent voluntarily removed all references to it in its submissions and evidence.”\nAgain, it was clearly the Claimant who had brought up the Conviction again.\n\n27.\n\nMr Bryant did not give any details about the Conviction in either of his published decisions.\n\nD.\nOther relevant aspects of the Trade Mark proceedings\n\n28.\n\nIn his original Particulars of Claim the Claimant relied on a number of aspects of the Trade Mark Proceedings to allege (in effect) that the Defendants had secured the result dishonestly. These have been relegated somewhat in the DAPOC (fraud is no longer a head of claim) but they have not been removed entirely, so it is necessary to summarise the Claimant’s complaints and how they were dealt with in the Trade Mark Proceedings. I adopt the shorthand used by the Defendants:\n\n29.\n\nThe\nLack of Authority Issue\n. The Claimant contends that the First Defendant did not have authority from Hoya to act for that company. In her decision after the First CMC, Ms Pike rejected this as “misconceived”.\n\n30.\n\nSubsequently, the Claimant obtained a letter from a senior lawyer at Hoya dated 7 March 2024 which stated that RIM\n“Is substantially conducting such opposition proceeding as the licensee of certain Pentax trademarks from HOYA, in the name of HOYA…Therefore, the statements in such proceedings were made by RIM’s attorney, Lewis Silkin LLP under instruction of, and on behalf of, RIM. HOYA has not been substantially involved in such opposition proceedings, including the Statement of Grounds of Opposition signed by Lewis Silkin LLP”\n.\n\n31.\n\nQuite what is being said in that letter is unclear, but the Claimant relied on it to re-open the issue, first in correspondence with the IPO and again at the final hearing. The IPO did not reverse its finding that the Claimant’s challenge was misconceived.\n\n32.\n\nThe\nNo Valid Opposition Issue\n. The Claimant alleged before the IPO that Hoya had no valid grounds for opposing registration, including an allegation that Pentax Corporation had not validly transferred two marks to Hoya (not the marks that were the subject of the Trade Mark Proceedings).\n\n33.\n\nA sub-issue here was the\nTM16 Allegation\n: the Claimant alleged that, prior to the commencement of the proceedings, false TM16 forms had been filed. These are forms used to register a change in the ownership of a trade mark with the IPO. He alleged that the forms (filed in 2010 and 2012) purported to record transfers by the Pentax Corporation to Hoya at a time when Pentax Corporation had ceased to exist. The forms were completed on behalf of Pentax Corporation by Ablett & Stebbing. The DAPOC allege that this was done by the Fifth Defendant. I presume the Claimant no longer maintains that position, given the evidence that she did not join Ablett & Stebbing until 2015. He asserts that the TM16s were used to procure the fraudulent registration of marks in Hoya’s name. He then accuses all the Defendants of dishonestly concealing this information in the Trade Mark Proceedings.\n\n34.\n\nThe TM16 Allegation was extensively ventilated in the Trade Mark Proceedings, even though they did not involve the same marks (with Hoya’s position being that it had acquired the marks referred to in the TM16s upon merger with Pentax Corporation and before the latter’s dissolution). Mr Bryant noted it but did not need to resolve it: Hoya did not have to prove ownership of any marks to bring their opposition. It was sufficient for Hoya to demonstrate that there was residual goodwill in the ASAHI PENTAX brand and that the goodwill did not belong to Photo-Image.\n\n35.\n\nThe\nCorporate Veil Issue\n. The Claimant asserted in the Trade Mark Proceedings that Hoya’s attribution of bad faith to Photo-Image by reference to his own character and conduct was an illegitimate attempt to “pierce the corporate veil”. Mr Bryant expressly addressed this in his decision, explaining that Hoya was not seeking to “pierce the corporate veil” in the sense that phrase is used in the authorities (e.g. seeking to hold the Claimant personally liable for acts done by Photo-Image) and that the IPO was entitled to consider the Claimant’s motives and intentions when assessing whether Photo-Image had registered the marks in bad faith, given his role as sole director and moving force behind the company at the time of registration.\n\nE. THE DRAFT AMENDED PARTICULARS OF CLAIM\n\n36.\n\nAlthough more succinct than the original Particulars of Claim, the DAPOC are still prolix and argumentative. However, I disregard those aspects for the time being because if there were any merit in the underlying claim, these matters could perhaps be cured by further redrafting.\n\n37.\n\nThe DAPOC focus on the deployment of the Conviction (by which I mean its inclusion in the Second Defendant’s Witness Statement, and then the submissions that were made about it at the First CMC). From time-to-time, reliance is also placed on the matters that preceded and followed this deployment: the instruction to Cerberus, the obtaining of information about the Conviction from Cerberus, the reporting of this to Hoya, and the Glass Letter which sought to defend the deployment of the Conviction.\n\n38.\n\nSix causes of action are now identified. I can summarise them as follows:\n\n(1)\n\nA claim for breach of statutory duty under the\nRehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974\n(\nROA\n), alleged against the First to Fourth Defendants. The Claimant contends that the ROA gives rise to a private law cause of action for rehabilitated offenders where its terms have been breached. The alleged breach is the commissioning and obtaining of the Cerberus report, the deployment of the Conviction in the Trade Mark Proceedings and the defence of this put forward in the Glass Letter;\n\n(2)\n\nA claim under the UK GDPR, against the First Defendant as data controller, for unlawful processing of the Claimant’s “criminal offence data” consisting of the commissioning of the Cerberus report, the obtaining of the details of the Conviction from Cerberus, and then the deployment of the Conviction in the Trade Mark Proceedings, as well as mentioning it in the Glass Letter;\n\n(3)\n\nA claim for misuse of private information founded on the same facts as the data protection claim, as well as disclosing the information to Hoya/those instructing the First Defendant;\n\n(4)\n\nA claim for malicious falsehood based on seven identified statements made in the course of the Trade Mark Proceedings. Five of these are statements made by Mr Carter; one is an allegation included in Hoya’s Statement of Grounds (to the effect that the Claimant had caused Photo-Image to apply to register the marks as an exercise in “trade mark squatting”); one is an allegation included in the Second Defendant’s witness statement recording that the Cerberus Report showed that the Claimant and his affiliated companies had not used the marks in question commercially. Particulars of falsity are given. As to malice, the Claimant asserts that Mr Carter and the Defendants knew the statements to be untrue, or were reckless as to their truth or falsity and that they were made as part of a personal attack on the Claimant;\n\n(5)\n\nA claim for abuse of process. The Claimant alleges that the Defendants pursued the Trade Mark Proceedings for a predominant improper purpose, that purpose being to discredit and silence the Claimant personally; to cut the Claimant off from his backers and customers; and to deter him from exposing the allegedly fraudulent TM16 forms and the alleged fact that the Defendants were acting without authority from Hoya. Of the 11 “facts” relied on, 6 were statements made in the Trade Mark Proceedings. Beyond this, the Claimant relies on the Defendants’ investigation of him via Cerberus; the fact that he was targeted personally even though he was not a party; and the Defendants’ “silence” in the face of his accusations about the TM16 forms and the First Defendant’s lack of authority to act;\n\n(6)\n\nA claim for conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, pleaded against all the Defendants (with Mr Carter being named as a co-conspirator). The Claimant alleges that all the Defendants and Mr Carter combined to injure the Claimant personally (as per the abuse of process claim) and that they agreed to use means that were unlawful, viz the breach of the ROA, the breach of data protection legislation, the misuse of the Claimant’s private information and the publication of malicious falsehoods, as already set out in the first to fourth causes of action.\n\n39.\n\nThe DAPOC repeatedly stress that the Claimant is not seeking to impugn the correctness of Mr Bryant’s determination in the Trade Mark Proceedings. Nevertheless, the DAPOC contain lengthy passages reviving the Lack of Authority Issue, the TM16 Allegation and the Corporate Veil Issue which are incorporated by reference when the Claimant alleges malice, collateral purpose and an intention to injure.\n\n40.\n\nThe DAPOC purport to explain why the claim lies against all the Defendants (or, in the case of some causes of action, the Defendants the Claimant has identified) and why the statements of Mr Carter in the course of submissions can be relied on against the Defendants. His pleaded case on these issues struck me as unpromising but, apart from objecting to the inclusion of the Fifth Defendant (considered below), Mr Harris did not focus his submissions on this aspect of the Claimant’s case.\n\n41.\n\nThe Claimant claims general, special, aggravated and exemplary damages. He asserts he has suffered psychiatric harm, distress, reputational harm, loss of his directorship at Photo-Image and economic loss in the form of damage to his camera repair and service business as well as money spent mitigating the harm caused by the Defendants’ actions. He claims he is entitled to damages of at least £375,000. Again, the Defendants did not focus their attack on the damages pleading, other than to submit that the Claimant’s claim to have been distressed by the limited disclosure of the Conviction is “incredible”.\n\nF.\n\nTerminating rulings and applications to amend\n\n42.\n\nThe Court may strike out a Claimant’s statement of case if it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim, or if it is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings, or where there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order (CPR 3.4(2)).\n\n43.\n\nWhere a statement of case is found to be defective, the Court should consider whether the defects might be cured by amendment and, if so, whether it should give the party an opportunity to amend.\n\n44.\n\nSummary judgment may be entered under CPR Part 24 where the claim has no realistic prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason why the case should continue to trial. The correct approach was summarised by Lewison J in\nEasyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd\n[2009] EWHC 339 at [15] (cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in\nAC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd\n[2009] EWCA Civ 1098\n). I do not need to set out this very well-known passage here. The Claimant places particular emphasis on the need to avoid a “mini-trial” and the fact that I must consider not only evidence already available but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial.\n\n45.\n\nBoth under CPR 3.4(2) and CPR Part 24 the Court can and should resolve a short point of law provided it is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument. By contrast, the authorities caution against determining an issue summarily, without full fact-finding at a trial, when the relevant area of law is in a state of development.\n\n46.\n\nA party applying to amend their statement of case must show that the proposed amended case has a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success: see the summary in\nElite Property Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank PLC\n[2019] EWCA Civ 204\nat [40]-[42].\n\nG.\n\nTHE REHABILITATION OF OFFENDERS ACT 1974\n\n47.\n\nThe Claimant places reliance on the ROA in two ways: first, he says it cuts down the immunity from suit that otherwise attaches to legal proceedings; second, he says it gives rise to a private law cause of action that he is entitled to advance. Given the central importance of the ROA to the Claimant’s case, it is necessary to address some of its key provisions here.\n\n48.\n\nThe preamble states that the ROA is “\nAn Act to rehabilitate offenders who have not been reconvicted of any serious offence for periods of years, to penalise the unauthorised disclosure of their previous convictions, to amend the law of defamation, and for purposes connected therewith”\n.\n\n49.\n\nThere is no dispute that, within the meaning of\nthe Act\n, the Claimant is a “rehabilitated person” and that the Conviction was “spent” when the Defendants obtained information about it and deployed it.\n\n50.\n\nSection 4 relevantly provides:\n\n4.\n\n— Effect of rehabilitation.\n\n(1)\n\nSubject to\nsections 7 and 8\nbelow, a person who has become a rehabilitated person for the purposes of\nthis Act\nin respect of a conviction shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction; and, notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, but subject as aforesaid—\n\n(a)\n\nno evidence shall be admissible in any proceedings before a judicial authority exercising its jurisdiction or functions in England and Wales to prove that any such person has committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for any offence which was the subject of a spent conviction; and\n\n(b)\n\na person shall not, in any such proceedings, be asked, and, if asked, shall not be required to answer, any question relating to his past which cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to a spent conviction or spent convictions or any circumstances ancillary thereto.\n\n(2)\n\nSubject to the provisions of any order made under subsection (4) below, where a question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances is put to him or to any other person otherwise than in proceedings before a judicial authority—\n\n(a)\n\nthe question shall be treated as not relating to spent convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent convictions, and the answer thereto may be framed accordingly; and\n\n(b)\n\nthe person questioned shall not be subjected to any liability or otherwise prejudiced in law by reason of any failure to acknowledge or disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction in his answer to the question.\n\n(3)\n\nSubject to the provisions of any order made under subsection (4) below,—\n\n(a)\n\nany obligation imposed on any person by any rule of law or by the provisions of any agreement or arrangement to disclose any matters to any other person shall not extend to requiring him to disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction (whether the conviction is his own or another's); and\n\n(b)\n\na conviction which has become spent or any circumstances ancillary thereto, or any failure to disclose a spent conviction or any such circumstances, shall not be a proper ground for dismissing or excluding a person from any office, profession, occupation or employment, or for prejudicing him in any way in any occupation or employment.\n\n51.\n\nSection 7 provides various exceptions to the prohibition on admitting evidence about a spent conviction. These are mostly defined by reference to the type of proceedings (s7(2)(a) for example disapplies the prohibition in criminal proceedings). Section 7(2)(f) disapplies the prohibition where the person is a party or a witness and they consent. Subject to some irrelevant limitations, section 7(3) allows a court to direct that the spent conviction and ancillary circumstances can be admitted where satisfied that\n“justice cannot be done in the case except by admitting or requiring evidence relating to a person’s spent convictions or to circumstances ancillary thereto”\n.\n\n52.\n\nPausing there, the Claimant did not distinctly consent to his Conviction and ancillary matters being ventilated at the hearing before me. Out of an abundance of caution (I rather doubt that any party was putting forward the Conviction to prove that the Claimant had been convicted and sentenced – which was common ground), I made a direction under s7(3).\n\n53.\n\nSection 8 concerns defamation actions where the statement complained of alleges that a rehabilitated person has committed (etc) an offence for which, by the time of publication, their conviction has become spent. It is somewhat complex but, for example, it provides that a defence of truth based on the fact of the conviction will fail if a claimant can prove that the defendant published the allegation maliciously: s8(5).\n\n54.\n\nSection 9 creates an offence where (in summary) a person with access to official records discloses information about a spent conviction contained in the records otherwise than in the course of their official duties. It also makes it an offence for anyone to obtain information about a spent conviction from any official record by fraud, dishonesty or bribery.\n\n55.\n\nWarby J considered the ROA in\nNT1 v Google LLC\n[2019] EWHC 799 (QB)\n,\n[2019] QB 344\n, a case where the claimants sought remedies in data protection law and the tort of misuse of private information in respect of Google’s failure to delist links to press articles referring to their spent convictions. At [17] Warby J described the words in s4(1)\n“shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed… the offence”\nas\n“wording of exceptional breadth that might at first sight be thought to provide a complete and ready answer to these claims”\n. However, he continued: “\nBut nobody suggests that this is its effect. All parties have treated\nsection 4(1)\nas embodying a legal policy to which the court should have regard in resolving the issues before it\n.”\n\nH.\n\nIMMUNITY FROM SUIT\n\n56.\n\nIn\nXGY v Chief Constable of Sussex Police\n[2025] EWCA Civ 1230\n,\n[2026] KB 365\nthe Court of Appeal comprehensively reviewed the law concerning the circumstances in which the common law doctrine of immunity from suit prohibits claims based on statements made in the course of, or in preparation for, legal proceedings (\nthe Immunity Rule\n). The Court summarised its conclusions at [30] as follows:\n\n“(i)\n\nIt is a general principle that every wrong should have a remedy. Nonetheless, it is necessary for the proper administration of justice that advocates, parties, witnesses, judges, and jurors are immune from suit for statements made in court whatever the cause of action, regardless of whether the statement was made maliciously or was irrelevant to the court proceedings. This is known as the core immunity. It is founded on public policy and is intended to encourage freedom of expression and communication in court proceedings in order to protect the proper administration of justice and the interests of justice.\n\n(ii)\n\nThe core immunity can be extended if the extension is necessary for the proper administration of justice, which is a strict test. There are two established extensions: witnesses and potential witnesses are immune from suit for statements made outside of court with a view to giving evidence. This extends to the preparation of evidence they are likely to give in court proceedings, including their preliminary examination to ascertain what they could prove. And investigators are immune from suit for statements made as part of the process of investigation.\n\n(iii)\n\n[…]\n\n(iv)\n\nIn order for the core immunity and extensions to be practicable and effective, it must be foreseeable at the time of its making whether a statement will be immune.\n\n(v)\n\nPublic policy can change over time and be re-evaluated. When an established immunity is re-evaluated or an extension to an established immunity is contemplated, careful justification is required for a departure from the principle that every wrong should have a remedy. There is an important distinction, however, between that position, and determining whether on its facts, a case falls within an established immunity. To impose a requirement of justification in the latter case, would fundamentally undermine the utility and purpose of the core immunity, and cut across the policy reasons for its […]\n\n(vi)\n\nAs a consequence of the re-evaluation in [\nArthur JS Hall & Co v Simons\n[2002] 1 AC 615\n] and [\nJones v Kaney\n[2011] 2 AC 398\n], advocates can now be liable to their clients for the negligent conduct of court proceedings and expert witnesses can be liable for breach of duty to those who retain them. Beyond that, advocates can still claim the core immunity.”\n\n57.\n\nAlso of relevance is what Sharp P said at [16]:\n\n“The effectiveness of the immunity would be undermined if the scope of the protection afforded had to be tested after the event in each case. As Lord Hoffmann explained in\nTaylor\n[\nv Director of Serious Fraud Office\n[1999] 2 AC 177\n] at 214E-G, if the core immunity is to be effective in enabling those involved in the administration of justice to “speak freely without fear of being sued, the person in question must know at the time he speaks whether or not the immunity will attach””.\n\n58.\n\nXGY\nconcerned a criminal prosecution for alleged domestic violence and rape. The complainant had provided her new address to the police in confidence. The police included the address in documents sent to the CPS for a forthcoming bail hearing, so that appropriate bail conditions could be set. At the hearing, the CPS advocate read out the new address in the presence of the defendant. The complainant brought claims for breach of confidence and misuse of private information and also under the\nHuman Rights Act 1998\n(\nHRA\n) and the\nData Protection Act 2018\n(\nDPA 2018\n).\n\n59.\n\nThe distinctive features of the case, it was argued, were (1) that the provision of the address was purely for administrative purposes, not for the purposes of presenting evidence or argument, and therefore fell outside the scope of the immunity as previously articulated; and (2) the claim was based not only on common law/equitable causes of action but on the statutory provisions of the HRA and the DPA 2018.\n\n60.\n\nThe Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by these arguments and restated the immunity in the broad terms set out above. As to the latter point, Sharp P said, at [77]: “\nIf Parliament had intended the\nHRA\n(or the\nDPA\nfor that matter) to cut across the common law immunity from suit, such an intention would need to be clearly expressed in\nthe Act\n, or arise by necessary implication”\n(citing\nR v SSHD, Ex p Pierson\n[1998] AC 539\n).\n\n61.\n\nXGY\nis presently the subject of a further appeal and, by a quirk of timing, the Supreme Court heard argument on the day before I heard these applications. I raised with the parties whether I should stay the present applications until the Supreme Court had delivered judgment. For different reasons, everyone urged me not to take this course. They showed me the statement of facts and grounds for the Supreme Court appeal.\n\n62.\n\nMr Harris, for the Defendants, stressed that he relied on the immunity only in relation to the preparation and delivery of evidence and argument in the Trade Mark Proceedings. He submitted that it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would revisit this aspect of the immunity, given that the distinctive feature of\nXGY\n(it is said) is that the statement complained of was of a different character (administrative, not evidence or argument).\n\n63.\n\nThe Claimant meanwhile submitted that the Supreme Court is highly unlikely to qualify what Sharp P said, at [77], about the circumstances in which statute might cut down the immunity. He must be right about that because the Supreme Court refused XGY permission to appeal on the question of whether the immunity was restricted by the HRA or the DPA 2018. Whatever the Supreme Court decides, it will apply, it seems, to all causes of action founded on statements made during or in preparation for the purposes of litigation, whether common law or statutory.\n\n64.\n\nI have therefore decided that I must determine the immunity issue now. It is a short point of law and there are no relevant disputes of fact that need to be resolved before I grapple with it.\n\n65.\n\nMr Harris submits that the inclusion of information about the Conviction in the Second Defendant’s Witness Statement, and the subsequent deployment of this information by the Defendants and counsel in the Trade Mark Proceedings, all plainly fall within the “core immunity” or the well-recognised extension of the core immunity to cover the preparation of materials for use at a hearing. He does not seek to argue that the Immunity Rule covers other matters, e.g. the Defendants’ acquisition of the Cerberus report, or the filing of the allegedly fraudulent TM16s.\n\n66.\n\nThe Claimant accepts that the Trade Mark Proceedings were judicial proceedings to which the immunity applies in principle. However, he said there are two reasons why the immunity does not apply in this particular case. First, he submits that the words of ROA s4 (that a rehabilitated person “\nshall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction…\n”) expressly or by necessary implication restrict the scope of the immunity. Second, he submits that the immunity cannot be relied upon by lawyers who were acting without the authority of their purported client, which he says is a triable issue in this case.\n\n67.\n\nDealing first with the ROA point, I reject the Claimant’s submission that the words of ROA s4 that he relies on expressly or by necessary implication restrict the scope of the immunity. That is for four reasons:\n\n(1)\n\nI agree with what Warby J said about these words in\nNT1\nat [17], where he implicitly accepted the characterisation placed on them by the parties. They are indeed words\n“of exceptional breadth”\nbut they serve to identify a\n“legal policy to which the court should have regard in resolving the issues before it\n” rather than having direct legal effect;\n\n(2)\n\nThe “legal policy” articulated in s4(1) is given effect, among other things, by the restrictions on evidence and questions in legal proceedings set out in s4(1)(a) and (b). They place an onus on the Court to ensure that spent convictions are not brought up in the course of proceedings unless the exceptions in s7 apply. It does not, follow, however that, if a party or witness fails to respect these prohibitions, they lose the immunity. On the contrary, the case law on the immunity reviewed in\nXGY\nstresses that the immunity does not turn on fine distinctions as to what may or may not be relevant or admissible. If Parliament had intended that the ROA should change this approach, much clearer wording would have been required;\n\n(3)\n\nIt was not clear to me whether the Claimant was arguing that the immunity is abrogated in all cases which are founded on the mention of a spent conviction, or only where the spent conviction is deployed in circumstances where none of the conditions in s7 are met. Both versions of the argument are highly problematic. If it is the former, then advocates who mention spent convictions in (e.g.) sentencing hearings in criminal proceedings would be vulnerable to claims in defamation and privacy on a huge scale: surely something that Parliament cannot have intended. If it is the latter, then, in a case where the spent conviction is only admissible because of a direction under s7(3), advocates and witnesses would be vulnerable to civil claims in respect of statements made in support of an application for permission to rely on the conviction, even if permission is eventually granted. That would be absurd, but the ROA gives no clue as to how the immunity should be preserved in the meantime. That suggests very strongly that Parliament did not intend to abrogate the immunity at all;\n\n(4)\n\nPerhaps more simply, and stepping back, applying the Immunity Rule to statements about a person with a spent conviction would not involve a failure to treat them as a person who has not committed (etc) the offence. It would be treating them in exactly the same way as a person who has not committed an offence, because the Immunity Rule applies equally to everyone who is mentioned in evidence or argument in the course of legal proceedings.\n\n68.\n\nAs to the Claimant’s submission that the immunity cannot protect the Defendants because the First Defendant lacked authority to conduct the Trade Mark Proceedings on behalf of Hoya, there are two answers.\n\n69.\n\nFirst, for the reasons I explain below, it is not open to the Claimant to revive, in these proceedings, his contention that the First Defendant lacked authority in the Trade Mark Proceedings. That would be an abuse of process.\n\n70.\n\nSecond, and more fundamentally, the Claimant’s submission is irreconcilable with what was said by Sharp P in\nXGY\nat [16], namely that, if the immunity is to be effective and serve its public policy ends, advocates and witnesses must be able to know for certain when they speak (or prepare their evidence) whether the immunity will attach or not.\n\n71.\n\nQuestions about whether lawyers have been properly instructed to act for a party do arise from time to time in litigation. There may be some defect in the formal instructions; there may be - particularly in cases involving complicated corporate structures – doubts about whether the authority has been granted by the relevant entity within a group; there may be doubts about the precise scope of the instructions and whether an advocate has strayed outside them in the heat of argument. Matters like that cannot be relied on to unpick the immunity if it is to serve its purpose. The Defendants (and Mr Carter) participated in the Trade Mark Proceedings as lawyers and (in the Second Defendant’s case) a witness. That is sufficient to bring them within the immunity. The contrary is not arguable.\n\n72.\n\nThere is no “developing area of law” here that might require me to defer determination until further fact-finding at trial. That principle is not engaged simply by asserting a proposition of law that has never previously been recognised.\n\n73.\n\nI deal with some specific points about the Immunity Rule in the context of claims for abuse of process and conspiracy when addressing those aspects of the DAPOC below.\n\nI.\n\nABUSE OF PROCESS\n\n74.\n\nI am dealing here with the Defendants’ submission that the claim is an abuse of process, not the Claimant’s contention that the Defendants have committed the tort of abuse of process (addressed below). The Defendants put their case on abuse of process in two ways.\n\nAbuse of process through re-litigation\n\n75.\n\nFirst, the Defendants allege that, in important respects, the present claim is an abusive attempt to relitigate matters already determined in the Trade Mark Proceedings. Looked at in substance, the Defendants say, the Claimant is repeating his case on the Lack of Authority Issue, the TM16 Allegation, the Corporate Veil Issue, and the issue of the spent Conviction.\n\n76.\n\nThe Claimant disputes this. He says that, whatever the faults of the original Particulars of Claim, he has made it expressly clear in the DAPOC that he is not trying to invalidate the outcome of the Trade Mark Proceedings. He makes the point that neither he nor the Defendants were parties to the Trade Mark Proceedings and that the claim he now brings is for loss and damage suffered personally and not by reason of Photo-Image’s loss of the marks.\n\n77.\n\nIn\nAllsop v Banner Jones Ltd\n[2021] EWCA Civ 7\n,\n[2022] Ch 55\nat [44]-[45], Marcus Smith J (for the Court of Appeal) explained that the court’s jurisdiction to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process is an “exceptional” jurisdiction. It may arise in cases where, even though questions of\nres judicata\nor issue estoppel do not arise (because the parties in the later proceedings are different from those in the earlier proceedings), the second proceedings are being used to relitigate an issue already decided in the first proceedings. The fact that a second claim involves relitigation may render it abusive, but that fact alone does not even raise a prima facie case of abuse. Further (he continued, at [44] (c)):\n\n“…it is necessary to be very clear what is meant by relitigation. In my judgment, relitigation means arguing the same issue, that has already been determined in earlier proceedings, all over again in later proceedings. In civil proceedings, generally speaking, for an issue to be the same, it will arise as between the same parties (or their privies). That is why, in such cases, the doctrine of res judicata estoppel comes into play. The role of the doctrine of abuse of process is, correspondingly, much more limited. The abuse doctrine will only arise where one of the parties to the earlier litigation sues a stranger to that litigation. In such a case, the claim will typically be permissible and not abusive, and that will generally be because the case is not one of relitigation at all…”\n\n78.\n\nMarcus Smith J gave, as an illustration of relitigation that was abusive, the case of\nLaing v Taylor Walton\n[2008] PNLR 11\n, CA where the earlier decision\n“was being revisited in later and distinct proceedings on the basis of no new evidence at all”\nsuch that¸\n“In reality… the subsequent proceedings were no more than an (improper) attempt to appeal the decision of”\nthe Judge in the first proceedings: [44](b).\n\n79.\n\nMarcus Smith J concluded, at [45], by saying:\n\n“In short, the doctrine of abuse of process is best framed, at least in the context of a collateral attack on a prior civil decision, by reference to the test expounded by Lord Diplock and Morritt V-C [\nin Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police\n\n[1982] AC 529\n]: If the parties to the later civil proceedings were not parties to or privies of those who were parties to the earlier proceedings then it will only be an abuse of the process of the court to challenge the factual findings and conclusions of the judge in the earlier action if (a) it would be manifestly unfair to a party to the later proceedings that the same issues should be relitigated or (b) to permit such relitigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”\n\n80.\n\nAbuse of process of this kind is not confined to collateral attacks on the earlier decision of a court. It can arise where the alleged collateral attack is on the decision of a tribunal or other body:\nKamoka v Security Service\n\n[2017] EWCA Civ 1665\n, at [75] (Flaux LJ).\n\n81.\n\nIt is clear, from this exposition of the law, that it is no answer for the Claimant to say that the parties in the present claim are different, or that he is not seeking to overturn the ultimate decision of the IPO. It suffices if he is seeking to relitigate matters that were decided along the way by the Hearing Officers, provided that this is “relitigation” in the narrow sense described by Marcus Smith J and that there are other attendant circumstances that render the exercise manifestly unfair to the present Defendants or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.\n\n82.\n\nI am satisfied that there are some aspects of the present claim that do amount to an abuse of this variety. They impugn the conduct of the Defendants in substantially the same terms as the Claimant used in the Trade Mark Proceedings, and on substantially the same evidence, and where the IPO clearly rejected the Claimant’s submissions.\n\n83.\n\nFirst, there are passages in the DAPOC which seek to resurrect the Lack of Authority Issue, now repackaged to show, it is said, that the Defendants had a dishonest state of mind (where that is required by one of the causes of action relied on) and/or to challenge\n“the capacity in which they did the acts complained of”\n(which I take to be a reference to the argument - disposed of above - that the Immunity Rule does not apply because the First Defendant was not properly instructed by Hoya).\n\n84.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the Lack of Authority Issue was determined in the Trade Mark Proceedings by Ms Pike and that Mr Bryant then declined to revisit the decision notwithstanding the emergence of the curious 7 March 2024 letter. No new evidence is put forward. It would be manifestly unfair to make the Defendants defend themselves for a second time on this issue.\n\n85.\n\nSecond, there are passages in the DAPOC which seek to resurrect the Corporate Veil Issue, now repackaged in support of the allegation that the Trade Mark Proceedings were conducted in a way which amounted to a gratuitous personal attack on the Claimant’s own personal character and conduct, an allegation which the Claimant contends assists him on the causes of action he now seeks to plead.\n\n86.\n\nAgain, there can be no doubt that the Corporate Veil Issue was determined by Mr Bryant and that the Claimant is trying to resurrect it with no new evidence. Mr Bryant clearly determined that Hoya were permitted to rely on the Claimant’s character and conduct to advance their case that Photo-Image had registered the marks in bad faith, and that this did not involve “piercing the corporate veil”. Again, it would be manifestly unfair to make the Defendants defend themselves for a second time on this issue.\n\n87.\n\nBy contrast, I would not exclude, on the grounds of abusive relitigation, the Claimant’s resurrection of the TM16 Allegation. That may cast some light on his motives more generally but, as far as I can tell, it was not determined in the Trade Mark Proceedings, no doubt because Mr Bryant considered that it was unnecessary for Hoya to show that it was the owner of any particular mark in order to bring their opposition.\n\n88.\n\nFor slightly different reasons, I would also not exclude, on the grounds of abusive relitigation, the Claimant’s complaint about the deployment of the Conviction. It is true that Ms Pike ruled it admissible and that, implicitly, the Claimant is now inviting the Court to find that this decision was wrong. However, so far as I can tell (I may not have seen all the relevant materials), her attention was not drawn to the heightened test for admissibility set out in ROA s7(3). If it had otherwise been open to the Claimant to rely on the deployment of the Conviction in the Trade Mark Proceedings (it is not – because of the Immunity Rule) I would not have held that it was manifestly unfair to the Defendants to require them to defend the deployment.\n\nAbuse of process by reason of ulterior motive\n\n89.\n\nIt is an abuse of process to misuse the court’s processes to achieve something not properly available to the claimant in the course of properly conducted proceedings. That may be the case where the claim is seeking a collateral advantage beyond the proper scope of the action, or the conduct of the proceedings themselves (including the initiation of the claim itself), is not so as to vindicate a right but rather in a manner designed to cause the defendant problems of expense, harassment, commercial prejudice or the like beyond those ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation: see White Book 2026 3.4.15 citing\nWallis v Valentine\n[2002] EWCA Civ 1034\n;\n[2003] EMLR 8\n(CA) and\nBroxton v McClelland\n[1995]. The editors continue, that the power to strike out on this ground should be used only in the most clear and obvious case, and that, at the pre-trial stage, the test is an objective one.\n\n90.\n\nThere are certainly features of this case which, judged objectively, would tend to suggest that it has been brought and is being pursued in a manner designed to harass the Defendants: the choice of Defendants (particularly the inclusion of the Fifth Defendant, who cannot have been responsible for the acts complained of); the reliance on statements made by Mr Carter, in circumstances when it is unclear how they can be attributed to the named Defendants and where the case against him personally has been dismissed; the rehashing of arguments already ventilated, and sometimes ruled upon, in the Trade Mark Proceedings; the extravagant remedies claimed; and the changing nature of the Claimant’s case, through multiple iterations of the Particulars of Claim, all tend to support the inference that this is a vexatious claim.\n\n91.\n\nHowever, I am not persuaded that this is such a clear and obvious case that I should strike it out on this ground. The Claimant seeks damages for misuse of private information (where an award will reflect the fact and nature of the misuse, as well as compensating for distress) and in data protection law (where distress is a recognised head of damage). There is evidence (notably the transcript of the hearing before Ms Pike) to suggest that the Claimant was genuinely distressed at the disclosure of his spent Conviction in a public forum. He appeared emotional when he explained to me how he had sought to rebuild his life after his time in prison and how he felt when his Conviction was then brought up in the Trade Mark Proceedings. I could not, at this stage, accept Mr Harris’s submission that the Claimant’s case on distress is “incredible”. I cannot rule out the possibility that, buried beneath the many unattractive features of this case, there is a genuine desire on the Claimant’s part to vindicate his rights as a rehabilitated person. Because of the immunity and other matters addressed below, he will not be able to achieve that aim, but that is a point about his prospects of success, not abuse of process.\n\nJ.\n\nTHE CLAIMS THAT THE CLAIMANT NOW WISHES TO ADVANCE\n\n(1)\n\nBreach of the\nRehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974\n\n92.\n\nInsofar as the Claimant complains about the deployment of his Conviction in the Trade Mark Proceedings, the immunity is a complete answer to this claim. The only other matters the Claimant relies upon are the initial acquisition of information about the Conviction from Cerberus, and then the inclusion of reference to it in the Glass Letter.\n\n93.\n\nThe\nROA 1974\ndoes not expressly create a private law right of action against those who breach its terms. Absent express language, the Court will only infer the existence of such a right if it is clear that that is what Parliament intended to create. One indicator in favour of a private law right is that the statute confers protection on a limited class of people. However, this is not conclusive. Other considerations will include whether the law provides other methods by which that protection may be afforded. See, generally,\nClerk & Lindsell on Torts\n(25\nth\nedn) at 8-9 to 8-28.\n\n94.\n\nThe Claimant says that the ROA does protect a limited class of individuals – rehabilitated offenders like himself. He says that the words in s4(1) (\n“shall be treated for all purposes in law”\nas a person who has not committed the offence) are absolute and that, in the absence of a recognised right to sue, the protection afforded by these words is unenforceable and vacuous. He reminds me of the well-known statement in\nAshby v White\n(1703) 2 Ld Raym 938 that\n“it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy”\n. He relies on the fact that the disclosure of spent convictions will frequently engage ECHR Art 8 and, in turn, on the interpretative obligation in HRA\ns3\nto support his preferred interpretation, which he says is necessary to give proper protection to his Art 8 rights.\n\n95.\n\nThe Defendants point out that there appears to be no case in which the ROA has been held to create a private law right of action. Mr Harris submits that\nthe Act\ngives meaningful effect to the general statement in s4(1) without the need to imply such a right of action. Thus, he points to the duty on Courts to exclude the mention of spent convictions other than in specified circumstances (s4(1)(a)); the protection given to people who are improperly asked about spent convictions in job interviews and the like (s4(2)); the protection against sanctions for non-disclosure (s4(3) – it is well established for example that dismissal for non-disclosure would be unfair dismissal); the fact that s8 precludes a malicious publisher from relying on a spent conviction to prove the truth of their article; and the creation of the offences under s9, committed by public officials who disclose spent convictions or those who obtain that information from official records by fraud, dishonesty or bribery.\n\n96.\n\nI am not persuaded that the ROA creates a private law right of action against those who obtain, disclose or mention a person’s spent conviction or ancillary information.\n\n97.\n\nI accept that the ROA is aimed at protecting a defined class of people. That is not determinative.\n\n98.\n\nMy starting point is what Warby J said about s4(1) in\nNT1\n(set out above), i.e. wording of “exceptional breadth” which sets out a legal policy at a high level of generality.\nThe Act\nthen goes on to set out how that policy is to be given effect in various situations. It does so by creating a number of “shields” for the rehabilitated person: in court proceedings; in situations outside court in which they might otherwise be asked inappropriate questions or sanctioned for non-disclosure; and by criminalising certain people who disclose or solicit information about spent convictions. Those protections are real.\nThe Act\nis not toothless just because it does not provide for private law damages claims.\n\n99.\n\nThen there is section 8. To my mind this is the clearest indication that Parliament did not envisage private law claims under\nthe Act\nitself but rather envisaged that aggrieved claimants would have to find a common law (or other statutory) cause of action if they wanted damages. Section 8 therefore modifies the common law of defamation so that it will operate in a way which gives effect to the “legal policy” set out in s4(1), e.g. by removing a defence of truth if the publication of spent conviction information has been made maliciously. (The only other likely common law cause of action at the time of\nthe Act\nwould have been malicious falsehood, which already has a requirement for proof of malice and so did not need to be rebalanced in the same way as defamation; misuse of private information was yet to be recognised as a cause of action and data protection law did not yet exist).\n\n100.\n\nIt would have been distinctly odd for Parliament to have created, on the one hand, a freestanding, unfettered cause of action for disclosure of spent conviction information (no malice required) within the ROA itself, while, simultaneously, qualifying the equivalent common law right by requiring proof of malice before a remedy could be obtained. The better view is that parliament did not intend to create a private law right of action at all and left disgruntled rehabilitated offenders to find causes of action elsewhere in the law. The interpretative obligation in the HRA does not compel a different answer: ECHR Art 8 rights are well-protected by those other causes of action, particularly since the advent of privacy and data protection law.\n\n101.\n\nThe Claimant says that, given the dearth of authority, this must be regarded as a developing area of law and that I should not stifle his claim at this early stage. I disagree. The fact that the law has not developed in a particular direction is not the same as saying that it is capable of developing. The fact that, in the last 50 odd years, and despite the well-known ingenuity and perseverance of media lawyers, no-one has apparently tried to place direct reliance on the ROA to found a private law claim strongly suggests that it is not capable of development.\n\n102.\n\nThe arguments against the existence of a private law right of action are compelling and do not require me to put off the determination of this point until fact-finding at trial.\n\n(2)\n\nData Protection\n\n103.\n\nUK GDPR Art 10 relevantly provides that data relating to criminal convictions and offences may only be processed when authorised by domestic law. DPA 2018 s10(5) provides that this requirement is met only if the processing meets a condition in Parts 1, 2 or 3 of Schedule 1 to\nthat Act\n.\n\n104.\n\nIt is helpful to divide the processing into “deployment processing” (the inclusion of the Conviction in the Second Defendant’s Witness Statement and then the reliance on it in the course of the Trade Mark Proceedings), and “non-deployment” processing (the processing of information about the Conviction when commissioning Cerberus, receiving and storing their report and later, on 27 February 2026 referring to the Conviction in the Glass Letter).\n\n105.\n\nImmunity from suit is a complete answer to all the deployment processing.\n\n106.\n\nMr Harris does not rely on the immunity for the other processing. Instead, he submits he has an unanswerable case that the condition in DPA 2018 Sch 1, para 33 is met. Paragraph 33 provides:\n\n33 Legal claims\n\nThis condition is met if the processing—\n\n(a)\n\nis necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings),\n\n(b)\n\nis necessary for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, or\n\n(c)\n\nis otherwise necessary for the purposes of establishing, exercising or defending legal rights.\n\n107.\n\n“Necessary” in the context of the data protection legislation means more than desirable but less than indispensable or absolutely necessary- a test of reasonable necessity should be applied:\nCooper v National Crime Agency\n\n[2019] EWCA Civ 16\n, [88]-[92] (Sales LJ).\n\n108.\n\nMr Harris submits that given that the First Defendant’s clients were seeking advice on, and wishing to advance, a case of bad faith registration, where the Claimant was clearly the person behind Photo-Image’s registration application, and where the Second Defendant had seen a media article referring to the Conviction, it was plainly reasonably necessary to obtain information about the Conviction for the purpose of the clients obtaining advice and for the purpose of prospective legal proceedings. Likewise, when the Claimant had threatened a claim against the First Defendant precisely for deploying the Conviction in the Trade Mark Proceedings, he says it was clearly reasonably necessary to refer to the Conviction in the Glass Letter, responding to that threat.\n\n109.\n\nThe Claimant submits that the “necessity” test is, at least arguably, not met. He says that it cannot have been necessary to research his conviction for the purpose of a claim against Photo-Image (rather than himself), but this is just an impermissible reworking of the “Corporate Veil” argument. And he says that it was over-the-top to do so for the purposes of a mere trade mark case (which sounds like a submission about proportionality).\n\n110.\n\nI agree with Mr Harris for the reasons he advanced. To the extent that the “necessity” test under para 33 might import considerations of proportionality (see, by analogy,\nAshley v Revenue and Customs Comrs\n[2025] EWHC 134 (KB),\n[2025] 4 WLR 29\nat [134](vii) & (viii)), then the interference with the Claimant’s rights as a data subject that occurred when the Cerberus report was commissioned and received was indisputably proportionate: Cerberus were not instructed, and did not, undertake any sort of intrusive investigation, they provided information contained in public judgments that are freely available online. It was clearly proportionate for the First Defendant to address the Conviction in the Glass Letter, replying to the Claimant’s letter of claim.\n\n111.\n\nThe proposed data protection claim therefore has no realistic prospect of success.\n\n(3)\n\nMisuse of private information\n\n112.\n\nThe 2-stage approach to this cause of action is well-known. At stage 1 the claimant must establish that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information concerned. At the second stage, the Court will consider whether there were sufficiently strong countervailing justifications for the defendant to have used the information in the way that it did:\nMurray v Express Newspapers Ltd\n[2008] EWCA Civ 446\n,\n[2009] Ch 481\nat [35]-[36] & [40]-[41] (Sir Anthony Clarke MR). The tort protects a claimant’s ECHR Article 8 right to respect for their private and family life and, as such, the interference with private life must attain a certain level of seriousness before it is actionable: see\nM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions\n[2006] UKHL 11\n,\n[2006] 2 AC 91\nat [83]. Whatever the position may be in data protection, proportionality is clearly a consideration at the second stage in this tort.\n\n113.\n\nIt is recognised that a conviction, though initially public, may eventually recede into the domain of a person’s private life and that the fact that the conviction has become spent will be an important factor when considering whether that point has been reached. Whether it has, and whether there are sufficiently strong countervailing factors to justify the use that is made of it, requires consideration of all the circumstances, including assessing the nature and extent of any actual or prospective harm:\nNT1\nat [166].\n\n114.\n\nAgain, it is helpful to distinguish between the use that the Defendants made of the Conviction when deploying it in the Trade Mark Proceedings, and their prior acts of acquiring the information from Cerberus and sharing it with Hoya (as well as later, mentioning it in response to the Claimant’s letter of claim).\n\n115.\n\nImmunity from suit is again a complete answer to the claim insofar as it concerns the use of the Conviction in the proceedings.\n\n116.\n\nMr Harris submitted that the Claimant had no realistic prospect of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of his Conviction. I would not find for the Defendants on that ground. This is a highly fact-sensitive issue; the judgments mentioning the Conviction, though they remain available in open access archives, are 5+ years old and the Claimant told me that he had taken successful steps to get Google and other search engines to delist links to press articles that mentioned them. There might be evidence at an eventual trial that would support a contention that the Conviction had receded sufficiently to become part of the Claimant’s private life.\n\n117.\n\nNevertheless, it would be hopeless to argue that it was an actionable misuse of private information to obtain and use information about the Conviction for the purposes of a prospective legal claim to which it might have some relevance, and where the information was readily retrievable from public judgments without the use of intrusive search methods. A court would be bound to find that any interference with the Claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy was either trivial or entirely justified. And again, the First Defendant was plainly entitled to refer to the Conviction when responding to the Claimant’s letter of claim. The contrary is not arguable.\n\n(4)\n\nMalicious falsehood\n\n118.\n\nAll the 7 allegedly false statements were made in Hoya’s Statement of Grounds, the Second Defendant’s Witness Statement and submissions by Mr Carter in the course of the Trade Mark Proceedings.\n\n119.\n\nImmunity from suit is therefore a complete answer to the malicious falsehood claim.\n\n120.\n\nI would add though that the DAPOC also fail to meet the pleading requirements for a case on malice. It is very well established that a Claimant cannot simply allege malice in a pleading in general terms. They must set out facts which, if true, are more consistent with the presence of malice than its absence. That is a reflection of the fact that malice is a form of dishonesty, to which heightened standards of pleading apply. For a recent iteration of this principle see\nBridgen v Hancock\n[2026] EWCA Civ 991\nat [68], Warby LJ.\n\n121.\n\nThe Claimant’s particulars of malice do not come close to this standard. It is not necessary to lengthen this judgment by going through them in detail when the claim is in any event unviable because of immunity from suit.\n\n(5)\n\nAbuse of process\n\n122.\n\nIn\nCrawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd\n[2013] UKPC 17\n,\n[2014] AC 366\n, the Privy Council recognised a distinct tort of abuse of process which is made out where civil proceedings are initiated or conducted for a predominant purpose other than that for which they were designed, so as to obtain an extraneous benefit other than, and not reasonably connected with, the relief sought (see headnote, holding (1)).\n\n123.\n\nThe Immunity Rule does not prohibit a claim for abuse of process, even if one step in the abusive conduct involved the making of statements in Court: see\nRoy v Prior\n[1971] AC 470\nat 477 (Lord Morris). The Claimant’s case in abuse of process necessarily re-opens the Lack of Authority Issue and the Corporate Veil issue. However, I can see that an objection that a new claim relitigates matters already decided in the earlier claim may have less force when the new cause of action is abuse of process.\n\n124.\n\nRather, I prefer at this stage to stand back and ask whether, if all the eleven matters relied upon by the Claimant are considered, he would have a realistic prospect of securing a finding that the Defendants were predominantly seeking to damage, discredit and deter the Claimant.\n\n125.\n\nIt is already clear that there is no realistic prospect of the Claimant establishing this at trial. It is fanciful to suggest that the Defendants were doing anything other than seeking to advance Hoya’s interest in preventing Photo-Image from registering the marks.\n\n126.\n\nThe fact that this involved criticising the character and conduct of the Claimant does not change anything. That aspect of the case is readily explicable when it is borne in mind that the ground of opposition was that the registration was done in bad faith and that it was the Claimant (as director) who had caused Photo-Image to apply to register the marks. So, even if (as I assume in the Claimant’s favour) it would be permissible to relitigate the Corporate Veil Issue for the purposes of advancing this cause of action, it is clear beyond doubt that it would be determined in the same way as Mr Bryant determined it.\n\n127.\n\nLikewise, the suggestion that the Defendants turned their sights on the Claimant to prevent him “exposing” some irregularity about the historic TM16s or their authority to act for Hoya is fanciful when they had every reason to scrutinise the Claimant’s character and conduct for the purposes of advancing Hoya’s legitimate case.\n\n(6)\n\nUnlawful means conspiracy\n\n128.\n\nThe Immunity Rule cannot be sidestepped by reframing as a conspiracy what is in reality a claim based on the making of statements in court (or otherwise protected by the immunity): see\nXGY\nat [11], citing\nKing v Stiefel\n[2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm)\nand\nEl Haddad v al Rostamani\n[2024] EWHC 448.\n\n129.\n\nCare needs to be taken however when identifying the nature of the conspiracy alleged. This was considered in\nSurzur Overseas Ltd v Koros\n[1999] CLC 801. The claimant alleged that the defendants had conspired to defraud the claimant by concealing assets, forging documents, and giving instructions to solicitors to make “\nfalse and misleading statements to others including (\nif necessary\n) to the court…\n”, and\n“the procuring and deployment\nin and out of court\nof false evidence”\n(my emphasis).\n\n130.\n\nWaller LJ (for the Court of Appeal) considered the case law on the Immunity Rule, including what was said in\nRoy v Prior\nand held that this supports the proposition that\n“if the action is not brought simply in respect of evidence given or supplied but is brought in relation to some broader objective during the currency of which it may well be that evidence was given witness immunity should not apply”\n.\n\n131.\n\nLooking at the conspiracy alleged by the claimant he concluded that it did have a\n“broader objective and it was not a necessary ingredient that false evidence should be given”\n. He said it would be absurd if the claimant could have sued the defendants if they had succeeded in their objective before matters reached court, but not if matters did reach court. Neither did he accept that the in-court statements would have to be disregarded. He said,\n“If the conspiracy is correctly characterised as a conspiracy to hide assets and cheat Surzur by the manufacture of false documents, then it seems to me it is not a cause of action to which the witness immunity rule applies”\n.\n\n132.\n\nTaking the same approach here, I am satisfied that the alleged conspiracy could only realistically be characterised as a conspiracy to harm the Claimant by making statements in Court, and that the immunity indisputably applies. Practically all of the “unlawful means” relied upon consisted in making statements in the course of the Trade Mark Proceedings. Where they did not (the acquisition of the Conviction information from Cerberus; sharing it with Hoya; referring to it in the Glass Letter) these acts were in preparation for the proceedings or in reaction to what the Claimant said about the proceedings. This is not, even arguably, a conspiracy with a “broader objective” to which the making of statements in court was unnecessary or incidental.\n\n133.\n\nFurther, I agree with Mr Harris that the Claimant has failed to set out any particulars capable of sustaining his case that the Fifth Defendant was party to the alleged conspiracy. Her inclusion as a Defendant is particularly egregious. It seems that she was not working for Ablett & Stebbing at the time the TM16 forms were filed. She is not identified as having been responsible for commissioning Cerberus or receiving their report in 2023, and she had left the First Defendant before the Second Defendant included the Conviction in his witness statement in January 2024. Why she should have been party to a conspiracy to make harmful statements about the Claimant in the Trade Mark Proceedings is completely unexplained.\n\nK.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n134.\n\nSome aspects of the proposed amended claim involve abusive relitigation; almost all of it is precluded by the Immunity Rule; and the small parts of it that are not have no realistic prospect of success for the further reasons I have identified above. It has not been necessary to address all the arguments advanced by the Defendants to reach this conclusion.\n\n135.\n\nI shall therefore refuse permission to amend and I shall strike out the whole claim. This is already the Claimant’s third set of draft amendments. There is nothing to suggest that he could cure the fundamental defects I have identified through further redrafting.\n\n136.\n\nI shall also certify the Claim and the application to amend as totally without merit. Despite the energy devoted by the Claimant to finding a viable formulation, this claim was always bound to fail and there were no reasonable arguments available to him to persuade the Court that it should proceed. I would add that, although I have not struck out the claim on the ground that it was brought for an improper collateral purpose, there were nonetheless numerous aspects to it that can be described as vexatious: see [90] above.\n\n137.\n\nThe Defendants have already applied for a civil restraint order against the Claimant, and that application should now be listed unless in the meantime it becomes unnecessary (Mr Carter has also made such an application, which is to be heard on 6 November 2026).\n\n138.\n\nFinally, I should record that the Claimant addressed the Court and Mr Harris with the utmost courtesy throughout the lengthy hearing, despite it obviously being a stressful occasion for him. This was in stark contrast to the way his behaviour has been described in a number of judgments I was shown from his previous litigation. He told me that he has taken on board those judicial criticisms and has learned to control himself in court. I have no reason to doubt this.","changes":[]}