{"check":null,"uid":"09464c72ce5ccf13","title":"Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations Act of 2026","title_generated":false,"country":"США","organ":"Конгресс США","kind":"law","kind_name":"Законодательство","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-24","summary":"Данный законопроект предусматривает создание независимого совета при Конгрессе США для проведения расследований и анализа угроз в области кибербезопасности и искусственного интеллекта. Полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","snippet":"","topics":["Кибербезопасность","Искусственный интеллект"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":33503,"versions":2,"url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5541","first_seen":"2026-10-07","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:19","relevance":"hit","score":50,"query":"","source_key":"congress_us","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":50,"topics":["Кибербезопасность","Искусственный интеллект"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":0,"ctx":"cybersecurity and ai board of investigations act of 2026 данный законопроект предусматривает создание н","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"кибербезопасн","weak":false,"pos":195,"ctx":"ависимого совета при конгрессе сша для проведения расследований и анализа угроз в области кибербезопасности и искусственного интеллекта. полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"искусственн интеллект","weak":false,"pos":215,"ctx":"конгрессе сша для проведения расследований и анализа угроз в области кибербезопасности и искусственного интеллекта. полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":188,"ctx":"41 introduced in senate (is)]  <doc>  119th congress 2d session s. 5541  to establish the cybersecurity and ai board of investigations, and for other purposes.  ________________________________","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":621,"ctx":"_______________________________________________________________  a bill  to establish the cybersecurity and ai board of investigations, and for other purposes.  be it enacted by the senate and","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":861,"ctx":"f america in congress assembled,  section 1. short title.  this act may be cited as the ``cybersecurity and ai board of investigations act of 2026''.  sec. 2. findings; purpose.  (a) findings.-","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":1006,"ctx":"6''.  sec. 2. findings; purpose.  (a) findings.--congress finds the following: (1) robust cybersecurity infrastructure and institutions are integral to national security and economic security.","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"cybersecurity","weak":false,"pos":1329,"ctx":"(3) the advancement and increased accessibility of artificial intelligence can strengthen cybersecurity controls while also increasing the volume and sophistication of cyber threats. (4) critic","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Кибербезопасность","term":"critical infrastructure","weak":true,"pos":1426,"ctx":"curity controls while also increasing the volume and sophistication of cyber threats. (4) critical infrastructure sectors, such as clean and wastewater utilities and telecommunications networks, are susc","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1290,"ctx":"digitization across economic sectors. (3) the advancement and increased accessibility of artificial intelligence can strengthen cybersecurity controls while also increasing the volume and sophistication","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1550,"ctx":"uch as clean and wastewater utilities and telecommunications networks, are susceptible to artificial intelligence-enabled cyber incidents. (5) as artificial intelligence systems continue to evolve, these","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1606,"ctx":"ions networks, are susceptible to artificial intelligence-enabled cyber incidents. (5) as artificial intelligence systems continue to evolve, these trends in cybersecurity threats will accelerate. (6) ot","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1856,"ctx":"mputing, are likely to pose additional, novel cybersecurity threats that will compound on artificial intelligence-driven risks. (7) the federal government has an interest in understanding cyber incidents","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":2278,"ctx":"ber defenses of public and private institutions in responding to the cyber risks posed by artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.  sec. 3. cybersecurity and ai board of investigations.","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":2430,"ctx":"3. cybersecurity and ai board of investigations.  (a) definitions.--in this section: (1) artificial intelligence.--the term ``artificial intelligence'' has the meaning given the term in section 238(g) o","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Телеком и инфраструктура","term":"telecommunication","weak":true,"pos":1502,"ctx":"threats. (4) critical infrastructure sectors, such as clean and wastewater utilities and telecommunications networks, are susceptible to artificial intelligence-enabled cyber incidents. (5) as arti","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Криптоактивы и блокчейн","term":"crypto","weak":false,"pos":26821,"ctx":"l.--any subpoena issued electronically under this paragraph shall be authenticated with a cryptographic digital signature, or other comparable successor technology, of the chair or designee of","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Цифровая идентификация и госуслуги","term":"digital signatur","weak":false,"pos":26835,"ctx":"na issued electronically under this paragraph shall be authenticated with a cryptographic digital signature, or other comparable successor technology, of the chair or designee of the chair, that al","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":32711,"ctx":"om a source independent of a submission submitted under subsection (i)(2). (k) additional privacy and digital security protections.-- (1) privacy and civil liberties.--any document, inclu","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":32759,"ctx":"d under subsection (i)(2). (k) additional privacy and digital security protections.-- (1) privacy and civil liberties.--any document, including in electronic form, or testimony provided t","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-11","meta":{"congress":"119","billType":"S","number":"5541","policyArea":"","subjects":[],"latestAction":"2026-09-24 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.","textVersion":"is"},"source_url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5541","text":"FULL TEXT\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n[S. 5541 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n\n<DOC>\n\n119th CONGRESS\n2d Session\nS. 5541\n\nTo establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for\nother purposes.\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n\nSeptember 24, 2026\n\nMr. Markey introduced the following bill; which was read twice and\nreferred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nA BILL\n\nTo establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for\nother purposes.\n\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\nUnited States of America in Congress assembled,\n\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n\nThis Act may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity and AI Board of\nInvestigations Act of 2026''.\n\nSEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.\n\n(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:\n(1) Robust cybersecurity infrastructure and institutions\nare integral to national security and economic security.\n(2) Cyber threats have become more pervasive and\npotentially more disruptive with continued digitization across\neconomic sectors.\n(3) The advancement and increased accessibility of\nartificial intelligence can strengthen cybersecurity controls\nwhile also increasing the volume and sophistication of cyber\nthreats.\n(4) Critical infrastructure sectors, such as clean and\nwastewater utilities and telecommunications networks, are\nsusceptible to artificial intelligence-enabled cyber incidents.\n(5) As artificial intelligence systems continue to evolve,\nthese trends in cybersecurity threats will accelerate.\n(6) Other emerging technologies, including quantum\ncomputing, are likely to pose additional, novel cybersecurity\nthreats that will compound on artificial intelligence-driven\nrisks.\n(7) The Federal Government has an interest in understanding\ncyber incidents in this shifting threat landscape and advancing\nbest practices in cybersecurity.\n(b) Purpose.--The purposes of this Act are--\n(1) to establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of\nInvestigations; and\n(2) to bolster the cyber defenses of public and private\ninstitutions in responding to the cyber risks posed by\nartificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.\n\nSEC. 3. CYBERSECURITY AND AI BOARD OF INVESTIGATIONS.\n\n(a) Definitions.--In this section:\n(1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial\nintelligence'' has the meaning given the term in section 238(g)\nof the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019\n(10 U.S.C. note prec. 4061; Public Law 115-232).\n(2) Board.--The term ``Board'' means the Cybersecurity and\nAI Board of Investigations established under subsection (b)(1).\n(3) Chair.--The term ``Chair'' means the Chair of the Board\ndesignated under subsection (c)(3)(A)(i).\n(4) Cybersecurity purpose; cybersecurity threat;\ninformation system; security control; security vulnerability.--\nThe terms ``cybersecurity purpose'', ``cybersecurity threat'',\n``information system'', ``security control'', and ``security\nvulnerability'' have the meanings given those terms in section\n2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).\n(5) Federal agency.--The term ``Federal agency'' means any\nexecutive department, military department, Government-\ncontrolled corporation, or other establishment in the executive\nbranch of the Federal Government, including the Executive\nOffice of the President or any independent regulatory agency.\n(6) Federal civilian executive branch agency.--\n(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph\n(B), the term ``Federal civilian executive branch\nagency'' means a Federal agency.\n(B) Exception.--The term ``Federal civilian\nexecutive branch agency'' does not include the\nDepartment of Defense or any Federal agency that is an\nelement of the intelligence community, as defined in\nsection 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50\nU.S.C. 3003(4)).\n(7) Federal civilian executive branch information system.--\n(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph\n(B), the term ``Federal civilian executive branch\ninformation system'' means any information system\noperated by a Federal civilian executive branch agency.\n(B) Exception.--The term ``Federal civilian\nexecutive branch information system'' does not\ninclude--\n(i) a national security system, as defined\nin section 3552(b) of title 44, United States\nCode; or\n(ii) a system described in paragraph (2) or\n(3) of section 3553(e) of title 44, United\nStates Code.\n(8) Incident.--The term ``incident'' means an occurrence\nthat actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful\nauthority--\n(A) the integrity, confidentiality, or availability\nof information on an information system; or\n(B) an information system.\n(9) Near-miss.--The term ``near-miss'' means a\ncircumstance--\n(A) in which a known or newly discovered security\nvulnerability is exploited in an attempt to jeopardize\nthe integrity, confidentiality, or availability of\ninformation on an information system; and\n(B) through which no harm amounting to a\nsignificant cyber incident, as defined by the Board, is\nrealized.\n(10) Relevant congressional committees.--The term\n``relevant congressional committees'' means--\n(A) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and\nTransportation of the Senate;\n(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and\nGovernmental Affairs of the Senate;\n(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the\nHouse of Representatives; and\n(D) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House\nof Representatives.\n(b) Establishment; Purposes; Organization.--\n(1) Establishment.--On the date that is 90 days after the\ndate of enactment of this Act, there is established as an\nindependent establishment, as defined in section 104 of title\n5, United States Code, the Cybersecurity and AI Board of\nInvestigations.\n(2) Charter.--The Board established under paragraph (1)\nshall establish a charter, which shall be made publicly\navailable, that includes non-exhaustive criteria for, and\ninform the prioritization of, the work of the Board,\nincluding--\n(A) initiating reviews and assessments of\nincidents;\n(B) conducting trend analyses; and\n(C) placing a limitation on incidents eligible for\nreview to incidents for which all evidence, factual\nfindings, and recommendations are unclassified or\ndeclassified to the best knowledge of the Board at the\ntime of selection.\n(3) Purposes.--The purposes of the Board are to--\n(A) advance the safety, reliability, and resilience\nof the digital and communications infrastructure of the\nUnited States, which supports commerce, innovation, and\npublic safety;\n(B) conduct independent and impartial reviews and\nassessments with respect to--\n(i) incidents affecting Federal civilian\nexecutive branch information systems or non-\nFederal information systems, particularly such\nsystems that support critical infrastructure\nsectors;\n(ii) near-misses in which a significant\ncybersecurity incident was narrowly averted;\n(iii) systemic cybersecurity\nvulnerabilities across sectors, vendors, or\ntechnology categories, including within the\nartificial intelligence sector, that give rise\nto incidents affecting relevant Federal\ncivilian executive branch and non-Federal\ninformation systems; and\n(iv) breakdowns in regulatory oversight,\ncoordination, or response processes with\nrespect to incidents and systemic risks\naffecting critical infrastructure sectors;\n(C) identify contributing technical,\norganizational, and systemic failures relating to each\nreview and assessment conducted under subparagraph (B)\nin order to produce actionable recommendations for\nimplicated public and private entities on improving the\nresilience of the United States with respect to\ncybersecurity threats and security vulnerabilities;\n(D) in coordination with the Director of the\nNational Institute of Standards and Technology and the\nAssistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and\nInformation, establish and maintain the near-miss\nsystem established under paragraph (4) to collect and\nanalyze confidential reports of incidents and near-\nmisses from public and private entities for the purpose\nof improving the resilience of the United States with\nrespect to security vulnerabilities;\n(E) facilitate learning and transparency across the\npublic and private sectors by publicly releasing timely\nreports of the reviews and assessments conducted under\nsubparagraph (B);\n(F) issue trend analyses with respect to recurring\ncybersecurity threats, security vulnerabilities, and\nsystemic risk patterns, with attention paid to the\nnovel and intensified risks relating to the continued\ndevelopment and adoption of artificial intelligence;\n(G) maintain a historical record of major incidents\nand contributing risk patterns with respect to those\nmajor incidents to promote the proactive reduction of\ncybersecurity threats and security vulnerabilities\nacross critical infrastructure sectors; and\n(H) operate independently from regulatory review\nand enforcement actions without assigning legal fault\nor liability for any review and assessment conducted\nunder subparagraph (B).\n(4) Offices, bureaus, and divisions of the board.--The\nBoard shall establish such distinct and appropriately staffed\noffices, bureaus, and divisions as may be necessary to carry\nout this section and investigate and report on incidents, which\nshall include the following:\n(A) The Office of Investigations, which shall be\nresponsible for--\n(i) conducting investigations into\nsignificant incidents, failures of information\nsystems, intrusions into information systems,\nand near-misses;\n(ii) developing the factual record\nnecessary for the Board to determine the causes\nof, and contributing factors to, the matters\ndescribed in clause (i); and\n(iii) supporting the development of\nreports, findings, and recommendations of the\nBoard under this section.\n(B) The Office of Trend Analysis and Learning,\nwhich shall be responsible for--\n(i) administering the near-miss reporting\nsystem established under paragraph (5), which\nmay inform wider trend analyses;\n(ii) issuing public trend reports to\npromote proactive reduction of cybersecurity\nthreats and security vulnerabilities across\ncritical infrastructure sectors; and\n(iii) conducting ongoing analysis of the\nnovel and intensifying cybersecurity risks\nposed by emerging technologies, including\nartificial intelligence.\n(C)(i) The Office of Coordination, which shall be\nresponsible for--\n(I) serving as the principal liaison\nbetween the Board and Federal agencies,\nincluding for the purpose of facilitating\nsecure information sharing and coordination\nduring investigations conducted by the Board;\n(II) serving as the principal liaison\nbetween the Board and private sector entities;\nand\n(III) coordinating with the Office of\nInvestigations to ensure timely and efficient\naccess to relevant Federal, State, local, and\nprivate sector personnel, systems, and\ninformation for the purposes of an\ninvestigation conducted by the Board; and\n(ii) The Office of Coordination shall establish\nseparate internal functional units, as appropriate, to\nmanage coordination with Federal entities and\ncoordination with private sector entities,\nrespectively, in order to ensure clear channels of\ncommunication and preserve the independence of\ninvestigative activities conducted by the Board.\n(5) Voluntary near-miss reporting system.--The Board shall\nestablish a voluntary, anonymized near-miss reporting system,\nwhich shall--\n(A) allow individuals and organizations to\nconfidentially report near-misses within critical\ninfrastructure sectors, including events that could\nhave disrupted critical communications or commerce\nsystems or exposed private data;\n(B) protect from disclosure the identity of each\nindividual or organization submitting a report under\nsubparagraph (A);\n(C) be designed to identify systemic security\nvulnerabilities across technologies, sectors, and\ngovernance models; and\n(D) support proactive risk management and learning\nwithout attribution of fault or liability.\n(c) Membership.--\n(1) Board members.--\n(A) In general.--The Board shall be composed of 5\nmembers, each of whom shall be appointed--\n(i) by the President, by and with the\nadvice and consent of the Senate; and\n(ii) on the basis of technical\nqualification, professional standing, and\ndemonstrated knowledge in cybersecurity or\nrelated fields.\n(B) Limitation.--Not more than 3 members of the\nBoard may be members of the same political party.\n(2) Terms of office and removal.--\n(A) In general.--Each member of the Board shall\nhold office for a term of 5 years.\n(B) Vacancies.--A member of the Board appointed to\nfill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the\nterm for which the predecessor of that member was\nappointed shall be appointed for the remainder of that\nterm.\n(C) End of term.--When the term of office of a\nmember of the Board ends, the member may continue to\nserve until a successor is appointed pursuant to\nparagraph (1)(A).\n(D) Removal.--The President may remove a member of\nthe Board for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or\nmalfeasance in office.\n(E) Pay.--Each member of the Board shall be paid an\nannual rate of basic pay not to exceed the rate paid\nfor a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule\nunder section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.\n(3) Chair and vice chair.--\n(A) Chair.--\n(i) In general.--The President shall\ndesignate, by and with the advice and consent\nof the Senate, a Chair of the Board.\n(ii) Duties and powers.--The Chair shall--\n(I) serve as the chief executive\nand administrative officer of the\nBoard; and\n(II) subject to the general\npolicies and decisions of the Board--\n(aa) appoint and supervise\nofficers and employees, other\nthan regular and full-time\nemployees of the offices of\nother members of the Board,\nnecessary to carry out this\nsection;\n(bb) fix the pay of\nofficers and employees who are\nappointed to carry out this\nsection;\n(cc) distribute business\namong the officers, employees,\nand administrative units of the\nBoard; and\n(dd) supervise the\nexpenditures of the Board.\n(B) Vice chair.--The President shall designate a\nVice Chair of the Board, by and with the advice and\nconsent of the Senate.\n(C) Terms.--The Chair and Vice Chair shall each\nhold office for a term of 3 years.\n(D) Vacancy.--When the Chair is absent or unable to\nserve, or when the position of Chair is vacant, the\nVice Chair shall serve as Chair.\n(4) Personnel matters.--\n(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), each\nmember of the Board shall appoint and supervise\nemployees in the office of that member, provided that\neach such employee has been approved for employment\nwith the Board by the designated agency ethics official\nwith respect to the Board under the same guidelines\nthat apply to all employees of the Board.\n(B) Limitation.--Except with respect to the office\nof the Chair of the Board, the authority under\nsubparagraph (A) shall be limited to the number of\nfull-time equivalent positions (plus 1 senior\nprofessional position, the annual rate of basic pay of\nwhich shall be not greater than that for step 10 of\ngrade 15 of the General Schedule), as allocated\nannually by the Chair of the Board through the internal\nstaffing plan of the Board.\n(d) Convening the Board.--\n(1) In general.--The Board--\n(A) shall meet not fewer than 4 times each calendar\nyear at a time and date to be determined by the Chair;\nand\n(B) may meet at additional times at the call of the\nChair.\n(2) Quorum.--Three members of the Board shall constitute a\nquorum for conducting the business of the Board.\n(e) Review and Assessment; Reports.--\n(1) Initiation of review.--The Board may initiate a review\nand assessment described in subsection (b)(2)(B) upon a\nmajority vote of all members of the Board, the results of which\nshall be made publicly available.\n(2) Commencement of review and assessment.--In addition to\na meeting of the Board convened under subsection (d), the Chair\nmay, at any time, call a meeting of the Board to initiate a\nreview and assessment described in subsection (b)(3)(B).\n(3) Reports.--Upon completing each review and assessment\ndescribed in subsection (b)(3)(B), the Board shall prepare a\nreport with respect to the event that is the subject of the\nreview and assessment that--\n(A) contains factual findings and actionable\nrecommendations for improving cybersecurity practices,\nsystemic resilience, incident response practices and\npolicies, and coordination across public and private\nentities;\n(B) includes--\n(i) a timeline of relevant events;\n(ii) an analysis of contributing technical,\norganizational, and systemic factors with\nrespect to the applicable event;\n(iii) a section relating to insights and\nlessons learned that--\n(I) identifies--\n(aa) factors that enhanced\nor impeded the review and\nassessment by the Board; and\n(bb) any gaps in\nauthorities, tools, or\ninteragency coordination; and\n(II) contains recommendations to\nimprove the future operations of the\nBoard;\n(iv) appendices that include--\n(I) technical indicators of\ncompromise, such as data points or\nartifacts that identify or describe the\nmethods used in an incident; and\n(II) detailed methodological\ninformation with respect to the\nanalytical processes, tools, and\ntechnical methods used to conduct each\nreview and assessment described in\nsubsection (b)(3)(B); and\n(v) a plain language executive summary of\nthe matters described in this paragraph, which\nshall be accessible to a non-technical\naudience; and\n(C) is informed by and composed of only\nunclassified or declassified information and\ninformation appropriate for public consumption.\n(4) Updates.--The insights and lessons learned described in\nparagraph (3)(B)(iii) shall--\n(A) inform updates to Board procedures, training,\nand coordination protocols; and\n(B) be shared across the Federal cybersecurity\necosystem to improve interagency readiness.\n(5) Public availability.--The Board shall--\n(A) submit to the relevant congressional committees\neach report prepared under paragraph (3), consistent\nwith the protections for documents and testimony\nvoluntarily provided to the Board under subsection\n(i)(2); and\n(B) make each report prepared under paragraph (3)\npublicly available, consistent with the protections for\ndocuments and testimony voluntarily provided to the\nBoard under subsection (i)(2).\n(6) Responses.--Not later than 90 days after the date on\nwhich the Board issues a report prepared under paragraph (3)\nthat includes a recommendation applying to a Federal civilian\nexecutive branch agency, each such Federal civilian executive\nbranch agency shall respond in writing to that recommendation,\neven when the Federal civilian executive branch agency does not\nfollow the recommended course of action, to allow the Board to\ntrack the progress of implementation across all of the\nrecommendations of the Board.\n(f) Personnel.--\n(1) In general.--The Board shall be supported by a\npermanent, full-time Federal staff, which may include positions\nas--\n(A) lead investigators;\n(B) malware analysts;\n(C) system engineers;\n(D) legal counsel;\n(E) digital forensic experts;\n(F) communications professionals and technical\nwriters; and\n(G) other subject matter experts, as determined\nnecessary by the Chair.\n(2) Additional staff.--In addition to the staff described\nin paragraph (1), a member of the Board may nominate personal\nsupport staff to assist in the work of the Board, subject to\napplicable background checks, security clearances, and\nfinancial disclosure requirements.\n(3) Personnel flexibility.--To increase the capabilities of\nthe Board, the Board may--\n(A) enter into agreements with federally funded\nresearch and development centers;\n(B) appoint special Government employees, as\ndefined in section 202(a) of title 18, United States\nCode; and\n(C) as necessary, contract with private sector or\nacademic experts to serve as investigators.\n(g) Exemption From Certain Laws.--The Board shall not be subject\nto--\n(1) chapter 10 of title 5, United States Code (commonly\nknown as the ``Federal Advisory Committee Act''); or\n(2) section 552b of title 5, United States Code (commonly\nknown as the ``Government in the Sunshine Act'').\n(h) Board Management.--\n(1) In general.--To ensure that the Board fulfills the\npurposes described in subsection (b)(3), the Chair shall take\nall necessary actions to manage the affairs of the Board and\nthe conduct of the reviews and assessments described in\nsubsection (b)(3)(B), which shall include--\n(A) developing and promulgating, with the approval\nof the Board, a charter and other bylaws and internal\nprocedures concerning the work of the Board, including\nnon-exhaustive criteria for defining a significant\ncybersecurity incident and selecting incidents for\ninvestigation, all of which shall be made public; and\n(B) making contracts and entering into agreements\nwith Federal departments and Federal agencies as\nnecessary and appropriate to carry out the\nresponsibilities of the Board, including by\ncoordinating with the Secretary of Commerce, the\nDirector of the National Institute of Standards and\nTechnology, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for\nCommunications and Information.\n(2) Party system.--\n(A) In general.--The Chair may adopt a party\nparticipation system under which an organization\naffected by a matter that is subject to a review and\nassessment described in subsection (b)(3)(B), including\nany entity operating or providing digital\ncommunications, technology products, or critical\ninfrastructure services implicated in that matter, may\nprovide factual input for investigators of the Board.\n(B) Level of participation.--A party that provides\nfactual input under subparagraph (A) may not\nparticipate in drafting findings or shaping\nrecommendations contained in, or reviewing, a final\nreport of the Board before publication of that report.\n(3) Conflicts of interest.--The Chair shall implement a\nsystem to identify, mitigate, and manage any conflicts of\ninterest that may arise as a result of participation by an\nindividual in the work of the Board under this section.\n(i) Requests for Information and Administrative Subpoenas.--\n(1) Purpose.--In order to ensure that the Board has\nsufficient information to conduct the reviews and assessments\nrequired under subsection (e) and issue reports under that\nsubsection, the Chair, or an appropriate designee of the Chair,\nmay request and receive relevant documents (including in\nelectronic form) and testimony from, and issue subpoenas ad\ntestificandum and subpoenas duces tecum to--\n(A) any entity or individual affected by the\nincident or issue giving rise to a review and\nassessment under subsection (e);\n(B) any entity that, or individual who, responded\nto the incident or issue described in subparagraph (A);\nor\n(C) any other entity or individual that the Board\nreasonably believes may have information relevant to\nthe review and assessment carried out, or report\nissued, under subsection (e).\n(2) Voluntary provision of information.--\n(A) In general.--Any entity or individual may\nvoluntarily provide the Board with documents, including\nin electronic form, and testimony relevant to a review\nand assessment carried out, or report issued, by the\nBoard under subsection (e), with or without a Board\nrequest for those documents or that testimony.\n(B) Board request for information.--If the Chair\nhas reason to believe that an entity or individual has\ninformation relevant to an incident under review by the\nBoard under subsection (e), the Chair, or an\nappropriate designee of the Chair, may request that\ninformation from the entity or individual.\n(C) Treatment of information provided in response\nto a board request.--Any document, including in\nelectronic form, or testimony provided to the Board in\nresponse to a request under subparagraph (B) shall be--\n(i) treated as voluntarily provided; and\n(ii) subject to the protections set forth\nunder subsection (j).\n(3) Subpoena authority.--\n(A) In general.--If the Chair, or an appropriate\ndesignee of the Chair, determines that the response, or\nlack of a response, by an entity or an individual to a\nrequest made under paragraph (2)(B) is deficient, the\nChair, or an appropriate designee of the Chair, may,\nsubject to approval under subparagraph (B)(i) of this\nparagraph, issue a subpoena to compel the disclosure of\ndocuments, including in electronic form, and testimony\nrelevant to an incident under Board review under\nsubsection (e).\n(B) Procedures.--\n(i) In general.--Before the issuance of a\nsubpoena under subparagraph (A), a simple\nmajority of the members of the Board must\napprove the issuance of the subpoena.\n(ii) Considerations.--In evaluating whether\nto approve a subpoena under subparagraph (A),\nthe members of the Board shall consider factors\nincluding--\n(I) whether the Board is able to\nobtain the documents, including in\nelectronic form, or testimony through\nother non-compulsory means;\n(II) whether further communication\nwith the entity or individual is likely\nto produce the documents, including in\nelectronic form, or testimony on a\nvoluntary basis;\n(III) whether, based on the nature\nof the request, a reasonable amount of\ntime has elapsed to allow the entity or\nindividual to voluntarily provide the\ndocuments, including in electronic\nform, or testimony to the Board;\n(IV) the importance of the\nrequested documents, including in\nelectronic form, or testimony to the\nability of the Board to complete a full\nand complete review and assessment or\nreport under subsection (e); and\n(V) whether, after consultation\nwith relevant Federal agencies, the\nsubpoena would affect a regulatory, law\nenforcement, foreign intelligence, or\ndiplomatic effort of the United States.\n(C) Civil action.--\n(i) In general.--If an entity or individual\nfails to comply with a subpoena issued under\nthis paragraph, the Chair may refer the matter\nto the Attorney General to bring a civil action\nin an appropriate district court of the United\nStates to enforce the subpoena.\n(ii) Venue.--An action under this\nsubparagraph shall be brought in the judicial\ndistrict in which the entity against which, or\nthe individual against whom, the civil action\nis brought resides, is found, or does business,\nor in the District of Columbia.\n(iii) Contempt of court.--A court may\npunish a failure to comply with a subpoena\nissued under this paragraph as contempt of\ncourt.\n(D) Exclusion for government entities.--This\nparagraph shall not apply to a State, local, Tribal,\nterritorial, or Federal Government entity, or to any\nemployee of that entity with respect to matters related\nto the official duties of the employee.\n(E) Delegation of subpoena authority.--The\nauthority of the Chair to issue a subpoena under this\nparagraph may only be delegated to another Board\nmember.\n(F) Authentication.--\n(i) In general.--Any subpoena issued\nelectronically under this paragraph shall be\nauthenticated with a cryptographic digital\nsignature, or other comparable successor\ntechnology, of the Chair or designee of the\nChair, that allows the Chair or the designee of\nthe Chair to demonstrate that the subpoena was\nissued by the Chair or the designee of the\nChair and has not been altered or modified\nsince the subpoena was issued.\n(ii) Invalid if not authenticated.--Any\nsubpoena issued electronically pursuant to this\nparagraph that is not authenticated in\naccordance with clause (i) shall not be\nconsidered to be valid by the recipient of the\nsubpoena or by any court.\n(G) Preservation.--For purposes of section 2703(f)\nof title 18, United States Code, the Board shall be\nconsidered to be a ``governmental entity''.\n(H) Protections for information obtained by\nsubpoena.--Any document, including in electronic form,\nor testimony obtained by a subpoena under this\nparagraph--\n(i) shall not be subject to subsection (j);\nand\n(ii) in the discretion of the Board, may be\nprotected from public disclosure where\notherwise consistent with applicable law.\n(4) Stored communications act.--Nothing in this subsection\nmay be construed to permit or require disclosure by a provider\nof a remote computing service or a provider of an electronic\ncommunication service to the public of information not\notherwise permitted or required to be disclosed under chapter\n121 of title 18, United States Code (commonly known as the\n``Stored Communications Act'').\n(5) Information from federal agencies.--\n(A) Requests.--The Chair, or an appropriate\ndesignee of the Chair, may request from any Federal\nagency such information as necessary to carry out the\nduties of the Board.\n(B) Furnishing information.--Upon request of the\nChair, or the appropriate designee of the Chair, under\nsubparagraph (A), the head of a Federal agency shall\nfurnish the applicable information to the Board.\n(j) Protections for Information Voluntarily Provided to the\nBoard.--\n(1) Application.--The protections in this subsection shall\napply to any document, including in electronic form, or\ntestimony voluntarily provided to the Board under subsection\n(i)(2).\n(2) Disclosure, retention, and use.--Any document,\nincluding in electronic form, and testimony voluntarily\nprovided to the Board may be disclosed to, retained by, and\nused by any Federal agency or department, component, officer,\nemployee, or agent of the Federal Government, consistent with\notherwise applicable provisions of Federal law, solely--\n(A) for a cybersecurity purpose;\n(B) to identify--\n(i) a cybersecurity threat, including the\nsource of the cybersecurity threat; or\n(ii) a security vulnerability;\n(C) to respond to, or otherwise prevent or\nmitigate, a specific threat of death, a specific threat\nof serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious\neconomic harm, including a terrorist act or use of a\nweapon of mass destruction;\n(D) to respond to, investigate, prosecute, or\notherwise prevent or mitigate, a serious threat to a\nminor, including sexual exploitation and threats to\nphysical safety; or\n(E) to prevent, investigate, disrupt, or prosecute\nan offense arising out of an incident or issue assessed\nby the Board, pursuant to subsection (e), or any of the\noffenses listed in section 105(d)(5)(A)(v) of the\nCybersecurity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1504(d)(5)(A)(v)).\n(3) Protections for entities and information.--Any\ndocument, including in electronic form, or testimony\nvoluntarily provided to the Board under subsection (i)(2)\nshall--\n(A) be considered the commercial, financial, and\nproprietary information of the providing entity or\nindividual when so designated by that entity or\nindividual;\n(B) be exempt from disclosure under--\n(i) section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United\nStates Code (commonly known as the ``Freedom of\nInformation Act''); and\n(ii) any provision of State, Tribal, or\nlocal freedom of information law, open\ngovernment law, open meetings law, open records\nlaw, sunshine law, or similar law requiring\ndisclosure of information or records;\n(C) be considered not to constitute a waiver of any\napplicable privilege or protection provided by law,\nincluding trade secret protection; and\n(D) not be subject to a rule of any Federal agency\nor any judicial doctrine regarding ex parte\ncommunications with a decision-making official.\n(4) Liability protections.--\n(A) In general.--No cause of action arising from\nthe voluntary provision of documents to the Board under\nsubsection (i)(2) shall lie or be maintained in any\ncourt by any person, and any such action shall be\npromptly dismissed.\n(B) Restrictions.--\n(i) In general.--Subject to clause (ii), no\nsubmission voluntarily provided to the Board\nunder subsection (i)(2), or any communication,\ndocument, material, or other record, created\nfor the sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or\nsubmitting such submission, may be received in\nevidence, subject to discovery, or otherwise\nused in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding\nin or before any court, regulatory body, or\nother authority of the United States, a State,\nor a political subdivision of a State.\n(ii) Exception.--This subparagraph shall\nnot prevent the use, retention, or disclosure\nof information in the documents or testimony\ndescribed in clause (i) to investigate or\nprosecute a person or entity suspected or\nalleged to have committed, conspired to commit,\nor aided and abetted the commission of, an\nincident described in the documents or\ntestimony, provided that the submission itself\nis not disclosed.\n(C) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this\nparagraph may be construed to create a defense to\ndiscovery or otherwise affect the discovery of any\ncommunication, document, material, or other record not\ncreated for the sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or\nsubmitting such submission, except that this paragraph\nshall not apply to information developed from a source\nindependent of a submission submitted under subsection\n(i)(2).\n(k) Additional Privacy and Digital Security Protections.--\n(1) Privacy and civil liberties.--Any document, including\nin electronic form, or testimony provided to or obtained by the\nBoard shall be retained, used, and disseminated, where\npermissible and appropriate, by the Federal Government in a\nmanner that protects personal information from unauthorized use\nor unauthorized disclosure.\n(2) Digital security.--Any document, including in\nelectronic form, or testimony provided to or obtained by the\nBoard shall be collected, stored, and protected, at a minimum,\nin accordance with the requirements for moderate impact Federal\ninformation systems, as described in Federal Information\nProcessing Standards Publication 199 of the National Institute\nof Standards and Technology, or any successor document.\n<all>","changes":[{"id":1198,"doc_id":15482,"v_from":16652,"v_to":16889,"detected_at":"2026-10-11 03:35:44","added":790,"removed":1,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-The text of this bill is not yet available. Please check back soon.\n+[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n+[S. 5541 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n+\n+<DOC>\n+\n+119th CONGRESS\n+2d Session\n+S. 5541\n+\n+To establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for\n+other purposes.\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n+\n+September 24, 2026\n+\n+Mr. Markey introduced the following bill; which was read twice and\n+referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+A BILL\n+\n+To establish the Cybersecurity and AI Board of Investigations, and for\n+other purposes.\n+\n+Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\n+United States of America in Congress assembled,\n+\n+SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n+\n+This Act may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity and AI Board of\n+Investigations Act of 2026''.\n+\n+SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.\n+\n+(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:\n+(1) Robust cybersecurity infrastructure and institutions\n+are integral to national security and economic security.\n+(2) Cyber threats have become more pervasive and\n+potentially more disruptive with continued digitization across\n+economic sectors.\n+(3) The advancement and increased accessibility of\n+artificial intelligence can strengthen cybersecurity controls\n+while also increasing the volume and sophistication of cyber\n+threats.\n+(4) Critical infrastructure sectors, such as clean and\n+wastewater utilities and telecommunications networks, are\n+susceptible to artificial intelligence-enabled cyber incidents.\n+(5) As artificial intelligence systems continue to evolve,\n+these trends in cybersecurity threats will accelerate.\n+(6) Other emerging technologies, including quantum\n+computing, are likely to pose additional, novel cybersecurity"}],"passport":null}