{"check":null,"uid":"14f3e59acfc092ff","title":"LAU TAK LUN v. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR PERSONAL DATA, [2026] HKCFI 5522, HCAL2130/2024","title_generated":false,"country":"Гонконг","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-30","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина против решения Комиссии по защите личной информации Гонконга об отказе провести расследование по фактам «доксинга». Суд пришёл к выводу, что решение было принято в рамках полномочий Комиссии и не подлежит судебному пересмотру. Комиссия обладает дискреционным правом решать, начинать ли расследование, исходя из наличия достаточных доказательств преступного деяния. Суд отклонил аргументы заявителя о незаконности отказа и отсутствии оснований для проведения расследования.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":25348,"versions":1,"url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=185532&currpage=T","first_seen":"2026-10-01","last_checked":"2026-11-16 07:36","relevance":"hit","score":11,"query":"","source_key":"legalref_hk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":11,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":15,"ctx":"lau tak lun v. privacy commissioner for personal data, [2026] hkcfi 5522, hcal2130/2024","zone":"название","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":40,"ctx":"lau tak lun v. privacy commissioner for personal data, [2026] hkcfi 5522, hcal2130/2024","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":29,"ctx":"hcal2130/2024 lau tak lun v. privacy commissioner for personal data  hcal 2130/2024  [2026] hkcfi 5522  in the high court of t","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":54,"ctx":"hcal2130/2024 lau tak lun v. privacy commissioner for personal data  hcal 2130/2024  [2026] hkcfi 5522  in the high court of the  hong kong special administr","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":320,"ctx":"law list no 2130 of 2024  ________________________  between  lau tak lun  applicant  and  privacy commissioner for personal data  putative respondent  ________________________  before:  h","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":345,"ctx":"________________________  between  lau tak lun  applicant  and  privacy commissioner for personal data  putative respondent  ________________________  before:  hon coleman ja, sitting as an ad","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":789,"ctx":"ve to apply for judicial review, so as to challenge the decision (“decision”) made by the privacy commissioner for personal data (“commissioner”) on 15 august 2024, not to carry out an in","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":814,"ctx":"review, so as to challenge the decision (“decision”) made by the privacy commissioner for personal data (“commissioner”) on 15 august 2024, not to carry out an investigation in relation to the","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":1840,"ctx":"set out in appendix a; and (c) that the commissioner do in any event request the various social media platforms to take down the doxxing posts as set out in appendix a which contains the appl","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":3857,"ctx":"tes, and as a result, competitors sought to ‘dox’ the applicant and his family on various social media platforms. the applicant alleges that this doxxing caused them to suffer from specified h","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-01","meta":{"case_no":"HCAL2130/2024","ncn":"[2026] HKCFI 5522","parties":"LAU TAK LUN v. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR PERSONAL DATA","lang":"English","uploaded":"2026-09-30","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга"},"source_url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=185532&currpage=T","text":"HCAL2130/2024 LAU TAK LUN v. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR PERSONAL DATA\n\nHCAL 2130/2024\n\n[2026] HKCFI 5522\n\nIN THE HIGH COURT OF THE\n\nHONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION\n\nCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCE\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2130 OF 2024\n\n________________________\n\nBETWEEN\n\nLAU TAK LUN\n\nApplicant\n\nand\n\nPRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR PERSONAL DATA\n\nPutative Respondent\n\n________________________\n\nBefore:\n\nHon Coleman JA, sitting as an additional Judge\nof the Court of First Instance, in Chambers (Open to Public)\n\nDate of Decision:\n\n30 September 2026\n\n__________________\n\nD E C I S I O N\n\n__________________\n\nA. Introduction\n\n1.\nBy Form 86 dated 14 November 2024, the\nApplicant sought leave to apply for judicial review, so as to challenge the decision (“Decision”) made by the\nPrivacy Commissioner for Personal Data (“Commissioner”) on 15 August 2024, not to carry out an\ninvestigation in relation to the “doxxing” offence under section 64 of the Personal Data (Privacy)\nOrdinance (“PDPO”).\n\n2.\nAlong with the Form 86, the Applicant filed an\naffirmation, a spreadsheet exhibiting all the Applicant’s complaints, and a Bundle of Exhibits totalling\nover 1770 pages.\n\n3.\nIn his Affirmation, the Applicant sought the following\nrelief:\n\n(1) an order of\ncertiorari\nto quash the Decision;\n\n(2) a declaration that the Decision is unlawful and of no legal effect;\n\n(3) an order of\nmandamus\n: (a) that the Commissioner do commence specified\ninvestigations into the Applicant’s doxxing complaints set out in Appendix A (i.e. the annexed\nspreadsheet), and inform the Applicant of the results of the specified investigation pursuant to\nsection 66S PDPO; (b) that the Commissioner do take a statement from the Applicant regarding the\ndoxxing complaints set out in Appendix A; and (c) that the Commissioner do in any event request the\nvarious social media platforms to take down the doxxing posts as set out in Appendix A which contains the\nApplicant and his family’s personal data;\n\n(4) or alternatively, an order of\nmandamus\n, that the Commissioner refers those doxxing\ncases as set out in Appendix A which involves suspected commission of an indictable offence under\nsection 64(3C) PDPO to the Hong Kong Police Force for follow up and the Secretary for Justice for\nconsideration of prosecution pursuant to the Commissioner’s Complaint Handling Policy and Part 9A of the\nPDPO; and\n\n(5) an order for costs.\n\n4.\nI gave directions giving leave to the Commissioner to file\nand serve an Initial Response to the application, and leave to the Applicant to file a Reply to that Initial\nResponse.\n\n5.\nThe originally envisaged timetable was significantly\nlengthened as a result of various factors, including the time taken for the Applicant to provide to the\nCommissioner a copy of the Bundle of Exhibits (which had not been provided, and given its volume, where it was\nimpractical to make copies of at the High Court Registry), and several extensions of time granted to the\nparties, and a stay triggered by the Applicant’s application for legal aid (though I later lifted that stay, and\ndeclined the Applicant’s invitation to reverse that decision).\n\n6.\nUltimately, I have since had the benefit of an Initial\nResponse filed by Mr Martin Ho of Counsel, and the Applicant’s Reply. I have taken both into\naccount, together with the materials originally filed by the Applicant.\n\n7.\nHaving done so, I am satisfied the application can be dealt\nwith on the papers. This is my decision.\n\nB. Background\n\n8.\nThe relevant facts can be broadly summarised as follows.\n\n9.\nThe Applicant was a partner of a retail business in the toy\nindustry known as “The Qube”, which was also trading as “The Qube by Tomica Hong Kong”, since 2019.\nAccording to the Applicant, there were some business disputes, and as a result, competitors sought to ‘dox’ the\nApplicant and his family on various social media platforms. The Applicant alleges that this doxxing caused\nthem to suffer from specified harm as defined under PDPO, and as a result they had to stay in a hotel and close\nall their retail shops due to fear for safety, and physical/psychological harm and distress.\n\n10.\nThe Applicant first lodged a complaint with the\nCommissioner in July 2022. The Commissioner commenced a specified investigation on or about\nDecember 2022 against 7 doxxing offenders, and took a statement from the Applicant. Whilst the\nCommissioner concluded that the evidence was insufficient to carry out prosecution, it did request Facebook to\ntake down the relevant posts, which was complied with (“July 2022 Specified Investigation”).\n\n11.\nThe Applicant then proceeded to file many more complaints,\nwhich (as noted by Mr Ho in the Initial Response) exceeded 500 complaints. The impugned Decision\nconcerns 478 of those complaints, lodged between 3 August 2023 and 5 January 2024.\n\n12.\nIn relation to those complaints, the Commissioner handed\ndown eleven decisions, ten of which were appealed against by the Applicant to the Administrative Appeals Board\n(“AAB”). In one of the appeals, the Commissioner’s decision was set aside. But, notwithstanding\nthat, the Commissioner did not commence any investigation.\n\n13.\nBy letter dated 26 July 2024, the Commissioner\ninformed the Applicant that she would withdraw the decisions and reconsider the matters holistically. The\nApplicant was invited to withdraw the remaining appeals.\n\n14.\nThat reconsideration resulted in the Decision. The\nDecision was expressed as being that, in light of the lack of\nprima facie\nevidence showing requisite\nintent, the doxxing complaints do not constitute a criminal offence of “doxxing” under section 64 of the\nPDPO and therefore no criminal investigation would be carried out.\n\n15.\nThe Applicant apparently attempted to seek further\nassistance from the AAB, which stated that it was\nfunctus officio\n, so that the Decision “conveniently”\n(the Applicant’s word) was outside the jurisdiction of the AAB.\n\n16.\nThe Applicant also subsequently approached the Office of\nthe Ombudsman, which apparently took the view that the Decision was one of professional judgment outside its\npurview of investigation. Further, the Hong Kong Police Force considers that it would need the\nCommissioner to refer matters to it for an indictable offence under section 64(3C) of the PDPO, and from\nNovember 2024 closed the Applicant’s crime report.\n\nC. Amenability\n\n17.\nIt is trite that decisions made by the Department of\nJustice not to prosecute are not amenable to judicial review, apart from where there is a challenge as to\nunconstitutionality. This flows from Article 63 of the Basic Law (“BL 63”), which directs that\nthe Department of Justice shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference. Whilst there are\nno fixed categories of cases where a prosecution decision may be regarded as falling outside the constitutional\nlimits of the Secretary for Justice, examples may include (a) where the prosecuting authority has acted in\nobedience to political instructions, (b) where it has acted out of bad faith, or (c) where there has\nbeen rigid fettering of prosecutorial discretion.\n\n18.\nMr Ho has drawn attention to the case of\nWong Wai\nYin v Buildings Department\n\n[2020] HKCFI 3011\n, where Chow J (as he then was) held that the same principles\napplied to the Buildings Department in its exercise of prosecutorial powers under the Buildings Ordinance\nCap 123. By analogy, the principles would also apply to the current situation.\n\n19.\nIndeed, I accept Mr Ho’s submission, that given the\nCommissioner has power under section 64C of the PDPO to prosecute doxxing offences (in relation to\nsections 64(1), 64(3A) of the PDPO), such prosecutorial decisions fall within the scope of BL 63.\n\n20.\nIn any event, even under the Applicant’s submission made\nin his Reply that the present doxxing complaints fall under section 64(3C) of the PDPO – which as an\nindictable offence and is outside the scope of the Commissioner’s power – the relevant principles are still\napplicable, given that the procedure would result in the referral of the case to the Police and the Department\nof Justice.\n\n21.\nThe Applicant submitted that the Decision currently being\nchallenged is a refusal to carry out a criminal investigation (pre-investigation), which is distinct from a\ndecision not to prosecute (post-investigation), and as a result, the relevant principles on amenability do not\napply. I disagree. It seems to me that the principles applicable to a decision not to carry out\na criminal prosecution are equally applicable to a decision not to commence an investigation in relation to a\ncriminal offence. The Commissioner, albeit acting under independent statutory powers, is responsible for\ntasks akin to law enforcement (e.g. Police, ICAC).\n\n22.\nIt is settled that only in highly exceptional cases would\nthe Court disturb the decisions of an independent prosecutor and investigator. This is because the powers\nin question are only entrusted to the officers identified, and no other authority may exercise these powers or\nmake the judgments on which such exercise must depend: see\nR (Corner House Research) v Director of Serious\nFraud Office\n[2009] 1 AC 756, at 840F-841D.\n\n23.\nThe Applicant has accepted that the Commissioner is the\nonly authority entrusted with powers to exercise investigatory and prosecutorial powers in relation to the data\nprivacy of individuals in Hong Kong. As I have previously acknowledged in the past – see, for example,\n\nYeung Wing Kit v Commissioner of Independent Commission Against Corruption\n\n[2021] HKCFI 3337\n– in its judicial review jurisdiction, the Court exercises great\ncaution in interfering with a prosecutorial decision, and that extends to potential interference with the public\nauthority’s decision on whether to commence criminal investigations.\n\n24.\nIt is also important to note that law enforcement\nofficers, in performing their duty to bring offenders to justice, enjoy a wide margin of discretion (which\ninclude, amongst other things, whether a complaint warrants investigations, what investigative steps to take,\nand whether there is sufficient evidence obtained to charge a suspect or refer a case to a prosecutor). In\ncarrying out this discretion, officers are entitled to take into account a wide variety of factors, and the\nweight to be allocated to each factor is a matter for them to determine – not the Court: see\nIn re\nMcQuillan\n[2022] AC 1063. This wide margin of discretion, in my view, applies to the Commissioner,\nwho is tasked with overseeing the enforcement and compliance of the PDPO in Hong Kong.\n\n25.\nThe Applicant does not articulate how the Decision was\nallegedly made in an unconstitutional manner, and – subject only to the bad faith point raised in Ground 4,\nbelow – the challenge to the Decision must fail as being not amenable to judicial review.\n\nD. Grounds of Review\n\n26.\nThe Applicant has advanced four intended grounds of\nreview. In brief, they are:\n\n(1) Ground 1: The Applicant had a legitimate expectation that the Commissioner would follow\nthe same procedure and same practice in dealing with the Applicant’s doxxing complaints as it had previously\ndone so with regards to the Applicant’s July 2022 Specified Investigation.\n\n(2) Ground 2: The Decision is irrational (i.e.\nWednesbury\nunreasonable).\n\n(3) Ground 3: The Decision is illegal due to an error of law.\n\n(4) Ground 4: The Decision was made in bad faith.\n\n27.\nBad faith is not in itself a general standalone ground of\njudicial review, as such. It is a claim ordinarily made in conjunction with or as part of a claim of\nunreasonableness, or made for the purposes of allowing a usually non-reviewable decision to be reviewed\n(i.e. on a question of amenability).\n\n28.\nAs I have already indicated, if the Applicant’s claim of\nbad faith is not made out to the standard necessary for the grant of leave to apply for judicial review, the\napplication fails on amenability alone, and strictly I need not consider the three other intended grounds of\nreview. Therefore, I shall first deal with the intended ground of bad faith, before addressing the first\nthree intended grounds advanced by the Applicant.\n\nE. Ground 4: Bad Faith\n\n29.\nIn relation to this ground, the Applicant submitted that\nthe Decision was made in bad faith with the improper motive of circumventing the jurisdiction of the AAB, as\nseen by (1) the Commissioner’s manner of handling the Applicant’s doxxing complaints since\nDecember 2021, and (2) the Commissioner’s failure to conduct any investigation after undertaking to\nthe Applicant and the AAB to “reconsider” the Applicant’s doxxing complaints.\n\n30.\nThe relevant principles governing a claim of bad faith in\njudicial review proceedings have been stated in my previous decision of\nTang Chiu Man and Lam Ka Fun Anita v\nSecretary for Justice for Director of Lands\n\n[2025] HKCFI 3253\nat §86, and can be stated again as follows:\n\n(1) “Bad faith” is not the test. It is the conclusion at the end of the analysis.\n\n(2) The applicant must show that the public body’s conduct was so unreasonable or so perverse that\nit is akin to bad faith.\n\n(3) Mere faulty administration, or even administration which fails to take into account certain\nfactors which should be taken into account, is not sufficient to show bad faith.\n\n(4) An ulterior motive may be indicative of bad faith, and the Court is allowed to examine those\nmotives.\n\n(5) But again, an ulterior motive is not the same as merely failing to take into account relevant\nconsiderations. The former must carry some sort of moral impropriety in that the decision-maker either\nknowingly pursues a purpose that is different from that being openly pursued (i.e. a sham); knowledge\nthat the decision was for extra-legal purposes; the motive behind the decision was based on personal factors\nsuch as financial gain, revenge or prejudice; or the decision involves a degree of personal malice,\nvindictiveness, or animosity against a particular group or individual.\n\n(6) It is thus no surprise that allegations of bad faith attract a very heavy standard of proof.\n\n(7) A heavy burden of proof is also commensurate with the general position that serious\nallegations require cogent evidence. To allow too readily some non-reviewable decisions to become\nreviewable would risk defeating the certainty that previous authorities have sought to promote.\n\n31.\nI do not think that there is reasonably arguably\nsufficient basis to claim any moral impropriety (i.e. ulterior motive) on the part of the Commissioner in\nrelation to the Decision. Firstly, the Applicant does not provide any explanation as to why the\nCommissioner would deliberately circumvent the AAB’s appeal jurisdiction just to refuse to carry out any\ninvestigation on the Applicant’s complaints. Secondly, I do not see how it is reasonably arguable\nthat the Commissioner, in coming to the Decision, was influenced by anything other than the merits of the\napplication.\n\n32.\nIndeed, as submitted by Mr Ho, the Commissioner\nclearly articulated her reasons for coming to the Decision in both the letter to the Applicant dated\n15 August 2024, and also within the related Internal Memorandum M.1 (“Internal Memorandum”). A\nreconsideration of a decision does not necessitate a reversal of the decision. An offer or undertaking to\n“reconsider” a decision does not mean an offer or promise to reverse it. The Commissioner, as a\nresponsible public authority, is perfectly entitled to reconsider her position, and such an approach actually\nshows a degree of flexibility and open-mindedness, rather than any intention to maintain a decision “through\nthick and thin”. As it happens, after reconsideration of the information available and the circumstances\nof the cases, the Commissioner nevertheless came to the same conclusion.\n\n33.\nThe Applicant, in his Reply, sought to provide a number of\nexplanations to further support the allegation of bad faith. However, I see no reasonably arguable\nmerit in any of those points, as they are either premised on misunderstandings of fact and law, or provide no\nsufficient value to support an allegation of bad faith.\n\n34.\nFor instance, the Applicant contended that it is in the\nCommissioner’s submission that the Applicant “sold fake toys”, and defamatory statements are evidence that the\nCommissioner was clearly acting in bad faith. I do not accept that argument. The Commissioner was simply\nreferring to the nature of the allegations made by the Facebook posters.\n\n35.\nThe Applicant tried to point out that there is a\ncontradiction between the Commissioner’s submissions, which say that the complaints were premised on “fake\ntoys”, and the Commissioner’s previous finding that the complaints were premised on “monetary disputes”.\nFirstly, this is incorrect, as the Internal Memorandum refers to both “fake toys” and “monetary disputes” with\nregards to the factual background and context against which the complaints arose. Secondly, in any event,\nthis is not indicative of any bad faith.\n\n36.\nOther explanations ranged from suggestions that the\nCommissioner “wilfully ignored” certain pieces of legislation and evidence, to suggestions that in\nsubstantiating her case the Commissioner was acting in bad faith by citing English cases instead of Hong Kong\ncases.\n\n37.\nWith respect, these arguments may well exhibit the degree\nof the Applicant’s dissatisfaction with the Decision – which may also be seen by the Applicant describing the\nDecision as an “elaborated hoax”. But they do not shed any light as to how the Commissioner allegedly came\nto hold an ulterior motive against the Applicant, or how the Decision is so unreasonable that it is akin to bad\nfaith.\n\n38.\nAs a result, I do not think the matters advanced by the\nApplicant are reasonably arguable capable of meeting the high standard of proof required for bad faith on behalf\nof the Commissioner. The Decision is, therefore, not amenable to judicial review.\n\n39.\nNevertheless, for the sake of completeness, I shall\ncontinue to address each of the remaining grounds.\n\nF. Ground 1: Legitimate Expectation\n\n40.\nThe Applicant’s first ground is that he reasonably held a\nlegitimate expectation that the Commissioner would follow the same procedure and practice in handling the\nApplicant’s doxxing complaints as she previously did in relation to the Applicant’s July 2022 Specified\nInvestigation.\n\n41.\nThis legitimate expectation, the Applicant submitted,\narose both from express representations set out in Part 9A, sections 64 and 66S of the PDPO and in §17\nof the Commissioner’s Complaint Handling Policy, and impliedly from the Commissioner’s conduct in the handling\nof the Applicant’s July 2022 Specified Investigation (which, involved the taking of a statement from the\nApplicant and conducting a specified investigation that is in line with the procedure adopted by other law\nenforcement agencies).\n\n42.\nI do not think there is any force in this argument.\nThe documents referred to by the Applicant – namely the PDPO and the Commissioner’s Complaint Handling Policy,\ndo not provide that the Commissioner must initiate a criminal investigation regardless of merit in the\ncomplaint. In fact, it states the contrary – §8 of the Policy not only refers to the discretion of the\nCommissioner to refuse to carry out an investigation under section 39(2) PDPO, but also provides further\nexplanation as to how the Commissioner exercises this discretion. For example, it states that under\nsection 39(2)(d) PDPO, the Commissioner may find an investigation (or further investigation) unnecessary,\nwhere after preliminary enquiry by the Commissioner, there is no\nprima facie\nevidence of any\ncontravention of the requirements under the PDPO.\n\n43.\nI also do not see any reasonably arguable basis for this\nexpectation to have arisen from the Commissioner’s previous handling of a complaint. If the Commissioner\nis to address every complaint with a specified investigation without any regard as to its merits, it would not\nonly be imposing an onerous workload on the Commissioner – it would also neuter the Commissioner’s discretion\nunder section 39 of the PDPO.\n\n44.\nThus, Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nG. Ground 2: Irrationality\n\n45.\nUnder his second ground, the Applicant submitted that the\nCommissioner’s decision not to commence any specified investigation regarding the doxxing complaints is “so\noutrageous and unreasonable that no law enforcement body could ever have come to it”.\n\n46.\nIn support, the Applicant claimed that the Commissioner\nhas a statutory duty under the Victims Charter to provide professional investigation of every report of crime by\na victim, and that it is also unreasonable for the Commissioner to place the burden on applicants to provide\n\nprima facie\nevidence before the complaints can be investigated.\n\n47.\nI do not accept this submission as giving rise to a\nreasonably arguable point. Firstly, it has to be noted that the Victims Charter is merely an\nadministrative guide set out by the Department of Justice, and does not serve as statutory guidance for the\nCommissioner (which, instead, is found in the PDPO).\n\n48.\nSecondly, the Applicant submitted that section 39 of\nthe PDPO does not explicitly state “lack of\nprima facie\nevidence” as a valid reason for the Commissioner\nto refuse to carry out an investigation. But as I have mentioned above, section 39(2)(d) of the PDPO\nallows the Commissioner the discretion to refuse investigation using this reason, which is explicitly mentioned\nat §8 of the Commissioner’s Complaint Handling Policy.\n\n49.\nI also accept Mr Ho’s submission that this is a\nmatter of professional judgment for the Commissioner – particularly in determining whether the materials\nprovided justify the expenditure of public resources in conducting investigations on the Applicant’s complaints,\ngiven that the Commissioner’s duty is in part to reduce the massive drain on the PCPD’s limited complaint and\nlegal assistance application handling resources (see §19 of the Complaint Handling Policy).\n\n50.\nI am not persuaded that it is reasonably arguable that the\nDecision made was one not reasonably open to the Commissioner. A reading of the Internal Memorandum clearly\nshows that the Commissioner made the Decision after a substantial consideration of the evidence available (in\nparticular, the posts and comments, and the data disclosed therein).\n\n51.\nIt was found that some of the disclosed data were\ninformation in relation to the Applicant’s business that was publicly available (and thus not private personal\ndata), and some of the data did not directly or indirectly permit a person to ascertain the Applicant’s\nidentity. It was also found that these posts and comments were made in relation to the comments and\ndissatisfaction of the business mode of The Qube and of the Applicant.\n\n52.\nAs Mr Ho fairly accepted, there may be legitimate\ndifference in views amongst reasonable people on what and whether investigations might commence. But that\ndoes not mean that the Decision was one which no reasonable public authority in the Commissioner’s position was\nentitled to make. Certainly, I do not see how the Commissioner has, as put forward by the Applicant,\n“turned a blind eye” towards the numerous doxxing complaints.\n\n53.\nHence, Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nH. Ground 3: Illegality\n\n54.\nThe Applicant’s third ground was essentially an extension\nof his second ground, being premised on the Commissioner’s comment on the lack of\n“prima facie”\nevidence\nin relation to the requisite\nmens rea\nelement of the doxxing offence.\n\n55.\nThe Applicant argued that the Commissioner made an error\nof law, as the duty to provide evidence is not on him – rather, as a victim, he merely has to provide reasonable\nsuspicion that a suspected crime has occurred, which in this case, is achieved by lodging a complaint with the\nCommissioner.\n\n56.\nI disagree. There is no legal basis which supports\nany threshold requirement for the Commissioner to commence any criminal investigations. A reading of the\nstatute displaces this argument. Section 39 of the PDPO provides that the Commissioner has the\ndiscretion to refuse to commence any investigation, so long as one of the listed reasons are present – in this\ncase, section 39(2)(d), which allows for the Commissioner to take into consideration the lack of\nprima\nfacie\nevidence.\n\n57.\nFurther, the Applicant is essentially submitting that all\ncomplaints must result in investigations by the Commissioner. As noted earlier, this would be an abuse of\npublic resources and would also directly contravene section 39 PDPO.\n\n58.\nTherefore, the matters raised by Ground 3 do not\nidentify any reasonably arguable illegality challenge with any realistic prospect of success.\n\nI. Result\n\n59.\nAs stated above, the application fails on amenability\nalone. In any event, had the Decision been amenable to judicial review, the Applicant has also failed to\nshow any reasonable arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.\n\n60.\nThe Applicant’s application for leave to apply for\njudicial review is hence dismissed. I make no order as to costs.\n\n(Russell Coleman)\n\nJustice of Appeal of the Court of Appeal\nHigh Court\n\nThe applicant, acting in person\n\nMr Martin Ho, instructed by Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, for the putative respondent","changes":[]}