{"check":null,"uid":"0839ccfcf55bcd69","title":"Lewis George Hewitt v Information Commissioner","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-11-06","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина Льюиса Хевита на Информационную комиссию Великобритании относительно нарушения процедуры рассмотрения запроса доступа к данным под Законом о защите данных 2018 года. Было установлено, что жалоба была ошибочно приостановлена, несмотря на отсутствие правовых оснований для этого. Суд счёл необходимым восстановить жалобу и указал, что трибунал не обладает полномочиями рассматривать фактические вопросы или оспаривать выводы Комиссии, сделанные ранее. В итоге жалоба была отклонена из-за отсутствия обоснованных причин для повторного рассмотрения.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":11828,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1527","first_seen":"2026-11-10","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:29","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"data protection","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"орган","name":"ICO","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":22,"ctx":"Lewis George Hewitt v Information Commissioner Acronyms used  DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regu","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"ICO","weak":false,"pos":152,"ctx":"DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber  ICO Information Commissioner’s Office  SAR Subject Access Request under the DPA  Background","zone":"орган","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":70,"ctx":"Lewis George Hewitt v Information Commissioner Acronyms used  DPA the Data Protection Act 2018  FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber  ICO Information Commissioner’s O","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":23,"ctx":"acronyms used  dpa the data protection act 2018  ftt the first-tier tribunal general regulatory chamber  ico information commiss","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":7458,"ctx":"formed mr delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with uk gdpr.  22.  therefore, the ftt on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-11-10","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01527 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1527","text":"Acronyms used\n\nDPA\nthe Data Protection Act 2018\n\nFtT\nthe First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber\n\nICO\nInformation Commissioner’s Office\n\nSAR\nSubject Access Request under the DPA\n\nBackground\n\n1.\n\nThis Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress made about ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2.\n\n2.\n\nMr Hewitt’s complaint which was given reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 was provided to the FtT as Annex 1 to the ICO’s response. That document records that on 29 April 2026 at 13:03, Mr Hewitt’s complaint was about Ackroyd Legal, and he gave an email address of [name]@ackroydlegal.com. Documentation provided indicates that a SAR was made to Ackroyd Legal on Fri 19 Jun (which I take to be 2026 as 19 June 2026 fell on a Friday).\n\n3.\n\nMr Hewitt provided further information to the ICO in which he alleged he was the victim of an equity-stripping scheme, naming other entities “We Buy Any Homes / Associated Entity” and “PX Hub”. Within the documentation provided for this application, I see that Mr Hewitt wrote to We Buy Any Home making a SAR on Tue 16 Jun; (16 June 2026 was a Tuesday).\n\n4.\n\nOn 29 April 2026, Mr Hewitt filed a complaint with the ICO.\n\n5.\n\nBy GRC3 dated 29 July 2026, Mr Hewitt sought an Order to Progress.\n\n6.\n\nIt appears that, in error, Mr Hewitt was told by HMCTS that he needed to wait 6 months from the date of complaint before making application. On 16 September 2026, at a hearing, Chamber President O’Connor, consented to the withdrawal of the application, notice of seeking to withdraw having been filed by Mr Hewitt in correspondence dated 11 August 2026.\n\n7.\n\nMr Hewitt, by email sent on 17 September 2026 at 12:34, wrote “I want it reinstated”. No GRC5 was, it appears, submitted. A Legal Officer gave written instructions by email sent on 29 September 2026 at 16:15 to admit the application dated 29 July 2026 (it being in time). It is unclear whether they were told of the application being withdrawn with the Chamber President’s consent. I have not seen any order reinstating the application or permitting Mr Hewitt to make the application without completing a GRC5.\n\n8.\n\nIn any event, Initial Case Management Directions were then issued on 01 October 2026, despite the application having previously been withdrawn (with proper consent by the FtT at a hearing).\n\n9.\n\nOn 12 October 2026 the ICO provided its outcome for the complaint allocated ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2; that is Annex 4 to the ICO Response. They informed Mr Hewitt they had written to Ackroyd Legal LLP and asked them to provide a response to the SAR.\n\n10.\n\nBy GRC5 dated 29 October 2026, the ICO applied to the Tribunal for the application to be struck out.\n\n11.\n\nThe directions dated 01 October 2026 gave Mr Hewitt the opportunity to respond to such application; by email sent on 29 October 2026 at 13:07, Mr Hewitt opposed the application to strike out.\n\nProcedural irregularity\n\n12.\n\nThere has been a clear procedural irregularity. HMCTS issued directions at a time when the application was withdrawn and, therefore, ended. There was no legal basis upon which they could be sent out as no judicial decision had been made to reinstate the application. Despite that, the ICO has responded to the application and applied for strike out.\n\n13.\n\nIt seems, from what I have read, that Mr Hewitt requested to withdraw the application because he was told to wait for a 6-month period which is not required in law (6 months plus 28 days is the maximum time period not the minimum – see rule 22(6)(f) of the GRC Rules).\n\n14.\n\nThe ICO has filed a response and applied for strike out and Mr Hewitt has made representations about that application to strike out.\n\n15.\n\nI consider it appropriate, in the unique circumstances of this application, to waive the requirement that an application is made on GRC5 and, pursuant to Mr Hewitt’s request made by email on 17 September 2026, reinstate the application.\n\nNo hearing\n\n16.\n\nBoth sides have been given opportunity to put their case in writing. I note that Mr Hewitt’s GRC3 recorded his request for the application to be dealt with without a hearing. I consider it appropriate to deal with the ICO’s application to strike out the proceedings without holding a hearing.\n\nThe Law – Section 166\n\n17.\n\nThe key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are\nKillock and VeaIe v\nInformation Commissioner\n[2022] 1 WLR 2241\n(\nKillock\n),\nR (Delo) v Information\nCommissioner\n(\nDelo\n) in the High Court (\n[2023] 1 WLR 1327\n) and Court of Appeal\n(\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n) and\nSmith v Information Commissioner\n[2025] UKUT 74\n(AAC) (\nSmith\n).\n\n18.\n\nIn\nKillock\n, the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances\nin which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section\n165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an\nappropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The\nUpper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast\na critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to\nachieve a different complaint outcome.”\n\n19.\n\nIn\nKillock\n, the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in\nterms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight\nto the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed\nthe view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and\nis in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any\nparticular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal\nindicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other\ninvestigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources\neffectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider\nregulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special\nposition. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in\nKillock\n.\n\n20.\n\nIn\nR (Delo) v Information Commissioner\n\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n, in the Court of Appeal,\nWarby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant\nlegislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a\ncomplaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further\ninvestigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that,\nhaving done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine\nwhether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view\nabout the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80).\n\n21.\n\nIn\nDelo\n, Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits\nwould clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader\nconnotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in\nKillock\nthat the word\n“outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also\nagreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in\nDelo\nin the High Court that outcome would\nproperly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint,\nhaving informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be\ncompliant with UK GDPR.\n\n22.\n\nTherefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the\nmerits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision\nin\nSmith\nconfirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the Commissioner has issued a\ncomplaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application.\nBut, as Judge Stout also explained in\nSmith\nat [60], in a case where the Commissioner\nhas carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a\nsection 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons.\n\n23.\n\nThe first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a\nprocedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether\nthe Commissioner has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot\nbe used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application\nto the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages\nagainst the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s\ndecision (see further [74] of\nKillock\n).\n\n24.\n\nThe second reason is because the Commissioner has a wide discretion under section\n165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the\nscope for the FtT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is\nlimited.\nEW\n, decided alongside\nKillock\n, was an exceptional case where the\nCommissioner, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at\nall. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in\nDelo\n, the Commissioner is not required\nto determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further\n([64]), the Commissioner is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78])\nand\nhas a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so,\nto what extent” ([80]).\n\nApplication of law to the facts\n\n25.\n\nMr Hewitt’s opposition is on 4 grounds:\n\na.\n\nThe outcome was provided by the ICO only after the application was filed.\n\ni.\n\nI consider that such is an inevitable fact for each application which is made at a time when the ICO has not provided an outcome letter. It is not a good reason to say that there is a reasonable prospect of the FtT making an Order to Progress.\n\nb.\n\nCompliance is not complete.\n\ni.\n\nThese proceedings at the FtT are confined to section 166; the FtT is not determining whether any underlying infringement occurred.\n\nc.\n\nReasonable adjustment sought for provision of the information.\n\ni.\n\nThe way in which a data controller or processor complies with its substantive obligations is not a matter for determination in these proceedings, which are confined to the FtT's jurisdiction under section 166 DPA 2018.\n\nd.\n\nThe ICO’s response refers to “We Buy Any Homes / ASUS Investment Limited”.\n\ni.\n\nThe only place at which I can find the ICO response referring to “We Buy Any Homes / ASUS Investment Limited” is at paragraph 19, where they record what Mr Hewitt wrote in his GRC3.\n\nii.\n\nAt Section 5.1 and 6.1 of his own document (the GRC3), Mr Hewitt refers to “we buy any homes” (formatting as in original); at 6.1 in his document, Mr also refers to “ASUS investment Limited” (again, formatting as in original).\n\niii.\n\nAny reference to those entities appears to be in error because it is clear from the actual complaint document (Annex 1 to the ICO response) that ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 is about Mr Hewitt’s complaint about Ackroyd Legal LLP and not about those other entities. It does not appear to me that the ICO was confused by this reference, their response clearly sets out why they say they have now given an outcome for ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 and why they say the application for an Order to Progress should be struck out.\n\n26.\n\nAn outcome has now been provided to Mr Hewitt. The FtT's role is to consider whether, notwithstanding the outcome now provided, there remains any realistic basis for making an order under section 166. For the reasons set out above, I consider there is no reasonable prospect of the FtT making an Order to Progress ICO complaint with reference number IC-508902-Q6J2. Therefore, and pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) of the GRC Rules, I strike out the application\n\nSigned:\nJudge Worth\n\nDate:\n06 November 2026","changes":[]}